State v. McCollum

[Cite as State v. McCollum, 2026-Ohio-4481.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : Nos. 116124 and 116427 v. : TYREESE S. MCCOLLUM, : Defendant-Appellant. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 12, 2026 Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CR-24-695203-A, CR-24-695590-A, CR-25-701340-A, and CR-25-704356-A Appearances: Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Carley Berman and Chauncey Keller, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. Kimberly Kendall Corral and Alasan M. Huff, for appellant. ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.: Defendant-appellant Tyreese McCollum (“McCollum”) appeals the judgments entered after he pleaded guilty in four cases. He contends that the trial court should have held a competency hearing before accepting his pleas and that the record does not support the consecutive sentences the court imposed. After a thorough review of the record and the law, we affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History The four cases arose from conduct that spanned a year. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-695590-A, McCollum’s parole officer conducted a home visit on December 6, 2023, and found a bag in a living room closet that held a loaded handgun and suspected narcotics. Tr. 77, 79. The narcotics tested positive for cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl mixtures. Tr. 77. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-695203-A, Parma police stopped McCollum’s car on September 7, 2024, because he had an active warrant, and found a loaded firearm under the front passenger seat. Tr. 81. McCollum admitted that he bought the gun on the street. Tr. 82. He was indicted in those two cases in October 2024 and arraigned on both on October 16, 2024. Tr. 109. While those two cases were pending, the conduct underlying the other two cases occurred. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-25-701340-A, a resident of Gertrude Avenue in Cleveland found a bullet hole in her front door on November 5, 2024, and her son said a gunshot had woken him. Tr. 82. A truck parked on the street had new bullet damage, and police recovered casings from the street. Tr. 82-83. Neighbors’ home security videos showed shots being fired from a Dodge Dart driving down the street on October 27 and 28, 2024. Tr. 83. Police stopped McCollum in the Dodge Dart outside his home on November 6, 2024, and recovered a firearm from the car. Tr. 83. A ballistics database search produced a match to casings recovered after the October 27 shooting. Tr. 83. One week later, McCollum did not appear for a pretrial in the first two cases, and the trial court issued a capias. Tr. 109. He did not appear for the later pretrials or for trial on January 21, 2025. Tr. 109-110. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-25-704356-A, McCollum and his girlfriend argued at her grandmother’s home in Cleveland on December 4, 2024, and the argument became physical. Tr. 84. When she followed him outside and said she would call the police, he turned and fired a gun in her direction several times. Tr. 84. Her grandmother saw him fire, and a neighbor who lived in the other unit of the house found bullet damage on his side. Tr. 85-86. On February 6, 2025, while the capias was outstanding, McCollum fired a gun from a car at another driver on Interstate 71 in Fayette County. Tr. 91- 92. He was convicted after a trial in Fayette County and sentenced to 24 years in prison. Tr. 98. He was then returned to Cuyahoga County, where he was indicted in the two remaining cases in August 2025. Tr. 110. The parties negotiated a plea that resolved all four cases together. On December 1, 2025, McCollum pleaded guilty in Case No. CR-24-695203-A to having weapons while under disability and improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle; in Case No. CR-24-695590-A to four amended counts of drug trafficking, all third-degree felonies, and having weapons while under disability; in Case No. CR- 25-701340-A to two counts of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises and having weapons while under disability; and in Case No. CR-25-704356-A to felonious assault, attempted felonious assault, improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation, and having weapons while under disability. Tr. 5-16, 65-72. The State deleted every firearm specification and dismissed the remaining counts. Tr. 5-16. The parties agreed that the cases were packaged and that none of the offenses were allied offenses of similar import. Tr. 7, 11, 14, 16-17. Before accepting the pleas, the trial court asked McCollum about his background and his medication. McCollum told the court that he was 26 years old, had graduated from high school, and could read and write. Tr. 21-22. He said he was not under the influence of anything that would affect his ability to understand the proceedings. Tr. 22. When the court asked whether he was taking any medication in the jail, he said he was taking “[p]sych meds,” which he identified as Risperdal and a second medication, and that he had taken them since July. Tr. 22. He explained when he took each one and said that he had been taking them as prescribed, including over the past several days. Tr. 23-24. When the court asked whether he felt “clearheaded and focused,” he answered, “Yes.” Tr. 24. The colloquy that followed was thorough. McCollum told the court that he had reviewed the discovery with counsel and understood it, that he was satisfied with counsel, and that he had pleaded guilty before. Tr. 24-26. He said that he had asked counsel questions about the indictments and that counsel had answered them. Tr. 31. He confirmed the prior convictions that served as the disability for the weapons counts. Tr. 32, 57. When the court asked what “concurrently” meant, he answered, “Ran together,” and when it asked what “consecutively” meant, he answered, “One after another.” Tr. 35. When the court explained the indefinite sentences that apply to second-degree felonies under the Reagan Tokes Law, McCollum correctly did the arithmetic in each of the court’s examples. Tr. 50-51. He told the court that he had no questions for counsel or the court. Tr. 64. Defense counsel told the court that he believed McCollum was entering his pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Tr. 19. The court accepted the pleas and found that they were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Tr. 72. When the court asked whether the defense wanted a presentence- investigation report, defense counsel answered, “We had discussed a court psychiatric mitigation of penalty report.” Tr. 29. The court ordered both reports and told McCollum that if people from “the psychiatric department and the probation department” came to see him, it was because he and his attorney had asked for them. Tr. 29. The court then set the matter for sentencing and ordered “a pre-sentence investigation as well as a mitigation report at the request of your attorney.” Tr. 73. The December 1, 2025 journal entry in each case referred McCollum to the court psychiatric clinic and directed: director, psychiatric clinic: in accordance with provisions of the ohio revised code, 2947.06(b) reports for the purpose of determining the disposition of a case: psychiatric factors in the crime[;] psychiatric recommendations regarding disposition[.] you are directed to examine Tyreese McCollum. The same entry ordered the county jail to provide the psychiatric clinic with McCollum’s medical, mental health, and disciplinary records from his jail stay “for purposes of competency evaluation.”  At sentencing on January 5, 2026, the trial court stated that it had received the presentence-investigation report and the “psychiatric factors in committing the crime report” that the defense had requested. Tr. 74. Defense counsel stated that he had reviewed both, had no additions, deletions, or corrections, and stipulated to the findings of the report. Tr. 74. The court corrected a typographical error in the presentence-investigation report concerning the date of a 2018 competency evaluation. Tr. 75. In mitigation, defense counsel told the court that McCollum had struggled with his mental health since a young age, that he had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder in 2018 and again in 2023, and that “the current referral does not indicate schizoaffective disorder, does not indicate that there was an incredible nexus between these mental health struggles and the conduct that formed the basis of these charges.” Tr. 94. Counsel described McCollum as respectful and said that he “understood why he was charged with a particular offense” and that “he gets it.” Tr. 93. Counsel asked the court not to impose a sentence that would extend beyond the 24-year Fayette County sentence. Tr. 104. McCollum apologized for his actions. Tr. 104-105. The State argued that the four cases escalated in violence and that McCollum went on to commit another shooting in Fayette County. Tr. 89-91. The trial court reviewed McCollum’s record, which included juvenile adjudications that resulted in commitments to the Ohio Department of Youth Services, an adult case in which he violated community control, and a 2020 conviction for felonious assault with a firearm specification and having weapons while under disability, for which he was sent to prison. Tr. 106-108. The court then reviewed the timeline of the four cases, noting that McCollum was on postrelease control when the first offense occurred and that the conduct in Case Nos. CR-25-701340-A and CR-25-704356-A and in Fayette County occurred after he stopped coming to court on the first two cases. Tr. 109-111. The court noted that he used a different firearm each time. Tr. 111. The court imposed three years in Case No. CR-24-695203-A, six years in Case No. CR-24-695590-A, six years in Case No. CR-25-701340-A, and a stated prison term of ten to thirteen and one-half years in Case No. CR-25-704356-A, and ordered the cases to be served consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of 25 to 28.5 years. Tr. 115-121. The court ordered the aggregate term to run concurrently with the Fayette County sentence. Tr. 121, 125. McCollum appealed in Case No. CR-25-704356-A. This court granted his motion for leave to file a delayed appeal in the other three cases and consolidated the appeals. McCollum raises two assignments of error for our review: 1. The trial court was ineffective for failing to order a competency finding and/or hold a competency hearing when the record evidenced questions as to appellant’s competency; and 2. The trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences and failing to give the proper analysis under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). II. Law and Analysis A. Competency In his first assignment of error, McCollum argues that the trial court should have held a competency hearing before it accepted his pleas. He relies on his statement that he takes psychiatric medication and on his counsel’s request for a psychiatric mitigation report. He also contends that the trial court itself raised the issue when its December 1, 2025 entry ordered the jail to release his records “for purposes of competency evaluation,” and he argues that the court then never held the hearing or made a finding. Although the assignment of error states that the trial court was “ineffective,” we understand McCollum to argue that the trial court erred by proceeding without a competency hearing. He did not ask for a hearing in the trial court, and he acknowledges that our review is for plain error. A defendant is presumed to be competent. R.C. 2945.37(G). A defendant is incompetent only if, “because of the defendant’s present mental condition, the defendant is incapable of understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings against the defendant or of assisting in the defendant’s defense.” Id. The same standard applies to a defendant who pleads guilty. State v. Ingram, 2019-Ohio-2438, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). Under R.C. 2945.37(B), “the court, prosecutor, or defense may raise the issue of the defendant’s competence to stand trial,” and “[i]f the issue is raised before the trial has commenced, the court shall hold a hearing on the issue.” Apart from the statute, the right to a competency hearing “rises to the level of a constitutional guarantee where the record contains ‘sufficient indicia of incompetence,’ such that an inquiry into the defendant’s competency is necessary to ensure the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359 (1995); State v. Ahmed, 2004-Ohio-4190, ¶ 64. And “the failure to hold a mandatory competency hearing is harmless error where the record fails to reveal sufficient indicia of incompetency.” State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 110 (1986). We begin with McCollum’s contention that the trial court raised the issue of his competency. The record does not support it. No one mentioned competency at the plea hearing. Defense counsel asked for “a court psychiatric mitigation of penalty report,” and the trial court granted that request, describing it at the end of the hearing as “a mitigation report at the request of your attorney.” Tr. 29, 73. The journal entry followed suit. It referred McCollum to the psychiatric clinic “in accordance with provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, 2947.06(b),” for “reports for the purpose of determining the disposition of a case,” and it specified the two subjects of those reports: “psychiatric factors in the crime” and “psychiatric recommendations regarding disposition.” R.C. 2947.06(B) permits a trial court to appoint psychologists or psychiatrists to prepare reports that the court requires to determine the sentence. An evaluation of a defendant’s competency is governed by a different statute, R.C. 2945.371, which the entry does not cite. The phrase on which McCollum relies appears in a separate order directing the jail’s custodian of medical records to send records to the psychiatric clinic. That phrase does not change the nature of the referral that precedes it. The referral identified the reports the court wanted, and neither of them concerned competency. Nothing that followed suggests that the court, the State, or defense counsel understood the referral otherwise. The court never set a competency hearing, and the report the court received at sentencing was the one the entry requested, the “psychiatric factors in committing the crime report.” Tr. 74. Defense counsel stipulated to its findings. Tr. 74. McCollum contends that the record does not show that the competency report “was ever completed,” but no competency report was ever ordered. The trial court did not raise the issue of McCollum’s competency, and R.C. 2945.37(B) did not require a hearing. Even if we were to read the records order as McCollum does, the result would be the same, because the record does not contain sufficient indicia of incompetence. See Bock at 110. McCollum points first to his use of psychiatric medication. But a court may not find a defendant incompetent “solely because the defendant is receiving or has received psychotropic drugs or other medication, even if the defendant might become incompetent to stand trial without the drugs or medication.” R.C. 2945.37(F). The trial court asked what he was taking, how long he had taken it, whether he was taking it as prescribed, and whether he felt clearheaded and focused. Tr. 22-24. McCollum also points to his history of mental illness. Counsel told the court at sentencing that McCollum had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder in 2018 and 2023, and the presentence-investigation report referred to a 2018 competency evaluation. Tr. 75, 94. A history of mental illness is not the same as incompetence. “The term ‘mental illness’ does not necessarily equate with the definition of legal incompetency.” Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d at syllabus. “Incompetency must not be equated with mere mental or emotional instability or even with outright insanity. A defendant may be emotionally disturbed or even psychotic and still be capable of understanding the charges against him and of assisting his counsel.” Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d at 110. The question is the defendant’s present mental condition. R.C. 2945.37(G). Nothing in this record suggests that McCollum’s condition in December 2025 left him unable to understand the proceedings or to assist his counsel. Counsel himself told the court that the current report did not indicate schizoaffective disorder. Tr. 94. The plea hearing itself shows a defendant who understood what was happening. McCollum answered every question appropriately. Tr. 21-72. He defined concurrent and consecutive sentences in his own words, calculated the indefinite terms the court described, confirmed the prior convictions underlying the weapons charges, and told the court that he had asked his attorney questions about the indictments and had them answered. Tr. 31-32, 35, 50-51, 57. Defense counsel, who had spent what he described as a tremendous amount of time with McCollum, raised no concern about his ability to assist in his defense and told the court that McCollum understood why he was charged and “gets it.” Tr. 19, 93. At sentencing, McCollum told the court that he had understood the Reagan Tokes advisements when he pleaded and that he still understood them. Tr. 112-115. In Ingram, this court found no indicia of incompetence where the defendant “answered the trial court’s questions appropriately and without any signs of confusion or misunderstanding” and said that he was thinking clearly. Ingram 2019-Ohio-2438, at ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). The same is true here. And this record contains far less than the record in Berry, where defense counsel told the trial court that the defendant had withheld information from the defense, wanted to die, had not cooperated in his defense, and that the defense psychologist had developed “some strong feelings” that the defendant might not be sane enough to proceed, and the Ohio Supreme Court still found no sufficient indicia of incompetence. Berry at 360-361. Nothing in this record indicates that McCollum was unable to understand the nature and objective of the proceedings or to assist in his defense. Because the record does not contain sufficient indicia of incompetence, the trial court did not err, plainly or otherwise, by accepting McCollum’s pleas without holding a competency hearing. The first assignment of error is overruled. B. Consecutive Sentences In his second assignment of error, McCollum argues that the trial court did not make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing or in its entries. He also argues that the record does not support the court’s proportionality findings, because he was already serving a long sentence in Fayette County and therefore posed no danger to the public and because his aggregate sentence here is disproportionate to his conduct and to his sentence in Fayette County. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits this court to increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a felony sentence only if we clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. This standard is deferential to the trial court. State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 15. To reverse consecutive sentences, we “must have a firm belief or conviction that the record does not support the trial court’s findings.” Id. The statute “precludes an appellate court from substituting its judgment for that of the trial court.” Id. at ¶ 22. Under R.C. 2929.41(A), prison terms are presumed to run concurrently unless the court makes the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Under that statute, the court may require an offender to serve consecutive prison terms if it finds that consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender, that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and that at least one of the circumstances listed in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) applies. As relevant here, those circumstances include that the offender “committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing,” R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), and that “[t]he offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender,” R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c). The trial court must make the findings at the sentencing hearing and incorporate them into its sentencing entry, “but it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, syllabus. “[A] word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute is not required, and as long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” Id. at ¶ 29. The record refutes McCollum’s contention that the trial court did not make the findings. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court stated the following: As to the consecutive sentences here, Case 695590, in which you were on parole for at the time, the Court imposes prison terms consecutively, finding that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the defendant, that the consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and to the danger defendant poses to the public, and that the defendant committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the defendant was awaiting trial or sentencing, or was under community control, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. Tr. 123-124. The court stated that the findings applied to all four cases and went on to find that at least two of the offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct and that McCollum’s “history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the defendant.” Tr. 124-125. The court then identified the findings as those under “2929.14(C)(4)(a), (C)(4)(b), and (C)(4)(c).” Tr. 125. The sentencing entry in each case incorporates the findings. The trial court complied with Bonnell. The record also supports the findings. McCollum committed the offenses in Case Nos. CR-25-701340-A and CR-25-704356-A after he had been indicted and arraigned in the first two cases, and he committed the offenses in Case No. CR-25-704356-A after he had stopped coming to court. Tr. 109-111. Those offenses were committed while he was awaiting trial. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a). His history of criminal conduct includes juvenile adjudications that resulted in commitments to the Ohio Department of Youth Services, a community-control sanction that he violated twice, and a prior conviction for felonious assault with a firearm specification and having weapons while under disability that resulted in a prison term. Tr. 106-108. After his release, he possessed a firearm while under disability in each of the four cases, and he used a different firearm each time. Tr. 77- 85, 111. That history supports the court’s finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c). Only one of the findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) is required, and the record supports at least two. The record likewise supports the court’s findings that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public and to punish McCollum and are not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and the danger he poses. The offenses escalated from possessing a firearm to firing one. In Case No. CR-25- 701340-A, McCollum discharged a firearm and the shots struck the front door of a home, waking the resident’s son, and a vehicle parked on a residential street. Tr. 82- 83. In Case No. CR-25-704356-A, McCollum fired several times in his girlfriend’s direction, and bullets struck a neighboring unit. Tr. 84-86. That conduct took place while the first two cases were pending, and the shooting in Case No. CR-25-704356A took place after McCollum had stopped coming to court. Tr. 109-111. The trial court reviewed the presentence-investigation report and the psychiatric report, heard from both parties and from McCollum, and explained that the conduct that occurred “after you were supposed to be showing up here” was a concern as it considered the need to protect the public and to punish him. Tr. 105, 111-112. McCollum’s reliance on his Fayette County sentence does not show that the findings lack support. The record reflects that the Fayette County sentence is 24 years. Tr. 98. The trial court was aware of that sentence, considered it as part of McCollum’s criminal history, and ordered the aggregate sentence in these cases to run concurrently with it. Tr. 103, 121. The proportionality finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) concerns the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and the danger the offender poses to the public. The four cases before the trial court involved separate conduct on separate dates, two of them shootings in residential neighborhoods. That a court in another county imposed a lengthy sentence for a different shooting does not demonstrate that consecutive sentences for these offenses are disproportionate. McCollum’s argument asks us to weigh the sentencing considerations differently than the trial court did. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit us to do so. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, at ¶ 22. We cannot clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings. Therefore, McCollum’s second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.  It is ordered that a special mandate issue of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR