State v. Scott

[Cite as State v. Scott, 2026-Ohio-3576.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-G-0048 Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas JACK R. SCOTT, Trial Court No. 2024 C 000187 Defendant-Appellant. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Decided: September 14, 2026 Judgment: Affirmed James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecutor, and Alexandria R. Scheid, Assistant Prosecutor, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Suite 3A, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). Gary H. Levine, 4403 Saint Clair Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44103 (For Defendant- Appellant). EUGENE A. LUCCI, J. {¶1} Appellant, Jack R. Scott, appeals the judgment imposing sentence following his guilty pleas to two felonies and a firearm specification. We affirm. {¶2} In 2025, Scott was charged with aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), with an attendant firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A); two counts of improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation, second-degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1), with attendant firearm specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A); and improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, a fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.16(A).  {¶3} Following plea negotiations, Scott pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, as charged, and to an amended count of discharge of a firearm on or near a prohibited premises, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) and (C)(2), with an attendant firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A). At the change-of-plea hearing, the trial court noted that defense counsel and the State disputed whether the mandatory prison term for the offense underlying the gun specification—discharge of a firearm on or near a prohibited premises—was subject to reduction. The trial court informed Scott that it would hold the underlying offense as mandatory, meaning both that prison must be imposed and that the prison term could not be reduced. Thereafter, the trial court accepted the plea, ordered a presentence investigation report, and set the matter for sentencing. {¶4} At sentencing, the trial court imposed a prison term of 10 to 15 years on the aggravated burglary count, to run concurrently with a mandatory 30-month prison term on the discharge-of-a-firearm count. The court ordered a three-year mandatory prison term on the firearm specification, to be served consecutively to and prior to the other sentences. On the State’s motion, the court dismissed all remaining counts and specifications. {¶5} Scott noticed an appeal from the sentencing entry, and now assigns the following error: {¶6} “The trial court erred in sentencing appellant to a mandatory term of imprisonment to amended count II (discharge of firearm)[.]” {¶7} Scott maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that his sentence on the offense underlying the firearm specification was not subject to reduction pursuant to PAGE 2 OF 7 Case No. 2025-G-0048 statute. Thus, this appeal involves a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. State v. Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772, ¶ 8. {¶8} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.01(X), a “mandatory prison term” generally includes a prison term that must be imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)(1) to (8). See also State v. Johnson, 2008-Ohio-69, ¶ 9 (R.C. 2929.13(F) “addresses mandatory prison terms and lists offenses for which a sentencing court is obligated to impose a prison term.”). As relevant here, R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) provides: Notwithstanding divisions (A) to (E) of this section, the court shall impose a prison term or terms under sections 2929.02 to 2929.06, section 2929.14, section 2929.142, or section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and except as specifically provided in section 2929.20, or section 2967.191 of the Revised Code or when parole is authorized for the offense under section 2967.13 of the Revised Code shall not reduce the term or terms pursuant to section 2929.20, division (A)(2) or (3) of section 2967.193 or 2967.194, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code for any of the following offenses ... (8) Any offense, other than a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, that is a felony, if the offender had a firearm on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control while committing the felony, with respect to a portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to division (B)(1)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for having the firearm. (Emphasis added.) {¶9} R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) pertains to the sentences a court must impose on offenders who are found guilty of specifications described in R.C. 2941.141, 2941.144, and 2941.145. {¶10} With respect to these statutory provisions, in Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the following question on a certified conflict from the PAGE 3 OF 7 Case No. 2025-G-0048 Eighth District, “Does R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) require a mandatory prison term and preclude the imposition of community-control sanctions on an underlying felony when a defendant is found guilty on a corresponding firearm specification?”1 The Court held: When R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) directs the sentencing court to impose a prison sentence for “any offense . . . that is a felony,” it can mean only that a trial court must impose a sentence on the underlying felony because a firearm specification is not an offense. Rather, it is a sentencing enhancement that applies to the underlying offense. R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) therefore requires a trial court to impose a prison sentence for a defendant’s underlying felony offense if a firearm specification is attached. The felony-sentencing scheme confirms as much, and this interpretation addresses the Eighth District’s holding that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) refers only to firearm specifications. Logan at ¶ 2. {¶11} Here, the conviction for discharge of a firearm on or near a prohibited premises, in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3), underlies the R.C. 2941.145(A) firearm specification. Accordingly, the trial court was required to impose a prison term on that offense pursuant to statute. {¶12} Although the statute requires a prison term for the underlying felony, Scott argues that the prison term is not mandatory insofar as it pertains to potential reduction of the term. Based on the statutory language and our reading of Logan, we disagree. See State v. Armstead, 2026-Ohio-999, ¶ 22-23 (10th Dist.). See also State v. Totty, 2026- Ohio-2140, ¶ 58 (3d Dist.). But see State v. Young, 2026-Ohio-2603, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.) (“The non-mandatory underlying felony term must be served as a prison sentence, consistent with Logan, but it remains subject to reduction mechanisms available under Chapter 1. The Logan Court addressed a prior version of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8), 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166. However, the relevant portions of this provision are unchanged in the current version. PAGE 4 OF 7 Case No. 2025-G-0048 2967.”); compare with State v. Wright, 2026-Ohio-1714, ¶ 47-48 (5th Dist.) (a mandatory sentence subject to R.C. 2929.13(F)(5) may not be reduced). {¶13} Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772, did not specifically address reduction of a prison term imposed on the offense underlying the specification. However, the statute both requires a prison sentence and prohibits reduction pursuant to its plain language: “the court shall impose a prison term . . . and . . . shall not reduce the term or terms pursuant to section 2929.20, division (A)(2) or (3) of section 2967.193 or 2967.194, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120 . . . .” R.C. 2929.13(F)(8). The prohibition against reduction applies to “any offense” that is a felony “if the offender had a firearm on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control while committing the felony . . . .” Id. {¶14} The statute then qualifies that this provision applies only to the “portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to division (B)(1)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for having the firearm.” R.C. 2929.13(F)(8). However, this qualification does not pertain to the sentence for the specification itself; instead, it pertains to the portion of the sentence imposed for the “offense” underlying the specification. Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772, ¶ 14-16. Accordingly, the prison term imposed for the felony underlying the firearm specification is mandatory, meaning both that the court must impose the prison term and that the prison term is not subject to reduction except as specifically allowed under the statutes referenced within R.C. 2929.13(F)(8). PAGE 5 OF 7 Case No. 2025-G-0048  {¶15} Therefore, Scott’s sole assigned error lacks merit. {¶16} The judgment is affirmed. MATT LYNCH, P.J., SCOTT LYNCH, J., concur. PAGE 6 OF 7 Case No. 2025-G-0048  JUDGMENT ENTRY For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s sole assignment of error lacks merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant. JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH, concurs THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. PAGE 7 OF 7 Case No. 2025-G-0048