State v. McCall

[Cite as State v. McCall, 2026-Ohio-3385.] STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN ) STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 24CA012107 Appellee v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE SAVION MCCALL COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 22 CR 106129 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: August 31, 2026 STEVENSON, Judge. {¶1} Appellant, Savion McCall, appeals from his convictions in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty of complicity to murder, complicity to felonious assault, complicity to discharge a firearm on or near a prohibited premises, all with associated firearm specifications, and sentencing him on these offenses. This Court affirms. I. {¶2} This appeal involves a drive-by shooting that resulted in the death of J.B. McCall and his friend, Christian, were in a car with J.B. when she was shot. J.B. was Christian’s girlfriend at the time of the shooting. {¶3} According to the evidence the State presented at trial, McCall and Christian had “beef” with a group of individuals that included Lucas and Jeremiah. McCall and Christian fought with Lucas and Jeremiah a few weeks prior to the underlying shooting. On the day of the shooting, McCall argued with Lucas and Jeremiah at a gas station and at a Wendy’s restaurant. Lucas  2 testified that he had a gun at these incidents, and he is seen in the gas station surveillance video putting a gun in his front pocket as he exited the Impala. Lucas and Jeremiah were riding in a silver Chevy Impala. Witnesses testified that McCall repeatedly yelled “[l]et it blow” or “[b]low me” during the altercations, meaning “[s]hoot.” After arguing with Lucas and Jeremiah, McCall called Christian and told Christian that they “[had] to score.” {¶4} McCall’s girlfriend, S.J., and her brother (A.G.) were with McCall at the gas station and Wendy’s restaurant altercations and they overheard McCall’s phone conversations with Christian. S.J. was driving the vehicle that they were riding in, with the brother sitting in the front passenger seat and McCall sitting in the backseat. S.J. and the brother testified that McCall became so irate when S.J. refused to pick-up Christian that he tried to strangle S.J. S.J. testified that Christian picked up McCall from her house after the incidents at the gas station and Wendy’s restaurant. {¶5} Cellphone extracted evidence, including Snapchat messages, was admitted into evidence at trial to establish that Christian had contacted J.B. and told her to bring him his black fanny pack, which contained a 9-millimeter gun. J.B. drove her stepfather’s Jeep to pick up Christian and McCall. Christian, McCall, and J.B. then drove by Lucas’s mother’s house, with Christian driving the vehicle, J.B. riding in the front passenger seat, and McCall riding in the backseat. The silver Impala that Lucas and Jeremiah had been riding in at the gas station and Wendy’s restaurant was parked in front of the house. {¶6} According to the State, McCall fired shots into the parked Impala as they drove by it. Lucas’s friend, H.G., and Jeremiah were inside the car when the shots were fired, but neither was struck by the bullets. Bullet casings were found on the ground next to the Impala, and a bullet was recovered from the vehicle. There was testimony at trial that the trajectory of the bullets was  3 going toward the occupants of the vehicle and that the bullet recovered from the Impala was from a 9-millimeter gun. {¶7} Lucas was standing a short distance away when he heard the gunshots. Lucas testified that he “started running towards [the Jeep] shooting at it” when he heard the shots. One of the shots fired by Lucas struck J.B., who sustained a fatal gunshot wound to her back. Christian fled the scene in the Jeep. {¶8} An anonymous 911 call was made at 11:07 p.m. reporting hearing shots fired. Evidence was introduced at trial that Christian dropped McCall off at a grandparent’s house before calling 911 at 11:11 p.m. A City of Lorain police officer pulled over the Jeep driven by Christian about a mile from McCall’s grandparent’s house and found J.B. slumped over in the passenger seat of the vehicle. Christian had no firearms on his person and subsequent testing did not find any gunshot residue on his hands. {¶9} McCall called his girlfriend, S.J., multiple times between 11:13 p.m. and 11:15 p.m. and asked her to pick him up from a grandparent’s house. S.J. and her mother picked up McCall and drove him back to S.J.’s house where he then spent the night. S.J. testified that McCall had on different clothing from when she had seen him earlier that evening. She testified that McCall “didn’t want to talk about” what had happened during the time he was gone. S.J.’s brother testified that McCall “had like a whole different demeanor” when he came back to their house that night. {¶10} A grand jury indicted McCall on eight counts, including a count for the murder of J.B., counts for felonious assault as to H.G. and Jeremiah, and discharge of firearm on or near prohibited premises, all with firearm specifications. McCall pleaded not guilty and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. Three of the eight counts were dismissed prior to trial.  4 {¶11} The State presented testimony from 20 witnesses at trial. McCall did not testify nor did he present any witnesses. After hearing the testimony and evidence, the jury found McCall guilty of the following counts: Count One: guilty of complicity to murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), an unclassified felony, along with a firearm specification; Count Five: guilty of complicity to felonious assault against Jeremiah in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A), a felony of the second degree, along with two firearm specifications; Count Seven: guilty of complicity to discharge a firearm on or near prohibited premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3), a felony of the third degree, along with a firearm specification. The trial court sentenced McCall to an aggregate prison sentence of 30 years to life. {¶12} McCall appeals his convictions raising six assignments of error for this Court’s review. I. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MR. MCCALL’S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL BECAUSE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT MR. MCCALL ON THE INDICTED OFFENSES. {¶13} McCall argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred when it denied his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. He contends that the trial court erred because there was no evidence of an attempt to cause physical harm as to Jeremiah and there was no evidence that J.B.’s death was reasonably foreseeable. McCall further maintains that the trial court erred when it denied his motion because the State’s theory required impermissible inference stacking. We disagree.  5 Standard of Review {¶14} “There is no difference between the standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and that for a motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29.” State v. Rivera, 2023-Ohio-1788, ¶ 37 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Doss, 2019-Ohio-436, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.). As this Court stated in Rivera, “[a] sufficiency challenge questions whether the State met its burden of production at trial” and “[s]ufficiency is ‘that legal standard which is applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.’” Rivera at ¶ 37, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The issue of whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law, which we review de novo. Thompkins at 386. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. Felonious Assault {¶15} McCall was charged in count five with felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). Jeremiah is the alleged victim in count five. R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) states that “[n]o person shall knowingly . . . [c]ause or attempt to cause physical harm to another . . . by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.” A firearm constitutes a deadly weapon. See R.C. 2903.11(E)(1); R.C. 2923.11(A); R.C. 2923.11(B). Pursuant to R.C. 2901.22(B): A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.  6 {¶16} In addition to a felonious assault instruction, the court instructed the jury on complicity.1 R.C. 2923.03(A)(1)-(3) provides that “[n]o person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall . . . [s]olicit or procure another to commit the offense; [a]id or abet another in committing the offense; [or] [c]onspire with another to commit the offense . . . .” “A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.” R.C. 2923.03(F). {¶17} McCall argues that the trial court erred by denying his Crim.R. 29 motion based on the State’s purported failure to present evidence that he was aware the Impala was occupied. He argues that, absent such evidence, the State failed to prove that he “was complicit in knowingly causing or attempting to cause physical harm with a deadly weapon to [Jeremiah].” The State points to testimony at trial that H.G. and Jeremiah were both inside the Impala scrolling on their phones at the time of the shooting. It maintains that H.G. and Jeremiah’s faces “would have been clearly illuminated by the light of their cell phones on the dark street” and that sufficient evidence of an attempt to cause physical harm was presented at trial. {¶18} H.G. testified that she owned the Impala and that she and Jeremiah were “sitting in the car” when it was shot. She testified that the vehicle was parked in front of Lucas’s house and that she was in the backseat and Jeremiah was in the front passenger’s seat. According to H.G., they were scrolling on their phones, looking at Facebook. Lucas had also testified that H.G. and Jeremiah were in the car when it was shot. 1 As set forth under this Court’s analysis of McCall’s fifth assignment of error, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it gave a complicity instruction to the jury in this case.  7 {¶19} H.G. clarified on cross-examination that she was “propped up in the back seat[,]” “[b]y the driver’s side door.” H.G. was “propped up” and was able to “see [out] the windows.” Looking out the vehicle’s windows, she had seen the “Jeep drive by twice.” {¶20} There was testimony at trial that McCall and Christian were familiar with Jeremiah. Specifically, there was testimony that McCall and Christian had an “ongoing beef” with Lucas and Jeremiah, and that McCall exchanged words with both Lucas and Jeremiah at the gas station and Wendy’s restaurant on the night of the incident. Evidence was also produced at trial that McCall wanted to “score” that night; that, after being contacted by McCall, Christian had J.B. pick them up with his gun; and, that McCall and Christian sought out Jeremiah and/or Lucas that evening. {¶21} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that McCall has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in denying his Crim.R. 29 motion as to the felonious assault charge. There was ample evidence that, even though it was dark outside, Jeremiah and H.G.’s faces were visible inside the Impala when it was shot and that McCall was familiar with Jeremiah and that he knew what Jeremiah looked like. We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented of an attempt to cause physical harm to Jeremiah. J.B.’s Death {¶22} McCall next argues that “[e]ven if there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction that [he] was complicit in the drive-by shooting, [Lucas’s] actions broke the chain of causation and were not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of [his] conduct.” He argues that it was not reasonably foreseeable that Lucas would return fire and cause the death of J.B. The State contends that Lucas returning fire and J.B.’s death were both reasonably foreseeable. {¶23} Evidence was introduced at trial that Lucas had a gun in his pocket at the gas station on the night of the incident and that McCall was aware that Lucas had a gun. Witnesses testified  8 that McCall repeatedly yelled “[l]et it blow” or “[b]low me[,]” meaning “[s]hoot[,]” during the altercations with Lucas and Jeremiah at the gas station and Wendy’s restaurant. There was also testimony that, after arguing with Lucas and Jeremiah, McCall called Christian and told Christian that they “[had] to score.” {¶24} There was evidence admitted at trial, including cellphone extracted evidence and Snapchat messages, that Christian contacted J.B. after talking to McCall and that Christian told J.B. to bring him his black fanny pack that contained a gun. J.B. picked-up Christian in the Jeep, and they then picked-up McCall. The Jeep drove in front of Lucas’s house and one of its occupants fired the first shot that evening. {¶25} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that McCall has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in denying his Crim.R. 29 motion. The State presented evidence that McCall set into motion the events that occurred that evening and that McCall knew Lucas had a gun. Sufficient evidence was introduced to establish that, knowing Lucas had a gun, it was reasonably foreseeable that Lucas would return fire and that someone would be struck when shots were fired. See State v. Catron, 2015-Ohio-2697, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.) (it was reasonable for jury to conclude that, once shots were fired, shots would be fired back and cause death); State v. Hoston, 2015-Ohio-5422, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.) (it was reasonably foreseeable that, when shots are fired, shots will be fired in return and someone may be “struck by an errant shot”). Evidence was also introduced that J.B., who was sitting in the front passenger seat of the Jeep, had reclined her seat as far back as it would go to avoid being shot, indicating that the occupants of the Jeep believed that Lucas would return shots. We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to establish that it was reasonably foreseeable that Lucas would return fire and cause the death of J.B.  9 Inference Stacking {¶26} McCall lastly argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal because “the State’s theory required impermissible inference stacking for the factfinder to deduce that [he] desired a firearm to participate in a drive- by shooting.” He argues that there was no testimony or evidence at trial that he called Christian to acquire a firearm (first inference); that he was aware Christian had a firearm in the Jeep and that he desired to participate in a drive-by shooting (second inference); and/or that he was seen with a firearm that evening or that he shot from the Jeep (third inference). The State maintains that the trial court properly denied McCall’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal as sufficient evidence was introduced to establish that McCall called Christian to acquire a firearm; that it was reasonable to believe that McCall knew Christian had a firearm in the Jeep; and that, even if Christian was the shooter, McCall cooperated with the commission of the crime and shared the same criminal intent as Christian. {¶27} The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to demonstrate that McCall called Christian to obtain a firearm. Lucas testified that he and Jeremiah “got into a fight . . . over money” with McCall and Christian a couple of weeks before the incident and Detective Kurt Graupmann, the lead investigator, testified that he had learned about their “ongoing beef” during his investigation. Lucas also testified that he had “a gun in [his] pocket” at the gas station and Wendy’s on the night of the incident. Surveillance footage from the gas station was presented at trial showing Lucas putting a gun in the pocket of his hooded sweatshirt as he exited the Impala. S.J. testified that, after McCall repeatedly pounded on the roof of her car at the gas station yelling “[l]et it blow” at Lucas, he called Christian. S.J. heard McCall talking to Christian about meeting back up with those at the gas station and telling Christian that “he wanted to score.” She testified that  10 McCall was on the phone with Christian for over 20 minutes about needing to “score.” S.J.’s brother who, was also riding in the car, similarly testified that he heard McCall telling Christian that “we have to score.” Cellphone extracted evidence, including Snapchat messages, was admitted into evidence at trial to establish that Christian had contacted J.B. and told her to bring him his black fanny pack, which contained a 9-millimeter gun. {¶28} S.J. testified that she sat in the car with McCall at her house while McCall waited for Christian to pick him up. S.J. testified that she “begged [McCall] not to go” and that she “cried to [her] mom” when he left with Christian. S.J.’s testimony suggested that, knowing McCall wanted to “score,” she was worried about McCall’s safety. Evidence was also admitted at trial establishing that S.J. texted McCall to “be safe” after he left with Christian and that she repeatedly called and texted to see if McCall and Christian were okay. It can reasonably be inferred from S.J.’s testimony that she was fearful that McCall would be at risk of harm as he was intending to be involved in a shooting. {¶29} Sufficient evidence was presented that McCall told Christian to bring a gun. Even if McCall was not the shooter, sufficient evidence was presented to show that he “‘supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime[.]” State v. Hendon, 2016-Ohio-8137, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240 (2001), syllabus. As the Ohio Supreme Court stated in Johnson, “intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime” and “participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed.” Johnson at 245. {¶30} For the reasons set forth above, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support McCall’s  11 convictions for complicity to felony murder and complicity to felonious assault. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied McCall’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. McCall’s first assignment of error is overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING TESTIMONY FROM OFFICER CAMBARARE ABOUT [JEREMIAH’S] LOCATION AT THE TIME OF THE SHOOTING. {¶31} McCall argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred by admitting testimony from Officer Cambarare about Jeremiah’s location at the time of the shooting. We disagree. {¶32} McCall acknowledges that he did not object to the admission of Officer Cambarare’s testimony at trial and that his argument is subject to plain error review on appeal. “Plain error occurs if there has been an error, meaning a deviation from the legal rule; the error was an obvious defect; and the error affected a substantial right.” Rivera, 2023-Ohio-1788, at ¶ 65 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002); Crim.R. 52(B) (“[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”). “Notice of plain error . . . is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus. To correct a plain error, all of the following elements must apply: ‘First, there must be an error, i.e., a deviation from the legal rule. . . . Second, the error must be plain. To be ‘plain’ within the meaning of Crim.R. 52(B), an error must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial proceedings. . . . Third, the error must have affected ‘substantial rights[]’ [to the extent that it] . . . affected the outcome of the trial.’ State v. Jordan, 2014-Ohio-2857, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Bennett, 2014-Ohio-160, ¶ 64 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Hardges, 2008-Ohio-5567, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.).  12 Officer Cambarare’s Testimony {¶33} Officer Cambarare is a police officer for the City of Lorain and he was working patrol on the night of the incident. Officer Cambarare testified that he was in his patrol car with the windows down when he heard shots around 11:00 p.m. coming “from the area of 25th and Lexington.” He testified that he drove to the area where he heard the gunshots and that he “observed a silver or gray Impala . . . parked on West 25th Street with two individuals standing behind it.” It was later discovered that the Impala was parked in front of Lucas’s mother’s house. {¶34} According to Officer Cambarare, he asked the individuals standing by the Impala if they “hear[d] any gunshots or [knew] of anything going on[.]” He testified that the individuals told him that “they had no idea what was going on” and that, therefore, he “kept driving . . . [to] investigate the shots fired.” {¶35} Officer Cambarare testified that he returned to the Impala 5-10 minutes later and that he “observ[ed] some bullet holes [in] the vehicle and radiator fluid leaking from the engine area, leaking onto the pavement.” He also observed “shell casings . . . next to the . . . Impala[,]” “shell casings in the roadway[,]” and a “bullet fragment directly next to the front driver’s side fender” of the Impala. Officer Cambarare realized that the area “was potentially . . . the scene of a shooting” and he proceeded to secure the scene and investigate. {¶36} Officer Cambarare testified that, “as [he] was observing [the] shell casings,” Lucas came out of the house and tried to enter the Impala. Officer Cambarare and Sergeant Matthewson, who had arrived at the scene, detained Lucas and placed him in a police cruiser. {¶37} Officer Cambarare was asked on direct examination if he “encounter[ed] a person by the name of Jeremiah” after he returned to the Impala. The officer responded “[y]es.” Officer Cambarare testified that, as they were securing the scene, he saw Jeremiah “walking down the  13 sidewalk” and “approach[ing] from the east . . . .” The prosecutor asked Officer Cambarare what Jeremiah was doing, and he responded “[h]e approached us and I believe he stated he was sitting in that Impala when it was shot.” The prosecutor then asked the officer “what did you do . . .?” to which the officer replied, “[w]e secured him in another police cruiser separate from Lucas . . . so he could be interviewed later.” {¶38} Counsel for McCall asked the officer on cross-examination “[y]ou said at some point in time that [Jeremiah] said he was in the vehicle when shots were fired, correct?” Officer Cambarare responded “[y]es.” The prosecutor then asked Officer Cambarare on redirect examination: Q. You don’t know where Jeremiah . . . was when there were shots fired at the Impala, do you? A. No, I do not. Q. But you later learned that Jeremiah . . . stated he was in the Impala? A. Yes. {¶39} Officer Cambarare’s testimony was consistent with the testimony of H.G. and Lucas. H.G. testified that she was in the Impala with Jeremiah when shots were fired at the vehicle. Lucas also testified that H.G. and Jeremiah “stayed in the car” and that he “got [H.G.] and Jeremiah out of the car” after the shots were fired. The State did not produce Jeremiah as a witness at trial. Analysis {¶40} McCall argues that Officer Cambarare’s testimony as to Jeremiah’s location at the time of the shooting constitutes inadmissible hearsay and that the trial court erred by admitting this testimony at trial. He further argues that the trial court admitted this testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause.  14 {¶41} The State contends that Officer Cambarare’s testimony was not hearsay as the statement was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to explain the officer’s conduct during the investigation. It further contends that, even if the officer’s statement was inadmissible, it was harmless error as H.G. and Lucas also testified that Jeremiah was in the Impala at the time of the shooting. {¶42} Evid.R. 801(C) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” “Statements that are offered into evidence to explain an officer’s conduct while investigating a crime are not, however, hearsay.” Jordan, 2014-Ohio-2857, at ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Blevins, 36 Ohio App.3d 147, 149 (9th Dist. 1987). The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that: in order for testimony offered to explain police conduct to be admissible as nonhearsay, the conduct to be explained should be relevant, equivocal, and contemporaneous with the statements; the probative value of statements must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; and the statements cannot connect the accused with the crime charged. State v. Ricks, 2013-Ohio-3712, ¶ 27. {¶43} The record reflects that Officer Cambarare was conducting an investigation when he encountered Jeremiah. He testified that he was securing the scene, and that he had already placed Lucas in a police cruiser to separate the witnesses, when he encountered Jeremiah. “‘It is well-established that, where statements are offered into evidence to explain an officer’s conduct during the course of investigating a crime, such statements are generally not hearsay.’” State v. Quintile, 2024-Ohio-2026, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Brown, 2020-Ohio-3614, ¶ 82 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Humphrey, 2008-Ohio-6302, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). Officer Cambarare’s statement about what Jeremiah told him was, therefore, properly admitted for the nonhearsay  15 purpose of explaining the police investigation. See State v. Parsons, 2019-Ohio-5021, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.) (statement to police officer that was made during course of investigation was nonhearsay and was properly admitted to explain “the progress of the police investigation.”). As there was no objection to this testimony at trial, there was no opportunity for the court to instruct the jury that Officer’s Cambarare’s statement was admissible for that purpose only. {¶44} Further, this Court cannot say that the outcome of trial would have been different but for the admission of Officer Cambarare’s statements concerning Jeremiah’s location at the time of the shooting. The officer was not the only witness that testified Jeremiah was in the car. H.G. testified that she was in the back seat of the Impala and that Jeremiah was in the front passenger seat of the vehicle at the time of the shooting. Lucas similarly testified that H.G. and Jeremiah were in the Impala at the time of the shooting and that he got them out of the vehicle after the shooting. We conclude that Officer Cambarare’s statements did not affect McCall’s substantial rights as they did not affect the outcome of trial. Jordan, 2014-Ohio-2857, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.). {¶45} McCall’s second assignment of error is, accordingly, overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III THE CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. {¶46} McCall argues in his third assignment of error that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. {¶47} When considering a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court is required to consider the entire record, “weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction  16 must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist. 1986). A reversal on a manifest weight of the evidence challenge is reserved for exceptional cases where the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. {¶48} In his third assignment of error, McCall focuses on the trial testimony of H.G. and Lucas that both H.G. and Jeremiah were in the Impala when it was shot. He points out that despite this testimony, he was found not guilty of felonious assault as to H.G. (count three), but guilty of complicity to felonious assault as to Jeremiah (count five). He argues that “the jury apparently found [Lucas] and [H.G.] lacked credibility[]” and that, “[s]ince Officer Cambarare’s testimony about [Jeremiah’s] location at the time of the shooting was inadmissible and unreliable, there was no credible, admissible evidence introduced at trial to result in a conviction.” As set forth under our analysis of McCall’s second assignment of error, we conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting testimony from Officer Cambarare about Jeremiah’s location at the time of the shooting. The State argues that “[t]he jury’s decision does not indicate that both [Lucas] and [H.G.] lacked credibility, rather it indicates that the jury believed there were key differences in [Jeremiah] and [H.G.’s] position in the car and involvement in the dispute with [McCall] and [Christian].” {¶49} McCall was charged with felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) states that “[n]o person shall knowingly . . . [c]ause or attempt to cause physical harm to another . . . by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.” A firearm constitutes a deadly weapon. See R.C. 2903.11(E)(1); R.C. 2923.11(A). The jury found McCall guilty of complicity to felonious assault as to Jeremiah. {¶50} To be guilty of complicity to felonious assault, the jury had to find that McCall, “acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of [the] offense . . . [s]olicited or  17 procure[d] . . . [a]id[ed] or abet[ted] . . . [or] [c]onspire[d] with another to commit the offense . . . .” R.C. 2923.03(A)(1)-(3). {¶51} McCall argues that the felonious assault verdicts were inconsistent. His argument is based on the testimony that both Jeremiah and H.G. were in the Impala when it was shot but the jury only found him guilty of complicity to felonious assault as to Jeremiah, but not guilty as to H.G. McCall argues that this demonstrates that the jury clearly lost its way, rendering his conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. McCall, however, “has not separately argued that the trial court erred by accepting inconsistent jury verdicts, so our consideration of this argument is limited to whether it bears on the weight of the evidence. It does not.” State v. Phillips, 2017-Ohio-1186, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.). “Even assuming arguendo that the issue was separately argued on appeal, ‘juries are not required to reach consistent verdicts between separate counts.’” State v. Hamilton, 2019-Ohio-1829, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Singh, 2018-Ohio-3473, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.). {¶52} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that this is an exceptional case where the jury lost its way by convicting McCall of complicity to felonious assault as to Jeremiah. See Otten at 340. There was evidence admitted establishing that the intended victim of the shooting was Jeremiah. The State introduced testimony at trial as to the trajectory of the bullets that were fired at the Impala. Detective Brian Denman of the Lorain Police Department testified that he recovered two bullets that had struck the Impala, with one bullet being recovered from the motor and the other bullet recovered from the passenger’s side firewall. He testified that the bullets were “[m]ost definitely” angled towards “the passenger compartment” of the Impala and that the bullet that was recovered from the firewall “was going in the direction towards the front passenger’s seat.” H.G. testified that Jermiah was sitting in the front passenger seat of the Impala when it was  18 shot. There was also testimony that McCall and Christian had an “ongoing beef” with Lucas and Jeremiah, not H.G. Due to the “ongoing beef,” they knew what Jeremiah looked like. {¶53} It is well-established that “a trier of fact enjoys the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Tyus, 2020-Ohio-4455, ¶ 57 (9th Dist.). See also Prince v. Jordan, 2004-Ohio-7184, ¶ 35 (9th Dist.) (“the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness.”) This Court “‘will not overturn a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of fact chose to believe the State’s version of events over another version.’” State v. Tolliver, 2017-Ohio-4214, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Barger, 2016-Ohio-443, ¶ 29 (9th Dist.). {¶54} We conclude that the jury, in resolving any conflicts in the evidence, did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice requiring a reversal of McCall’s complicity to felonious assault conviction. See Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d at 340. This is also not an exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. See Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. McCall’s manifest weight of the evidence argument, as asserted in his third assignment of error, is overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING TESTIMONY ABOUT MR. MCALL’S CHARACTER IN VIOLATION OF RULES 403 AND 404. {¶55} McCall argues in his fourth assignment of error that the trial court erred by admitting testimony about his character in violation of Evid.R. 403 and Evid.R. 404. We disagree. {¶56} “The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 180 (1987). Thus, an appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Myers, 2002-Ohio-6658, ¶ 75. “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of judgment; it implies that the  19 court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When applying an abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993). {¶57} Although Blakemore is often cited as the general standard for reviewing discretionary decisions, the Ohio Supreme Court has provided additional guidance about the nature of an abuse of discretion: Stated differently, an abuse of discretion involves more than a difference in opinion: the “‘term discretion itself involve the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations.’” State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 222 (1984), quoting Spalding v. Spalding, 355 Mich. 382, 384 (1959). For a court of appeals to reach an abuse-of-discretion determination, the trial court's judgment must be so profoundly and wholly violative of fact and reason that “‘it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.’” Id., quoting Spalding at 384-385. State v. Weaver, 2022-Ohio-4371, ¶ 24. Even if an appellant demonstrates that the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion, he does not establish reversible error unless he shows that the error prejudiced his substantial rights. Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 2005-Ohio-4787, ¶ 20. {¶58} Before Christian and J.B. picked up McCall on the night of the incident, McCall had been riding in a car driven by his girlfriend, S.J. S.J.’s brother was also in the car. S.J. and her brother were present at the gas station and Wendy’s restaurant when McCall exchanged words with Lucas and Jeremiah. {¶59} The brother went back to his house with McCall and his sister after the incident at Wendy’s. He testified that McCall left the house and came back that evening. According to the brother, McCall was “red-hot angry[