State v. Bevins

[Cite as State v. Bevins, 2026-Ohio-2522.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SCIOTO COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, : : Case No. 24CA4105 Plaintiff-Appellee, : : v. : : DECISION AND JUDGMENT BRANDI A. BEVINS, : ENTRY : Defendant-Appellant. : : APPEARANCES: Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant. Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jay Willis, Assistant Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee. Smith, P.J. {¶1} Appellant, Brandi A. Bevins, appeals the judgment of the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas convicting her of two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs, trafficking in cocaine, and trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound. On appeal, appellant contends 1) that her convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence and 2) that the trial court erred by improperly sentencing her to Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 2 consecutive prison terms. However, because we find no merit to her assignments of error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. FACTS {¶2} On September 13, 2023 law enforcement used a confidential informant to successfully conduct a controlled buy at a Campbell Avenue residence in Portsmouth. The next day, in addition to conducting surveillance on the Campbell Avenue residence, law enforcement executed a search warrant during which a large amount of suspected drugs, drug trafficking material, and drug paraphernalia were located throughout the residence. Present at the time of the execution of the warrant were the residents, appellant and Johnny Fitzpatrick. Also present were Michael Lewis and Tony Walker, residents of Dayton. {¶3} On October 3, 2023, appellant, Fitzpatrick, Lewis, and Walker were indicted on nine counts, with counts one and two occurring on September 13, 2023, and counts three through nine occurring on September 14, 2023: Count 1: aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(d), a second- degree felony; Count 2: aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2911(C)(1)(c), a second-degree felony; Count 3: aggravated trafficking of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(d), a second- degree felony; Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 3 Count 4: aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(c), a second-degree felony; Count 5: tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) and R.C. 2921.12(B), a third-degree felony; Count 6: trafficking in cocaine in violation R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2925.03(C)(4)(f), a first-degree felony; Count 7: possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(e), a first-degree felony; Count 8: trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2925.03(C)(9)(f), a first- degree felony; and Count 9: possession of a fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2925.11(C)(11)(e), a first- degree felony. The indictment also contained a forfeiture specification for counts three, six, seven, eight, and nine for $2,355 in cash. Prior to trial, counts six and seven were amended to second-degree felonies. {¶4} Appellant entered a not guilty plea and was tried before a jury along with co-defendant Fitzpatrick on September 16, 2024. At the trial, the State adduced evidence that the Southern Ohio Drug Task Force (“SODTF”) conducted a controlled buy at the Campbell Avenue residence using a confidential informant. This confidential informant had purchased drugs at the same Campbell Avenue residence three or four times before. On September 13, 2023, the confidential Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 4 informant entered the Campbell Avenue residence with buy money and a recording device provided by the SODTF and purchased what later tested as 29.23 grams of methamphetamine from Lewis. {¶5} The SODTF had received information that there were large amounts of drugs being sold at the Campbell Avenue residence, and also that people were seen coming and going from the residence. As the SODTF members and other witnesses described, the Campbell Avenue residence had the markings of a “trap house.” A “trap house” is a place where the primary resident has allowed various people to enter a residence for some benefit and the house then becomes a place for selling, using, and stashing drugs – a sort of “convenience store” for drug activity. The confidential informant who testified agreed that the Campbell Avenue residence would be characterized as a “trap house.” {¶6} The SODTF obtained a search warrant for the Campbell Avenue residence, a shotgun-style, single-family dwelling. On September 14, 2023, members of the SODTF began surveilling the residence about 7:00 a.m. and they executed the search warrant at 10:30 a.m. When entering the residence, SODTF realized from the design of the home, someone in the rear bedroom could see what was going on in the front room, and vice versa. The house had debris and trash throughout. In the kitchen, the SODTF saw Lewis. From the kitchen, they could also see Fitzpatrick seated on a chair in the living room. The SODTF found large Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 5 amounts of a crystal-like substance (methamphetamine or its byproduct) scattered all over the floor in the living room. In fact, the drugs were so apparent that members of the SODTF did not have to get on their hands and knees to see them. The methamphetamine in the living room was spread around Fitzpatrick and on his person. {¶7} The SODTF found Walker and appellant in the front room of the residence. They also found methamphetamine on the floor around where appellant was located, but not on her person. The SODTF found syringes and a spoon near appellant. {¶8} In addition to the drugs seen out in the open throughout the house, law enforcement saw drug paraphernalia including syringes, bindles (papers used to package drugs), digital scales, a razorblade and credit card used for cutting and packaging drugs, cell phones, a bag full of numerous empty clear plastic capsules used for drug trafficking, baggies, and a large amount of lottery tickets folded into bindles. Law enforcement found large amount of the bindles in both the living room and front room located near appellant and Fitzpatrick. Law enforcement also found a torn plastic baggie in the room where Fitzpatrick was. In addition, law enforcement found a large amount of cash in excess of $2,300 on Lewis, including marked money from the controlled buy the day before. Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 6 {¶9} During the search, Fitzpatrick said he resided there at the Campbell Avenue house. In addition, in an interview with law enforcement, appellant said she had been living at the Campbell Avenue residence for approximately five months prior to the date of the search, that she had been dating Fitzpatrick for about three months prior to the search, and that both had resided at the Campbell Avenue residence. Appellant claimed that Lewis had initially pushed his way in the house at Campbell Avenue to sell drugs. However, testimony revealed that law enforcement received no calls that drug dealers pushed their way into appellant’s home. Later, Appellant admitted that she had agreed to let Lewis stay there if he would pay the water bill. She claimed that she had received no money from Lewis because he had only arrived two days prior to the execution of the search warrant. {¶10} Appellant also said that when Lewis arrived, he had three softball- sized bags of drugs, which the SODTF explained was a large amount of drugs. Appellant also said that a week prior to the search warrant Lewis sent his sister and a male named “DJ” to the Campbell Avenue residence to trap and sell drugs for a few days. Appellant also said that when Lewis arrived, he sent text messages out to multiple individuals offering up free “testers” of drugs. Those free “testers” were in small, folded lottery tickets containing a tenth of a gram of drugs. Lewis would sometimes give people free testers and sent multiple text messages out that he had free testers, and to come to the residence. The SODTF explained that this Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 7 was Lewis’ attempt to build a client base. Appellant also said that Walker was Lewis’ “assistant.” During the search, the SODTF members observed appellant, Lewis, and Walker speaking to one another, back and forth. {¶11} At trial, Detective Metzler of the SODTF explained the course and scope of drug trafficking that the task force investigates. In particular, Metzler described a source city where the drug originates (like Dayton, where Lewis and Taylor were from) being shipped to the destination city (like Portsmouth) where it is sold and used. Metzler described the need for the task force to use confidential informants to stop distribution and sale. In addition, Metzler described the street terminology for various drugs and their appearance. Finally, Metzler explained that the “user amounts” of drugs are those in the range of a gram or two. However, due to the expense of the drugs, the task force sees drugs in the amounts of quarter pounds to pounds in the possession of those who are trafficking. {¶12} In addition to testimony from the confidential informant and members of the SODTF, the State also called to testify a male drug purchaser whose drugs of choice were cocaine and fentanyl. This drug purchaser testified he had purchased drugs from Lewis at the Campbell Avenue residence before (“a half- dozen times”), which the drug purchaser would describe as a “trap house.” This drug purchaser testified that Lewis gave out “free testers.” Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 8 {¶13} The day of the search, the drug purchaser received a text from Lewis to come get a “test product” of cocaine and fentanyl at the residence. This drug purchaser went to get the product that day and testified that the people who lived in the Campbell Avenue residence were there when he smoked crack cocaine and injected fentanyl in the house, although he did not get the drugs off the residents. Another black male was also there. This drug purchaser said that fentanyl and cocaine were out in the open and being sold there. This drug purchaser testified that on the day of the search the SODTF came while he was there. {¶14} Further, the SODTF members testified that a female drug purchaser showed up during the search warrant with $10 on her person. This amount is enough to purchase a bindle of meth, which is the going rate for a tenth of a gram. {¶15} The State presented testimony from the BCI Crime Lab forensic scientist regarding the identity and amounts of the following substances seized the day of the search: xylazine and fentanyl - less than .1 gram; methamphetamine - 9.09 grams; methamphetamine - 20.11 grams; cocaine - 7.77 grams; cocaine - 13.18 grams; methamphetamine - 7.85 grams; xylazine and fentanyl - 1.48 grams; xylazine and fentanyl - 1.78 grams; xylazine and fentanyl - 2.44 grams; xylazine and fentanyl - 14.22 grams; xylazine and fentanyl - .41 grams; methamphetamine - 1.23 grams; and methamphetamine - 5.8 grams. Some of these items were in separate paper folded lottery tickets (bindles) as if packaged for individual sale. Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 9 {¶16} At the close of evidence in the State’s case, appellant and Fitzpatrick moved for Crim.R. 29 acquittal. Appellant made a general argument. Fitzpatrick argued that the State had shown that Lewis was trafficking. Fitzpatrick contended, however, that he was not complicit in the activities of Lewis. The trial court overruled the motions. During closing arguments, the State suggested that appellant and Fitzpatrick were guilty of trafficking under a complicity theory. {¶17} The jury found appellant not guilty of tampering with evidence (count five), but guilty of all other counts. The trial court merged certain counts, and the State made election of offenses for sentencing. Ultimately, appellant was convicted of counts one, three, six, and eight – the trafficking counts. For these offenses, appellant was sentenced to two years on count one; four years on count three; four years on count six; and five to seven and a half years on count eight. The trial court ordered all prison sentences to be served consecutively for a total prison term of 15-17.5 years in prison. Appellant submitted a timely notice of appeal and raises two assignments of error. Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 10 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I. MS. BEVINS’ CONVICTIONS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND ARE CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MS. BEVINS BY IMPROPERLY SENTENCING HER TO CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR OF I {¶18} In her first assignment of error, appellant contends that her convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant contends that as to the controlled buy that occurred on September 13, she had no involvement whatsoever even though the drugs were purchased at the Campbell Avenue residence, because she cannot be seen on the video of the controlled buy and the confidential informant did not testify that appellant was present during the buy. She further avers that the mere offering of her home for the selling of drugs is not sufficient for a conviction of trafficking. She also asserts she was not guilty of possession or drug trafficking the following day, when the search warrant was executed, because she did not constructively possess the drugs and the drugs were not found on her person. {¶19} The State counters that the evidence was sufficient and the convictions were not against the manifest weight because appellant was not merely present in the home, but an active participant in the offenses. The State points out that the task force found crystal methamphetamine and other drugs throughout the house. Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 11 Further, Bevins provided a statement that she knew Lewis had shown up with a large amount of drugs to sell out of the residence, for which she received an economic benefit of Lewis offering to pay the water bill. Further, the State claims that appellant was present during drug transactions at various times and clearly had knowledge the drugs were being sold and used there. Standard of Review {¶20} Because appellant challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence, we initially set forth both standards of review. {¶21} A claim of insufficient evidence invokes a due process concern and raises the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997), syllabus; State v. Blevins, 2019-Ohio-2744, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court's inquiry focuses primarily on the adequacy of the evidence; that is, whether the evidence, if believed, could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at syllabus. The standard of review is whether, after viewing the probative evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 12 {¶22} Furthermore, under the sufficiency of the evidence standard, a reviewing court does not assess “whether the state's evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a conviction.” Thompkins, supra, at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). Therefore, when reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, an appellate court must construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 205 (1996); State v. Grant, 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 477 (1993). A reviewing court will not overturn a conviction on a sufficiency of the evidence claim unless reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion the trier of fact did. State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 162 (2001); State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 484 (2001). {¶23} “Although a court of appeals may determine that a judgment of a trial court is sustained by sufficient evidence, that court may nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence.” Thompkins, supra, at 387. “The question to be answered when a manifest weight issue is raised is whether ‘there is substantial evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all the elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Leonard, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 81, quoting State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 193-194 (1998), citing State v. Eley, 56 Ohio St.2d 169 (1978), syllabus. A court that considers a manifest weight challenge must “ ‘review the entire record, weigh the evidence and Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 13 all reasonable inferences, and consider the credibility of witnesses.’ ” State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-493, ¶ 208, quoting State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 328. However, the reviewing court must bear in mind that credibility generally is an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67 (2001); State v. Murphy, 2008-Ohio-1744, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.). “ ‘Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly competent to decide “whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses,” we must afford substantial deference to its determinations of credibility.’ ” Barberton v. Jenney, 2010-Ohio-2420, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Konya, 2006-Ohio-6312, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), in turn quoting State v. Lawson, 1997 WL 476684 (2d Dist. Aug. 22, 1997). {¶24} Thus, an appellate court will generally defer to the trier of fact on evidence weight and credibility issues, as long as a rational basis exists in the record for the fact-finder's determination. State v. Picklesimer, 2012-Ohio-1282, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.); accord State v. Howard, 2007-Ohio-6331, ¶ 6 (4th Dist.) (“We will not intercede as long as the trier of fact has some factual and rational basis for its determination of credibility and weight.”). Accordingly, if the prosecution presented substantial credible evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the essential elements of the offense had been established, the judgment of conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accord Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 14 12, quoting Thompkins, supra, at 387, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990) (a judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence when “ ‘ “the greater amount of credible evidence” ’ ” supports it). {¶25} Consequently, when a court reviews a manifest weight of the evidence claim, a court may reverse a judgment of conviction only if it appears that the fact- finder, when it resolved the conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” Thompkins, supra, at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983); accord McKelton at ¶ 328. Finally, a reviewing court should find a conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Thompkins, supra, at 387, quoting Martin, supra, at 175; accord State v. Clinton, 2017-Ohio-9423, ¶ 166; State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 483 (2000). Legal Analysis {¶26} At the outset, we observe that although the jury found appellant guilty of trafficking and possession, the trial court merged the possession counts with the trafficking counts. Thus, if sufficient evidence supports appellant’s trafficking convictions, an erroneous verdict on the merged counts would be harmless. See State v. Foster, 2023-Ohio-746, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.); State v. Whitehead, 2022-Ohio- Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 15 479, ¶ 78 (4th Dist.); State v. Worley, 2021-Ohio-2207, ¶ 73; see also State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-4693, ¶ 54 (4th Dist.) (because court does not impose sentence for merged offenses, defendant is not “convicted” of merged offenses and thus, there is no “conviction” for appellate court to vacate). Consequently, if we determine that sufficient evidence supports appellant’s trafficking convictions, we need not address her sufficiency argument regarding the possession offenses. {¶27} In addition, we acknowledge that for each of the drug offense counts the State was required to prove the identity and amount of drugs recovered. However, appellant does not take issue with these elements. Appellant’s arguments focus solely on whether she was complicit in the trafficking of the drugs themselves, as the State alleged at trial. We therefore limit our discussion accordingly. September 13, 2023 - Count One {¶28} Count one of the indictment alleges that appellant committed aggravated trafficking in drugs, pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (C)(1)(d). Relevant to our discussion, R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) provides: “[n]o person shall knowingly * * * sell or offer to sell a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.” R.C. 2901.22(B) defines the culpable state of “knowingly: A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 16 circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact. {¶29} R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) states that “[n]o person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall * * * [a]id or abet another in committing the offense.” “ ‘A conviction for aiding and abetting under R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) requires the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, “that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal.” ’ ” State v. Crumpton, 2024-Ohio-5064, ¶ 30 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Smith, 2022-Ohio-371, ¶ 53 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240 (2001), syllabus. “ ‘ “Participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense is committed.” ’ ” Id., quoting Johnson at 245, quoting State v. Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d 29, 34 (4th Dist. 1971). Yet, “ ‘ “the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” ’ ” Id., quoting Johnson at 243, quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982). “ ‘This rule is to protect innocent bystanders who have no connection to the crime other than simply being present at the time of its commission.’ ” Id. Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 17 {¶30} Further, “[a] person's mere association with a principal offender is not enough to sustain a conviction based on aiding and abetting; there must be some level of active participation by way of providing assistance or encouragement.” State v. Anderson, 2009-Ohio-2521, ¶ 25 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Mootispaw, 110 Ohio App.3d 566, 570 (4th Dist. 1996). “Criminal intent, however, can be inferred from the presence, companionship and conduct of a criminal defendant both before and after the offense is committed and may be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Id., citing Mootispaw at 570, citing State v. McKnight, 2002-Ohio-1971, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.). {¶31} “ ‘We further observe that the complicity statute does not require the state to charge the defendant with complicity.’ ” Crumpton, 2024-Ohio-5064, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.), quoting Smith at ¶ 54. “ ‘Instead, R.C. 2923.03(F) allows the state to charge the defendant as a principal offender: “[a] charge of complicity may be stated in terms of [the complicity statute], or in terms of the principal offense.” ’ ” (Bracketed material in original.) Id., quoting R.C. 2923.03(F). {¶32} The State presented testimony that this offense occurred on September 13, 2023 at 408 Campbell Avenue, when Lewis sold approximately 29 grams (roughly an ounce) of methamphetamine. Appellant’s residence was 408 Campell Avenue, a trap house, where large amounts of drugs were being sold and people were coming and going at different times. It was the base of operation for the Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 18 drugs sales, or a “convenience store” for drugs where a large amount of drugs were found and stored. The confidential informant and the officers described the buy at trial, and video evidence supported their testimony. While it is true that appellant is not seen on the buy video, nor did the confidential informant testify to her presence during that specific buy, it is also clear that she knew full well that Lewis was selling drugs from her residence. She cooperated and encouraged Lewis by entering an agreement with him for which she received a benefit (him agreeing to pay the water bill). Circumstantial evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrant also supports the jury’s finding of guilt because drugs and drug paraphernalia (syringes and spoon which were signs of drug abuse) were found in the area of appellant, from which the jury could have concluded that appellant also received a benefit of drugs as part of the payment for allowing Lewis to sell out of the home. {¶33} Rather than mere association with Lewis, appellant clearly had the culpability of the principal of the count one trafficking offense. Appellant told law enforcement that when Lewis arrived at her home, he had three softball-size bags of drugs, and that Lewis had sold drugs at her house within at least the past week. Appellant also said she knew he sent out “testers” or samples out to drug users. Evidence at the trial showed that both before and during the execution of the search warrant, at least two other people in addition to the confidential informant Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 19 either purchased or attempted to purchase drugs from that location when appellant was present. In fact, a purchase was made by a user who injected fentanyl and smoked crack cocaine in the residence while the residents were there the next day. Thus, the State presented concrete evidence of three persons who had purchased or attempted to purchase drugs at the Campbell Avenue residence, and also that at least some of the persons may have been at the residence multiple times to purchase drugs. {¶34} In her argument, appellant cites two cases in particular where appellate courts have vacated convictions for complicity to drug trafficking. The first is State v. Jordan, 2006-Ohio-538 (8th Dist.). In Jordan, the appellate court observed that “there must be some evidence demonstrating that [the defendant] took an active role in the drug transaction.” Jordan at ¶ 11. Jordan involved a purchase from a confidential informant at a public convenience store. In Jordan, a law enforcement officer testified that he dropped off the confidential informant, who had a brief conversation with Jordan. After this brief conversation, Jordan and the confidential informant exited the store and approached a male standing outside from whom the confidential informant purchased the drugs while Jordan was merely “standing there.” Id. In Jordan, the state presented no evidence of what the confidential informant and Jordan discussed in the store, nor that Jordan Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 20 was a lookout of some sort. As a result, the appellate court found whether Jordan was complicit in the transaction was “mere speculation.” Jordan at ¶ 12. {¶35} The appellant also cites State v. Ricks, 2011-Ohio-5043 (6th Dist.), in support of her argument. In Ricks, the defendant was merely present during the crime, and nothing existed to connect the defendant to the drugs or participating in the setting up of the drug transaction. {¶36} We find these cases to be inapposite. The State established that the principal actor involving count one was Lewis, who was from the Dayton area, which is a source city. The task force members also explained the course of trafficking where members from a source city seek out persons of a destination city (Portsmouth) to sell drugs. Appellant clearly provided a place in Portsmouth, described as a type of “convenience store,” where Lewis could sell the drugs. In addition to providing the place to sell drugs, it is clear the drugs were kept there. Appellant admitted she had agreed to allow the sale of drugs from her residence in exchange for Lewis’ promise to pay the water bill. Further, there is at least some circumstantial evidence she also received a benefit by using the drugs as well. She admitted that she knew about Lewis selling from the home “a couple days before” and others selling drugs a week prior. Additionally, while the controlled buy occurred on September 13, the evidence obtained during the search warrant and the testimony from the confidential informant and drug purchaser constitute significant Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 21 evidence that appellant knew about and participated in the controlled buy of September 13. {¶37} Appellate courts have held that the providing of a place to sell and store drugs is sufficient involvement for a drug trafficking conviction. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 2012-Oho-5124, ¶ 41-42 (11th Dist.) (defendant guilty of drug trafficking when he rented the house where drug sale took place and police later recovered the drugs packaged for sale); State v. Kidd, 2007-Ohio-4113, ¶ 54 (11th Dist.) (where court held complicity instruction was proper because “[i]f for the sake of argument, [defendant’s] role in these activities were nothing more than allowing them to occur in the apartment, she could be found guilty of complicity”); State v. Scott, 2007-Ohio-303, ¶ 36-42 (5th Dist.) (complicity convictions supported by sufficient evidence where drug buys occurred at [the defendant’s] residence and drugs, paraphernalia, and firearms were found in her bedroom). Thus, even though the confidential informant did not see the appellant on the day he purchased the drugs, the manifest weight of the evidence supports the jury’s finding that appellant was complicit in the September 13 controlled buy. September 14, 2023 - Counts Three, Six and Eight {¶38} Similarly, there is also substantial evidence that appellant is guilty of counts three, six, and eight, under a complicity theory, even though appellant argues there is insufficient evidence that she constructively possessed the drugs. Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 22 Appellant’s convictions related to these counts involve drug trafficking under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2). The definition of drug trafficking under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2). R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) states: “[n]o person shall knowingly * * * [p]repare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for distribution, or distribute a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance or a controlled substance analog is intended for sale or resale by the offender or another person.” {¶39} Ohio courts have held that a drug trafficking conviction under a complicity theory does not require that the accomplice offender possess the drugs, as long as the state proves the principal offender possessed the drugs incident to the trafficking. See e.g., State v. McGowan, 2005-Ohio-1335 ¶ 18-22 (7th Dist.) (conviction upheld where the defendant provided transportation to facilitate a drug sale, even though he never possessed the drugs); State v. Wilcoxen, 2003-Ohio- 6061, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.) (evidence sufficient for drug trafficking under a complicity theory where defendant permitted the principal offender to carry on the drug sales from her home and shared in the proceeds of the sale); State v. Peavy, 2002-Ohio- 5067, ¶ 11, 27 (8th Dist.) (where court upheld a conviction for trafficking when defendant acted as a lookout and was complicit to the drug trafficking even though he himself did not possess the drugs). Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 23 {¶40} Ample evidence shows appellant was an accomplice to Lewis in the drug trafficking offenses related to the September 14, 2023 search warrant. Not only was she present during the sale to the male drug purchaser that day as well as when the female potential buyer showed up, she clearly provided her trap house residence for the transaction. She also received a benefit from providing her residence. {¶41} “ ‘To sustain an R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) trafficking conviction as a principal offender, the state must prove that a defendant had control over, i.e., possessed, the illegal substance.’ ” State v. Crumpton, 2024-Ohio-5064, ¶ 32 (4th Dist.) (Emphasis added.), quoting State v. Smith, 2022-Ohio-371, ¶ 59 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Cabrales, 2008-Ohio-1625, ¶ 30. In the instant case, the State presented a large amount of evidence that Lewis, the principal, possessed the drugs. In contrast, the State presented evidence that appellant was an accomplice, and not the principal of the drug trafficking offenses. However, even if she was required to possess the drugs related to search warrant trafficking counts, we still find that she constructively possessed the drugs, contra to appellant’s argument on appeal. {¶42} Possession “means having control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 24 found.” R.C. 2925.01(K). “ ‘Constructive possession exists when an individual knowingly exercises dominion and control over an object, even though that object may not be within his immediate physical possession.’ ” State v. Carr, 2025-Ohio- 2583, ¶ 27 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87, (1982), syllabus. “For constructive possession to exist, the state must show that the defendant was conscious of the object's presence.” Id., citing Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d at 91; State v. Kingsland, 2008-Ohio-4148, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.). “Both dominion and control, and whether a person was conscious of the object's presence, may be established through circumstantial evidence.” Carr at ¶ 28, citing State v. Foster, 2023-Ohio-746, ¶ 27 (4th Dist.), and State v. Brown, 2009-Ohio-5390, ¶ 19 (4th Dist.). {¶43} “ ‘Furthermore, to establish constructive possession the state need not show that the defendant had “[e]xclusive control” over the contraband.’ ” Carr at ¶ 29, quoting State v. Whitehead, 2020-Ohio-479, ¶ 91 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Tyler, 2013-Ohio-5242, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.). Additionally, “[m]ultiple persons may have joint constructive possession of an object.” Id., citing State v. Philpott, 2020- Ohio-5267, ¶ 67 (8th Dist.); State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 332-329 (“[p]ossession * * * may be individual or joint” and “control or dominion may be achieved through the instrumentality of another”). Further, “[a]lthough a defendant's mere proximity is in itself insufficient to establish constructive Scioto App. No. 24CA4105 25 possession, proximity to the object may constitute some evidence of constructive possession.” State v. Price-Tuggle, 2026-Ohio-1027,¶ 43 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Fry, 2004-Ohio-5747, ¶ 40 (4th Dist.). Thus, “ ‘presence in the vicinity of contraband, coupled with another factor or factors probative of dominion or control over the contraband, may establish constructive possession.’ ” Id., quoting Kingsland, 2008-Ohio-4148, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.). {¶44} Here, while drugs were not found on appellant’s person, they were found in the room where she was sitting and drug paraphernalia was also found close by. In the front room, as well as living room, the task force found a crystal- like substance on the floor. Not only were large quantities of various drugs found throughout the home where she resided and from where she provided permission to sell drugs, but drugs were found in the small room where she was located, some of which wer