State v. Harding

[Cite as State v. Harding, 2026-Ohio-3849.] STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF WAYNE ) STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 25AP0017 Appellee v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE JEFFREY ELMER HARDING COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 2024 CRC-I 000299 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: September 30, 2026 STEVENSON, Judge. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey Harding appeals from the judgment of the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas denying a motion to suppress and finding him guilty of aggravated trafficking in drugs. For the reasons set forth below, this Court affirms. I. {¶2} A grand jury indicted Mr. Harding on one count of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the third degree. He pleaded not guilty to the charge, and the matter proceeded. Mr. Harding moved to suppress the evidence against him on the basis that the officers did not have grounds to initiate the traffic stop or to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and the matter proceeded to trial. {¶3} There was testimony at trial that, on February 5, 2024, City of Wooster patrol officers assigned to a Community Impact Unit, a special unit that investigates drugs within the city, were working with the county drug task force agency Medway Drug Enforcement Agency  2 (“Medway”) and conducting surveillance on a house on Friendsville Road. The house, located directly across the street from the police department, was a known drug house that had been under surveillance for several months. {¶4} Officer Quinn McConnell is a police officer for the City of Wooster and a member of the Community Impact Unit. On that day, Officer McConnell was working in plain clothes and conducting surveillance on the Friendsville house in an unmarked car. He testified that he observed a truck driven by Mr. Harding pull in and park at the residence. Officer McConnell was familiar with Mr. Harding and his truck. He “had seen that vehicle on numerous other occasions and conducted surveillance on that vehicle prior to that day.” Officer McConnell “had significant intel prior to [February 5, 2024] that Mr. Harding was involved in drug activity” and he “had watched him engage in activity that was suspicious prior to this time[.]” {¶5} Officer McConnell observed Mr. Harding and the resident of the Friendsville house, who was “a known drug trafficker[,]” exit the truck and to talk to another individual who had been waiting in the driveway. The officer observed the resident and other individual enter the residence and Mr. Harding return to his truck and leave. Mr. Harding was at the residence for approximately 10 minutes. {¶6} Officer McConnell proceeded to follow Mr. Harding in the unmarked vehicle. He testified that he observed Mr. Harding commit a crosswalk violation as he was following him. Officer McConnell testified that he observed Mr. Harding make a right-hand turn off Friendsville Road without yielding to a family that was crossing the street in a marked crosswalk and had the right of way. According to the officer, the family had to stop in the roadway so Mr. Harding could proceed with the right-hand turn.  3 {¶7} Officer McConnell radioed City of Wooster Officer Shane Berry, who was working in a marked police cruiser and wearing police-identified clothing, and asked him to initiate a traffic stop of Mr. Harding. He asked Officer Berry to initiate a stop based on the observed crosswalk violation. There is no dispute that Officer Berry did not personally observe the crosswalk violation and that he initiated the traffic stop shortly after being contacted by Officer McConnell. {¶8} Officer Berry was also a member of the Community Impact Unit. He testified that, “[d]ue to the drug investigation,” he asked Agent Nathaniel Koch, a Medway canine handler, to come to the scene of the stop with his canine. Officer Berry testified that Mr. Harding informed him that he had dropped off a family member at the Friendsville residence and that he was heading to his mom’s house. Mr. Harding acknowledged having some marijuana in his possession. Officer Berry had Mr. Harding exit his truck while Agent Koch had his canine partner, Dedam who is trained in the odor of narcotics, conduct a “free air sniff” around the truck. {¶9} Agent Koch testified that Dedam detected the odor of narcotics near the front area of the truck. When near the front area of the truck, Dedam “showed a head snap and increase of respirations[,]” known as “bracketing,” which is indicative of narcotic detection. Dedam also “tried to go underneath the truck” to enter “the cabin space of the truck” and get to the detected narcotics. Agent Koch testified that Dedam’s behavior gave probable cause to search the vehicle. He advised Officer Berry of the positive canine alert. The validity of the free air sniff is not at issue in this appeal. Counsel for Mr. Harding acknowledged at a suppression hearing that “after the sniff occurred . . . [the officers] had grounds for a search” of the vehicle. {¶10} Agent Koch stood with Mr. Harding while Officer Berry conducted a probable cause search of the truck. Officer Berry found a black zippered pouch on the passenger side floorboard of the truck. He testified that he opened the pouch and discovered a methamphetamine  4 pipe, a small black bag of methamphetamine, and plastic baggies. Officer Berry discovered a larger bag of methamphetamine in the pouch after going back to the police station. Officer Berry advised Mr. Harding of his Miranda rights and placed him under arrest for possession of drugs. {¶11} The baggies of methamphetamine were sent to BCI for testing and BCI reported that the small baggie contained 1.4 grams of methamphetamine and the larger baggie contained 10.81 grams of methamphetamine. The black pouch, two baggies of methamphetamine, and BCI testing results were admitted into evidence at trial. {¶12} Mr. Harding testified in his own defense. He testified that he was helping the resident of the Friendsville house move and had finished the last load of moving. Mr. Harding testified that he drove the resident home and talked to her mother for a few minutes in the driveway while he wrapped up tie-down straps that were used in moving. He testified that the resident was in his truck for “a couple of hours easy” and he had learned from the resident that day that she is involved in drug trafficking. {¶13} Mr. Harding does not deny that individuals were coming across the road when he made the right-hand turn off Friendsville Road. He maintains that the individuals had “just started coming out into the road” as he was “already making [his] turn.” Mr. Harding testified that he “couldn’t stop in the middle” of the road and that is why he proceeded with the turn. {¶14} Mr. Harding testified that he had never seen the black pouch that was discovered in his truck. He described the black pouch as a “makeup pouch” that belonged to a female. Mr. Harding denied having any knowledge about the black pouch or its contents. {¶15} The jury found Mr. Harding guilty of aggravated possession of drugs. The court sentenced him to 24 months in prison. Mr. Harding appeals, asserting two assignments of error for our review.  5 II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I[] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS WHEN THERE WAS NO REASONABLE SUSPICION TO CONDUCT THE TRAFFIC STOP. {¶16} Mr. Harding argues in his first assignment of error that there was no reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop and that, therefore, the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. We disagree. Motion to Suppress {¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated: Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. (Citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “Pursuant to Burnside, ‘[o]nce this Court has determined that the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, we consider the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.’” State v. Sugden, 2024-Ohio-4442, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Iloba, 2021-Ohio-3700, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), citing Burnside at ¶ 8. Fourth Amendment {¶18} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” Article I, Section 14, of the Ohio Constitution contains nearly identical language.  6 The traffic stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810 (1996). Reasonable Suspicion {¶19} “[A] law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that an occupant is or has been engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Epling, 105 Ohio App.3d 663, 664 (9th Dist. 1995). See also Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996) (“[If] an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid . . . .”) “A stop is constitutionally valid provided the law enforcement officer has ‘a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.’” Sugden, 2024-Ohio-4442, at ¶ 16 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Roberts, 2006-Ohio-3042, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.); citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). {¶20} “Reasonable suspicion is something less than probable cause.” Epling at 664, citing State v. VanScoder, 92 Ohio App.3d 853, 855 (9th Dist. 1994). Reasonable suspicion “is something more than an unparticularized suspicion or mere hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” Roberts at ¶ 7, citing Terry at 1. “Thus, ‘the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.’” State v. Cunningham, 2015-Ohio-4306, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.), quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). To satisfy that standard, the law enforcement officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry at 21. {¶21} When “analyzing whether reasonable suspicion existed, this Court looks to the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search and considers whether those facts  7 would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. Blair, 2008-Ohio-6257, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.). “Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Bralek, 2018-Ohio- 2496, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.), citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981). The Court must consider “the totality of the circumstances as they were known to [the officer] prior to the time [the officer] stopped [the defendant], together with reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the circumstances . . . .” State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 40. Reasonable suspicion exists even if a defendant is not cited for the traffic violation. State v. Thayer, 2012-Ohio-3301, ¶ 21 (9th Dist.). Analysis {¶22} Mr. Harding argues that the traffic stop of his truck was pretextual and was really part of an undercover drug operation. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress where “[t]he alleged crosswalk violation was unsupported by articulable facts,” and “reasonable suspicion did not exist at the time the decision to seize was made[.]” It is his position that the State failed to present any evidence to support a crosswalk violation and that “the claimed crosswalk violation amounted to a label, not an articulable basis for a stop.” {¶23} The State argues that the “testimony by Officer McConnell and Officer Berry constituted competent and credible evidence” supporting the trial court’s factual findings that Officer McConnell observed a family crossing the intersection in the crosswalk; the family had to stop walking to yield to Mr. Harding; and that, based on his observations, Officer McConnell believed Mr. Harding had committed a crosswalk violation. The State maintains that the officer had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop.  8 {¶24} The trial court found that Officer McConnell “observed a family crossing the intersection in the crosswalk” and that “[t]he family had to stop walking to yield to [Mr. Harding] as he made his right hand turn.” It found that “Officer McConnell articulated that he believed [Mr. Harding’s] conduct constituted a crosswalk violation” and that he had “a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation to justify the traffic stop[.]” We conclude that the trial court’s factual finding is supported by competent, credible evidence in the record. {¶25} At the time of the stop, R.C. 4511.46(A) provided that: When traffic control signals are not in place, not in operation, or are not clearly assigning the right-of-way, the driver of a vehicle, . . . shall yield the right of way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield . . . to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching so closely from the opposite half of the roadway as to be in danger. {¶26} Officer McConnell testified at the suppression hearing that he observed Mr. Harding commit the crosswalk violation. He testified that a family that included a man, woman, child in a stroller, and dog, were in a “clearly . . . marked area” of a crosswalk when Mr. Harding made a right-hand turn without yielding to the family. Officer McConnell testified that the family was “approximately halfway across the road” in the crosswalk when Mr. Harding turned right and that the family had to “stop[]” so that Mr. Harding could “proceed[] to make his right turn[.]” Based on his observation, it was “obvious[]” that Mr. Harding “was not going to yield” and that is why the family “stopped” in the crosswalk. {¶27} Mr. Harding does not dispute that a crosswalk violation constitutes a traffic violation and he acknowledged at the suppression hearing that a family was “on the road” when he proceeded to make a right-hand turn. He testified that he did not “see [the family] when I first pulled out there” and that he “was already turning when I [saw] them.” Mr. Harding claims that the family was “[o]n the other side of . . . [t]he center line” and in the other lane when he turned.  9 When asked by the trial court if the family “had already started crossing” or were “in [his] lane,” Mr. Harding responded “[i]t was like one in the road already, he was waiting on the kids and stuff.” Mr. Harding’s own testimony proves competent, credible evidence of his violation of R.C. 4511.46(A). {¶28} Based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop at issue in this case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Officer McConnell had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Mr. Harding committed a crosswalk violation. Mr. Harding argues that he was not cited for the traffic violation, but this court has found that reasonable suspicion can exist even if a defendant is not cited for the traffic violation. Thayer, 2012-Ohio-3301, at ¶ 21 (9th Dist.). He also argues that the traffic stop was a pretext for a search for drugs, but “[w]here a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution even if the officer had some ulterior motive for making the stop, such as a suspicion that the violator was engaging in more nefarious criminal activity.” Dayton, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, at syllabus. The observed violation was sufficient to initiate a traffic stop of Mr. Harding’s vehicle. Mr. Harding’s first assignment of error is, accordingly, overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II MR. HARDING’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. {¶29} Mr. Harding argues in his second assignment of error that his aggravated possession of drugs conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. {¶30} When considering a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court is required to consider the entire record, “weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier  10 of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist. 1986). “A reversal on this basis is reserved for the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Croghan, 2019-Ohio-3970, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.). This Court “will not overturn a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of fact chose to believe the State's version of events over another version.” State v. Barger, 2016-Ohio-443, ¶ 29 (9th Dist.). {¶31} Mr. Harding argues that “the State’s case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence” and that it failed to prove he knowingly possessed a controlled substance. He points out that the black pouch was found on the passenger-side floorboard, an area that was “inaccessible to him while driving and immediately after transporting a passenger[,]” and that no forensic testing was done on the pouch. The State argues that it “met its burden of persuasion regarding the ‘knowingly’ and ‘obtain or possess’ elements of the charged aggravated possession of drugs offense.” {¶32} Mr. Harding was found guilty of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), which provides: (A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog. R.C. 2925.11(C) provides: (C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of one of the following: (1) If the drug involved in the violation is a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance in schedule I or II, with the exception of marihuana, cocaine, L.S.D., heroin, any fentanyl-related compound, hashish, and any controlled substance analog, whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of aggravated possession of drugs. The penalty for the offense shall be determined as follows: ...  11 (b) if the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds the bulk amount but is less than five times the bulk amount, aggravated possession of drugs is a felony of the third degree, and there is a presumption for a prison term for the offense. {¶33} Possession or possess “means having control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.” R.C. 2925.01(K). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B). {¶34} “‘[A] person may knowingly possess a substance or object through either actual or constructive possession.’” State v. Henry, 2026-Ohio-1012, ¶ 39 (9th Dist., quoting State v. Hilton, 2004-Ohio-1418, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.). “‘Constructive possession exists when an individual knowingly exercises dominion and control over an object, even though that object may not be within his immediate physical possession.’” State v. Kendall, 2012-Ohio-1172, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87 (1982), syllabus. This Court has also recognized that “‘the crucial issue is not whether the accused had actual physical contact with the article concerned, but whether the accused was capable of exercising dominion [and] control over it.’” State v. Graves, 2011- Ohio-5997, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Ruby, 2002-Ohio-5381, ¶ 30 (2d Dist.). “Ownership need not be proven to establish constructive possession.” State v. Sarvabui, 2020-Ohio-1429, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). We have previously noted that the jury is entitled to find that the defendant constructively possessed a controlled substance based on “‘the drugs’ presence in a usable form and in close proximity to the defendant.’” Henry at ¶ 39, quoting State v. Figueroa, 2005-Ohio- 1132, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.).  12 {¶35} The State's evidence showed through Officer Berry’s testimony that the drugs were found on the passenger side floorboard of Mr. Harding’s truck. Mr. Harding was the only occupant in his truck at the time of the stop. At the time of the stop, Mr. Harding was the only person able to exert dominion and control of the drugs. {¶36} Mr. Harding does not dispute that the drugs were found in his truck. He maintains that he had no knowledge about the existence of the black pouch or drugs. Mr. Harding testified at trial that he had no knowledge about the black zippered pouch that was discovered in his truck. {¶37} The jury clearly did not believe Mr. Harding’s testimony about his knowledge of the drugs. “Generally credibility determinations are for the trier of fact because ‘a trier of fact enjoys the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses.’” State v. Samamra, 2025-Ohio-126, ¶ 34 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Tyus, 2020-Ohio-4455, ¶ 57 (9th Dist.). The jury is best positioned to decide which version to believe. Id. Generally, “[this Court] will not overturn [a jury’s] verdict on a manifest weight of the evidence challenge simply because the jury chose to believe certain witnesses’ testimony” over the testimony of others. State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-196, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.). {¶38} Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we cannot conclude that this is an exceptional case where the trier of fact clearly lost its way in finding that Mr. Harding was guilty of aggravated possession of drugs. The State presented evidence that Mr. Harding was in constructive possession regardless of ownership or whether he had actual physical possession. See Henry at ¶ 40. The drugs were found in an easily accessible area of Mr. Harding’s truck. The State also introduced testimony that methamphetamine is a controlled substance, a Schedule II drug and that the amount involved exceeded the bulk amount of three grams. Mr. Harding has not shown how the jury erred in its determination of his credibility.  13 {¶39} Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Harding’s conviction is not against the weight of the evidence and his second assignment of error is overruled. III. {¶40} Based on the foregoing, Mr. Harding’s assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant. SCOT STEVENSON FOR THE COURT FLAGG LANZINGER, P. J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.  14 APPEARANCES: YU MI KIM-REYNOLDS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. ANGELA WYPASEK, Prosecuting Attorney, and JOSEPH F. SALZGEBER, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.