State v. Neff
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledSeptember 22, 2026
Docket26 NO 0536
JudgeHanni
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Neff, 2026-Ohio-3719.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
NOBLE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN P. NEFF,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 26 NO 0536
Criminal Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas of Noble County, Ohio
Case No. 225-2089
BEFORE:
Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.
JUDGMENT:
Affirmed.
Atty. Jordan C. Croucher, Noble County Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee and
Atty. Edward F. Borkowski, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.
Dated: September 22, 2026
–2–
HANNI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jonathan P. Neff, appeals from a Noble County
Common Pleas Court judgment convicting him of nine counts of rape of his step-daughter,
following a jury trial. Appellant argues on appeal that his convictions were not supported
by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because
Appellant’s convictions are supported by both the sufficiency and the weight of the
evidence, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} Mother has one daughter, I.T. Mother was married to Appellant for several
years and Appellant lived with mother and I.T.
{¶3} On the morning of July 11, 2024, mother left for work. Appellant was to
drop I.T., who was ten years old at the time, off at his mother’s house for the day. Later
that day, when mother picked I.T. up from Appellant’s mother’s house, mother noticed
that I.T. seemed withdrawn and was not acting like her usual, talkative self. Upon
questioning by mother, I.T. began crying and shaking. She told mother that that morning,
Appellant had forced her to put his “privates” in her mouth. Mother immediately called
Appellant’s family members and told them to come get Appellant out of her house. Next,
mother took I.T. to the sheriff’s department and reported what I.T. had just disclosed. A
forensic interviewer was called in to interview I.T. I.T. was cooperative and talkative with
the interviewer when discussing her day. But as soon as the interviewer asked I.T. why
she was there, I.T. shut down and would not discuss what had happened.
{¶4} Appellant never returned to Mother’s house and their divorce was final in
October 2024. In the meantime, no progress was made on the case. In 2025, Mother
contacted the sheriff’s department to inquire why the investigation had stalled.
{¶5} On May 15, 2025, I.T. had a second forensic interview. Once again, I.T.
appeared comfortable and talkative when discussing school, her pets, and her daily
routine. Once the interviewer turned to the subject of why she was there, I.T. became
quiet and withdrawn. This time, however, she was more open with the interviewer. I.T.
disclosed that Appellant had made her put his “private” in her mouth on multiple
occasions. She said that it happened more than three times, more than five times, and
about ten times. I.T. stated that Appellant would do this in the kitchen and in the
Case No. 26 NO 0536
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bathroom. She told the interviewer that sometimes something white, “like water” would
come out of Appellant’s private and she would spit it in the trash. I.T. also described an
instance where Appellant made her take her clothes off and lay on her mother’s bed while
Appellant put his “private” on her “private.”
{¶6} On July 29, 2025, a Noble County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on nine
counts of rape of a child under age 13, first-degree felonies in violation of R.C. 2907.02(B).
Appellant entered a not guilty plea to the charges.
{¶7} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on January 21, 2026. The jury heard
testimony from I.T., Appellant, and several other witnesses. It found Appellant guilty on
all counts.
{¶8} The court held a sentencing hearing on February 5, 2026. It sentenced
Appellant to the statutorily-mandated sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole
after ten years on each of the nine counts. It ordered Appellant to serve the sentences
on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 consecutively to each other but concurrently with the sentences
on Counts 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Thus, Appellant’s total sentence is life in prison with the
possibility of parole after 40 years. The court also classified Appellant as a Tier III sex
offender.
{¶9} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on February 10, 2026. He now
raises two assignments of error for our review.
{¶10} Appellant’s first assignment of error states:
APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS WERE UNSUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE.
{¶11} Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.
Appellant was convicted on nine counts of rape. He points out the only count that I.T.
testified to in detail was the last instance that occurred on July 11, 2024, where I.T.
testified that Appellant put his penis in her mouth when they were in the kitchen. Appellant
concedes the evidence was likely sufficient on this one count. But he claims that as to
the other eight counts there was no evidence of what he allegedly did or where he did it.
{¶12} Sufficiency of the evidence is the legal standard applied to determine
whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient as a
matter of law to support the verdict. State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113 (1997).
Case No. 26 NO 0536
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Sufficiency is a test of adequacy. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).
Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. Id. In
reviewing the record for sufficiency, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d
at 113.
{¶13} A sufficiency of the evidence challenge tests the burden of production while
a manifest weight challenge tests the burden of persuasion. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d
at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). Therefore, when reviewing a sufficiency challenge, the
court does not evaluate witness credibility. State v. Yarbrough, 2002-Ohio-2126, ¶ 79.
Instead, the court looks at whether the evidence is sufficient if believed. Id. at ¶ 82.
{¶14} The jury convicted Appellant of nine counts of rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b), which provides: “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another
who is not the spouse of the offender . . . when . . . [t]he other person is less than thirteen
years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of the other person.”
{¶15} Mother was the first witness to testify. She stated that while she was
married to Appellant she worked weekdays, during the day. (Tr. 154). Appellant worked
swing shifts. (Tr. 155). On days when Appellant was available, he helped to care for I.T.
(Tr. 155).
{¶16} Mother testified that on July 11, 2024, she left for work in the morning. (Tr.
158-159). Appellant volunteered to take I.T. to his mother’s house, where I.T. was going
to spend the day. (Tr. 158-159). When mother picked I.T. up from Appellant’s mother’s
house later that day, she noticed that I.T.’s demeanor was “off.” (Tr. 159). Normally,
mother testified, I.T. is hyper and talkative. (Tr. 159-160). But that day I.T. did not want
to tell mother about her day and just wanted to go home. (Tr. 160). Mother pried for a
bit. (Tr. 160). I.T. then “broke down” and started shaking and crying. (Tr. 161). I.T. told
mother she did not want to tell her what happened because she was afraid mother would
get hurt. (Tr. 161). I.T. told mother that Appellant made her “stick his private parts in her
mouth.” (Tr. 164).
{¶17} Mother immediately called Appellant’s family members to get Appellant out
of her house. (Tr. 162). Next, she called the sheriff’s department. (Tr. 162). Mother and
Case No. 26 NO 0536
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I.T. went to the sheriff’s department where Ginger Davey, a caseworker with the
department of job and family services, conducted a forensic interview with I.T. (Tr. 164).
{¶18} Mother testified that she has a camera for security in her living room but she
does not have a subscription for saving the video. (Tr. 167-168). Still, she had access
to an older video from March 5, 2024. (State Ex. A; Tr. 170). The video showed I.T.
walking from the kitchen area toward the bathroom carrying Appellant’s tee shirt and
sweatpants. (State Ex. A; Tr. 173).
{¶19} Mother testified that she began taking I.T. to counseling in 2024. (Tr. 191).
I.T. was diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr.
192).
{¶20} On cross-examination, mother admitted she had been angry with Appellant
for cheating on her with his ex-wife, which she learned of in February 2024. (Tr. 177,
188). As a result of this, she and Appellant worked on their marriage through counseling.
(Tr. 188). She filed for divorce in October 2024. (Tr. 186). Mother learned that Appellant
was engaged in February 2025. (Tr. 186). She contacted law enforcement in April 2025,
to inquire about the investigation in this case as no progress had been made. (Tr. 186).
{¶21} I.T. testified next. She was 11 years old at the time of trial. (Tr. 201). She
testified that the reason she was testifying is because something happened between
Appellant and her at her house. (Tr. 205). She stated that Appellant had been her step-
dad. (Tr. 205). The prosecutor asked I.T. what happened between her and Appellant.
(Tr. 206). I.T. responded that, “[h]e put his privates in my mouth.” (Tr. 206). When asked
what she meant by “privates”, I.T. explained it was “[h]is bottom, between his legs.” (Tr.
206). When asked what Appellant’s private part looked like, I.T. described it as looking
“[l]ike a finger” and “skin color.” (Tr. 207).
{¶22} The prosecutor continued:
Q And when this happened, where were you?
A In the house or the kitchen.
Q In the kitchen?
A Yeah.
Q Did it just happen one time?
Case No. 26 NO 0536
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A More than once.
Q Did you say more than once?
A Yeah.
Q More than three times?
A Yeah.
Q More than five times?
A Yeah.
Q More than ten times?
A About ten times.
Q Did it always happen in the kitchen?
A No.
Q Where else did it happen?
A The bathroom.
Q Any other places?
A No.
Q Was this all on the same day?
A No.
Q Different days?
A Yes.
Q Do you remember the last time it happened?
A No, I don’t remember the date, but I remember it happening.
Q Do you remember about when it would have happened? Let me ask
you this. Were you in school when it happened?
A No, it was done in the summer.
Case No. 26 NO 0536
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Q Would it have been last summer or the summer before that or when?
A Not last summer but the summer before.
(Tr. 207-209). She later explained that all of the times happened in the summer when
she was ten years old. (Tr. 211, 214).
{¶23} I.T. went on to explain that after it happened the last time she told her mom
when she picked I.T. up from Appellant’s mother’s house. (Tr. 209). I.T. testified that it
happened that time in the kitchen by the sink. (Tr. 209). And she stated that when it
happened in the bathroom, she was by the bathroom sink. (Tr. 211).
{¶24} In explaining the last time Appellant raped her, I.T. stated that Appellant
“took his pants down and told me to sit on the chair.” (Tr. 211). Appellant then “put it in
[her] mouth.” (Tr. 211). Again, I.T. stated that “it” looked “[l]ike a finger” and it was
“pointing out.” (Tr. 211-212). I.T. described that Appellant would hold his privates when
he put it in her mouth and a white goo came out into her mouth. (Tr. 212). She said
whenever she was in the kitchen, she spit the goo into the trash can. (Tr. 212-213). She
also stated that when she was in bathroom, she did the same. (Tr. 213).
{¶25} I.T. testified that Appellant told her not to tell her mother because her mother
would get mad at her. (Tr. 213).
{¶26} In addition, I.T. testified that on one occasion, Appellant put his private on
her private but it did not go in. (Tr. 214). Appellant then had her “dry” him with a towel.
(Tr. 214-215). She stated that she was counting this as one of the ten times. (Tr. 214).
{¶27} Davey was the State’s next witness. Davey is a forensic interviewer and
caseworker for the department of job and family services. She was called by law
enforcement on July 11, 2024, to conduct a forensic interview of I.T. (Tr. 235). The State
then played the video of the July 11, 2024 interview (first interview). (State Ex. B2; Tr.
239-241).1
{¶28} During the beginning of the interview, I.T. was very talkative while she was
discussing what she did that day. (State Ex. B2). But her demeanor instantly changed
when Davey tried to delve into the purpose of the interview. When asked if she knew why
1 The transcript refers to the video of the first interview as State Exhibit B1. It is actually State Exhibit B2.
State Exhibit B1 is the second interview that took place May 15, 2025.
Case No. 26 NO 0536
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she was being interviewed, I.T. told Davey it was because something that she did not like
happened at home. (State Ex. B2). I.T. also told Davey that she did not want to talk
about it. (State Ex. B2; 49:19).
{¶29} After the video of the first interview was played for the jury, the State
continued questioning Davey. When asked about her observations, Davey pointed out
that I.T. was initially very open and engaging while she was talking about things that she
was comfortable talking about. (Tr. 245). But when Davey tried to get to the point of why
she was there, I.T.’s disposition “changed entirely.” (Tr. 245). Davey noted that I.T.
became “withdrawn, putting her head down, lack of eye contact, getting upset at times,
not actually crying, but you could just hear it in her breath, her voice lower, her vocabulary,
where she was very open, became very closed.” (Tr. 245-246).
{¶30} Davey testified that she conducted a second forensic interview of I.T. on
May 15, 2025 (second interview). (Tr. 256). The State played the video of the second
interview for the jury. (State Ex. B1; Tr. 252).
{¶31} For approximately the first 15 minutes of the interview, I.T. is bubbly and
talkative while she spoke about school, her daily routine, and her pets. (State Ex. B1).
But as soon as Davey asked I.T. about why she is there, I.T. began crying and said about
“what happened.” (State Ex. B1; 16:43). I.T. stated that something happened with
Appellant. (State Ex. B1; 24:16). At first, I.T. wrote down what happened with Appellant.
(State Ex. B1; 27:36). I.T. wrote, “he put his private in my mouth.” (State Ex. B1; 27:37).
Davey asked I.T. where on his body was Appellant’s “private” and I.T. indicated between
her legs. (State Ex. B1; 27:46). Davey asked I.T. if she saw Appellant’s private and I.T.
nodded “yes.” (State Ex. B1; 27:49). Davey asked what it looked like and I.T. showed
Davey her finger. (State Ex. B1; 28:45). I.T. stated that she saw Appellant’s private
because he had on a shirt but no pants. (State Ex. B1; 29:12). She told Davey that this
happened in her kitchen. (State Ex. B1; 29:29).
{¶32} Davey asked I.T. if this happened one time or more than one time. (State
Ex. B1: 29:44). I.T. responded “more than once.” (State Ex. B1; 29:45). Davey asked
I.T. if it was more than three times and I.T. responded “yeah.” (State Ex. B1: 29:56).
Davey then asked if it was more than five times and I.T. said “yeah.” (State Ex. B1;
29:59). Davey asked if was more than ten times and I.T. responded “maybe.” (State Ex.
Case No. 26 NO 0536
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B1; 30:03). Next, Davey asked if it always happened in the kitchen to which I.T.
responded “no” and then stated it also happened in the bathroom. (State Ex. B1; 30:16).
I.T. also told Davey that it happened on different days. (State Ex. B1; 30:32). I.T. told
Davey that the last time it happened was “last summer.” (State Ex. B1; 30:46). I.T. then
described that she was home alone with Appellant. (State Ex. B1; 31:19). I.T. told Davey
that it happened in the kitchen by the sink. (State Ex. B1; 31:56).
{¶33} I.T. next told Davey that Appellant made her “dry him” with a towel. (State
Ex. B1; 33:36). When she did this, I.T. stated she saw Appellant’s whole body with no
clothes on. (State Ex. B1; 39:58). On this occasion, I.T. said Appellant did not make her
put his private in her mouth. (State Ex. B1; 35:29). Davey then asked I.T. if Appellant
ever put his private anywhere other than her mouth and I.T. nodded “yes.” (State Ex. B1;
35:46). I.T. said that Appellant’s private went on her private. (State Ex. B1; 35:49). I.T.
said this only happened once. (State Ex. B1; 36:33). I.T. said this happened in her
mother’s room on her bed. (State Ex. B1; 36:48; 37:20). Appellant told her to take her
clothes off. (State Ex. B1; 40:11). I.T. demonstrated for Davey how Appellant had her
lay on the bed. (State Ex. B1; 42:03). She told Davey Appellant’s private did not go
inside of her body. (State Ex. B1; 42:45). I.T. said Appellant moved his private up and
down on top of her private. (State Ex. B1; 42:53). Appellant told I.T. that her mom would
be mad if I.T. told her about this and I.T. would not be able to go on any trips. (State Ex.
B1; 44:00).
{¶34} Davey asked I.T. if anything ever came out of Appellant’s private when he
put it in her mouth and I.T. nodded “yes.” (State Ex. B1; 44:35). I.T. told Davey “it was
disgusting”, “off white”, and “like water.” (State Ex. B1; 44:41). I.T. stated that she spit it
out into the trash can. (State Ex. B1; 45:03). I.T. indicated the “white stuff” did not come
out every time. (State Ex. B1; 45:17). I.T. also stated that when this happened in the
bathroom, she spit it in the sink. (State Ex. B1; 47:06).
{¶35} Davey then testified that based on things like spontaneous responses and
body language, I.T. did not appear to have been coached. (Tr. 255). She also testified
that she purposely misstated how many incidents happened in the bedroom to see if I.T.
would correct her, which she did, indicating truthfulness. (Tr. 255).
Case No. 26 NO 0536
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{¶36} The State’s final witness was Noble County Sheriff’s Captain Kelly
McGilton. Cpt. McGilton became involved in this case in 2025, around the time mother
had called to check on the case’s progress. (Tr. 288-289). She testified that this case
had been left open since July 2024 because while they thought something had happened,
they were initially unable to substantiate charges being filed. (Tr. 289). Cpt. McGilton
learned that I.T. had since disclosed more details so she requested that Davey conduct
the second forensic interview. (Tr. 289-290). The captain reviewed the second interview
and determined that an interview with Appellant was needed. (Tr. 291). Cpt. McGilton
went to Appellant’s residence to speak with him. (Tr. 292). She recorded the entire
interview. (Tr. 292). The interview was played for the jury. (Tr. 296; State Ex. C).
{¶37} The interview took place on July 24, 2025, when Cpt. McGilton went to
Appellant’s house. During the first several minutes, the captain introduced herself and
asked Appellant if he would be amenable to counseling to help “close out” this matter.
(State Ex. C; generally). Appellant initially denied “doing anything” with I.T. (State Ex. C;
7:07). But he stated he would go to counseling if the captain wanted him to do that. (State
Ex. C; 7:16). Appellant offered to sign up for counseling and email Cpt. McGilton the
receipts, logs, and “whatever you need.” (State Ex. C; 8:10). She then asked him “no
vaginal sex, correct?” and Appellant answered “correct.” (State Ex. C; 8:24). She later
asked Appellant if he could, would he apologize to I.T. (State Ex. C; 12:20). Appellant
said “yes” that he would apologize for the way he acted with her, how he lost his temper,
and how he was not the best step-dad. (State Ex. C; 12:21).
{¶38} When asked if some sexual things happened with I.T., Appellant stated that
his “behavior could have been better.” (State Ex. C; 13:48). When pressed, Appellant
admitted he meant “not just anger.” (State Ex. C; 14:03). The captain then asked, “that
includes sexual is that correct?” to which Appellant responded, “that’s the one thing I can’t
say.” (State Ex. C; 14:21). She asked again if anything sexual happened with I.T. and
Appellant said that he was not going to comment on that. (State Ex. C; 15:30). Appellant
told the captain he had two children and he was not going to say anything that would
jeopardize his future with them. (State Ex. C; 15:48). Appellant later stated that he was
“in a very dark place” at that time. (State Ex. C; 18:10). He stated, “I should have done
better. I should have been a better step-father.” (State Ex. C; 19:20).
Case No. 26 NO 0536
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{¶39} Cpt. McGilton then told Appellant she knew there was some sexual contact
with I.T. (State Ex. C; 20:52). She asked him to confirm that there was no vaginal
penetration, which he confirmed. (State Ex. C; 21:05). She then asked how many times
total did he have sexual contact with I.T. and asked if it was less than ten or more than
ten. (State Ex. C; 21:12). Appellant responded, “I honestly can’t remember.” (State Ex.
C; 21:48). She asked again, “you can’t remember?” and Appellant responded, “I’ve done
a lot to forget my past, to bury that.” (State Ex. C; 21:50). And a bit later Cpt. McGilton
asked “would you say the sexual contact was more than five but less than ten?” (State
Ex. C; 24:31). Appellant responded, “I one hundred percent I [sic] do not remember.”
(State Ex. C; 24:49).
{¶40} The captain asked once again if Appellant ever had vaginal intercourse with
I.T. and he responded in the negative. (State Ex. C; 26:26). She then asked, “any other
inappropriate contact . . . would you say it was less than ten times?” (State Ex. C; 26:34).
Appellant responded, “I think.” (State Ex. C; 26:47). She asked, “is it possible it was a
little bit more than ten times?” (State Ex. C; 26:49). Appellant answered, “I don’t think
so.” (State Ex. C; 27:00). Next she asked “kitchen, bathroom, bedroom, correct?” and
Appellant responded, “I was a shitty human being in the whole house.” (State Ex. C;
27:09, 27:15).
{¶41} Appellant cites to several cases from the Eighth District, which he claims
support his position.
{¶42} In State v. Hemphill, 2005-Ohio-3726 (8th Dist.), the defendant was
convicted on 58 counts including numerous counts each of rape of a child under 13, gross
sexual imposition (GSI), and kidnapping with sexual motivation specifications spanning
two years. On appeal, the defendant argued he was convicted of a generic pattern of
abuse and there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. Relying on the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2005), the Eighth
District found there was no evidence offered as to actual numbers or specific incidents.
Id. at ¶ 82. It noted the victim testified that he touched her inappropriately on any
opportunity that he could do so, and the state offered a numerical estimate. Id.
{¶43} And in State v. Hlavsa, 2011-Ohio-3379 (8th Dist.), the defendant was
convicted of 63 counts of rape, GSI, and kidnapping involving his minor niece. On appeal,
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he argued the indictment violated his constitutional right to due process because it
contained numerous undifferentiated counts of rape and GSI. Once again, the Eighth
District cited to Valentine, 395 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2005), in reversing two rape convictions
and most of the GSI convictions. In that case the child-victim testified that vaginal
intercourse occurred “‘[m]aybe about 40 [times],’ and that digital penetration occurred
‘thirty times.’ She estimated that Hlavsa performed oral sex on her ‘maybe seven or eight
times’ and that he touched her in the hot tub ‘[m]aybe like 30 times.’” Id. at ¶ 9. The court
found that the estimates did not provide sufficient specificity to identify the acts that would
support the remaining counts. Id. at ¶ 21.
{¶44} Finally, in State v. Thomas, 2011-Ohio-705 (8th Dist.), the defendant relied
on Valentine in support of his assertion that the carbon copy indictment failed to provide
him with adequate notice because it did not connect each sexual battery count to a distinct
incident. The Eighth District found there was sufficient evidence to differentiate four out
of ten counts of GSI.
{¶45} In Valentine, the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s grant of habeas corpus relief to the defendant on all but one of his 40
convictions, holding that multiple, undifferentiated rape charges in the indictment violated
the defendant’s constitutional rights to due process and against double jeopardy. In that
case, the victim “described typical abuse scenarios and estimated the number of times
the rapes occurred, e.g., ‘about 20,’ ‘about 15’ or ‘about 10’ times.” Id. at 628.
{¶46} This Court has directly determined not to follow Valentine. We discussed
the reasons for this in detail in State v. Palmer, 2021-Ohio-4639, ¶ 24-27 (7th Dist.):
As appellant acknowledges, we are not bound by Valentine and do
not follow Valentine. State v. Miller, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 120,
2018-Ohio-3430; State v. Adams, 7th. Dist. Mahoning, No. 13 MA 130,
2014-Ohio-5854, 26 N.E.3d 1283; State v. Moats, 7th Dist. Monroe, No. 14
MO 0006, 2016-Ohio-7019; State v. Billman, 7th Dist. Monroe, Nos. 12 MO
3, 12 MO 5, 2013-Ohio-5774; State v. Clemons, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 10
BE 7, 2011-Ohio-1177. 2020-Ohio-633, ¶ 11-16.
One of our most recent decisions declining to follow Valentine is
State v. Thomas, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 18 MA 0025, 2020-Ohio-633, ¶
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14-17. There, Thomas was convicted of 19 counts of rape of a minor child.
Id. The indictment charged him with 16 counts of rape and 3 counts of rape
by force or threat of force. The first 16 counts identically charged that “on
or between August 12, 2011 and August 11, 2015,” Thomas engaged in
sexual conduct with the victim, the victim was less than 13 years old, and
he compelled the child victim to submit by force or threat of force. Id. at ¶
9. The other three counts charged that “on or between August 12, 2015
and February 29, 2016,” he engaged in sexual conduct with the victim and
compelled him to submit by force or threat of force. Id. On appeal, Thomas
relied upon Valentine and argued that the indictment violated his due
process and double jeopardy protections. He asserted that the “carbon
copy” charges of multiple counts of child rape failed to put him on notice of
the charges or protect him from any future prosecution for the same
offenses.
In deciding not to follow Valentine, we looked to our previous
explanation in State v. Triplett, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0128, 2018-
Ohio-5405:
As we recently stated in Miller, this court does not
follow Valentine. State v. Miller, 7th Dist., 2018-Ohio-3430,
[118] N.E.3d [1094], ¶ 30, citing, e.g., State v. Adams, 7th
Dist., 2014-Ohio-5854, 26 N.E.3d 1283, ¶ 36; Billman, 7th
Dist. Monroe Nos. 12 MO 3, 12 MO 5 at ¶ 34-36; State v.
Clemons, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 10 BE 7, 2011-Ohio-1177,
2011 WL 861847 (finding no due process violations and
opining potential double jeopardy concerns can be cured if
they arise in the future). This type of argument would
improperly protect a defendant who committed multiple
instances of the same offense against a child in his care.
Miller, 7th Dist., 2018-Ohio-3430, [118] N.E.3d [1094], at ¶ 31,
citing Billman, 7th Dist. Monroe Nos. 12 MO 3, 12 MO 5 at ¶
36. Contrary to the Valentine majority's claim, there is no
Case No. 26 NO 0536
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indication the jury would believe its finding of guilt on one
count of child endangering would require a conviction on
another count of child endangering merely because it
contained the same elements and the same date range.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit does not rely on Valentine as
precedent. Miller, 7th Dist., 2018-Ohio-3430, [118] N.E.3d
1094]. At ¶ 22, citing Coles v. Smith, 577 Fed.Appx. 502, 507-
508 (6th Cir. 2014) (rejecting this argument by a defendant in
a case of 43 undifferentiated counts of rape regarding his
step-daughter as Valentine used an incorrect standard for
habeas).
In declining to follow Valentine, we found that Thomas had not
offered any new arguments or new reasons why we should follow Valentine.
2020-Ohio-633, ¶ 17. We also cited to the victim's testimony that while he
did not recall the exact number of times Thomas raped him because it was
too many to count, he recalled that when he was nine, ten, eleven and
twelve years old, Thomas raped him at least once per season, and once
per season when he was thirteen years old. Id. at ¶ 18. We found that this
sufficiently established each count of the charges. Id.
{¶47} We next applied this reasoning to Palmer’s case. We explained that the
analysis in Thomas applied since the victim’s testimony was similar, but even more
specific. Id. at ¶ 28. We pointed to the victim’s testimony “that when appellant lived with
her and her family during the dates identified in the indictment, he forced his penis inside
of her vagina at least 10 times, put his mouth on her ‘private area’ more times than she
could count, but more than 10 times and less than 15, and digitally penetrated her more
than five times.” Id. We then affirmed Palmer’s convictions.
{¶48} Turning to the case at bar, based on our prior case law, the evidence here
was sufficient to support the nine counts of rape.
{¶49} I.T. testified that each of the rapes occurred during the summer of 2024 with
the last time occurring on July 11, 2024. She differentiated that some of the instances
Case No. 26 NO 0536
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occurred in the kitchen, while other occurred in the bathroom. She explained that
sometimes “white goo” came out of Appellant’s private, which she would then spit into the
trashcan, while other times nothing came out. I.T. testified that these instances with
Appellant happened about ten times. Each of these times, she said, happened on a
different day in the summer of 2024. One of those times, she stated, Appellant did not
put his private in her mouth but instead laid her down on her mother’s bed and placed his
private on her private. Thus, subtracting this time in the bedroom where oral sex did not
occur from the ten times, would leave nine counts of rape.
{¶50} Moreover, Appellant’s admissions to Cpt. McGilton further support his
convictions. While Appellant initially said he could not remember how many times he had
sexual contact with I.T., he later told the captain that he thought it was less than ten times.
And when the captain named three locations (kitchen, bathroom, bedroom), pertaining
the sexual contact, appellant told her “I was a shitty human being in the whole house.”
{¶51} In construing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, as we are required to do in a sufficiency challenge, the State presented
sufficient evidence to support each of Appellant’s convictions.
{¶52} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
{¶53} Appellant’s second assignment of error states:
APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶54} Here, Appellant contends his convictions were against the manifest weight
of the evidence. Appellant points out there was no physical evidence that corroborated
I.T.’s claims nor were there any other witnesses. He also claims there was no evidence
as to what he specifically did that constituted rape. Appellant goes on to assert that
mother had ample reason to fabricate these allegations against him. Appellant notes that
mother had become angry with him when she learned he had cheated on her. It was a
few months later, on July 11, 2024, when mother took I.T. to the sheriff’s office to file a
report yet I.T. did not disclose the rape to the authorities at that time. Then in February
2025, mother learned Appellant was engaged and his fiancé was pregnant. A few weeks
later, mother contacted the sheriff’s office to express her concern with the lack of
Case No. 26 NO 0536
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investigation. Appellant further contends he offered credible testimony in his defense
where he denied any sexual contact with I.T.
{¶55} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all
reasonable inferences and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380.
“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible
evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” Id. at
387, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) (Emphasis sic). In making its
determination, a reviewing court is not required to view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution but may consider and weigh all of the evidence produced at
trial. Id. at 390.
{¶56} Yet granting a new trial is only appropriate in extraordinary cases where the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175
(1st Dist. 1983). This is because determinations of witness credibility, conflicting
testimony, and evidence weight are primarily for the trier of the facts who sits in the best
position to judge the weight of the evidence and the witnesses’ credibility by observing
their gestures, voice inflections, and demeanor. State v. Rouse, 2005-Ohio-6328, ¶ 49
(7th Dist.), citing State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 205 (1996); State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio
St.2d 230, 231 (1967). Thus, “[w]hen there exist two fairly reasonable views of the
evidence or two conflicting versions of events, neither of which is unbelievable, it is not
our province to choose which one we believe.” State v. Dyke, 2002-Ohio-1152 (7th Dist.).
{¶57} Only when “it is patently apparent that the factfinder lost its way,” should an
appellate court overturn the jury verdict. State v. Woullard, 2004-Ohio-3395, ¶ 81 (2d
Dist.). If a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a new trial is to be
ordered. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. “No judgment resulting from a trial by jury
shall be reversed on the weight of the evidence except by the concurrence of all three
judges hearing the cause.” State v. Miller, 2002-Ohio-4931, ¶ 36 quoting Ohio Const.,
art. IV, § 3(B)(3).
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{¶58} In considering whether Appellant's convictions are against the manifest
weight of the evidence, in addition to the State's evidence, we must also consider
Appellant's testimony.
{¶59} Appellant testified that he is on the autism spectrum and suffers from
Asperger’s Syndrome, which affects how he communicates and makes it difficult for him
to express emotion and communicate effectively. (Tr. 350-351).
{¶60} Appellant testified unequivocally that he never engaged in sexual conduct
with I.T. (Tr. 351). And he testified that he never made her put her mouth anywhere on
his body. (Tr. 351).
{¶61} Appellant testified that when he agreed to speak with Cpt. McGilton he
believed that he would be able to explain himself and that, if he cooperated, this matter
would be resolved. (Tr. 352). He acknowledged that during the interview, he described
himself as a bad step-father. (Tr. 352). By a “bad” step-father, Appellant explained that
he was talking about his anger, yelling at I.T., and his lack of controlling his anger. (Tr.
353). Appellant said he was not talking about sexual conduct with I.T. (Tr. 353). He
stated he agreed to go to counseling because of his anger issues. (Tr. 353).
{¶62} Appellant explained that he answered “I’m not going to comment on that” to
the question regarding whether he resented sexual things that may have happened
between I.T. and him. (State Ex. C; Tr. 355-356). When pressed by the captain about
how many times sexual contact between him and I.T. occurred, Appellant answered, “I
honestly can’t remember.” (State Ex. C; Tr. 358). Appellant’s counsel asked Appellant
why he answered the question that way and Appellant said he was “[t]rying to say no
without saying no since no had previously not worked on the detective and she wasn’t
taking no for an answer.” (State Ex. C; Tr. 358). He also testified that he did not
understand tha