State v. Carlson

[Cite as State v. Carlson, 2026-Ohio-3462.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 2025-CA-29 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2025 CR 099 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas JAMES ROBERT CLIFFORD : Court) CARLSON : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & Appellant : OPINION ........... Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on September 4, 2026, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24. Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket. For the court, MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE EPLEY, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.  OPINION CHAMPAIGN C.A. No. 2025-CA-29 JOHN A. FISCHER, Attorney for Appellant KARA N. RICHTER, Attorney for Appellee HUFFMAN, J. {¶ 1} James Robert Clifford Carlson appeals from a judgment entry of conviction on one count each of assault on a peace officer and obstructing official business (“obstruction”). For the following reasons, the judgment of the Champaign County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} On September 3, 2025, Carlson was indicted for assault and obstruction. He was charged in relation to an altercation with sheriff’s deputies who responded to the home of Carlson’s parents on a report that he was experiencing a mental health crisis. A jury trial occurred on November 5, 2025, and the jury found Carlson guilty of both counts in the indictment. The trial court imposed concurrent prison sentences of 18 months for assault and 12 months for obstruction. The court also imposed concurrent fines of $250 on each count. Carlson timely appealed. Assignments of Error and Analysis Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence {¶ 3} Carlson asserts three assignments of error. We consider his first two assigned errors together. He initially argues that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. According to Carlson, “even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, it is plain that the State failed to prove that [he] had the requisite mental state to commit” assault and obstruction. He claims that law enforcement “escalated the situation by 2 attempting to tase [him] and, failing that, immediately rushing to tackle him.” Carlson argues that he “had no time to think” and “reacted instinctively” in order to escape the “gang-tackle.” {¶ 4} As to the assault offense, Carlson argues that he “only struggled with the officers at the moment he was jumped by them” and did not act knowingly. He claims he “was compliant and did nothing improper or violent against any of the officers.” As to obstruction, Carlson again asserts that he was merely “reacting by instinct not by any planning, and as a result, not with any purpose,” and he claims he “could not be expected to react in any other way.” He analogizes his offense to an innocent bystander being charged with obstruction after being startled by a police officer in pursuit of a suspect on foot and bumping into the officer, thereby allowing the suspect to escape. According to Carlson, “[i]nstinctive reactions should not form the basis of an obstructing-official-business charge.” {¶ 5} In his second assignment of error, Carlson argues that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. He claims, again, that he “simply fought back,” because he was “the subject of an unprovoked and unexpected attack.” He directs our attention to the testimony of Detective Brandon Fenwick, which he asserts “shows conclusively that [Carlson] did not initiate the struggle.” Carlson argues that the evidence was clear that he, “while in the throes of a mental health crisis, was attacked out of the blue by three officers in a darkened room after being unsuccessfully tased.” He asserts that “no reasonable jury could conclude” that he assaulted the officers or obstructed official business. He acknowledges that it is “unfortunate” that an officer was injured but argues that he should not be blamed. {¶ 6} In State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997), the Supreme Court of Ohio clarified the distinction between appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence and appellate review of the weight of the evidence. A sufficiency of the evidence argument 3 relates to whether the State “presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), citing Thompkins. “In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law.” Thompkins at 386. {¶ 7} The test for sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991): An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. In other words, on review for sufficiency, courts are to assess not whether the State’s evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a conviction. Thompkins at 390. {¶ 8} A weight of the evidence argument, on the other hand, challenges the believability of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is more believable or persuasive. Wilson at ¶ 12, citing State v. Hufnagel, 1996 WL 501470, *3 (2d Dist. Sept. 6, 1996). The proper test to apply to a manifest weight of the evidence inquiry is set forth in State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983): “[T]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the 4 evidence, the jury lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” {¶ 9} “In order to find that a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred, an appellate court must conclude that a guilty verdict is ‘against,’ that is, contrary to, the manifest weight of the evidence presented.” Wilson at ¶ 14, citing State v. McDaniel, 1998 WL 214606 (2d Dist. May 1, 1998). “Typically, in manifest weight review, we defer to trial court decisions on credibility issues, as those courts are in the best position to make that determination.” State v. Curtis, 2020-Ohio-4152, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Lawson, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (2d Dist. Aug. 22, 1997). Put differently, our review of witness credibility is not de novo. State v. Reillo, 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 22. {¶ 10} “Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts, manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding of sufficiency.” State v. Flores-Lopez, 2017-Ohio-690, ¶ 49 (2d Dist.), citing State v. McCrary, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.); accord State v. Robinson, 2015-Ohio-1167, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). As a result, “a determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.” Robinson at ¶ 17, citing State v. Braxton, 2005-Ohio-2198, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). {¶ 11} R.C. 2903.13 proscribes assault on a police officer and states in relevant part: (A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another . . . . ... 5  (C)(1) Whoever violates this section is guilty of assault . . . . Except as otherwise provided in division (C) . . . (5) . . . of this section, assault is a misdemeanor of the first degree. ... (5) If the assault is committed in any of the following circumstances, assault is a felony of the fourth degree: (a) The victim of the offense is a peace officer . . . while in the performance of the officer’s . . . official duties.” {¶ 12} R.C. 2901.22(B) sets forth the definition of how and when a person acts knowingly: A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact. {¶ 13} R.C. 2921.31 governs obstruction and states: (A) No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official's lawful duties. 6  (B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of obstructing official business. Except as otherwise provided in this division, obstructing official business is a misdemeanor of the second degree. If a violation of this section creates a risk of physical harm to any person, obstructing official business is a felony of the fifth degree. “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22 (A). {¶ 14} At trial, Deputy Brian Fenwick of the Champaign County Sheriff’s Office testified that on August 25, 2025, he was dispatched to an address on Apple Road on a report from Scott Carlson (“Scott”), Carlson’s father, that his son “was in a mental health crisis.” Fenwick stated that Cadet Adkins was with him, and Deputy Carnes also responded to the scene. Scott and Charles Cureton were outside the home when the officers arrived. Scott advised officers that Carlson “was acting crazy” and “turning off the electricity to the house and turning on the gas to the gas stove and [letting] it just go fill up the house with gas.” According to Fenwick, Scott was dependent on an oxygen tank 24 hours a day, and without electricity, his tank defaulted to a battery pack. Fenwick testified that Cureton advised that Carlson was “off his rocker” and had been carrying an “edged weapon,” like a hatchet or an axe. {¶ 15} The officers entered the home and spoke to Carlson’s mother, who was visibly upset. Carlson’s mother directed the officers to Carlson’s bedroom down a hallway. Fenwick stated that “my concern was getting eyes on the defendant” at that point. As Fenwick approached the bedroom, he heard Carlson speaking to what Fenwick believed to be a type 7 of AI assistant. Fenwick said that Carlson was lying on his bed when he first observed him and that his bedroom was cluttered with “a lot of obstacles.” Fenwick was concerned that a weapon could be hidden in the room and also that officers might trip over the clutter if the situation were to escalate. Fenwick stated that Carlson did not want the officers to enter his room. Fenwick remained on the left side of the doorway in the hall “because when you’re dealing with somebody in a mental health crisis, giving them their distance is very important” to avoid adding to the person’s frustration. {¶ 16} Fenwick spoke to Carlson, expressing safety concerns for his parents due to the reports of the gas being turned on and the electricity being turned off, especially given Scott’s need for oxygen. Fenwick testified that Carlson told him that the reported issue was “a family matter.” According to Fenwick, Carlson “wasn’t making much sense,” asking Fenwick if he was color blind and mentioning “extraterrestrials.” Fenwick stated that the bedroom light was not working, so he and Carnes were using flashlights. The beams of light from the flashlights bothered Carlson, so they directed the lights toward the wall on the right. Fenwick said that “we weren’t trying to agitate him.” {¶ 17} Fenwick stated that because Scott relied on oxygen to “stay alive” and was also a smoker, he did not perceive Carlson’s reported conduct in turning off the electricity and turning on the gas “as normal behavior.” Fenwick wanted “to get him help” in a hospital setting with a mental health professional. He testified that he spoke to Carlson for 15 to 20 minutes, and the “first half of the conversation was pretty cordial,” with Fenwick “trying to build a rapport with him to keep him calm and trying to explain to him . . . why I wanted him to go to the hospital to be evaluated.” {¶ 18} Fenwick stated that, over time, Carlson became agitated, with his tone of voice changing. He asked Carlson, “James, will you just please go to the hospital with us?” 8 Fenwick stated, “We just want you to get checked out. I want to go peacefully.” According to Fenwick, Carlson then stood up, “clenched his fists,” and “flexed” his biceps and forearms in an aggressive manner, and it was “apparent that the agitation in him was . . . growing.” He described Carlson as “pretty muscular.” Fenwick indicated that Carlson “was just screaming ‘no’” and that Carlson “was going to blow his brains out.” Fenwick testified that he would not ask a suspect making such a threat if he had a gun, “because that . . . could prompt a response of him grabbing a gun, if a gun is present, and him blowing his head off.” Fenwick stated that he kept a calm demeanor, but Carlson kept clenching his fists. Fenwick explained that based on his training, knowledge, and experience at the police academy and other trainings, he perceives that “when a person is clenching their fists, odds are they’re not wanting to give up.” Police policy dictated getting Carlson into custody safely, according to Fenwick. {¶ 19} Fenwick testified that if a person “is showing that they are a threat to themselves or a threat to others,” law enforcement officials have the authority to place the person on a mandatory mental health hold, known as a “pink slip.” He stated that although he initially attempted to give Carlson the choice to seek help, which “gives a better outcome than going in there and acting like a jerk,” it became apparent that Carlson “wasn’t going to go peacefully.” Several times Fenwick told Carlson to turn around with his hands behind his back in a calm tone of voice, but Carlson refused to comply. {¶ 20} Fenwick “did not just want to go rushing into this bedroom,” but in the course of a “threat assessment” based on Carlson’s earlier reported possession of an edged weapon, the items cluttering the floor, and Carlson’s refusal to obey commands, Fenwick “opted to use [his] taser to disable him so that way we’d be able to take him into custody safely and get him to the hospital.” He testified that he was “trying to mitigate risk of injury to 9 myself, my partners, and Mr. Carlson.” Fenwick stated, however, that upon deploying his taser at Carlson, rather than becoming disabled, Carlson remained standing and was twisting and turning. {¶ 21} Fenwick and Carnes then entered the bedroom and grabbed Carlson, falling onto the bed with him. Fenwick lost his flashlight, the bedroom became “pitch black,” and he realized that Carnes had also lost his flashlight. Fenwick tried unsuccessfully to get a hold of Carlson’s arms, and he “felt [Carlson’s] mouth and his teeth” on his left forearm. Fenwick yanked his arm away, and Carlson began hitting him with a closed fist in his face and side of the head. Fenwick exchanged punches with Carlson in the struggle. He then felt Carlson’s mouth and teeth on his left hand and yanked it away. Fenwick felt Carlson’s “legs coming up” around his neck, feared he was going to be put in a choke hold, and called out to Carnes. Fenwick testified that if he had been alone and Carlson got his legs around his neck, “it would have resulted in a legal use of force.” Carnes and Adkins were able to gain control of Carlson’s legs while Carlson continued throwing punches. Fenwick testified he then applied a pressure point he learned at the police academy behind Carlson’s right ear. Carlson stated, “I’m done,” and stopped fighting. He was placed in handcuffs willingly, and EMS was called to evaluate him based on the use of the taser. Once outside, Carlson began moving his legs around, and he was briefly placed in shackles to prevent him from kicking the officers. The shackles were removed when “it was deemed that he was calm enough.” {¶ 22} The St. Paris Fire Department responded, and taser probes were located in Carlson’s “left pec muscle” and left hand. The probes were removed, and Carlson was medically cleared by EMS personnel. Fenwick stated that he had hoped Carlson would choose to voluntarily go the hospital for a “pink slip” and evaluation. Although Fenwick 10 repeatedly gave Carlson the opportunity to do so, after the altercation, he was arrested for obstruction and assault. {¶ 23} Fenwick sustained injuries to his arm, lip, shoulder, and behind his right ear. The injuries were photographed, and the photos were shown to the jury. Fenwick testified that he was still receiving treatment for his shoulder injury at the time of trial. {¶ 24} Deputy Brian Carnes of the Champaign County Sheriff’s Office testified consistently with Fenwick regarding the incident. Carnes stated that while Fenwick stood in the doorway of Carlson’s bedroom, Carnes was behind Fenwick to Fenwick’s right, while Adkins was behind Carnes. He stated that Fenwick tried to “de-escalate the situation” and persuade Carlson to go to the hospital. After Carlson stated that he would “blow his head off,” Fenwick “told him it wasn’t optional anymore.” Carnes testified that Carlson clenched his fists, flexed his muscles, and stated that “we were going to have to make him go to the hospital.” Carnes stated that after Carlson ignored repeated instructions to turn around and place his hands behind his back, Fenwick tased Carlson without effect before the officers tackled him onto the bed. Carnes said that Carlson fought them—putting his legs around Fenwick’s neck, punching Fenwick, and trying to bite Fenwick. {¶ 25} Finally, Deputy Amber Adkins testified that she was a cadet in the Sheriff’s Office on the date of the incident. She stated that Fenwick “tried to get James to go to the hospital voluntarily, explained that we just wanted to make sure everything was okay with him, and if everything was good, he would be released and he’d go about his day.” Consistent with Fenwick and Carnes, Adkins described the progression of Carlson’s agitation. She testified that she was initially behind Carnes and could not see into the room until Fenwick called out, and she followed Carnes into the bedroom. She said that Fenwick and Carnes dropped their flashlights during the incident, and the bedroom consequently 11 became completely dark. During the struggle, Fenwick had control of Carlson’s upper body, Carnes was at the area of Carlson’s mid-body, and she tried to control Carlson’s legs, which Carlson attempted to put around Fenwick’s neck. Adkins stated that she was hit in the head by Carlson’s calf, knocking off her sunglasses. {¶ 26} Having thoroughly reviewed the entire trial transcript and the wholly consistent testimony of the officers, we conclude that Carlson completely mischaracterizes the record in suggesting that he was attacked without warning, triggering an “instinctive” reaction. Fenwick made clear that his priority during Carlson’s mental health crisis was the safety of Carlson’s parents, the officers, and especially Carlson. He deliberately acted to prevent an escalation of events by remaining calm and giving Carlson multiple opportunities to agree to an evaluation in a peaceful manner. Fenwick acknowledged Carlson’s desire that officers not enter his room by maintaining a distance from him. In attempting to build rapport with Carlson and without commands, Fenwick explained to Carlson why he needed to go to the hospital, but Carlson declined to do so. {¶ 27} After a lengthy and calm effort by officers to assess and diffuse the situation, Carlson stood, clinched his fists, flexed his muscles, screamed “no,” refused commands to turn around, and threatened to “blow his brains out,” thereby at least suggesting the presence of a gun. Only after the incident had so escalated did Fenwick, relying on his training and experience, respond with his taser. He testified that he did so to mitigate any risk of injury to the officers and Carlson. At that moment, Fenwick was aware that Carlson had earlier carried an “edged weapon,” that Carlson was threatening, and that the clutter in the dark bedroom not only presented obstacles to the officers but also could have concealed a weapon. Contrary to Carlson’s assertion that he only struggled with the officers “at the moment he was jumped by them,” thereafter becoming compliant and nonviolent, he inflicted 12 injuries on Fenwick by punching Fenwick in the face and head, biting Fenwick, and trying to put Fenwick in a choke hold. Fenwick sustained visible injuries, and the injury to his shoulder still required treatment at the time of trial. Carlson’s innocent bystander analogy fails; he initiated the struggle. {¶ 28} After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that, if believed, any rational trier of fact could have found that Carlson knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to the responding officers, and that he purposefully hampered or impeded the officers in the performance of their lawful duties, creating a risk of physical harm with the specific intention of preventing his removal. Carlson’s concession that he “simply fought back” belies any suggestion that he did not act knowingly or with purpose, especially given Fenwick’s injuries. Carlson’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence. Further, the jury clearly found the officers’ testimony credible, and we defer to the jury’s assessment of credibility. Because the jury did not lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice, Carlson’s convictions are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, his first two assignments of errors are overruled. Discretionary Fines {¶ 29} In his third assignment of error, Carlson argues that the trial court erred in imposing a concurrent fine for each of his convictions. He asserts that while the court indicated that it considered his present and future ability to pay, “the evidence plainly showed [h]e did not have” any such ability. Carlson claims that it is “undisputed that, at the time of sentencing, the trial court considered Mr. Carlson to be indigent.” {¶ 30} Further, Carlson argues that “the only evidence admitted at the sentencing hearing was that [he] was not able to work at present and in the future.” He notes that he advised the court that he was pursuing a Social Security disability claim for both physical 13 and mental health issues. He argues that the State provided no evidence of his present and future ability to pay. {¶ 31} Finally, Carlson argues that if he had been convicted of an offense that required a mandatory fine, “he would have successfully completed the steps necessary for him to show that the fine should be waived,” but “[n]o such process appears to be required for a discretionary fine, even though [he] showed that he did not have the present or future ability to pay by following the necessary steps” in R.C. 2929.18(B)(1). According to Carlson, it was “unfair and prejudicial . . . to permit the trial court to impose a fine against him when he would have rebutted the imposition of such a fine in a mandatory-fine case.” {¶ 32} R.C. 2929.18 governs financial sanctions for felony offenses and authorizes both mandatory and discretionary fines. R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) states: “Before imposing a financial sanction under section 2929.18 of the Revised Code or a fine under section 2929.32 of the Revised Code, the court shall consider the offender’s present and future ability to pay the amount of the sanction or fine.” A hearing on the defendant’s ability to pay is not required, nor is the court required to make findings; “‘all that is required is that the trial court “consider” a defendant’s ability to pay.’” State v. Davenport, 2017-Ohio-688, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Hodge, 2011-Ohio-633, ¶ 55 (2d Dist.). Further, “[u]nder appropriate circumstances, a reviewing court may infer that a trial court considered the issue.” Id. {¶ 33} The procedural requirements differ significantly for mandatory fines. R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) requires that for a first, second, or third degree felony violation of any provision of R.C. Chapters 2925, 3719, or 4729, the sentencing court must impose on the defendant a mandatory fine of at least one-half of, but not more than, the maximum statutory fine amount authorized for the level of offense. “If an offender alleges in an affidavit filed with 14 the court prior to sentencing that the offender is indigent and unable to pay the mandatory fine and if the court determines the offender is an indigent person and is unable to pay the mandatory fine described in this division, the court shall not impose the mandatory fine upon the offender.” Id. Put differently, contrary to Carlson’s suggestion otherwise, the affidavit of indigency is only the first requirement; the trial court must still make a finding that the defendant is indigent. Further, “a determination that a criminal defendant is indigent for purposes of receiving appointed counsel is separate and distinct from a determination of being indigent for purposes of paying a mandatory fine.” State v. Dansby-East, 2016-Ohio- 202, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.). {¶ 34} At disposition, the court provided the parties with a 2021 pre-sentence investigation report completed after Carlson possessed and consumed fentanyl while he was an inmate at the Tri-County Jail. According to the prosecutor, in the 2021 case, Carlson “had four separate sets of community control violations,” was unsuccessfully discharged from multiple treatment programs, and was released from prison in January 2025. {¶ 35} When Carlson was asked by the trial court if he got a job upon his release from prison, he replied, “I am currently waiting determination of disability,” and said that “during that determination time I haven’t been able to seek employment.” He stated that his physical disability involved a “botched” ACL reconstructive surgery on his knee, as well as an undefined issue with his left elbow. The court confronted Carlson with the fact that it took three deputies to physically gain control of him, and Carlson responded, “I’m aware of their narrative.” {¶ 36} In imposing concurrent fines, the court found “that the Defendant has a present and future ability to pay [a] financial obligation” and that “Defendant is employable 15 notwithstanding his claim of physical disability.” As far as any mental disability, the court found “that the Defendant has not demonstrated commitment to employment.” {¶ 37} It was not the State’s burden to establish Carlson’s present and future ability to pay his fine, and Carlson provided no evidence regarding his alleged physical and mental disabilities. It was within the trial court’s authority to consider Carlson’s credibility in determining whether he was disabled and whether he had the present and future ability to pay the modest fine the court imposed. Carlson’s suggestion that he could have “rebutted” the imposition of a mandatory fine pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(1) based on indigency is speculative and lacks merit. The record reflects that the court properly considered Carlson’s present and future ability to pay his discretionary fine, and no more was required. Carlson’s third assignment of error is overruled. Conclusion {¶ 38} Carlson’s convictions for assault on a peace officer and obstruction are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court properly considered Carlson’s present and future ability to pay the concurrent fine imposed. Having overruled Carlson’s assignments of error, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. ............. EPLEY, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. 16