Full Opinion

[Cite as State v. Smith, 2026-Ohio-4611.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY STATE OF OHIO : : Appeal No. 30636 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CR 03190 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas MICHAEL RYAN SMITH : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION ........... Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 20, 2026, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24. Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket. For the court, CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, JUDGE LEWIS, P.J., concurs. TUCKER, J., concurs. OPINION MONTGOMERY Appeal No. 30636 STEPHEN E. PALMER, Attorney for Appellant MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee EPLEY, J. {¶ 1} Michael Ryan Smith appeals from his conviction in the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court on one count of rape, three counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and three counts of sexual battery. Smith asserts that the testimony regarding DNA evidence against him violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause and that the trial court erroneously permitted improper evidence and testimony. Additionally, Smith contends that his counsel was ineffective and that he was deprived of a fair trial. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. I. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} On November 25, 2024, Smith was charged with one count of rape, three counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, three counts of sexual battery, and one count of corrupting another with drugs. Following several continuances, a jury trial began on September 2, 2025. {¶ 3} The evidence introduced at trial indicated that Smith had sexually abused his 14-year-old step-daughter, M.N., multiple times on November 7, 2024. On that date, M.N. contacted her mother and her aunt to report Smith’s conduct. Police were also contacted. M.N. went to Dayton Children’s Hospital and underwent a SANE examination conducted by Ronda Norris, a forensic nurse. Norris observed multiple injuries on M.N.’s genitals during the exam and collected vaginal swabs. 2 {¶ 4} Erika Jimenez, a forensic scientist in the DNA section of the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”), testified that STR and Y-STR DNA tests had been conducted on the samples taken from M.N.’s SANE examination. STR testing refers to a traditional DNA test where a person can be identified based on the DNA received from both parents. Conversely, with respect to a Y-STR DNA test, Jimenez explained that females have two X chromosomes and males have an X and a Y chromosome; when conducting a Y-STR DNA test, all the female DNA is ignored and the focus is on looking for male DNA, which has the Y chromosome. {¶ 5} With respect to M.N., the results of the STR DNA testing were consistent with M.N.’s DNA, and four of the samples showed a mixture of M.N.’s DNA with another contributor. Because the amount of DNA that was mixed with M.N.’s was too small to be tested using the STR test, a Y-STR test was conducted on the samples. The Y-STR DNA testing of the samples from M.N.’s SANE exam showed that the Y-STR profile of the male DNA found in M.N.’s underwear was consistent with Smith, with a probability of 1 in 4,416 males. Unlike an STR DNA test, the Y-STR test identifies the Y chromosome that is passed from the father in a family line. Therefore, unlike an STR DNA test, where the odds are perhaps 1 in billions or trillions that the sample came from anyone else other than the contributor, Y-STR DNA only narrows the probability to men in the same familial line. {¶ 6} Notably, with respect to the DNA testing procedure, Jimenez testified that BCI uses a “teamwork approach.” There are analysts that take the samples, a robot team that does the quantification and amplification of the samples, and a report writer. Jimenez was the report writer, meaning that she took all the data collected, compared the samples to the reference sample, and wrote a report of her findings. Although she did not conduct the testing herself, Jimenez stated that she had reviewed the work of everyone involved in the 3 testing, and the method used for testing had been in accordance with nationwide standards for DNA testing. Additionally, following the completion of the final report, another qualified analyst conducts a technical review of the entirety of the work done on a sample prior to approving the final report. A supervisor also conducts an administrative review of the report. {¶ 7} Following the completion of the State’s case, during the submission of exhibits, Smith’s counsel objected to the admission of Jimenez’s report because she had not conducted the testing herself. He asserted that this violated Smith’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, because the analysts from the BCI who had conducted the testing were not called to testify. The trial court noted that Smith’s attorney had not objected to Jimenez’s designation as an expert witness and had declined to inquire as to her qualifications during her testimony. Further, Smith’s attorney had not raised any objection to the admissibility of Jimenez’s testimony while she was on the stand. Ultimately, the trial court determined that Jimenez’s report would not be admitted as an exhibit. However, the trial court declined to exclude Jimenez’s in-court testimony. {¶ 8} The jury found Smith not guilty of corrupting another with drugs and guilty of all the other charges. Smith was sentenced to a prison term of 11 to 16.5 years for the rape, which was merged with one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and one count of sexual battery. Additionally, the trial court merged the other counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and sexual battery and sentenced Smith to a prison term of 60 months on that offense. The trial court ordered that these sentences be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 21 to 26.5 years in prison. Smith was also classified a Tier III sex offender. {¶ 9} Smith appeals, raising seven assignments of error. II. Appellate Review 4 A. Jimenez’s Testimony Was Testimonial Hearsay in Violation of the Confrontation Clause but Any Error Was Harmless {¶ 10} In his first assignment of error, Smith asserts that the trial court erred by permitting Jimenez to offer testimony regarding the DNA testing of M.N.’s samples. Although she made the comparisons between the DNA samples and wrote the report on the findings, Jimenez did not take the samples or quantify them, and the analysts who did were not called to testify. Smith contends that this violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Further, although the trial court excluded Jimenez’s report, Smith argues that this did not remedy the violation of his rights because Jimenez’s in-court testimony was based on the information in the excluded report. Smith did not object to Jimenez’s testimony while she was on the witness stand; rather, the objection came after the close of the State’s evidence and during a review of the offered exhibits. {¶ 11} Ordinarily, we review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McNeal, 2019-Ohio-2941, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.). However, when a defendant asserts that the evidentiary decision violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, we apply a de novo standard. Id. {¶ 12} “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which contains many of the document’s protections for criminal defendants, commands that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” State v. Hale, 2024-Ohio-5579, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Confrontation Clause to prohibit the admission of testimonial statements of an absent witness during trial, unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 783 (2024). Further, the Confrontation Clause requires that statements that are (1) made out of court and introduced to prove the truth of the matter they assert (hearsay) 5 and (2) testimonial must be offered live and in the first person. Id. This includes forensic evidence. Id. Specifically, “[w]hen an expert conveys an absent analyst’s statements in support of his [or her] opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth . . . [a]nd if those statements are testimonial too . . . the Confrontation Clause will bar their admission.” Id. 1. Hearsay Prong {¶ 13} “The Confrontation Clause is concerned only with the introduction of hearsay,” which is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Hale at ¶ 22; see Evid.R. 801(C). “A statement offered ‘for a reason unrelated to its truth’ poses no Confrontation Clause problem.” Id., citing Smith at 785. This applies to the opinions of expert and lay witnesses, and “the prosecution may not introduce the contents of a sworn forensic report into evidence, unless that report’s author is available to confront the defendant.” Id. at ¶ 23. “Accordingly, the analysts who write reports that the prosecution introduces must be made available for confrontation,” irrespective of their qualifications or scientific acumen. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 661 (2011). {¶ 14} Jimenez’s testimony regarding the DNA testing was based on work done by analysts who were not called to testify. Specifically, when asked whether she had performed the testing, Jimenez testified: So at BCI, we work in a teamwork approach. So we have analysts that do the forensic biology portion where they take the samples. We have a robot team that does the middle steps, the quantification, the amplification. And then the final comparison step is the report writer’s job. And that’s where myself in this case took all the data, all the paperwork associated with the case. I made the actual comparisons between the evidence samples and the reference samples 6 and wrote a report to the findings. Tr. at 302. {¶ 15} Additionally, when asked to confirm that she did not actually conduct the STR or Y-STR DNA testing, Jimenez responded, “correct.” Tr. at 302. Jimenez went on to describe the testing and analysis process, stating: So [the analyst who performed the testing] actually did the exact same thing as me, but only in the traditional DNA testing. So then when the standard came in and a Y-STR testing also needed to be performed, I rewrote – and I completely didn’t even look at her results, rewrote the report and put the STR, the traditional testing, and the Y-STR comparisons in a new report, so that she wouldn’t have to test – two of us wouldn’t have to come here to testify should it go to court in the future. Tr. at 302-303. {¶ 16} Jimenez’s testimony established that her report was based on the results of testing conducted by analysts who were not called to testify. Further, the statements of the absent analysts only provided support to Jimenez’s report if they were true and the results of the absent analysts’ testing were accurate. Moreover, there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that the absent analysts were unavailable to testify, and Smith did not have any other opportunity to cross-examine them. Therefore, Jimenez’s testimony regarding the DNA testing constituted hearsay. 2. Testimonial Prong {¶ 17} To determine whether a statement is “testimonial” with respect to the Confrontation Clause, courts must first identify the out-of-court statement introduced and then examine the principal purpose for which the statement was made. Hale, 2024-Ohio- 7 5579, at ¶ 64 (1st Dist.). Generally, a statement will be considered “testimonial” if the declarant had a reasonable belief that the statement would later be used during a trial. {¶ 18} Jimenez’s testimony established that she was aware that the DNA testing at issue was being done because of a police investigation. Further, she specifically acknowledged that one of her considerations while preparing her part of the report was to avoid a situation where she and the analyst who conducted the testing would both have to testify. Accordingly, it is clear that Jimenez’s statements regarding the DNA testing were also testimonial. 3. Harmless Error {¶ 19} Because we have determined that Jimenez’s testimony regarding the DNA testing constituted testimonial hearsay, we must now engage in a harmless error analysis. “Harmless error review requires: (1) that the defendant was prejudiced by the admission of the improper evidence at trial, (2) that the appellate court believes that the error was not ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,’ and (3) that after excising the improper evidence, the remaining evidence overwhelmingly supports finding the defendant guilty.” State v. Smith, 2019-Ohio-3257, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Morris, 2014-Ohio-5052, ¶ 26-29. {¶ 20} In the present case, with respect to the first and second prongs, to the extent that Smith was prejudiced at all by the admission of Jimenez’s testimony, we believe that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, although testimony regarding DNA results is often compelling to a jury, Jimenez’s testimony included the acknowledgement that Smith’s DNA was not found during the standard DNA test. Instead, Smith’s DNA was found as a result of the Y-STR DNA testing, which only narrowed the probability of Smith being the contributor to a probability of 1 in 4,416 males. Unlike standard DNA test results that can narrow the probability of the DNA belonging to anyone other than 8 the suspect down to 1 in billions, the jury in this case heard testimony by Jimenez that this sample had much higher odds of being connected to someone other than Smith. Additionally, Jimenez acknowledged on cross-examination that she did not conduct every step of the testing and described BCI’s “teamwork approach” for the jury in detail. Jimenez also informed the jury that she had conducted the comparison of the DNA samples and documented her findings in her report. Therefore, although the jury heard Jimenez’s testimony regarding the Y-STR DNA test matching a sample from Smith, the jury also heard her testimony as to the odds that Smith was not actually the contributor of the DNA as well as the fact that she did not personally conduct each step of the testing. This allowed the jurors to assign the weight they determined was appropriate to Jimenez’s testimony and the DNA results. Accordingly, we find that the error in allowing Jimenez’s testimony was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. {¶ 21} As to the third prong, even without Jimenez’s testimony, the evidence of Smith’s guilt was overwhelming. M.N. testified in detail about the assaults. Additionally, both M.N.’s mother and aunt testified regarding M.N.’s demeanor after the sexual assaults, as well as what M.N. told them about Smith’s conduct. Notably, one of the allegations M.N. made against Smith was that he had used sex toys on her. This was corroborated by the testimony of M.N.’s mother, who stated that Smith had purchased the sex toys previously, and she had informed Smith that she had no interest in them. {¶ 22} M.N. also alleged that Smith had used a massage gun on her inappropriately and that he had sexually abused her while in the hot tub at their home. Specifically, she alleged that, on the morning of November 7, 2024, she stayed home sick from school and got into the hot tub to try to feel better. However, Smith also got in the hot tub with M.N. and proceeded to penetrate her digitally and with sex toys. M.N. then got out of the hot tub and 9 went to her bedroom, at which point Smith came into her room and assaulted her again. During this assault, he used a massage gun as well. These allegations were corroborated by the testimony of Austin Warden, an officer for the Centerville Police Department. Officer Warden testified that he was present for the execution of the search warrant for the home M.N. shared with Smith, her mother, and her siblings. The search took place on November 7, 2024, after M.N. went to the hospital and reported the assaults to her aunt, uncle, and mother. During the search of the home, officers located a massage gun in M.N.’s bedroom and bathing suits hanging in the bathroom that were still damp. {¶ 23} Based upon the foregoing, the evidence against Smith was significant. Even without the consideration of Jimenez’s testimony, M.N.’s testimony, as well as the testimony of her mother, aunt, and the medical and law enforcement personnel who responded, overwhelmingly supported a finding of guilt. {¶ 24} Smith’s first assignment of error is overruled. B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Allowing Evidence of Prior Bad Acts under Evid.R. 404(B) {¶ 25} In his second assignment of error, Smith asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of an uncharged sexual assault and prior “grooming” behavior in violation of Evid.R. 404(B). Specifically, Smith argues that, during its opening statements, the State informed the jury that all the sexual assault allegations pertained to November 7, 2024. The remaining charge of corrupting another with drugs was the offense alleged by the State to have occurred on November 6, 2024. However, Smith contends that the State elicited testimony from M.N. regarding an additional alleged sexual offense that took place on November 6, 2024. Smith also asserts that, along with allowing evidence of an additional uncharged sexual assault, the trial court erred by allowing evidence of “grooming.” 1. November 6, 2024 10 {¶ 26} Smith bases this assignment of error on testimony pertaining to an uncharged incident in the family’s hot tub. However, because Smith’s attorney did not object during trial to the testimony regarding another alleged sexual assault in the hot tub on November 6, 2024, we can only review this issue for plain error. See State v. Hirschy, 2023-Ohio-3204, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.). {¶ 27} Pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B), “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” However, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” {¶ 28} With respect to the first and second elements, Evid.R. 404(B) allows evidence of a defendant’s “other crimes, wrongs, or acts to be admitted “for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Hartman, 2020-Ohio-4440, ¶ 22. The first step is to determine whether the evidence at issue is “relevant to the particular purpose for which it is offered.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 26. Evidence of prior bad acts must be probative of something other than the defendant’s character or propensity to behave in a certain way, and there must be substantial proof that the prior bad act was also committed by the defendant. Id. at ¶ 26-28. {¶ 29} Under Evid.R. 103(A)(1), “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and . . . [i]n case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from 11 the context.” “[P]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” See Evid.R. 103(D); Crim.R. 52(B). {¶ 30} “A finding of plain error is three-fold, requiring (1) an error or deviation from law, (2) that the error is plain, or an obvious defect in the proceedings, and (3) that the error affected ‘substantial rights,’ altering the outcome of the trial.” Hirschy, 2023-Ohio-3204, at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Payne, 2007-Ohio-4642, ¶ 16. However, plain error will not be found unless one can establish that the outcome of the trial clearly would have been different, absent the admission of the alleged improper evidence. State v. Conway, 2006-Ohio-791, ¶ 105. Plain error is recognized with the utmost caution, and reversal due to plain error is only appropriate when the record is clear that a defendant would not have been convicted absent the error. Id. {¶ 31} We do not find that the trial court’s decision to allow M.N.’s testimony regarding the November 6, 2024 incident in the hot tub was an error or deviation from the law, nor was it a plain defect in the proceedings. M.N. testified that, on November 6, 2024, after Smith rubbed a sex toy on her thigh while in his truck, she got into the hot tub at their home. Smith proceeded to get into the hot tub with her, at which point he inserted the same sex toy into M.N.’s vagina. This testimony was relevant to establishing that Smith’s intent was to use the sex toy on M.N. during the sexual assaults on November 7, 2024. M.N.’s testimony also established that the use of the sex toy was a common plan for Smith, as he used one on November 7, 2024, as well. Smith’s use of the sex toy on November 6, 2024 also demonstrated a lack of mistake or accident because Smith used the toy on M.N. on both November 6, 2024 and November 7, 2024. {¶ 32} Next, with respect to the third element, “the trial court must determine whether the proffered evidence – though admissible under Evid.R. 404(B) – is nevertheless more 12 prejudicial than probative.” Hartman, 2020-Ohio-4440, at ¶ 26-28, citing State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-5695, ¶ 20. Evid.R. 403(A) dictates that evidence must be excluded when its probative value “is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.” “‘Exclusion on the basis of unfair prejudice involves more than a balance of mere prejudice.’” State v. Sutherland, 2021-Ohio-2433, ¶ 28 (2d Dist.), quoting Oberlin v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 91 Ohio St.3d 169, 172 (2001). “Emphasis must be placed on the word ‘unfair.’” Id. Unfair prejudice is that quality of evidence which might result in an improper basis for a jury decision. Id. The major function of Evid.R. 403 is to prevent the admission of evidence that has very little probative force but is “dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” Id. at ¶ 29, quoting United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979). If the evidence arouses the emotions or sympathies of the jury, evokes a sense of horror, or appeals to an instinct to punish, the evidence is likely unfairly prejudicial and should be excluded. Id. at ¶ 28. {¶ 33} The probative value of M.N.’s testimony regarding Smith’s conduct in the hot tub on November 6, 2024, was not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Specifically, this testimony demonstrated Smith’s plan with respect to the assaults and demonstrated that he consistently used a sex toy on M.N. and also had a pattern of assaulting her while she was in the hot tub. The testimony regarding what occurred in the hot tub on November 6, 2024, included details consistent with the evidence and testimony presented regarding the assaults on November 7, 2024, and would not have been likely to arouse emotions in the jury that were not triggered by the testimony regarding the charged assaults. {¶ 34} Accordingly, the trial court did not commit plain error by allowing M.N.’s testimony regarding Smith’s conduct in the hot tub on November 6, 2024. 2. Grooming 13 {¶ 35} Additionally, Smith asserts that the trial court erred by allowing inadmissible evidence of grooming, in violation of Evid.R. 404(B). We have defined “grooming” as “‘deliberate actions taken by a defendant to expose a child to sexual material; the ultimate goal of grooming is the formation of an emotional connection with the child and a reduction of the child’s inhibitions in order to prepare the child for sexual activity.’” State v. Landers, 2017-Ohio-1194, ¶ 58 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-5695, ¶ 21. Notably, although enacted after Smith’s trial and conviction, grooming is now a criminal offense under R.C. 2907.071. {¶ 36} Smith contends that the State introduced evidence of grooming throughout his trial. He takes issue with the prosecutor’s statement to the jury during opening statements that it was also important for them to consider Smith’s conduct during the period leading up to November 7, 2024. Tr. at 113. The State also elicited testimony from M.N. and her mother regarding allegations that Smith had touched M.N. in a way that made her uncomfortable in May 2024 and took her to Victoria’s Secret to purchase underwear. Finally, Smith notes that, during the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor stated: “This didn’t start on November 7, 2024. It didn’t start on November 6. It started months prior with the Defendant, Michael Smith, thinking that he had the right to touch his stepdaughter. You heard testimony from both [M.N.] and [her mother]. The Defendant, Michael Smith, was touching M.N. inappropriately and it made her feel uncomfortable. But he didn’t stop. And things got worse.” Tr. at 354-355. {¶ 37} However, the State contends that none of this evidence constituted evidence of “grooming.” Rather, this testimony established M.N.’s fear of Smith, as well as Smith’s opportunity and motivation to assault M.N. The State further asserts that it did not present 14 this testimony to establish a pattern of grooming, but to show that Smith had a plan and opportunity to assault M.N. on November 6 and November 7, 2024. {¶ 38} Notably, Smith was charged with rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), which states that “[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force.” The record before us demonstrates that the State’s purpose for questioning M.N. about Smith making her uncomfortable in May 2024 was to establish the element of force, rather than grooming. During M.N.’s testimony, the following exchange took place: The State: Was there a previous time where you have asked [Smith] to stop touching you? M.N.: Yes. ... The State: Do you remember about how long prior to these incidents in November that this was? M.N.: I’m pretty sure it was around May. The State: May of that same year? M.N.: Yes. The State: Okay. What was his response when you asked him to stop touching you? M.N.: That I’m his stepdaughter and he can do whatever he wants to me. The State: Were you fearful of your stepfather? M.N.: Yes. The State: Why? M.N. He was always talking about how he was in the military and he had 15 friends that had been to jail and he could pretty much get away with anything. The State: Were there guns in your house? M.N.: Yes. The State: Whose guns were they? M.N.: They were my stepdad’s. The State: They were your stepdad’s? During any of these incidents that we’ve been talking about, did you feel like you could tell your stepdad no? M.N.: No. The State: Why not? M.N.: I was scared of what he would do. Tr. at 174-175. {¶ 39} Although this portion of M.N.’s testimony referenced a prior incident of Smith touching M.N. in May 2024, it is apparent from the State’s line of questioning that the purpose was not to introduce evidence of a prior bad act by Smith to establish his propensity for acting in accordance with that prior act. The State also did not accuse Smith of grooming M.N. Rather, the State’s questioning was a clear attempt to establish that M.N. feared Smith and that Smith had assaulted M.N. under the threat of force. This evidence was relevant because Smith’s statement to M.N. that he could do whatever he wanted to her, as well as his possession of firearms, made it more probable that M.N. was in fear of Smith and that the element of force or threat of force had been satisfied. Finally, this evidence was not more prejudicial than probative: the testimony regarding May 2024 was relevant to proving one of the elements of the rape charge. There is nothing in the record to suggest that any of the testimony or statements at issue would have triggered disproportionate emotions in the jurors or created an instinct to punish Smith. 16 {¶ 40} Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed M.N.’s testimony regarding a prior incident with Smith in May 2024 or the State’s instruction to the jury to consider Smith’s behavior towards M.N. leading up to November 7, 2024. {¶ 41} Smith’s second assignment of error is overruled. C. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Failing to Provide a Limiting Jury Instruction Regarding Evidence of Prior Bad Acts under Evid.R. 404(B) {¶ 42} In his third assignment of error, Smith asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to provide a limiting instruction to the jury regarding evidence of prior bad acts under Evid.R. 404(B). However, Smith’s trial counsel did not request any such instruction during the trial and therefore waived all but plain error. {¶ 43} “A defendant is entitled to an appropriate instruction limiting the scope of a jury’s consideration of potentially prejudicial evidence that is admitted for a limited purpose.” State v. McDaniel, 1992 WL 206759, *3 (2d Dist. Aug. 19, 1992). “However, a defendant may rationally choose not to avail himself of his right to a limiting instruction because of his concern that it will only remind the jury of the evidence to which the instruction applies, and thereby reinforce the prejudice.” Id. “Because there may be good reasons for a defendant to elect to waive his right to a limiting instruction, a reviewing court should be reluctant to find plain error where a defendant has not requested a limiting instruction.” Id. {¶ 44} Here, the failure to provide a limiting instruction regarding evidence of prior acts did not constitute plain error. Specifically, even without the State’s references to the prior incidents in May 2024, it is not clear that the jury’s verdicts would have been different. The evidence against Smith included M.N.’s firsthand testimony regarding Smith’s conduct and the testimony of M.N.’s mother and aunt, who spoke to M.N. immediately following the last assault on November 7, 2024. Further, M.N.’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of multiple law enforcement officers and the SANE nurse who conducted M.N.’s 17 forensic examination. Accordingly, the outcome of the trial would not have been different if the trial court had given a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the submission of other acts evidence. {¶ 45} Smith’s third assignment of error is overruled. D. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Allowing the Testimony of the SANE Nurse {¶ 46} In his fourth assignment of error, Smith asserts that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the jury to hear testimony by Ronda Norris, the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner who conducted M.N.’s forensic examination at Dayton Children’s Hospital following the assaults on November 7, 2024. Smith contends that Norris was not designated as an expert and her testimony violated Evid.R. 702 and 703, as well as Crim.R. 16(K). {¶ 47} The Ohio Rules of Evidence delineate two forms of opinion testimony: lay and expert. “The distinction between lay and expert witness opinion testimony is that lay testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while expert testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.” State v. Wells, 2022-Ohio-30, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting 28 Ohio Jur.3d, Criminal Law: Procedure, § 1641; see State v. McKee, 91 Ohio St.3d 292, 297, fn. 2 (2001). {¶ 48} A lay witness may testify about opinions or inferences that are “(1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” Evid.R. 701. In other words, a witness must have first-hand knowledge of the subject of his or her testimony and the opinion must be one that a rational person would form based on the observed facts. It also must help the trier of fact in understanding the testimony of the witness or determining a fact at issue. Wells at ¶ 18; State v. Bolling, 2005-Ohio-2509, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). 18 {¶ 49} Pursuant to Evid.R. 702, a witness may testify as an expert if the proponent can demonstrate to the court that the witness’ testimony pertains to matters beyond the knowledge and experience of lay people, the witness possesses specialized knowledge, skill, or training, and the testimony is based on reliable scientific or technical information. See Evid.R. 702. Further, Evid.R. 703 dictates that the facts or data upon which an expert bases his or her opinion “may be those perceived by the expert or admitted in evidence at the hearing.” See Evid.R. 703. Finally, under Crim.R. 16(K), an expert witness is required to prepare a written report summarizing his or her testimony, findings, conclusions, or opinions, and that report must be disclosed to the court and opposing counsel prior to the trial. See Crim.R. 16(K). {¶ 50} Smith asserts that, although Norris was never qualified as an expert, her testimony went beyond her personal observations and pertained to issues beyond the knowledge of a lay person. Specifically, Smith contends that Norris improperly offered opinions that required specialized medical knowledge and training, including the cause of bleeding she observed during M.N.’s exam. Smith argues that M.N.’s credibility was at the core of this case and Norris’s opinions served as medical validation of M.N.’s claims. Smith also contends that, because Norris provided expert testimony, she had been required to submit a report under Crim.R. 16(K). {¶ 51} The Eighth District considered a similar question in State v. Bright, 2024-Ohio- 2803 (8th Dist.), in which a SANE nurse was not designated as an expert witness. The Eighth District held that her testimony “was permissible lay-witness testimony because the State laid a foundation demonstrating that the SANE nurse had sufficient experience and training, and that her testimony was based on personal knowledge and experience.” Id. at ¶ 25. Therefore, it was not plain error for the trial court to allow the testimony. Id. 19 {¶ 52} Similarly, Norris testified that she had been a forensic nurse at Dayton Children’s Hospital for six years and was certified as a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner for adults, adolescents, and pediatrics. At the time of her testimony, Norris had performed over 500 SANE examinations during her career. Norris further provided detailed testimony regarding the process of a SANE exam and the differences between an adult exam and a pediatric exam. With respect to her examination of M.N., Norris testified that she had observed injuries on M.N.’s genitals and recalled some vaginal bleeding. However, when Norris was asked whether she could determine whether the bleeding was menstrual bleeding or the result of an injury, Norris stated that it “appeared to be injury bleeding” because menstrual bleeding is usually a “deeper red color” and the sample at issue appeared to be merely “tinted.” (Emphasis added). Tr. at 265. Notably, on cross- examination, Norris acknowledged that she could not offer an opinion as to when the injuries occurred or what caused them. Id. at 269. Accordingly, the admission of Norris’s testimony was not plain error because the State laid a sufficient foundation of Norris’s training and experience, and Norris limited her testimony regarding M.N. to her own observations. Further, because Norris did not offer expert testimony, she was not required to submit a report under Crim.R. 16(K). {¶ 53} Smith’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. E. Smith’s Trial Counsel Did Not Render Ineffective Assistance {¶ 54} In his fifth assignment of error, Smith asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to review discovery before trial, failing to object to Norris’s testimony, and failing to request a limiting instruction regarding other acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B). We disagree. 20 {¶ 55} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, [a defendant] must demonstrate both that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the errors were serious enough to create a