State v. Hargrove

[Cite as State v. Hargrove, 2026-Ohio-2728.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MAHONING COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AKEEM MALIK HARGROVE, Defendant-Appellant. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case No. 25 MA 0097 Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio Case No. 2023 CR 00027 BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Mark A. Hanni, Katelyn Dickey, Judges. JUDGMENT: Affirmed. Atty. Elliot J. Kolkovich, Special Prosecuting Attorney, and Atty. C. Richley Raley Jr., Special Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee Atty. Stanley T. Booker and Atty. Melanie F. Womer, Law Firm of Stanley T. Booker, for Defendant-Appellant Dated: July 13, 2026  –2– WAITE, P.J. {¶1} Appellant Akeem Malik Hargrove appeals from a Mahoning County Common Pleas Court judgment convicting him of aggravated murder with an accompanying firearm specification following a jury trial. Appellant argues on appeal that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence; the trial court improperly excluded evidence that could have shown that the police did not conduct a thorough investigation; the trial court failed to exclude prior bad acts evidence; and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. His contentions as to the weight of the evidence and the other evidentiary issues are not supported by the record or by law and are overruled. Appellant’s assignment of error regarding his motion for a new trial is overruled on the basis that the motion was filed late. Appellant’s motion, based on jury misconduct, was required to be filed within 14 days of the verdict. Crim.R. 33(A)(2). The motion was filed well after the 14-day deadline. Appellant neither argued nor offered evidence that he was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion within 14 days, and thus, the trial court correctly dismissed the motion. As none of Appellant’s assignments of error have merit, his conviction and sentence are affirmed in full. Facts and Procedural History {¶2} On January 19, 2023, a Mahoning County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on charges of aggravated murder, an unclassified felony in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) and R.C. 2929.02(A) with an accompanying firearm specification (Count 1), and murder, an unclassified felony in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A)(D) and R.C. 2929.02(B) also with an accompanying firearm specification (Count 2). On July 19, 2024, a Mahoning County Case No. 25 MA 0097  –3– Grand Jury issued a superseding indictment. This superseding indictment did not affect Appellant’s charges, but added identical charges against co-defendant Zachary Bair. {¶3} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on August 11, 2025. {¶4} The victim of the crime was D.B. According to D.B.’s mother and his girlfriend, Appellant and D.B. had been close friends for many years. It was not until the fall of 2022 that the two had a falling out. {¶5} According to Appellant’s friend Arelis Jankovich, on the evening of December 21, 2022, Arelis picked up Appellant and brought him to her house on the south side of Youngstown so the two could eat and “hang out.” (August 11, 2025 Trial Transcript, hereinafter “Tr.,” 459.) Sometime later, Zachary Bair, dressed in black and wearing a mask, arrived at Arelis’s house and Appellant let him into the house. Bair visited for a period before purchasing some marijuana from Appellant. Bair used a kitchen knife with a teal-colored handle taken from a block of knives on Arelis’s counter to cut open the bag of marijuana. Bair then put the knife in his pocket. {¶6} Arelis stated that Appellant and Bair left the house together in her Jeep Cherokee. Appellant drove the Jeep even though Arelis had told him not to take it that evening. According to Bair, after driving around Youngtown, he and Appellant were travelling on South Avenue when Appellant spotted a Chevy Cruze vehicle in the parking lot of a Shell gas station. Upon seeing D.B. in the Cruze, Appellant said, “there go that motherfucker right there.” (Tr., p. 674.) Appellant then drove around the corner and parked in a driveway on a side street. He asked Bair if he “was with him” and pulled out a gun from his waistband. (Tr., p. 678.) Bair understood that he and Appellant were going to shoot the person in the Cruze. The two got out of car and walked to the Shell Case No. 25 MA 0097  –4– station with their guns in their hands. When they reached the car, Bair and Appellant “shot the car up.” (Tr., p. 686.) {¶7} Bair said the two ran through a field and back to the Jeep. While running, Bair dropped the knife from Arelis’s kitchen and his .45 firearm in the field. The two made it back to the Jeep and left the scene. Appellant drove them back to Arelis’s house and Appellant told Bair, “[d]on’t tell his girl then.” (Tr., p. 699.) Bair got into his car and left. {¶8} According to Arelis, when Appellant returned to her house his body language was “completely off.” (Tr., p. 475.) She testified Appellant was clenching his jaw and pacing. When she asked Appellant what was wrong, Appellant told her he had killed D.B. and it was on the news. Appellant told Arelis that D.B. had stolen money from him a few months prior and “it wasn’t sitting right with him.” (Tr., p. 476.) Arelis testified that Appellant asked for bleach and then cleaned himself up before leaving. {¶9} Officer Stephen Gaetano responded to the scene of the shooting. When he arrived at the gas station, the officer found the Chevy Cruze parked in a parking spot. D.B. was seated in the driver’s seat and appeared to have been shot. The driver-side window was shattered and there were spent shell casings on the ground near the car. D.B. suffered nine gunshot wounds and died as a result of his injuries. {¶10} During jury deliberations, Juror 8 asked to speak to the judge. Juror 8 brought to the court’s attention that one of the other jurors made a threatening remark towards him. Juror 8 said, “It was - - he was joking, but it was - - it was threatening.” (Tr., p. 1127.) The court asked Juror 8 if he could continue to be fair and impartial, to fairly listen to the other side, and to hold on to his convictions. Juror 8 responded, “I’m struggling holding on to my conviction because I do feel threatened.” (Tr., p. 1131). The Case No. 25 MA 0097  –5– court then spoke with each of the other jurors. They all indicated that they could be fair and impartial and were comfortable remaining on the jury. (Tr., pp.1133-1158). After further research and discussion with counsel, the judge dismissed Juror 8 and replaced him with an alternate juror. {¶11} The jury ultimately found Appellant guilty of both charges and the firearm specifications. {¶12} The trial court set the matter for sentencing on September 18, 2025. That day, Appellant filed a motion for new trial. He alleged there was no direct evidence of his involvement in the murder. Instead, Appellant argued, all of the direct evidence indicated that he was innocent. Appellant also argued that he was prejudiced by juror misconduct. {¶13} The trial court held the sentencing hearing as scheduled on September 18, 2025. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison without parole on Count 1 plus three years on the attendant firearm specification. The court found that Count 2 merged with Count 1 for purposes of sentencing, but imposed three years on the firearm specification. {¶14} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 17, 2025. On November 6, 2025, this Court issued a limited remand so that the trial court could rule on Appellant’s motion for a new trial. {¶15} The trial court held a hearing on the motion on November 6 and 17, 2025. It subsequently denied Appellant’s motion for a new trial, and we returned the case to our active docket. {¶16} Appellant now raises four assignments of error for our review. We address his second assignment of error out of order for ease of discussion. {¶17} In Appellant’s second assignment of error he states: Case No. 25 MA 0097  –6– APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. {¶18} In this assignment of error, Appellant asserts his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶19} The jury convicted Appellant of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), which provides in relevant part: “No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the death of another[.]” It also convicted him of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), which states in pertinent part: “No person shall purposely cause the death of another[.]” {¶20} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997). “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” Id. at 387, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) In making its determination, a reviewing court is not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution but may consider and weigh all of the evidence produced at trial. Id. at 390. Case No. 25 MA 0097  –7– {¶21} Granting a new trial is only appropriate in extraordinary cases where the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). This is because determinations of witness credibility, conflicting testimony, and evidence weight are primarily for the trier of the facts who sits in the best position to judge the weight of the evidence and the witnesses’ credibility by observing their gestures, voice inflections, and demeanor. State v. Rouse, 2005-Ohio-6328, ¶ 49 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 205 (1996); State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). Thus, “[w]hen there exist two fairly reasonable views of the evidence or two conflicting versions of events, neither of which is unbelievable, it is not our province to choose which one we believe.” State v. Dyke, 2002-Ohio-1152 (7th Dist.). {¶22} Only when “it is patently apparent that the factfinder lost its way,” should an appellate court overturn the jury verdict. State v. Woullard, 2004-Ohio-3395, ¶ 81 (2d Dist.). If a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a new trial is to be ordered. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. “No judgment resulting from a trial by jury shall be reversed on the weight of the evidence except by the concurrence of all three judges hearing the cause.” State v. Miller, 2002-Ohio-4931, ¶ 36, quoting Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3(B)(3). {¶23} Considering the evidence in light of the above standards, Youngtown Police Officer Stephen Gaetano testified that he responded to a call of a shooting at the Shell station on South Avenue. (Tr., p. 331.) He found a male, who appeared to have been shot, in the front seat of a Chevy Cruze. (Tr., p. 333.) The male was identified as D.B. (Tr., p. 335.) Case No. 25 MA 0097  –8– {¶24} Youngstown Police Officer Jacob Short worked with a K-9 partner named “Spawn.” (Tr., p. 342.) Officer Short and Spawn were called to the scene of the shooting. (Tr., p. 343.) The officer was informed that two subjects ran from the scene up a side street and into a field. (Tr., pp. 343-344.) Officer Short testified that Spawn was able to locate a scent trail. (Tr., p. 344.) The officer followed Spawn for about half a block and into a field. (Tr., p. 345.) Spawn was able to lead the officer to a firearm that had been abandoned in the field. (Tr., p. 345.) In his continued search, Spawn led Officer Short to a teal-handled knife, also in the field. (Tr., p. 346.) After finding these two items, Spawn continued to search, but then lost the scent trail. (Tr. p. 346.) {¶25} Youngstown Police Officer Greg Miller took photographs of various items involved in the investigation of this case, including several items in Arelis’s house. Officer Miller photographed a block of kitchen knives in Arelis’s kitchen. (Tr., p. 374; Exh. 67.) The officer testified that the knives in the kitchen block had turquoise green handles, which were “very similar” to the handle of the knife found by Spawn in the field. (Tr., p. 374.) {¶26} Officer Miller also testified that 11 spent shell casings were recovered from the scene at the Shell station. (Tr., p. 380.) Of these spent casings, five were .45 caliber and six were 9mm. (Tr., pp. 380, 383-384; Exh. 74.) Officer Miller also identified the firearm found in the field as a .45 caliber Glock model 21. (Tr., p. 391.) {¶27} The victim’s mother testified that her son D.B. and Appellant were very close friends until October or November of 2022. (Tr., pp. 406-407.) Case No. 25 MA 0097  –9– {¶28} D.B.’s girlfriend, Ebony, stated that from November 2021 to August 2022, D.B. was in prison for a parole violation. (Tr., pp. 437-438.) Ebony also testified that D.B. and Appellant had been close friends until September or October of 2022. (Tr., p. 439.) {¶29} Arelis had a relationship with Appellant. Arelis lived on West Judson Street on Youngstown’s south side with her children and drove a burgundy Jeep Cherokee at the time in question. (Tr., p. 458.) On the evening of the killing, Arelis picked Appellant up and drove him to her house to eat and spend some time. (Tr., pp. 459-460.) At some point, another man showed up at Arelis’s house. (Tr., p. 461.) Appellant, not Arelis, let the man into the house. (Tr., p. 462.) Arelis stated that the man was “masked up”, so she did not see his face. (Tr., p. 462.) She testified he wore a ski mask that “they wear for fashion now.” (Tr., p. 462.) Arelis did not find this particularly strange because “everyone was doing it then.” (Tr., p. 462.) Arelis left Appellant and the other man in her kitchen and went into another room. (Tr., p. 463.) Shortly after, Appellant and the other man left in her Jeep even though she had told Appellant not to take her vehicle. (Tr., pp. 464-465.) Arelis testified that she called Appellant numerous times to tell him to bring her vehicle back, but he did not answer. (Tr., pp. 466, 470.) {¶30} Arelis then called her friend, William Burton, who is a Youngstown Police Officer. (Tr., pp. 466-467.) She told him that something seemed “off,” and asked if, should he see her vehicle on the roadway, he would pull the driver over and let her know. (Tr., p. 467.) Arelis testified that when Appellant left she could tell “he wasn’t in the right state of mind” and “his whole demeanor and body language was off.” (Tr., p. 467.) {¶31} At trial, the prosecutor asked Arelis about the phone calls she made, noting that her phone records from AT&T were marked as an exhibit. (Tr., pp. 468-469; Exh. 8.) Case No. 25 MA 0097  – 10 – Arelis said that she had called 911 at 11:19 p.m. regarding her vehicle, but that she never talked to anyone and decided to hang up. (Tr., p. 470.) She called and spoke with Officer Burton at 1:29 a.m. (Tr., p. 472.) Additionally, she called Appellant multiple times both before and after calling Officer Burton but Appellant never answered. (Tr., pp. 472-473.) Her last attempted call to Appellant was at 2:01 a.m. (Tr., p. 474.) Arelis stated that shortly after that call, Appellant returned to her house. (Tr., p. 475.) {¶32} Arelis noticed that when Appellant walked into her house, his body language was “completely off.” (Tr., p. 475.) She testified Appellant “was clenching his jaw, he was pacing, he didn’t seem right.” (Tr., p. 475.) Arelis asked Appellant what was wrong. (Tr. 475). Appellant told her he had killed D.B. and it was on the news. (Tr., pp. 475-476). Appellant told Arelis that D.B. had stolen money from him a few months prior and “it wasn’t sitting right with him.” (Tr., p. 476.) Arelis stated that Appellant asked for bleach and then cleaned himself up. (Tr., p. 476.) Shortly after, Appellant left. (Tr., pp. 476-477.) Before he left, Arelis chastised Appellant for taking her vehicle, in which she transports her children, to commit a murder. (Tr., p. 477.) Appellant told her not to worry because the vehicle was parked several blocks away from the scene. (Tr., p. 477.) Arelis also stated that Appellant told her he had “smashed” cell phones belonging to her and her daughter in her basement, telling her she needed to get rid of them. (Tr., p. 478.) {¶33} After Appellant left, Arelis did not feel comfortable in her house. (Tr., p. 478.) She said that she did not want to drive her Jeep, so she left it in the garage. (Tr., p. 479.) A friend picked her and her children up. (Tr., p. 479.) Arelis testified that Officer Burton later picked her up from somewhere in Weathersfield. (Tr., p. 480.) She told him what Appellant had confessed to her. (Tr., p. 480.) Officer Burton advised Arelis that she Case No. 25 MA 0097  – 11 – needed to make a police report. (Tr., p. 480.) Officer Burton drove her to the police station, where she was questioned and made a report. (Tr., p. 481.) {¶34} Arelis went home after leaving the police station, accompanied by several detectives who took some photographs at her house. (Tr., p. 482.) Arelis testified that she has a wooden block of knives on her kitchen counter. (Tr., pp. 482-483.) The knives have teal-colored handles. (Tr., p. 482; Exh. 66.) Arelis identified the knife found in the field as one missing from her knife block. (Tr., p. 483; Exh. 83.) She also identified photographs a detective took of bleach located under her sink. (Tr., p. 486; Exh. 69.) {¶35} On cross-examination, Arelis stated that she owns a teal and silver 9mm firearm. (Tr., p. 502.) However, this firearm remained in her home the entire time. (Tr., 503.) Arelis also testified that D.B. had reached out to her a few days prior to the murder and said something that offended her. (Tr., pp. 510-511.) While she had testified that she did not have her phone on December 22 when she went to the police station, (Tr., p. 521) her phone records showed calls were made during that morning up until 7:00 a.m. (Tr., pp. 522-523.) Additionally, Arelis stated that she had never seen Appellant with Bair before that night. (Tr., p. 534.) {¶36} Officer Burton testified that Arelis called him at 1:29 a.m. on December 22, 2022, while he was working. (Tr., p. 571.) She was upset because Appellant took her car and was not answering his phone. (Tr., pp. 568-569.) Officer Burton advised Arelis to wait and see if Appellant returned her car later that morning and, if not, to file a police report. (Tr., p. 569.) Later that morning, after the officer was home, Arelis called Officer Burton again. (Tr., p. 571.) Arelis was “absolutely hysterical.” (Tr., p. 571.) She blurted out to Officer Burton that her boyfriend had killed someone and had used her car. (Tr., Case No. 25 MA 0097  – 12 – p. 571.) Officer Burton told Arelis to come to his house. (Tr., p. 572.) In the meantime, the officer called his supervisor, a Youngstown Police lieutenant, to report Arelis’s disclosure. (Tr., p. 572.) {¶37} The officer testified that Arelis did arrive at his house with her children. (Tr., p. 572.) She agreed to go to the police station to give a statement. (Tr., p. 572.) He testified that his involvement in this matter was as a friend to Arelis; he was not assigned as an officer on this case. (Tr., p. 574.) {¶38} Jenna Kolb is a forensic scientist in the latent print unit at the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (BCI). She examined the knife found in the field and concluded it contained no fingerprints. (Tr., pp. 593-594.) {¶39} Brittani Troyer is a forensic scientist in the DNA unit at BCI. She tested DNA swabs taken from various areas of Arelis’s vehicle, and the firearm and knife that were recovered in the field, and compared them to samples from Appellant, Arelis, and Bair. Troyer testified the firearm contained DNA from an unknown male and some “leftover” DNA, which was insufficient for her to compare. (Tr., pp. 610-611.) Troyer stated the knife had insufficient DNA for comparison. (Tr., pp. 612-613.) The DNA recovered from the steering wheel of Arelis’s car showed that Arelis’s DNA was the major profile and that some other DNA was leftover and was not sufficient to compare. (Tr., p. 614.) DNA from the gear shift was not sufficient for comparison. (Tr., p. 615.) DNA from the driver’s interior door pull showed a mixture of DNA, with a major contributor being an unknown male. (Tr., p. 615.) Finally, Troyer testified that DNA recovered from the firearm in the field showed that Bair was a major contributor. (Tr., p. 617.) Case No. 25 MA 0097  – 13 – {¶40} Joshua Barr is a forensic scientist in the firearm unit at BCI. He examined the bullets, casings, and firearm recovered in this case. Barr testified that three of the bullets recovered from D.B.’s body were fired from the .45 Glock firearm recovered from the field. (Tr., p. 644.) The 9mm Luger bullets recovered were all fired from the same firearm. (Tr., p. 645.) {¶41} Zachary Bair began his testimony by admitting that he took D.B.’s life, and was testifying in this case as part of a plea agreement with the State. (Tr., pp. 654-655.) He was also charged with aggravated murder and murder with accompanying firearm specifications. (Tr., p. 654.) As part of his plea agreement, Bair would give truthful testimony in this case and plead guilty to manslaughter with a firearm specification. (Tr., pp. 701-702.) In exchange, the State would recommend 10 to 13½ years in prison. (Tr., pp. 701-702.) {¶42} Bair stated that he did not previously know D.B., and the reason Bair shot him was “because of who I was with.” (Tr., p. 656.) Bair testified that he and Appellant had gone to school together. (Tr., p. 657.) On the night in question, he wanted to purchase some “weed” so he “pulled up” to the house where Appellant was visiting. (Tr., pp. 658-659.) He stated that he was alone. (Tr., p. 659.) Bair knocked on the door and went in wearing a mask “[b]ecause it was cold outside.” (Tr., p. 661.) Appellant was in the kitchen, and Bair was able to purchase his marijuana. (Tr., p. 662.) {¶43} Because the drug was wrapped in plastic wrap, Bair took a knife from the kitchen to cut it open. (Tr., pp. 663-664.) He then put the knife in his pocket. (Tr., p. 664.) Bair identified the knife found in the field as the one he took from the kitchen. (Tr., p. 664; Exh. 83.) Case No. 25 MA 0097  – 14 – {¶44} Bair then left with Appellant in a red Jeep, leaving his own car at the house. (Tr., p. 665.) Bair and Appellant spent some time driving around. (Tr., pp. 665-666.) The two drove around the south and west sides of Youngstown and met a few people to whom Appellant sold marijuana. (Tr., pp. 667-668.) Bair said he was carrying a loaded .45 Glock with him at the time. (Tr., pp. 668-669.) The Glock belonged to his friend Ezekiel. (Tr., p. 694.) Bair could not recall if Appellant had his phone with him at the time. (Tr., p. 671.) {¶45} As the two drove down South Avenue toward the downtown area, Appellant pointed out a Chevy Cruze parked at the Shell station. (Tr., p. 674.) Appellant said, “there go that motherfucker right there.” (Tr., p. 674.) Appellant drove past the Shell station and turned down the next street. (Tr., pp. 675-676.) They took another turn and parked the car in the driveway of a house on Samuel Street. (Tr., pp. 677-678.) Appellant then asked Bair if he “was with him” and pulled out a gun from his waistband. (Tr., pp. 678-679.) Bair understood this to mean they were going to “go down there and shoot [that] dude [who was in the car].” (Tr., pp. 679-680.) They got out of the car and walked to the Shell station with their guns in their hands. (Tr., pp. 682-683.) Bair said their intent was to “shoot the car up.” (Tr., pp. 683-684.) {¶46} As they approached the car, Bair could see someone sitting in it. (Tr., p. 685.) He testified that he and Appellant approached the car on the driver’s side “and shot the car up.” (Tr., p. 689.) Bair fired his weapon five or six times and then turned and ran. (Tr., p. 690.) He heard Appellant also fire shots. (Tr., pp. 690-691.) Bair dropped the knife he had taken from the kitchen while he was running. (Tr., p. 691.) He also dropped Case No. 25 MA 0097  – 15 – his gun. (Tr., p. 695.) Bair stated Appellant was running with him. (Tr., p. 692.) When the two made it back to the Jeep, they left the scene. (Tr., pp. 697-698.) {¶47} Appellant drove them back to the house and told Bair, “don’t tell his girl then.” (Tr., p. 699.) Bair got into his car and left. (Tr., p. 700.) {¶48} Bair testified that he was wearing all black that night as was Appellant, and that they both wore masks. (Tr., pp. 686-687.) Bair identified himself and Appellant in a video taken from a security camera near the scene. (Tr., p. 688; Exh. 101.) {¶49} When asked why he shot D.B., Bair responded, “because I was with him [Appellant].” (Tr., p. 701.) The prosecutor asked, “you do things for your friends?” and Bair responded, “If I’m with you. If I’m with you, yeah. I’m not proud of it.” (Tr., p. 701.) {¶50} Bair stated that he had only seen Appellant once after his arrest. (Tr., p. 704.) When Bair saw him, Appellant told Bair to “hold it down”, which means to “be loyal.” (Tr., p. 704.) {¶51} On cross-examination, Bair admitted that he had not previously told police he went to Arelis’s house for the purpose of purchasing marijuana. (Tr., pp. 717-718.) {¶52} Dr. Elizabeth Mooney is the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on D.B.’s body. Dr. Mooney testified that D.B. suffered nine gunshot wounds, which were fired from at least two different firearms. (Tr., p. 790.) D.B.’s cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. (Tr., p. 792.) {¶53} Tyesha is Bair’s ex-girlfriend. Tyesha testified that in January 2023, Bair gave her his car. (Tr., p. 822.) Her suspicions were not aroused at the time. (Tr., p. 822) But a few months later, the police confiscated the car. (Tr., pp. 822-823.) Case No. 25 MA 0097  – 16 – {¶54} Darren is D.B.’s cousin. On the night of the shooting, Darren lived on Dixon Street, which is next to the Shell station where D.B. was shot. (Tr., p. 833.) Darren had several security cameras on his property. (Tr., p. 833.) On the night in question, D.B. was supposed to visit his house, but he never arrived. (Tr., p. 834.) Darren heard gunshots and went outside to see what was happening. (Tr., pp. 834-835.) He saw that a vehicle that looked like D.B.’s had been “shot up” in the gas station parking lot. (Tr., pp. 835-836.) As a result, Darren called several family members, including D.B.’s mother, looking for D.B. (Tr., p. 836.) {¶55} Darren reviewed his security cameras. On the camera footage, he saw a red Jeep at approximately 2:16 a.m. (Tr., p. 843.) He then saw two figures walking down the street at 2:20 a.m., and those same figures running back from the gas station at 2:21 a.m. (Tr., pp. 843-844.) {¶56} Austin Fedchock is a criminal intelligence analyst for BCI. He was able to analyze Arelis’s and Appellant’s cell phone records. He testified that Arelis’s phone placed one call to Appellant’s phone at 10:22 p.m. on December 21, 2022, and placed nine calls between 1:09 a.m. and 2:01 a.m. on December 22, 2022. (Tr., pp. 866-868.) Fedchock stated there was no duration to these calls, which indicated they were not answered. (Tr., p. 869.) The geolocation area for the cell tower these calls connected to was the Newport area of the south side of Youngtown, which was near Arelis’s house. (Tr., p. 873.) This geolocation does not necessarily indicate the cell phone was stationary, just that the sector of the cell site is the one that provides the best quality of service to the mobile device. (Tr., p. 874.) During the time of the calls to Appellant’s cell phone, the calls were bouncing off of the same tower on the south side. (Tr., pp. 876-879.) Case No. 25 MA 0097  – 17 – {¶57} In his argument that the evidence does not support his convictions, Appellant first claims there are inconsistencies in Arelis’s testimony, which he insinuates implicated Arelis in the murder instead of himself. {¶58} Appellant cites to Arelis’s testimony that D.B. had called her a few days prior to the murder. (Tr., p. 510.) While she could not recall the exact conversation, Arelis stated that she was offended by what D.B. said. (Tr., p. 511.) Appellant argues this established a motive for Arelis to murder D.B. {¶59} Arelis’s testimony in this regard was scant. She did not describe what D.B. said that had offended her. No further testimony on this subject was ever offered. {¶60} Appellant next claims that Arelis’s use of the word “they” to describe the visitor to her house that night implies that more than one individual came to her house with Bair. (Tr., pp. 461, 513.) And he highlights her testimony that the man who came to her house wore a face mask so she did not see his face, yet she also testified that she fed the man while he was at her home. (Tr., pp. 462, 530-531.) {¶61} While Appellant claims that Arelis testified to more than one person showing up at her house, he misstates her testimony. This apparently stems from the following exchange: Q . . . At any point in that evening, did anyone come to your house that you didn’t know? A Yes. Q And when and how did that happen? Case No. 25 MA 0097  – 18 – A They drove to my house. Q Okay. When you say they - - A Well, he - - Q - - you’re speaking of how many people? A One person. (Tr., p. 461.) {¶62} Defense counsel repeatedly tried to get Arelis to testify that when she said “they” she meant that more than one person arrived at her home. (Tr., pp. 524, 529, 537- 538, 540.) She corrected counsel each of these times. It is disingenuous for Appellant to now argue otherwise. Even if Arelis’s testimony presented the jury with a slight discrepancy, it was up to the jury to determine whether Arelis was a credible witness and which part of her testimony was more, or less, believable. {¶63} Appellant takes issue with Arelis’s testimony on the timing of events. Arelis stated Appellant returned to her home between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m., which he asserts was before the murder occurred. (Tr., pp. 473, 516-517.) Appellant claims that Arelis called Officer Burton in order to create an alibi for herself at approximately 1:29 a.m. (Tr., pp. 471-472.) {¶64} The evidence indicated that the shooting took place at approximately 2:20 a.m. Arelis’s phone records showed that she called Appellant’s cell phone multiple times between 1:09 a.m. and 2:01 a.m. While Arelis’s testimony that Appellant returned to her Case No. 25 MA 0097  – 19 – house between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. appears to be slightly off, this was also a matter for the jury to consider in weighing Arelis’s credibility. {¶65} Appellant also takes issue with Arelis’s testimony that he took her and her daughter’s phone. Her actual testimony was that Appellant said he was taking the phones to her basement, and then she heard “a lot of ruckus” so she assumed he “smashed” them. (Tr., p. 478.) She later testified, however, that she made phone calls that morning. (Tr., pp. 479, 521-523.) {¶66} Again, these alleged inconsistencies were matters for the jury to consider while determining if Arelis’s testimony was truthful, whether her testimony was consistent, and which parts to believe if they discovered inconsistencies. {¶67} Appellant also relies on the GPS records for his phone during the time of the murder. He claims the evidence showed that his phone never moved and he was not near the scene of the murder on the morning in question. (Tr., p. 917.) {¶68} Bair testified that he was unsure whether Appellant had his phone with him when they were driving around before the murder. Both Arelis’s and Appellant’s phone records reflect that while Arelis called Appellant numerous times between the period after he left her house to the moment he returned, Appellant never answered his phone. Thus, it is possible that Appellant did not take his phone with him at the time. Moreover, the evidence does not prove, as Appellant suggests, that his phone never moved. The evidence only showed that Appellant’s phone signal was “bouncing off” of the same cell tower, indicating the signal was strongest for his phone in that area. {¶69} Ironically, Appellant states, “[t]he only evidence introduced by the State to establish Appellant’s guilt is the uncorroborated testimony of [Arelis] . . . and co-defendant Case No. 25 MA 0097  – 20 – Zachary Bair.” (Appellant’s Brf., p. 18.) However, he fails to recognize that these two witnesses corroborated each other’s testimony. Thus, their testimony was not uncorroborated as Appellant claims. {¶70} Whether to believe these two witnesses was a matter for the jurors to determine based on witness credibility. Although an appellate court is permitted to independently weigh the evidence including witness testimony, when determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must give deference to the fact finder's determination of the witnesses’ credibility. State v. Jackson, 2009-Ohio-6407, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.). The policy underlying this presumption is that the trier of fact is in the best position to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observations in determining the credibility of the proffered testimony. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). {¶71} While no direct physical evidence connects Appellant to the murder, two witnesses identified Appellant as one of the two people who murdered D.B. One witness testified that he participated in the murder with Appellant. The other witness testified that Appellant, while visibly shaken, confessed to the murder shortly after it happened. If found credible by the jury, the testimony of these two witnesses clearly established Appellant shot and killed D.B., and the lack of physical evidence connecting Appellant to the murder does not render the jury's conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶72} A conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because there is no direct physical evidence linking the defendant to the crime. See Jackson at ¶ 16 (“If [the witness’s] testimony is believed then the lack of fingerprints, DNA, Case No. 25 MA 0097  – 21 – footprints or any other type of physical evidence does not render the conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence.”); State v. Peeples, 2014-Ohio-4064, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.) (“a lack of physical evidence, standing alone, does not render appellant's conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence.”). {¶73} Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. {¶74} Appellant’s first assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE THAT WOULD HAVE DIRECTLY IMPEACH[ED] LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FOR A LACK OF MEANINGFUL INVESTIGATION. THE COURT THEREBY VIOLATED THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW VIOLATING HIS RIGHTS TO PRESENT A MEANINGFUL DEFENSE, AND TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSERS AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. {¶75} Officer Miller responded to the scene of the murder. He photographed the scene at the gas station, the items found in the field, and various items at Arelis’s house. {¶76} In cross examining Officer Miller, defense counsel asked if he was familiar with Conroy’s Party Shop, which is located approximately 100 feet from Arelis’s Judson Avenue home. (Tr., p. 397.) Counsel asked Officer Miller if he ever went to this shop to look for any surveillance video which may