State v. Nicholson
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket116333
JudgeE.T. Gallagher
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Nicholson, 2026-Ohio-4583.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 116333
v. :
AMARION NICHOLSON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 19, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-25-702335-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Chadwick P. Cleveland, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
Francis Cavallo, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
Defendant-appellant Amarion Nicholson appeals the denial of a motion
to withdraw his guilty pleas. He claims the following errors:
1. The trial court abused its discretion and erred in denying appellants
timely motion to withdraw his plea.
2. Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, depriving
him of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Nicholson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that Nicholson’s retained trial
counsel was not ineffective. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In January 2025, Cleveland police received a report of a man who had
been shot on East 92nd Street in Cleveland. Investigators subsequently learned that
the victim, Raeveon Camp (“Camp”), had driven his car to a residence on East 92nd
Street to sell marijuana. A juvenile went to Camp’s car to purchase the marijuana
and, while she was there, Nicholson, who came out of the residence, appeared
agitated and stated that they were “being shorted.” (Tr. 68.)
Nicholson, who was a juvenile at the time of the shooting, later told
police that when he approached the driver’s side window of Camp’s vehicle, he saw
Camp touch his ski mask and reach over to the passenger’s side of the car. He
reacted by shooting Camp in the back of the head at close range, killing him.
(Tr. 68.) Nicholson told homicide detectives that he was not going to wait and see
what Camp was reaching for. (Tr. 68.) And, when police searched the victim’s car,
they did not find a gun in the vehicle. (Tr. 68.) Nicholson told police that he never
saw the victim with a gun. (Tr. 69.)
Nicholson was charged in juvenile court with two counts of murder, two
counts of felonious assault, and one count of tampering with evidence. With the
exception of tampering with evidence, all of the charges included one- and three-
year firearm specifications. Due to Nicholson’s age and the level of the alleged
offenses, the juvenile court transferred Nicholson’s case to the general division
where he was indicted on the same five counts bound over from juvenile court.
Following several pretrials, the case was set for trial in December 2025.
However, following plea negotiations on the day of trial that included in-person
meetings between Nicholson, his attorneys, and his family, Nicholson agreed to
plead guilty to an amended charge of involuntary manslaughter in Count 1 of the
indictment, one count of felonious assault as alleged in Count 3 of the indictment,
and one count of tampering with evidence as alleged in Count 5 of the indictment.
The one-year firearm specifications attendant to the amended involuntary-
manslaughter and felonious-assault charges were deleted and the murder and
felonious-assault charges originally alleged in Counts 2 and 4 were nolled.
The parties agreed to a sentencing range of between 18 and 25 years
with no early release. In making this agreement, the parties also agreed that the
charges were nonallied offenses. The court indicated that it would sentence
Nicholson within the agreed sentencing range. (Tr. 20.)
The trial court engaged in a Crim.R. 11 colloquy with Nicholson and
asked Nicholson if he was satisfied with the representation of his retained counsel,
and Nicholson answered, “Yes.” (Tr. 21.) The court explained that Nicholson has a
constitutional right to counsel and that if he could not afford an attorney, the court
would appoint one for him. (Tr. 23.)
Thereafter, the court reviewed the charges to which Nicholson would
be pleading guilty, and Nicholson indicated that he understood them. (Tr. 23-28.)
The court also reviewed the maximum penalties Nicholson could receive and
explained the constitutional and nonconstitutional rights he was waiving by virtue
of his guilty pleas. Nicholson again indicated that he understood the penalties he
could receive and the rights he was waiving. Nicholson then pleaded guilty to the
amended charges, and the court scheduled a sentencing hearing for a later date.
In January 2026, when the parties appeared for sentencing, Nicholson
informed the court that he did not want to proceed with the sentencing because he
was “coerced and peer-pressured by [his] counsel into taking the plea.” (Tr. 36.)
Upon further inquiry by the court, Nicholson explained:
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you for giving me the time and opportunity
to express my concerns to the Court. My first concern is that even
though I took a guilty plea on December 15th I was coerced and peer-
pressured into taking that plea by my own counsel. I can and will
elaborate my claims to the Court after my concerns are expressed. It
was my attorneys’ job to get me the best possible plea deal and to help
me fight for my life. I feel as though they were insufficient in doing that
considering my age and the pressure put upon my shoulders. I was
afraid and took the deal that I was offered.
I, Amarion Nicholson, take full responsibility for my actions and would
like to recant my plea. I truly believe I can be rehabilitated.
THE COURT: Wait. Hold on. I don’t know what else you wrote in that
statement. If it’s your intention to request a withdrawal of your plea,
then I don’t think you should read any more of your statement.
Are you making that request to withdraw your plea?
THE DEFENDANT: I was coerced into taking the plea and I’d like to
take it back.
THE COURT: Mr. Nicholson, if I remember correctly, the day that you
changed your plea the Court cleared out the courtroom and gave you
an opportunity to speak with your family and go over the plea with your
family.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You had advised the Court that you had sufficient time
to review the plea offer —
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
(Tr. 37-38.) The court inquired further into Nicholson’s claim that he was coerced
into taking the plea, and Nicholson responded as follows:
THE DEFENDANT: I asked my counsel for time to consider the plea
that the prosecution offered. 18 to 25 years isn’t something you can
surely say yes or no to in a couple minutes, and they told me I had to
make that decision right then and there. First I said no plenty of times
and asked them to fight for a better plea. They claimed this was the
best they could do. Mind you, Your Honor, I’m still telling them no and
saying I want to go to trial. While I’m saying this one of my attorneys
tells me to sign this paper stating if I lose in trial I can’t say they didn’t
do their job, which basically insinuates to me that they won’t be fighting
for me if we moved on to trial.
Seeing my mother in distress also added to the already heavy pressure
of the decision I was given minutes to make.
I wish I fired my attorneys instead of taking that deal, but I wasn’t given
enough time to think of that until it was too late.
It felt like it was only me in the courtroom because they weren’t fighting
at all. Thank you. I hope you understand my concern and take it into
consideration.
(Tr. 39-40.) The court asked counsel if he had anything to say in response to
Nicholson’s statements, and counsel conceded that it was a “high pressure situation”
because Nicholson was facing 21 years to life in prison before they reached the plea
bargain. (Tr. 40.) Counsel insisted that despite the pressure of the situation,
Nicholson was not coerced. (Tr. 40.) Counsel also informed the court that he and
his cocounsel believed the plea was in Nicholson’s best interest because it was the
best alternative. (Tr. 41.) Thereafter, the court denied Nicholson’s motion to
terminate his retained counsel but nevertheless appointed new counsel to represent
him. (Tr. 47.)
Nicholson appeared in court with new counsel in March 2026. His
newly appointed counsel asserted that there was a plausible argument that
Nicholson acted in self-defense and that Nicholson’s prior attorneys failed to act on
it. Counsel further asserted that Nicholson’s prior attorneys should have raised the
issue of self-defense with the prosecutor’s office because it has a committee that
reviews self-defense cases, but they never did that. (Tr. 53.) Counsel further noted
that Nicholson’s prior attorneys never filed a notice of self-defense. (Tr. 54.)
The prosecutor responded that he took the case to the self-defense
committee after Nicholson’s new attorney was appointed. The prosecutor
explained:
I did take this case into the self-defense committee after [counsel] was
assigned by the Court. That committee reviewed the file and
determined from the State’s perspective as far as the prosecution goes
that this was not a self-defense case from our office’s perspective.
Now, I don’t have a crystal ball, Judge; but had the case been referred
prior to the trial date, I don’t think that would have changed anything.
It would have been the ultimate end result that we saw after it was
referred. I think they still obviously would have found that this case
was not a self-defense case from our office’s perspective.
(Tr. 56.)
The trial court had previously denied Nicholson’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea and proceeded with sentencing. The court sentenced Nicholson to 22
years in prison, which was within the agreed recommended sentencing range. (Tr.
83.) Nicholson now appeals the trial court’s judgment.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
In the first assignment of error, Nicholson argues the trial court erred
in denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
A presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to
Crim.R. 32.1 should be “freely and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d
521, 527 (1992). However, “[a] defendant does not have an absolute right to
withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
The trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is “a reasonable
and legitimate basis” for withdrawing the plea. Id.
The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “is
within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Xie at paragraph two of the syllabus.
We, therefore, will not disturb the trial court’s judgment absent an abuse of
discretion.
An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in
an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority.
Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. However, “a trial ‘court does not have
discretion to misapply the law.’” Morgan v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Auth., 2025-Ohio-1655, ¶ 64 (8th Dist.), quoting Johnson at ¶ 38. “Thus, an abuse
of discretion also occurs when a court ‘“applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies
the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.”’” Id.,
quoting Thomas v. Cleveland, 2008-Ohio-1720, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), quoting Berger v.
Mayfield, 265 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2001).
In deciding whether to grant or deny a presentence motion to
withdraw a guilty plea, courts have identified nine nonexhaustive factors that should
be considered. State v. Wilder, 2025-Ohio-3075, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). Those factors
include whether (1) the defendant was represented by competent counsel, (2) the
defendant was given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before entering his or her plea, (3) the
defendant is given a complete hearing on the motion to withdraw, (4) the record
reveals that the court gave full and fair consideration to the plea-withdrawal request,
(5) the motion was made in a reasonable time, (6) the motion stated specific reasons
for withdrawal, (7) the record shows that the defendant understood the nature of
the charges and the possible penalties, (8) the defendant had evidence of a plausible
defense, and (9) the State would be prejudiced by permitting the defendant to
withdraw his or her guilty plea. Wilder at ¶ 20-21, citing State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio
App.2d 211 (8th Dist. 1980), paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Fish, 104 Ohio
App.3d 236 (1st Dist. 1995); and State v. Barnes, 2022-Ohio-4486, ¶ 32 (Brunner,
J., concurring).
It is undisputed that the trial court held a hearing on Nicholson’s
motion and that Nicholson’s motion stated specific reasons for the plea-withdrawal
request. Nicholson claimed, as he does now on appeal, that his retained counsel was
ineffective because they failed to investigate and present a claim of self-defense.
A person may use deadly force in self-defense where he or she (1) was
not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray, (2) had a bona fide belief
that he or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his or
her only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force, and (3) did
not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-
4562, ¶ 14, citing State v. Barnes, 2002-Ohio-68.
The murder investigation revealed that the victim in this case did not
possess a gun at the time he was murdered. He was shot in the back of the head at
point-blank range while sitting in his car. (Tr. 68.) During the investigation,
Nicholson told police that he had purchased marijuana from the victim several times
and that he had never seen the victim with a gun. He also admitted that he had “no
beef or no prior issues” with the victim prior to the shooting. (Tr. 69.) Hence, it was
reasonable for Nicholson’s retained counsel to conclude that self-defense was not a
viable claim under these circumstances. Indeed, the issue of self-defense was
presented to the prosecutor’s office after Nicholson obtained new counsel and the
self-defense committee of the prosecutor’s office determined that this was not a self-
defense case. (Tr. 56.) Therefore, Nicholson’s retained counsel was not ineffective
for choosing not to present a futile claim of self-defense.
Despite Nicholson’s argument to the contrary, the record shows that
Nicholson was represented by competent counsel who negotiated a plea that
resulted in the dismissal of murder charges. The negotiated plea also provided an
agreed sentencing range instead of a life sentence. The mandatory minimum
sentence Nicholson would have received if he had been convicted of murder at trial
was a life sentence with eligibility for parole after 21 years.
Nicholson nevertheless argues that his attorneys failed to zealously
advocate for him and that he was disadvantaged because he was “barely an adult.”
(Appellant’s brief p. 7.) He contends that he experienced a “well-founded loss of
confidence” in his attorneys and that he was pressured to enter his guilty pleas.
However, as Nicholson’s retained counsel acknowledged, the plea negotiation was a
“high pressure situation” because Nicholson was facing 21 years to life in prison
before they reached the plea bargain. (Tr. 40.) The threat of a life sentence is
pressure, but that pressure does not mean that counsel pressured Nicholson. To the
contrary, Nicholson’s retained counsel indicated he believed the plea bargain was in
Nicholson’s best interest because it was the best alternative. (Tr. 41.) This belief is
reasonable under the circumstances, and the trial court was within its discretion to
believe counsel’s representations.
Nicholson expressed his desire to withdraw his pleas for the first time
in an oral motion at the sentencing hearing. “An oral motion to withdraw a
presentence guilty plea made at the sentencing hearing is not considered timely
filed.” State v. Resto, 2020-Ohio-4299, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Porch, 2017-
Ohio-8885, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). Therefore, his motion to withdraw his pleas was not
timely.
The trial court nevertheless afforded Nicholson a complete hearing on
the motion to withdraw, and the record reveals that the court gave full and fair
consideration to his plea-withdrawal request.
Furthermore, the trial court conducted a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before
Nicholson entered his guilty pleas and the record reflects that Nicholson understood
the nature of the charges and the possible penalties entering his plea. Nicholson
does not argue that he is innocent nor does he present any evidence that might
establish his innocence. He merely blames his attorneys for failing to obtain a better
outcome. Thus, Nicholson’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas can only be
construed as a change of heart, and a change of heart is not a sufficient basis for
withdrawing a guilty plea. State v. Allen, 2026-Ohio-3631, ¶ 61 (8th Dist.), citing
State v. Elliott, 2016-Ohio-2637, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.).
Therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In the second assignment of error, Nicholson argues his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was violated because his retained counsel was
ineffective.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable representation and that he or she was prejudiced by that deficient
performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). To
establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 694.
Nicholson contends his retained counsel was ineffective because they
failed to investigate a potential claim of self-defense before waiving the probable
cause hearing in the juvenile court. He argues that questioning some of the State’s
witnesses at a probable-cause hearing “probably could have helped.” (Appellant’s
brief p. 17.) However, had the homicide detectives testified at the hearing, they
would have presented evidence that the victim was unarmed, that there were no
prior conflicts between Nicholson and the victim, and that the murder was not
justified. Therefore, Nicholson fails to demonstrate prejudice, i.e., that questioning
the State’s witnesses would have changed the outcome of the proceeding.
Nicholson also argues that his retained counsel was ineffective
because they failed to pursue a self-defense claim. In support of this argument,
Nicholson cites the statements made on the record by appointed counsel at the
sentencing hearing where appointed counsel asserted that there may be a viable self-
defense claim. Appointed counsel’s belief was based on his review of the evidence
and presumably statements made to him by Nicholson. However, Nicholson fails to
contest the evidence that he shot and killed an unarmed victim who was sitting in
his car. He fails to address the lack of any evidence that the victim was a threat to
him. And, he fails to address his own statements to police where he admitted that
he had never seen the victim with a gun and that he had never had any issues with
the victim. Thus, Nicholson fails to demonstrate that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different if his retained counsel had pursued a claim
of self-defense. He, therefore, fails to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR