Full Opinion

[Cite as State v. Nicholson, 2026-Ohio-4583.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 116333 v. : AMARION NICHOLSON, : Defendant-Appellant. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 19, 2026 Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-25-702335-A Appearances: Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Chadwick P. Cleveland, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Francis Cavallo, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.: Defendant-appellant Amarion Nicholson appeals the denial of a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He claims the following errors: 1. The trial court abused its discretion and erred in denying appellants timely motion to withdraw his plea. 2. Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, depriving him of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Nicholson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that Nicholson’s retained trial counsel was not ineffective. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Facts and Procedural History In January 2025, Cleveland police received a report of a man who had been shot on East 92nd Street in Cleveland. Investigators subsequently learned that the victim, Raeveon Camp (“Camp”), had driven his car to a residence on East 92nd Street to sell marijuana. A juvenile went to Camp’s car to purchase the marijuana and, while she was there, Nicholson, who came out of the residence, appeared agitated and stated that they were “being shorted.” (Tr. 68.) Nicholson, who was a juvenile at the time of the shooting, later told police that when he approached the driver’s side window of Camp’s vehicle, he saw Camp touch his ski mask and reach over to the passenger’s side of the car. He reacted by shooting Camp in the back of the head at close range, killing him. (Tr. 68.) Nicholson told homicide detectives that he was not going to wait and see what Camp was reaching for. (Tr. 68.) And, when police searched the victim’s car, they did not find a gun in the vehicle. (Tr. 68.) Nicholson told police that he never saw the victim with a gun. (Tr. 69.) Nicholson was charged in juvenile court with two counts of murder, two counts of felonious assault, and one count of tampering with evidence. With the exception of tampering with evidence, all of the charges included one- and three- year firearm specifications. Due to Nicholson’s age and the level of the alleged offenses, the juvenile court transferred Nicholson’s case to the general division where he was indicted on the same five counts bound over from juvenile court. Following several pretrials, the case was set for trial in December 2025. However, following plea negotiations on the day of trial that included in-person meetings between Nicholson, his attorneys, and his family, Nicholson agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of involuntary manslaughter in Count 1 of the indictment, one count of felonious assault as alleged in Count 3 of the indictment, and one count of tampering with evidence as alleged in Count 5 of the indictment. The one-year firearm specifications attendant to the amended involuntary- manslaughter and felonious-assault charges were deleted and the murder and felonious-assault charges originally alleged in Counts 2 and 4 were nolled. The parties agreed to a sentencing range of between 18 and 25 years with no early release. In making this agreement, the parties also agreed that the charges were nonallied offenses. The court indicated that it would sentence Nicholson within the agreed sentencing range. (Tr. 20.) The trial court engaged in a Crim.R. 11 colloquy with Nicholson and asked Nicholson if he was satisfied with the representation of his retained counsel, and Nicholson answered, “Yes.” (Tr. 21.) The court explained that Nicholson has a constitutional right to counsel and that if he could not afford an attorney, the court would appoint one for him. (Tr. 23.) Thereafter, the court reviewed the charges to which Nicholson would be pleading guilty, and Nicholson indicated that he understood them. (Tr. 23-28.) The court also reviewed the maximum penalties Nicholson could receive and explained the constitutional and nonconstitutional rights he was waiving by virtue of his guilty pleas. Nicholson again indicated that he understood the penalties he could receive and the rights he was waiving. Nicholson then pleaded guilty to the amended charges, and the court scheduled a sentencing hearing for a later date. In January 2026, when the parties appeared for sentencing, Nicholson informed the court that he did not want to proceed with the sentencing because he was “coerced and peer-pressured by [his] counsel into taking the plea.” (Tr. 36.) Upon further inquiry by the court, Nicholson explained: THE DEFENDANT: Thank you for giving me the time and opportunity to express my concerns to the Court. My first concern is that even though I took a guilty plea on December 15th I was coerced and peer- pressured into taking that plea by my own counsel. I can and will elaborate my claims to the Court after my concerns are expressed. It was my attorneys’ job to get me the best possible plea deal and to help me fight for my life. I feel as though they were insufficient in doing that considering my age and the pressure put upon my shoulders. I was afraid and took the deal that I was offered. I, Amarion Nicholson, take full responsibility for my actions and would like to recant my plea. I truly believe I can be rehabilitated. THE COURT: Wait. Hold on. I don’t know what else you wrote in that statement. If it’s your intention to request a withdrawal of your plea, then I don’t think you should read any more of your statement. Are you making that request to withdraw your plea? THE DEFENDANT: I was coerced into taking the plea and I’d like to take it back. THE COURT: Mr. Nicholson, if I remember correctly, the day that you changed your plea the Court cleared out the courtroom and gave you an opportunity to speak with your family and go over the plea with your family. THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: You had advised the Court that you had sufficient time to review the plea offer — THE DEFENDANT: Yes. (Tr. 37-38.) The court inquired further into Nicholson’s claim that he was coerced into taking the plea, and Nicholson responded as follows: THE DEFENDANT: I asked my counsel for time to consider the plea that the prosecution offered. 18 to 25 years isn’t something you can surely say yes or no to in a couple minutes, and they told me I had to make that decision right then and there. First I said no plenty of times and asked them to fight for a better plea. They claimed this was the best they could do. Mind you, Your Honor, I’m still telling them no and saying I want to go to trial. While I’m saying this one of my attorneys tells me to sign this paper stating if I lose in trial I can’t say they didn’t do their job, which basically insinuates to me that they won’t be fighting for me if we moved on to trial. Seeing my mother in distress also added to the already heavy pressure of the decision I was given minutes to make. I wish I fired my attorneys instead of taking that deal, but I wasn’t given enough time to think of that until it was too late. It felt like it was only me in the courtroom because they weren’t fighting at all. Thank you. I hope you understand my concern and take it into consideration. (Tr. 39-40.) The court asked counsel if he had anything to say in response to Nicholson’s statements, and counsel conceded that it was a “high pressure situation” because Nicholson was facing 21 years to life in prison before they reached the plea bargain. (Tr. 40.) Counsel insisted that despite the pressure of the situation, Nicholson was not coerced. (Tr. 40.) Counsel also informed the court that he and his cocounsel believed the plea was in Nicholson’s best interest because it was the best alternative. (Tr. 41.) Thereafter, the court denied Nicholson’s motion to terminate his retained counsel but nevertheless appointed new counsel to represent him. (Tr. 47.) Nicholson appeared in court with new counsel in March 2026. His newly appointed counsel asserted that there was a plausible argument that Nicholson acted in self-defense and that Nicholson’s prior attorneys failed to act on it. Counsel further asserted that Nicholson’s prior attorneys should have raised the issue of self-defense with the prosecutor’s office because it has a committee that reviews self-defense cases, but they never did that. (Tr. 53.) Counsel further noted that Nicholson’s prior attorneys never filed a notice of self-defense. (Tr. 54.) The prosecutor responded that he took the case to the self-defense committee after Nicholson’s new attorney was appointed. The prosecutor explained: I did take this case into the self-defense committee after [counsel] was assigned by the Court. That committee reviewed the file and determined from the State’s perspective as far as the prosecution goes that this was not a self-defense case from our office’s perspective. Now, I don’t have a crystal ball, Judge; but had the case been referred prior to the trial date, I don’t think that would have changed anything. It would have been the ultimate end result that we saw after it was referred. I think they still obviously would have found that this case was not a self-defense case from our office’s perspective. (Tr. 56.) The trial court had previously denied Nicholson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and proceeded with sentencing. The court sentenced Nicholson to 22 years in prison, which was within the agreed recommended sentencing range. (Tr. 83.) Nicholson now appeals the trial court’s judgment. II. Law and Analysis A. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea In the first assignment of error, Nicholson argues the trial court erred in denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 should be “freely and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992). However, “[a] defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. The trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is “a reasonable and legitimate basis” for withdrawing the plea. Id. The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Xie at paragraph two of the syllabus. We, therefore, will not disturb the trial court’s judgment absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. However, “a trial ‘court does not have discretion to misapply the law.’” Morgan v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2025-Ohio-1655, ¶ 64 (8th Dist.), quoting Johnson at ¶ 38. “Thus, an abuse of discretion also occurs when a court ‘“applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.”’” Id., quoting Thomas v. Cleveland, 2008-Ohio-1720, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), quoting Berger v. Mayfield, 265 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2001). In deciding whether to grant or deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, courts have identified nine nonexhaustive factors that should be considered. State v. Wilder, 2025-Ohio-3075, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). Those factors include whether (1) the defendant was represented by competent counsel, (2) the defendant was given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before entering his or her plea, (3) the defendant is given a complete hearing on the motion to withdraw, (4) the record reveals that the court gave full and fair consideration to the plea-withdrawal request, (5) the motion was made in a reasonable time, (6) the motion stated specific reasons for withdrawal, (7) the record shows that the defendant understood the nature of the charges and the possible penalties, (8) the defendant had evidence of a plausible defense, and (9) the State would be prejudiced by permitting the defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea. Wilder at ¶ 20-21, citing State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211 (8th Dist. 1980), paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236 (1st Dist. 1995); and State v. Barnes, 2022-Ohio-4486, ¶ 32 (Brunner, J., concurring). It is undisputed that the trial court held a hearing on Nicholson’s motion and that Nicholson’s motion stated specific reasons for the plea-withdrawal request. Nicholson claimed, as he does now on appeal, that his retained counsel was ineffective because they failed to investigate and present a claim of self-defense. A person may use deadly force in self-defense where he or she (1) was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray, (2) had a bona fide belief that he or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his or her only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force, and (3) did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio- 4562, ¶ 14, citing State v. Barnes, 2002-Ohio-68. The murder investigation revealed that the victim in this case did not possess a gun at the time he was murdered. He was shot in the back of the head at point-blank range while sitting in his car. (Tr. 68.) During the investigation, Nicholson told police that he had purchased marijuana from the victim several times and that he had never seen the victim with a gun. He also admitted that he had “no beef or no prior issues” with the victim prior to the shooting. (Tr. 69.) Hence, it was reasonable for Nicholson’s retained counsel to conclude that self-defense was not a viable claim under these circumstances. Indeed, the issue of self-defense was presented to the prosecutor’s office after Nicholson obtained new counsel and the self-defense committee of the prosecutor’s office determined that this was not a self- defense case. (Tr. 56.) Therefore, Nicholson’s retained counsel was not ineffective for choosing not to present a futile claim of self-defense. Despite Nicholson’s argument to the contrary, the record shows that Nicholson was represented by competent counsel who negotiated a plea that resulted in the dismissal of murder charges. The negotiated plea also provided an agreed sentencing range instead of a life sentence. The mandatory minimum sentence Nicholson would have received if he had been convicted of murder at trial was a life sentence with eligibility for parole after 21 years. Nicholson nevertheless argues that his attorneys failed to zealously advocate for him and that he was disadvantaged because he was “barely an adult.” (Appellant’s brief p. 7.) He contends that he experienced a “well-founded loss of confidence” in his attorneys and that he was pressured to enter his guilty pleas. However, as Nicholson’s retained counsel acknowledged, the plea negotiation was a “high pressure situation” because Nicholson was facing 21 years to life in prison before they reached the plea bargain. (Tr. 40.) The threat of a life sentence is pressure, but that pressure does not mean that counsel pressured Nicholson. To the contrary, Nicholson’s retained counsel indicated he believed the plea bargain was in Nicholson’s best interest because it was the best alternative. (Tr. 41.) This belief is reasonable under the circumstances, and the trial court was within its discretion to believe counsel’s representations. Nicholson expressed his desire to withdraw his pleas for the first time in an oral motion at the sentencing hearing. “An oral motion to withdraw a presentence guilty plea made at the sentencing hearing is not considered timely filed.” State v. Resto, 2020-Ohio-4299, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Porch, 2017- Ohio-8885, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). Therefore, his motion to withdraw his pleas was not timely. The trial court nevertheless afforded Nicholson a complete hearing on the motion to withdraw, and the record reveals that the court gave full and fair consideration to his plea-withdrawal request. Furthermore, the trial court conducted a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before Nicholson entered his guilty pleas and the record reflects that Nicholson understood the nature of the charges and the possible penalties entering his plea. Nicholson does not argue that he is innocent nor does he present any evidence that might establish his innocence. He merely blames his attorneys for failing to obtain a better outcome. Thus, Nicholson’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas can only be construed as a change of heart, and a change of heart is not a sufficient basis for withdrawing a guilty plea. State v. Allen, 2026-Ohio-3631, ¶ 61 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Elliott, 2016-Ohio-2637, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.). Therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled. B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In the second assignment of error, Nicholson argues his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his retained counsel was ineffective. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation and that he or she was prejudiced by that deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). To establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Nicholson contends his retained counsel was ineffective because they failed to investigate a potential claim of self-defense before waiving the probable cause hearing in the juvenile court. He argues that questioning some of the State’s witnesses at a probable-cause hearing “probably could have helped.” (Appellant’s brief p. 17.) However, had the homicide detectives testified at the hearing, they would have presented evidence that the victim was unarmed, that there were no prior conflicts between Nicholson and the victim, and that the murder was not justified. Therefore, Nicholson fails to demonstrate prejudice, i.e., that questioning the State’s witnesses would have changed the outcome of the proceeding. Nicholson also argues that his retained counsel was ineffective because they failed to pursue a self-defense claim. In support of this argument, Nicholson cites the statements made on the record by appointed counsel at the sentencing hearing where appointed counsel asserted that there may be a viable self- defense claim. Appointed counsel’s belief was based on his review of the evidence and presumably statements made to him by Nicholson. However, Nicholson fails to contest the evidence that he shot and killed an unarmed victim who was sitting in his car. He fails to address the lack of any evidence that the victim was a threat to him. And, he fails to address his own statements to police where he admitted that he had never seen the victim with a gun and that he had never had any issues with the victim. Thus, Nicholson fails to demonstrate that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different if his retained counsel had pursued a claim of self-defense. He, therefore, fails to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR