State v. Jordan

[Cite as State v. Jordan, 2026-Ohio-2625.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SCIOTO COUNTY State of Ohio, : : Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 24CA4070 : v. : : DECISION AND Adrienne L. Jordan, : JUDGMENT ENTRY : Defendant-Appellant. : _____________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES: Adam J. Banks, Amlin, Ohio, for appellant. Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew F. Loesch, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee. _____________________________________________________________ Smith, P.J. {¶1} Appellant, Adrienne L. Jordan, appeals the judgment of the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas convicting her of one count of possession of cocaine, a first-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(f), as well as one count of possessing criminal tools, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A) and (C). On appeal, appellant contends 1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence; and 2) that she was denied her right to a fair trial in violation of the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions. However, because we Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 2 find no merit to the arguments raised under either of appellant’s assignments of error, they are overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. FACTS {¶2} On June 29, 2020, Appellant was indicted, along with her co-defendant Sashia Johnson, for the following offenses: Count One: Trafficking in Cocaine, a first-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(4)(g); Count Two: Possession of Cocaine, a first-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(f); and Count Three: Possessing Criminal Tools, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A) and (C). {¶3} Count One included two specifications. The first specification stated that appellant had possessed, sold, or had offered to sell approximately 170 grams of cocaine and that, as a result, she was a major drug offender. The second specification stated that appellant was the owner or possessor of a Cadillac Escalade which was contraband and/or property derived from or through the commission or facilitation of the offense, and/or was an instrumentality the offender used or intended to use in the commission of the offense and was subject to forfeiture pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417(A), R.C. 2981.02, and R.C. 2981.04. Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 3 Count Two contained identical specifications. Count Three referenced the same Cadillac being used criminally in the commission of a felony. {¶4} The charges stemmed from a traffic stop that occurred on the night of June 9, 2020, while appellant was a passenger in the Cadillac at issue, which was being driven by Sashia Johnson. Trooper Nick Lewis with the Ohio State Highway Patrol initially began to follow the Cadillac after an anonymous tip had been related to him by dispatch stating that a black Cadillac SUV would be travelling south on U.S. Route 23, driven by appellant and Johnson, and that the two women were carrying narcotics. Lewis observed the Cadillac heading south on U.S. Route 23 while he was sitting stationery in the median talking to Trooper Kuehne, who was located in a different vehicle. Lewis pulled out and followed the Cadillac for three to four miles during which time he paced the vehicle traveling 65 m.p.h. in a 60-m.p.h. zone and then observed the vehicle enter into a construction zone at 55 m.p.h. despite being marked a 35-m.p.h. zone. {¶5} Trooper Lewis initiated a stop of the vehicle, initially approaching the passenger side of the vehicle to ask for identification. Trooper Kuehne arrived at that time and commented to Trooper Lewis when he approached that he could smell marijuana. Trooper Lewis then moved to the driver’s side of the vehicle and briefly spoke to the driver before opening her vehicle door and ordering her to step out. When the door was opened, Lewis observed marijuana residue on a sock that Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 4 was stuck inside the door. After appellant got out of the vehicle upon Trooper Kuehne’s request, she informed him that she had marijuana and asked him if she could get back in the vehicle to get it. Trooper Kuehne did not permit her to do that. Both women were patted down, placed in the back of the cruiser, and a search of the vehicle followed. {¶6} The search ultimately yielded approximately 170 grams of cocaine which was found in the center front seat console of the vehicle, located between the driver and front passenger seats. A cell phone charging cord was plugged into the console where the bag of cocaine was found. Marijuana was also recovered from appellant’s purse. Appellant and Johnson, her co-defendant, were both placed under arrest and read their Miranda rights. Prior to being taken to jail, appellant’s mother, who was the registered owner of the vehicle, arrived at the scene. Appellant told her mother she was sorry through the window of the cruiser. While the two women were in jail, they each made several calls to their mothers attempting to locate money for a bond, a bondsperson, and an attorney who would represent both of them. {¶7} Appellant pled not guilty to the charges and the matter proceeded through discovery. It appears from the record that appellant and her co-defendant initially and intentionally hired the same attorney. The State filed a motion on August 3, 2020, on “Conflicting Representation,” claiming there was an indication Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 5 there could be a conflict of interest with respect to the two defendants having the same counsel and suggesting the trial court had a duty to inquire into the matter. Appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to the State’s motion on August 21, 2020, denying there was a conflict and attaching Conflict Waivers signed by herself and her co-defendant. Appellant argued that she and her co-defendant claimed innocence and wished to present a unified defense. She further claimed that neither had a desire to present a defense strategy in opposition to the other and that they were “in harmony” with one another. {¶8} While the conflict issue was still pending, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence on October 2, 2020. In her motion, she challenged the initial stop as well as the search of the vehicle and sought suppression of the results of the search. The motion also sought suppression of statements made by appellant. Thereafter, on November 9, 2020, the trial court issued a decision finding a “serious potential for a conflict of interest in dual representation of both defendants” and removed counsel from representing either appellant or her co- defendant. Appellant appealed that decision to this Court, but the appeal was unsuccessful, as evidenced by this Court’s decision issued on April 28, 2022. Appellant then appealed our decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which ultimately declined to accept jurisdiction on August 3, 2023. Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 6 {¶9} The trial court held a pretrial conference on August 25, 2023, and thereafter filed a judgment entry on September 5, 2023, stating that it had been informed appellant wished to retain counsel and that it was continuing an upcoming pretrial conference as a result. The transcript from that hearing indicates that appellant informed the court she had a bad experience with appointed counsel (Aaron Triplett) in the past and that she wanted to speak to her family about coming up with funds to hire a new attorney. Thereafter, on September 15, 2023, an entry was filed stating appellant tested positive for marijuana, that appellant was being held in contempt, and ordering appellant be remanded to jail. Appellant filed an affidavit of indigency on September 19, 2023, and it appears by that time the trial court had already appointed Aaron Triplett to represent her. Hearings were held on September 15, 2023, and October 2, 2023, and appellant made no complaint about Attorney Triplett. {¶10} A suppression hearing was held on November 29, 2023. Trooper Nick Lewis testified on behalf of the State, explaining the speed violations he observed which led to the initial stop as well as the detection of an odor of marijuana which expanded the stop and led to the detention of both women. He testified regarding appellant’s statement to Trooper Kuehne indicating she had marijuana in the vehicle, as well as the discovery of marijuana in appellant’s purse. He also testified regarding the search of the vehicle and the eventual discovery of Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 7 cocaine in the console. Trooper Lewis’ cruiser cam video was played and admitted into evidence along with several photographs, one of which demonstrated what the trooper described as marijuana residue on top of a sock that was stuck in the drivers’ side vehicle door. After the suppression hearing was conducted, appellant retained counsel on December 5, 2023, as evidenced by a notice of appearance filed the same date. The trial court issued a decision on December 19, 2023, denying appellant’s motion to suppress. {¶11} The matter thereafter proceeded to a jury trial. Appellant and her co- defendant were jointly tried, albeit with separate counsel. The State introduced four witnesses including Trooper Lewis, Lauren Ditto, Sergeant Drew Kuehne, and Captain Ron Davis. Trooper Lewis and Sergeant Kuehne both testified regarding their involvement in the initial stop, detention, search, discovery of drugs, and later review of the cruiser cam video. Portions of the cruiser cam videos were played for the jury, and a listening aid was provided to assist the jurors in listening to the video. The troopers’ testimony will be further discussed below. Lauren Ditto, a forensic scientist with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation, testified regarding her analysis of the substances sent for testing. She testified that the “white rock-like substance” was found to be cocaine with an approximate gram weight of 168.9770. Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 8 {¶12} Captain Ron Davis is the Administrative Captain of the Scioto County Sheriff’s Office. He testified regarding the telephone system that is used to record inmate phone calls placed from the jail. During his testimony, he identified two different calls placed from appellant to her mother as well as two different calls placed by appellant’s co-defendant to her own mother. Excerpts from all four calls were played for the jury, over the objection of defense counsel. Although the trial court denied the objection, it provided a limiting instruction regarding the consideration of jail calls as part of its general jury instructions that were provided at the close of the case. The contents of those calls will be discussed in detail below. {¶13} The State rested its case, at which time appellant moved the court for an acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A). The trial court denied the motion and the defense rested without presenting any evidence. After the matter was submitted to the jury for deliberation, the jury sent a question back asking to be able to view the cruiser cam video again. The jury was brought back in and allowed to watch the video. It was permitted once again to use the listening aid that it used during trial, however, it was not permitted to take the video or the listening aid back to the jury room with it. {¶14} The jury ultimately acquitted appellant on the drug trafficking charge and found her guilty of possession of cocaine and criminal tools. However, the Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 9 verdict form for possession of cocaine specified that the amount of cocaine possessed was less than 100 grams, which did not support the major drug offender specification as charged in the indictment. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years to an indefinite maximum prison term of up to ten years and six months for the possession of cocaine charge. It sentenced her to a prison term of six months on the possession of criminal tools charge and ordered the two prison terms to be served concurrently to one another but consecutive to a sentence appellant was already serving. The court further ordered the Cadillac at issue be forfeited to the State of Ohio and it imposed a fine of $20,000. {¶15} Appellant thereafter filed her timely appeal, setting forth two assignments of error for our review. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JORDAN’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. II. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JORDAN WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE U.S. AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS. Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 10 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I {¶16} In her first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. Appellant’s brief contains two “Issues presented for review” under this assignment of error, which are as follows: 1. Whether the evidence obtained during the search and seizure of the defendant was in violation of her United States and Ohio constitutional rights? 2. Whether the duration of the stop extended beyond the normal time frame for the purpose of the original stop such to render the search an illegal seizure? The State’s responses to each issue will be discussed in more detail below, however, it generally contends there is no merit to any of the arguments raised under this assignment of error. Standard of Review and Guiding Legal Principles {¶17} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-2146, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. The trial court acts as the trier of fact at a suppression hearing and is in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Sheets, 2023-Ohio-2591, ¶ 45 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Leonard, 2017-Ohio-1541, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.), citing Burnside at ¶ 8. This is because the trial court is able to “ ‘gauge the witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and to use these observations to weigh their credibility.’ ” Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 11 State v. Meadows, 2022-Ohio-287, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Hammond, 2019-Ohio-4253 ¶ 56 (4th Dist.). {¶18} However, as noted in Meadows, “ ‘[t]he trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness[.]’ ” Id. As a result, appellate courts defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Sheets at ¶ 45, citing State v. Gurley, 2015-Ohio-5361, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.). Accepting the trial court's findings of fact as true, appellate courts then “independently determine whether the trial court reached the correct legal conclusion in analyzing the facts of the case.” Sheets at ¶ 45, citing Gurley at ¶ 16, in turn citing State v. Roberts, 2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 100. {¶19} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provide that persons have a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and that probable cause is necessary for searches. The exclusionary rule protects this constitutional guarantee and mandates the exclusion of evidence obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure. State v. Shrewsbury, 2014-Ohio-716, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Emerson, 2012-Ohio-5047, ¶ 15. The same protection is provided by Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 12 Legal Analysis Initial Stop {¶20} Appellant first argues that the initial stop of the vehicle was invalid because it stemmed from an anonymous tip. She also contends there was no cruiser video to confirm a speed violation, suggesting that Trooper Lewis “utilized these alleged traffic violations to stop and search the vehicle and interrogate the occupants.” The State responds by arguing that Ohio law does not require that police have probable cause before following a vehicle. The State further argues that the trooper possessed reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based upon his observation of a speeding violation. {¶21} A traffic stop is a type of seizure and constitutionally valid only if an officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. State v. Williams, supra, at ¶ 17, citing State v. Mays, 2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 7 and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). Probable cause “is a stricter standard than reasonable and articulable suspicion” and “is a complete justification for a traffic stop[.]” Mays at ¶ 23, citing State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 411 (1993). The Supreme Court of the United States has held that probable cause is “defined in terms of facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.’ ” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-112 (1975), Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 13 quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). See also State v. Jordan, 2021- Ohio-3922, ¶ 19. {¶22} “ ‘A police officer may stop the driver of a vehicle after observing a de minimis violation of traffic laws.’ ” Williams, supra, at ¶ 19, quoting State v. Guseman, 2009-Ohio-952, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.). One such traffic law is the requirement that a motorist drive within the posted speed limit, including within a construction zone. See R.C. 4511.21. “ ‘Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held, “[w]here a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment ... even if the officer had some ulterior motive for making the stop[.]” ’ ” State v. Smith, 2025-Ohio-5752, ¶ 46 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-2803, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), in turn quoting Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 (1996), paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶23} Trooper Lewis testified during the suppression hearing that upon following the vehicle, he paced it going 65 m.p.h. in a 60-m.p.h. zone. He then observed the vehicle enter a construction zone with a posted speed limit of 35 m.p.h. while traveling 55 m.p.h. These observations by Trooper Lewis were sufficient to establish probable cause to justify a traffic stop, aside from the anonymous tip that was received. Stated another way, even if the trooper initially began following appellant based upon an ulterior motive stemming from the Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 14 anonymous tip, the subsequent observation of the traffic violations legitimized the stop and removed any requirement that the tip be determined to be reliable before acting upon it. {¶24} With respect to appellant’s argument that there was no cruiser video demonstrating that a speed violation occurred, Trooper Lewis testified at length regarding his observation of two speeding violations and the trial court obviously found his testimony to be credible. We must be mindful that “ ‘observing and evaluating the credibility of witnesses is the province of the trial court and we defer to the trial court’s judgment here.’ ” Williams at ¶ 23, quoting State v. Harris, 2012-Ohio-4237, ¶ 22. Moreover, as this Court stated in Williams, “there is no requirement for an officer’s observation of a traffic violation [to] be recorded on video.” Williams at ¶ 23, citing State v. Lemaster, 2012-Ohio-971, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.) (“Competent, credible evidence in the form of the trooper’s testimony from the suppression hearing supports this finding despite the fact that the violation was not caught on the video.”). Thus, based upon the foregoing, we conclude Trooper Lewis had probable cause to stop appellant’s vehicle. Detention and Search {¶25} Appellant next argues that Trooper Lewis’ act of opening the driver’s vehicle door constituted an illegal search. She further argues that she and her co- defendant were unlawfully detained. The State responds by arguing that because Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 15 the troopers encountered an odor of raw marijuana upon approaching the vehicle, they immediately acquired probable cause to search the vehicle. The State further argues that the order for both women to get out of the vehicle was reasonable and permissible. Finally, the State argues that because the troopers detected an odor of raw marijuana and then plainly saw evidence of marijuana being illegally transported in the vehicle, any extension of the length of the stop at that point was lawful and appropriate in order to conduct a search for illegal controlled substances and contraband. {¶26} We have already determined that the initial stop of the vehicle appellant was traveling in was valid. Aside from the fact that law enforcement had received an anonymous tip that a vehicle fitting the description of the vehicle at issue would be passing through and the occupants were carrying a large amount of narcotics, because Trooper Lewis observed two speeding violations, he had probable cause to stop the vehicle based upon the traffic violations alone. Furthermore, “[o]nce a driver has been lawfully stopped, an officer may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without any additional justification.” State v. Burkhart, 2016-Ohio-7534, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Kilbarger, 2012-Ohio- 1521, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), in turn citing State v. Huffman, 2011-Ohio-4668, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.); State v. Jackson, 2022-Ohio-4365, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.) (officer may order driver out of car and needs no justification beyond that necessary for the initial stop). See Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 16 also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, fn. 6 (1977) and State v. Alexander-Lindsey, 2016-Ohio-3033, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.) (“Officers can order a driver and a passenger to exit the vehicle, even absent any additional suspicion of a criminal violation.”). {¶27} Even though Trooper Lewis had a valid reason to stop the vehicle, “[i]t is well-established that the scope and duration of a routine traffic stop ‘must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification * * * and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ ” State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-561, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.), quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). Therefore, “ ‘[w]hen a law enforcement officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer may detain the motorist for a period of time sufficient to issue the motorist a citation and to perform routine procedures such as a computer check on the motorist's driver's license, registration and vehicle plates.’ ” Jones at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Aguirre, 2003-Ohio-4909, ¶ 36 (4th Dist.). {¶28} However, “ ‘[a]n officer may expand the scope of the stop and may continue to detain the vehicle and its occupants without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment if the officer discovers further facts which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that additional criminal activity is afoot.’ ” Jones at ¶ 23, quoting State v. Rose, 2006-Ohio-5292, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), in turn citing State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St. 3d 234, 240 (1997). See also State v. Dunbar, 2024-Ohio-1460, ¶ 29 (4th Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 17 Dist.). A reviewing court looks to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether reasonable articulable suspicion exists when a traffic stop is extended. State v. Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 17, citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). {¶29} Trooper Lewis clearly had reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle and both occupants once he and Sergeant Kuehne immediately detected an odor of raw marijuana when they approached the vehicle. These observations also provided the troopers with probable cause to search the vehicle. “Probable cause exists when there is a ‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” State v. Boykins, 2024-Ohio-5898, ¶ 15, (4th Dist.), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). “ ‘When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, the officer may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.’ ” Boykins at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Malone, 2022-Ohio-1409, ¶ 30 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000). Additionally, and importantly, Boykins explains that “ ‘Ohio courts have held that the production of drugs by an occupant of the vehicle independently provides an officer with additional probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of contraband.’ ” Boykins at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Donaldson, 2019-Ohio-232, ¶ 29 (6th Dist.). Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 18 {¶30} In fact, despite appellant’s argument to the contrary, this Court has recently reaffirmed and acknowledged that “ ‘ “[t]he smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize this odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to conduct a search.” ’ ” State v. Smith, supra, at ¶ 55 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Jones, supra, at ¶ 29, in turn quoting State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 (2000), syllabus.1 We further explained as follows in Smith: [“ ‘]Any odor of marijuana emanating from a legally stopped vehicle creates probable cause to believe that a violation of the law has occurred.[’ ” State v. Jones, supra, at ¶ 29, quoting] State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-2880, ¶ 9, 90 N.E.3d 384 (2d Dist.). [“ ‘W]hen a police officer has probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of a crime, the officer may conduct a warrantless search of every part of the vehicle and its contents, including all movable containers and packages, that could logically conceal the objects of the search.[’ ”] State v. Farrow, 2023-Ohio-682, ¶ 18, 209 N.E.3d 830 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Maddox, 2021-Ohio-586, ¶ 20, 168 N.E.3d 613 (10th Dist.), citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). Smith at ¶ 55. {¶31} Just as in Smith, here the State demonstrated that Trooper Lewis had probable cause to search the vehicle. The State established that Lewis was familiar 1 In her reply brief, appellant cites State v. Oliver, 2023-Ohio-1550 (10th Dist.), claiming that court held “that the smell of raw marijuana alone is no longer sufficient to establish probable cause because since legal and illegal marijuana coexist, it is impossible to discern legality based solely on odor.” However, this Court has reviewed Oliver and we find that the holding in that case is nothing close to what appellant represents. In fact, in Oliver, the search of the vehicle based upon an odor of raw marijuana was not challenged. Id. at ¶ 75. The Oliver court actually held that “[a]n officer's detection of the odor of marijuana in a car does not, alone, establish probable cause sufficient to search an occupant of that car without a warrant.” Id. at ¶ 80. The search of a person, as opposed to a vehicle, is not at issue in this case and, thus, Oliver has no applicability. Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 19 with the odor of raw marijuana through both training and experience. The State also introduced testimony from Trooper Lewis that when Sergeant Kuehne arrived and approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he commented to Lewis that he detected an odor of marijuana. Trooper Lewis explained that he had detected the same odor upon his initial approach. The State also introduced evidence in the form of testimony from Trooper Lewis as well as photographs demonstrating that marijuana residue was observed on a sock located inside the driver’s side door when Trooper Lewis opened the door for appellant to step out of the vehicle. {¶32} Further, we find no merit to appellant’s argument that Trooper Lewis’ act of opening the driver’s door of the vehicle for appellant’s co-defendant to exit in accordance with a lawful order constituted a search. In State v. Jackson, supra, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected an argument that an officer’s opening of a car door constituted a search. Jackson at ¶ 14. The Court held that Jackson’s argument was an attempt to circumvent Mimms, stating that arguing the act of an officer opening the car door, rather than the driver, constitutes not just a seizure, but a search, “miscomprehends” what constitutes a search. Id. The Court explained that “[t]he lead officer’s opening the door was not a search because he did not act with the purpose of finding out what was inside the car,” but instead the officer’s intent was to secure the driver. Id. at ¶ 16. Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 20 {¶33} The Jackson Court essentially held that if the initial stop is lawful, then the order to get out of the car is constitutionally permissible and the issue of who opened the door is irrelevant. Id. at ¶ 20, citing State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. 1978) (“there is little practical difference [under Mimms] between ordering a driver to open his door and get out of his car, on the one hand, and opening the door for the driver and telling him to get out”). Moreover, in the present case the troopers’ detection of an odor of raw marijuana upon approaching the vehicle had already provided sufficient probable cause to justify a search of the vehicle. Trooper Lewis’ observation of marijuana residue on a sock located in the drivers’ side door when the door was opened did not provide the only probable cause to search the vehicle. {¶34} Moreover, we find appellant’s argument that the trooper opened the vehicle because he intended to search it, rather than to control the driver, is not supported by the record. Trooper Lewis testified as follows during the suppression hearing: Q: How often would you say you ask a driver out of the vehicle, even if you’re not – even if you’re not going to conduct a search? A: Typically, if I’m working interdiction, the vast majority of the time – Q: Okay. A: -- I ask them to step out. Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 21 Q: Why is that? A: Basically, I – I like to have them out with me. I can see their body language. I can see if they have any weapons on them. I bring them back to my cruiser, talk to them, while I’m checking out their information. It basically expedites the process. So, instead of me going back and forth if I have questions, I don’t have to keep going back and forth. I have them back with me. I also feel it’s safer. Because if there is something inside the vehicle, I have them out with me, so I kind of eliminate that second approach to the car. Q: Okay. And based on your training through the highway patrol, is there statistical increase of harm on reapproach to a motor vehicle? A: Yes. Thus, Trooper Lewis’ testimony was consistent with attempting to secure and control and the driver, rather than an attempt to obtain grounds to conduct a search. This is true especially in light of the fact that the trooper already had probable cause to search the entire vehicle based upon the odor of raw marijuana alone. The additional observation of marijuana residue inside the vehicle door was simply incidental to lawfully removing the driver from the vehicle. {¶35} In light of our determinations that the initial stop was based upon probable cause, that the detention was lawful, and that the vehicle search was based upon probable cause and was lawfully conducted, appellant was not entitled to have the results of the search suppressed. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, having found no Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 22 merit in any of the arguments raised under appellant’s first assignment of error, it is overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II {¶36} In her second assignment of error, appellant contends that she was denied her right to a fair trial. Appellant presents six issues for review under this assignment of error, as follows: 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in removing defendant’s counsel of choice on the court’s perceived conflict of interest and then appointing as her counsel a former attorney with whom she had expressed her dissatisfaction? 2. Whether defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was abrogated by the admission of evidence as to her silence after receipt of Miranda warnings and the State’s repeated references to infer guilt by her silence? 3. Whether the admission of jail calls of the defendants below violates appellant’s due process rights and denies her a fair trial, especially inasmuch as neither defendant presented evidence or testified at trial? 4. Whether the trial court’s failure to give limiting instructions as to the jail calls at the time of the admission of the calls or testimony regarding same, coupled with his repeated assurances that he would do so, but reserving such limiting instruction to the end of trial deprived appellant of a fair trial? 5. Whether the denial of defendant’s Rule 29(A) motion at the close of the State’s case deprived her of a fair trial based upon the properly admitted evidence at trial? Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 23 6. Whether the cumulative effect of the errors below resulted in the defendant being denied a fair trial, such to require reversal of her convictions? The State’s response to each of these arguments will be discussed in more detail below, however, the State ultimately contends there is no merit to any of the arguments raised by appellant and that they should be overruled. Issue 1: Counsel of Choice/Appointed Counsel {¶37} Under her first issue presented, appellant essentially argues that the trial court abused its discretion in removing defendant’s counsel of choice on the court’s perceived conflict of interest and then appointing as her counsel a former attorney with whom she had expressed her dissatisfaction. As set forth above, appellant and her co-defendant initially retained the same counsel. The trial court agreed with the State that the dual representation presented the potential for a conflict of interest and removed retained counsel. Appellant appealed the decision to this Court, which upheld the trial court’s decision, and the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to consider the case. In her brief, appellant now states “without intent to revisit the rulings on the issue,” that “the Trial Court lacked impartiality in denying her the counsel of her choice.” Appellant further complains that the trial court thereafter appointed an attorney to represent her in whom she had expressed dissatisfaction in prior dealings. Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 24 {¶38} The State responds by arguing that this Court’s prior holding regarding the removal of appellant’s retained counsel in State v. Jordan, 2022- Ohio-1480 (4th Dist.), which determined there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in removing appellant’s counsel of choice, is controlling and that this present challenge is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. For the following reasons, we agree with the State. We further find no abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court’s appointment of counsel for appellant once it appeared she was indigent and could not hire new counsel. {¶39} The doctrine of res judicata generally states that “a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.” State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 176, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus. Consequently, “the doctrine serves to preclude a defendant who has had his day in court from seeking a second on that same issue.” State v. Saxon, 2006-Ohio-1245, ¶ 18. “In so doing, res judicata promotes the principles of finality and judicial economy by preventing endless relitigation of an issue on which a defendant has already received a full and fair opportunity to be heard.” Id. Scioto App. No. 24CA4070 25 {¶40} Despite appellant’s claim that she does not intend to revisit the prior rulings related to the removal of her hired counsel,