State v. Williams
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketWD-26-015
JudgeSulek
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Williams, 2026-Ohio-4617.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-26-015
Appellee
Trial Court No. 2024CR0301
v.
Adrian Williams, Jr. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: November 20, 2026
*****
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecutor, and
Kristofer A. Kristofferson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Jeffrey P. Nunnari, for appellant.
*****
SULEK, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant Adrian Williams appeals the judgment of the Wood County Court
of Common Pleas, which convicted him following his guilty plea to one count of
aggravated robbery and one count of abduction. Williams argues (1) that his guilty plea
was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court failed to inform him
that restitution could be part of his sentence, and (2) that the prosecutor breached the plea
agreement when it recommended restitution. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s
judgment is affirmed.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On August 7, 2024, the Wood County Grand Jury returned a three-count
indictment against Williams, charging him with one count of aggravated burglary, one
count of aggravated robbery, and one count of abduction, along with attendant firearm
specifications.
{¶ 3} On October 30, 2025, Williams entered a guilty plea to the count of
aggravated robbery with a one-year firearm specification and to the count of abduction.
In exchange for his plea, the State agreed to dismiss the count of aggravated burglary and
to make no recommendation regarding sentencing.
{¶ 4} Relevant here, during the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, as the trial court was
describing the potential penalties, it did not inform Williams of the possibility of
restitution. The signed plea agreement, however, did provide, “I understand that court
costs, restitution and other financial sanctions including fines, day fines, and
reimbursement for the costs of any sanctions may also be imposed upon me at
sentencing.”
{¶ 5} At the sentencing hearing, the victim stated that Williams and a co-
defendant broke into his home, tied him to the bed at gunpoint, beat him, and then stole
firearms and tools totaling $13,970. Despite promising not to make a recommendation,
the State asked for restitution as described by the victim.
2.
{¶ 6} Upon consideration of the parties’ statements, the statutory factors, and the
presentence investigation report, the trial court sentenced Williams to a total indefinite
prison term of 9 to 12 1/2 years in prison. The trial court further ordered Williams to pay
$13,970 in restitution, noting the evidence provided by the victim.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 7} Williams timely appeals his judgment of conviction, asserting two
assignments of error for review:
1. Appellant’s guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entered.
2. The State of Ohio breached the plea agreement by making a
recommendation for restitution at sentencing.
III. Analysis
{¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, Williams argues that his guilty pleas were
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.
{¶ 9} “A defendant’s decision to enter a guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary.” State v. Gowdy, 2025-Ohio-5575, ¶ 18, citing State v. Dangler, 2020-
Ohio-2765, ¶ 10. “And ‘[f]ailure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea
unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.’”
Id., quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). “A court ‘shall not accept a
plea of guilty or no contest without first’ ensuring that the defendant’s plea is voluntary
and that the defendant understands the charges, the maximum penalty involved, and the
effect of the plea, including its effect on the defendant’s rights.” Id., quoting Crim.R.
11(C)(2).
3.
{¶ 10} “When reviewing guilty pleas, we focus on ‘whether the dialogue between
the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences
of his plea.’” Id. at ¶ 19, quoting Dangler at ¶ 12. The questions to be answered are:
(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision[s] of [Crim.R.
11]? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported
failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating
prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant
met that burden?
Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Dangler at ¶ 17.
{¶ 11} Addressing those questions, the State concedes for purposes of this appeal
that the trial court did not fully comply with the requirement of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) to
inform Williams “of the maximum penalty involved” in that it did not inform him of the
possibility of restitution during the plea colloquy. The State, however, argues that the
trial court’s failure is not of a type that excuses Williams from demonstrating prejudice.
Notably, Williams does not disagree.
{¶ 12} “‘[A] defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the basis that it was not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made’ is generally not entitled to have his plea
vacated unless he demonstrates that he was prejudiced by the failure of the trial court to
comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11.” Gowdy at ¶ 19, quoting State v. Nero, 56
Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to
that general rule: “(1) when a trial court ‘fails to explain the constitutional rights set forth
in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c),’ . . . and (2) when a trial court ‘complete[ly] fail[s] to comply
with’ a requirement of Crim.R. 11.” (Internal citations omitted for readability). Id. at ¶
21, quoting State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 31, and State v. Sarkozy, 2008-Ohio-509, ¶
4.
22. “Aside from these two exceptions, a defendant claiming that his guilty plea was not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered is required to show prejudice.” Id.,
citing Dangler at ¶ 16.
{¶ 13} Here, the trial court failed to inform Williams of a potential—not
mandatory—financial sanction. Ohio courts have held that failure to inform a defendant
of the possibility of restitution is not a “complete failure” to comply with Crim.R. 11.
See State v. Blake, 2026-Ohio-1769, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.); State v. Willard, 2021-Ohio-2552, ¶
95 (11th Dist.). Williams, therefore, must demonstrate prejudice.
{¶ 14} In his appellate brief, Williams argues that prejudice was evident on the
face of the record because even though he was not advised that restitution could be part
of his sentence, the trial court nonetheless imposed it. The test for prejudice, however, is
not whether restitution was imposed, but “whether the plea would have otherwise been
made.” Gowdy at ¶ 20, quoting Dangler at ¶ 16, quoting Nero at 108. On that issue, the
record contains no evidence that Williams would not have pleaded guilty if he had been
informed that he may have to pay restitution. On the contrary, the written plea agreement
specifically informed him that restitution may be imposed. Williams voluntarily signed
that agreement. Moreover, Williams did not object to restitution during sentencing and
now makes no argument on appeal that he would not have entered his guilty plea had he
been informed about restitution.
{¶ 15} Williams, therefore, has not satisfied his burden to demonstrate prejudice
from the trial court’s failure to fully comply with Crim.R. 11(C). Accordingly, his first
assignment of error is not well-taken.
5.
{¶ 16} In his second assignment of error, Williams argues that the State breached
its plea agreement when it recommended restitution during the sentencing hearing despite
its promise not to do so. The State counters that it did not breach the plea agreement, but
even if it did, the breach does not rise to the level of plain error. For purposes of this
analysis, this court will presume that the State’s recommendation of restitution was a
breach of the plea agreement.
{¶ 17} “A plea agreement is considered a contract between the State and a
criminal defendant and is subject to general contract law.” State v. Wright, 2025-Ohio-
3176, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Watkins, 2016-Ohio-5756, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.).
“Accordingly, if one side breaches the agreement, the other side is entitled to either
rescission or specific performance of the plea agreement.” Id., citing State v. Walker,
2006-Ohio-2929, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 18} Williams acknowledges that because he did not object to the prosecutor’s
recommendation at sentencing, he has waived all but plain error. “Where a defendant
fails to object to the State’s breach of the plea agreement, the alleged error is forfeited,
and an appellate court reviews for plain error only.” Id. at ¶ 17, citing State v. Vasquez,
2024-Ohio-2496, ¶ 25 (6th Dist.); Puckett v. U.S., 556 U.S. 129 (2009). Crim.R. 52(B)
provides that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” To demonstrate plain error,
Williams must show “that an error occurred, that the error was obvious, and that there is a
reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice, meaning that the error affected
the outcome . . ..” State v. Echols, 2024-Ohio-5088, ¶ 50, citing State v. Knuff, 2024-
6.
Ohio-902, ¶ 117. “Plain error should be noticed only ‘with the utmost caution, under
exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” Id.,
quoting State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 47 (1980), quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio
St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 19} Upon review, this is not the exceptional case where a finding of plain error
is necessary to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. On this record, there is not a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the State had
remained silent at sentencing. Indeed, this court believes that an award of restitution was
inevitable after the trial court heard the victim’s statements describing the offense and the
property that was stolen. Further, the trial court stated that it considered the need for
restitution and also commented on the egregious nature of the case, the fact that some of
the property that was stolen were guns, and the fact that Williams ultimately received a
relatively paltry amount of money for the items that he stole. The trial court’s decision to
award restitution, therefore, was independent of the State’s recommendation. See State v.
Roby, 2022-Ohio-223 (6th Dist.) (no plain error for breach of the plea agreement where
the trial court made an independent determination that the defendant’s conduct justified
the maximum prison term); State v. Wright, 2025-Ohio-3176 (6th Dist.) (State’s failure to
recommend concurrent sentences not plain error where the trial court independently
considered the defendant’s extensive criminal history and drug addiction and where the
trial court had already rejected a different recommendation from the State to run the
sentence concurrently to an out-of-state prison term); but see State v. Vasquez, 2024-
Ohio-2496 (6th Dist.) (plain error where State promised to recommend a cumulative 15-
7.
year prison sentence but instead recommended 25 years, and the trial court sentenced the
defendant to 25 years in prison).
{¶ 20} Accordingly, the State’s recommendation of restitution, despite its promise
to remain silent at sentencing, did not constitute plain error. Williams’ second
assignment of error is not well-taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 21} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Wood County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed. Williams is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant
to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J.
CONCURS AND WRITES JUDGE
SEPARATELY.
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
JUDGE
Charles Sulek, J.
CONCUR. JUDGE
MAYLE, J., concurring,
{¶ 22} I concur in the majority decision. I write separately only to emphasize that
the State’s comments at sentencing unquestionably violated the plea agreement.
8.
{¶ 23} “An order of restitution imposed by the sentencing court on an offender for
a felony is part of the sentence[.]” State v. Danison, 2005-Ohio-781, syllabus. Here, the
State agreed “to decline to make a sentence recommendation.” Instead of honoring its
agreement, the State’s attorney told the court that the victim had tabulated a restitution
total that “[the State] will ask for as well.” (Emphasis added.) Then, when Williams
argued that restitution should not be imposed against him because it was not imposed
against his co-defendant, the State argued why restitution should nevertheless be imposed
against Williams:
So I understand [defense counsel’s] argument that, hey, my guy
should be treated the same way [as the co-defendant], but there was a
reason for that. And so whether the Court ordered restitution in the other
case or not, the evidence that’s been available to the Court today was not
presented at that hearing, it’s been presented today, and I don’t think there’s
a rule that prohibits the Court from ordering restitution in one co-
Defendant’s case and not the other, so we would join [the victim] in
requesting that the restitution be ordered. (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 24} I acknowledge that an agreement not to make a sentencing
recommendation does not prevent the prosecutor from participating in the sentencing
hearing. State v. Monroe, 2020-Ohio-4541, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Watkins,
2016-Ohio-5756, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Crump, 2005-Ohio-4451, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.).
“[A] prosecutor may ‘provide relevant factual information [and] correct misstatements’
without violating the plea agreement to make no recommendation regarding the
sentence.” Monroe at ¶ 21, quoting Watkins at ¶ 15, citing Crump at ¶ 11.
9.
{¶ 25} Here, however, the State went well beyond “participating” in the
sentencing hearing, “providing relevant factual information,” or “correct[ing]
misstatements.” It specifically requested that restitution be ordered. Twice.
{¶ 26} Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that there was no plain error here.
R.C. 2929.18(A) instructs that “the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a
felony . . . shall sentence the offender to make restitution pursuant to this section and
[R.C.] 2929.281.” And here, the victim appeared at the sentencing hearing well prepared
to address the financial loss he suffered as a result of Williams’s crime. Given these
facts, I agree with the majority that Williams was not prejudiced by the State’s violation
of the plea agreement.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
10.