State v. Thompson

[Cite as State v. Thompson, 2026-Ohio-3484.] IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT STARK COUNTY, OHIO STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 2025CA00132 Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry -vs- Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2025-CR-0864A ROGER LEE THOMPSON, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: September 3, 2026 BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Craig R. Baldwin; David M. Gormley, Judges APPEARANCES: KYLE L. STONE, Prosecuting Attorney, CHRISTOPHER A. PIEKARSKI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee; DONOVAN R. HILL, for Defendant-Appellant. Baldwin, J. {¶1} The appellant, Roger Lee Thompson, appeals his conviction by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. The appellee is the State of Ohio. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE {¶2} On May 16, 2025, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted the appellant and his co-defendant, V.W., each on one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) with firearm and repeat violent offender specifications under R.C. 2941.145(A) and R.C. 2941.149(A) respectively; one count of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3); and one count of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). The appellant pleaded not guilty.  {¶3} The charges arose from a shooting outside the Shorb Drive Thru, a business on 12th Street NW in Canton, on the morning of April 12, 2025. {¶4} C.S. testified that she drove to the Shorb Drive Thru that morning, picked up a friend, and offered him a ride home. After passing through the drive thru without incident and turning back north onto Shorb Avenue NW, she heard six to ten gunshots. When she looked back, she saw two men in the alley – Diana Place NW – positioned in “staggered” fashion, one in front of a house and the other beside a trash can at the side of the house. The man in front was shooting with his arm extended. C.S. did not recognize either man and did not get a good look at their faces; she agreed at trial that she would not have been able to identify them in a photo lineup. She noticed they were wearing hoodies and jackets. She did not realize her vehicle had been struck until she arrived home and saw the damage. Neither she nor her passenger was injured. {¶5} J.H., who lives next to the Shorb Drive Thru, was in her bathroom that morning when she heard gunfire and dropped to the floor. After the shooting stopped she heard running and yelling from the alley beside her home and called police. Her doorbell camera, which records when it detects motion, captured a man walking through her front yard at approximately 11:45 a.m. who then fired at a passing car. She downloaded the footage and provided it to police; it was admitted at trial as State’s Exhibit 3. J.H. did not recognize the man in the video or the vehicle. {¶6} Canton Police Officer Yubak Karki, assigned to the Real-Time Crime Center, reviewed footage from the city camera at 12th Street NW and Shorb Avenue NW, which faces the Shorb Drive Thru. He downloaded the footage, which was admitted as State’s Exhibit 1. The video shows two men walking southbound together toward the store, loitering briefly outside, and entering one after the other. One exits about four minutes later carrying a shopping bag; the second exits roughly a minute after that. Both then move east around the building and north up Jones Court NW, out of camera view. Minutes later C.S.’s vehicle enters and then exits the drive thru, turning north onto Shorb Avenue NW at 11:43 a.m., at which point the two men emerge from the side of the house at the corner of Shorb Avenue NW and Diana Place NW and fire handguns at the departing vehicle before fleeing east down Diana Place NW. Karki testified that the date and time stamp on the footage was accurate, and that he could tell the two shooters were the same men seen ten minutes earlier because they wore the same clothing. On cross-examination he acknowledged that approximately twelve people appear over the course of the video, most wearing dark jackets, and that the footage does not show distinguishing facial features. {¶7} Canton Police Detective Michael Brown responded to the scene on April 12, 2025. He testified he had been to the Shorb Drive Thru “too many times to count” in his capacity as a police officer and was familiar with the area and with the inside of the store. He knew from prior visits that the business maintained surveillance cameras. The owner pulled up footage from three cameras on her cell phone, permitted Brown to watch it, and permitted him to screen-record it; he forwarded the recordings to his work phone and then to Detective Diels. {¶8} The three videos, two from exterior cameras and one from an interior camera, were admitted as State’s Exhibits 2a through 2c. Brown testified that he specifically requested footage from the morning of April 12, that the footage he received began shortly before 11:33 a.m., and that he had no reason to believe it had been altered. He recognized the area depicted in the interior video as the inside of the Shorb Drive Thru store. He testified that the videos fairly and accurately depicted the premises on that date. On cross-examination he acknowledged that he never saw the equipment running the cameras and was not familiar with how the system operated. {¶9} Canton Police Detective Mark Diels took over as lead investigator. Sixteen spent shell casings were recovered along Diana Place NW, photographed, and collected – six grouped in one area and ten in another. Police identified C.S. through the license plate visible in the video and interviewed her the same day. Diels photographed her vehicle, which bore approximately four bullet strikes, and recovered a bullet from the door frame. {¶10} Diels reviewed the doorbell video, the city camera video, and the three drive thru videos. He noted that one suspect carried a shopping bag and walked with a distinctive gait – “with his feet out,” or “like a duck.” He acknowledged he could not immediately identify either suspect from the videos alone. Police therefore issued a BOLO alert using two still photographs of one suspect, one taken from the drive thru’s interior surveillance video and one from J.H.’s doorbell video, and published it. The BOLO was admitted as State’s Exhibit 7. {¶11} Following tips generated by the BOLO, Officer Brown advised Diels on April 15, 2025, that the man depicted was possibly V.W. Diels compared V.W.’s CJIS and OHLEG records and Facebook photographs against the videos and the BOLO and identified V.W. {¶12} Diels learned V.W. was on active GPS monitoring. Isaac Brenneman, an operations monitor with Oriana House’s electronic monitoring department, testified that he supervised V.W.’s ankle monitor, that such monitors are “[v]ery accurate,” and that he had received no notification of tampering or non-wear. Brenneman prepared a points report for April 12, 2025, admitted as State’s Exhibit 4, reflecting V.W.’s location in one-minute intervals. The report tracks V.W. from Worley Avenue NW southbound toward the drive thru beginning at 11:31 a.m.; at 829 12th Street NW, the address of the Shorb Drive Thru, from 11:34 until 11:39 a.m.; then northbound, pinging at 1211 Jones Court NW at 11:41 a.m. and at 1222 Shorb Avenue NW at 11:43 a.m.; and finally at 1241 Worley Avenue NW from 11:53 a.m. onward. Brenneman testified he could state definitively that V.W. was in the area of the Shorb Drive Thru at 11:43 a.m. He also explained the system’s tolerances: a person may ping at 1222 Shorb Avenue NW while standing at the corner of Shorb Avenue NW and Diana Place NW, and a brief event occurring between one-minute intervals may not ping at the exact address. {¶13} On April 17, 2025, officers located and arrested V.W. at 1241 Worley Avenue NW. Diels and other officers executed a search warrant at that address the same day. The appellant was inside the residence when the warrant was executed. The search produced a Glock 19 handgun from a closet in the living room area, a Guess hoodie, a Hilfiger jacket, and a pair of tennis shoes. Diels testified that the Guess hoodie matched the hoodie worn by V.W. in the drive thru and depicted in the BOLO still, and that the Hilfiger jacket and tennis shoes matched the clothing worn by the second suspect in the videos. Diels testified that the appellant and V.W. were routinely in and out of the Worley Avenue residence because they were “best friends.” He acknowledged that he never personally observed the appellant at the house before the warrant was executed and that neither CJIS nor OHLEG listed 1241 Worley Avenue NW as the appellant’s address. Diels testified that he ultimately identified the appellant as the second shooter after reviewing his CJIS and OHLEG photographs together with the video evidence. He identified V.W. and the appellant in the courtroom.  {¶14} Abigail Ilijevski, a firearms and fingerprint specialist with the Stark County Crime Laboratory, testified as an expert without objection. She received the Glock and the sixteen recovered casings. She determined the firearm was operable and test-fired it. Six of the sixteen casings were identified as having been fired from the Glock. The other ten were excluded from the Glock, but were identified as being fired from the same firearm as one another. Ilijevski testified that she did not swab the firearm for DNA or process it for latent prints because she was not asked to do so, and that no other items were submitted for that purpose. Diels likewise confirmed that no seized item was submitted for DNA or fingerprint analysis. {¶15} At the close of the State’s case, the appellant moved for acquittal under Crim.R. 29. The trial court overruled the motion. {¶16} The jury found the appellant guilty of all three counts and of the firearm specification. The trial court found him guilty of the repeat violent offender specification. The court proceeded immediately to sentencing and imposed an indefinite term of eight to twelve years on the felonious assault count, a mandatory three-year term on the firearm specification and an additional five-year term on the repeat-violent-offender specification, each specification term to be served consecutively to the underlying sentence, while thirty-six month terms on the remaining counts were ordered concurrent, for an aggregate term of sixteen to twenty years. {¶17} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and herein raises four assignments of error: {¶18} “I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY TELLING THE JURY APPELLANT WAS INDICTED WITH A REPEAT VIOLENT OFFENDER SPECIFICATION AND THE CURATIVE INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE COURT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ALLEVIATE THE PREJUDICE.” {¶19} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY PERMITTING ADMISSION OF THE VIDEO FROM THE INTERIOR OF THE SHORB DRIVE THRU WITHOUT PROPER AUTHENTICATION.” {¶20} “III. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.” {¶21} “IV. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.” I. {¶22} In his first assignment of error, the appellant argues that the trial court erred by disclosing the appellant was indicted on a repeat violent offender specification and that only giving a curative instruction to the jury was insufficient. We disagree. STANDARD OF REVIEW {¶23} The adequacy of a curative instruction is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court has declined to find an abuse of that discretion where an improper reference to a defendant’s criminal history is “fleeting and * * * promptly followed by a curative instruction.” State v. Allen, 2023-Ohio-3739, ¶ 45 (5th Dist.). {¶24} “The doctrine of invited error holds that a litigant may not ‘take advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced.’ ” State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 324 (2000), quoting Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Ohio St.3d 20 (1986), paragraph one of the syllabus.  {¶25} A claim not raised in the trial court is forfeited and reviewable only for plain error. Crim.R. 52(B). Plain error exists only where, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise. Notice of plain error is taken with the utmost caution and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. ANALYSIS {¶26} When an indictment includes a repeat violent offender specification, “[t]he court shall determine the issue of whether an offender is a repeat violent offender.” R.C. 2941.149(B). Evidence of the specification is accordingly presented to the trial court outside the presence of the jury. State v. Malloy, 2026-Ohio-14, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Oller, 2017-Ohio-814, ¶ 38 (10th Dist.). {¶27} After the jury was impaneled and sworn, the trial court began reading the indictment and stated that the appellant “has been indicted on the charges of Felonious Assault with a Firearm Specification, a Repeat Violent Offender Specification, Discharge of Firearm on Or Near a Prohibited Premises, and Having Weapons While Under Disability.” Defense counsel objected. The court excused the jury to the jury room so the matter could be addressed on the record in open court. {¶28} The mention of the specification to the jury was error, and the State does not contend otherwise. R.C. 2941.149(B) commits the repeat violent offender determination to the court, and the specification should not have been placed before the jury. {¶29} What followed is dispositive of the appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s response. The parties and the court discussed the matter outside the presence of the jury, and two remedies were placed before the appellant: a mistrial, which would have discharged the panel that heard the misstatement and begun the trial anew, or a curative instruction, which would retain that panel. Counsel conferred privately with the appellant and reported to the court: I’ve had the opportunity to speak with my client. I’ve gone over the options, that I can ask for a mistrial, and the Court could grant a mistrial, and if that were the case, we would start this whole process over, get a new jury; I also went over with him that I could ask the Court for a curative instruction to keep the jury members that we have; and based upon the discussion, he would prefer me to keep the jury members that we have with a curative instruction. {¶30} The appellant thus elected not to request a mistrial and instead requested that the existing jury be retained and given a curative instruction. His counsel then participated in selecting the instruction’s language. {¶31} When the jury returned, the court instructed: Remember when we were discussing how anybody could make a mistake? The Court, in error, when I was reading the offenses that Mr. Thompson has been indicted on, in error, I indicated that he had been charged with a Repeat Violent Offender Specification. That is incorrect, not true, and you are instructed to disregard that, and you cannot consider that for any purpose whatsoever. I know the toothpaste is out of the tube, but you got to put it back in there, and when it comes time for your deliberations, that is something that you absolutely, positively cannot consider because it is not true. Do you understand that?  {¶32} The appellant now argues that “[s]imply telling the jury to ignore the statement is insufficient.” That is the error he invited. The appellant elected a curative instruction instead of requesting a mistrial. A litigant may not “take advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced.” Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at 324. Having rejected a mistrial in favor of a curative instruction, and having framed that instruction, the appellant may not obtain a new trial on the ground that the instruction he chose was not enough. We note the limits of this holding: invited error bars his challenge to the remedy he selected. It does not bar our determination that the disclosure itself was error. {¶33} The appellant’s remaining contention is that the trial court “should have, at the very least, conducted an inquiry of the jurors to determine their thoughts regarding prior convictions.” Nothing the appellant requested induced the court’s failure to conduct such an inquiry, and invited error does not reach that claim. He did not, however, ask the court to conduct one. The claim is therefore forfeited and reviewable only for plain error. Crim.R. 52(B). The appellant does not expressly invoke that standard, though he quotes State v. Hernandez, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 658 (8th Dist.), for the proposition that an instruction submitting a specification to the jury “constitutes plain error which affects a substantial right.” Assuming the argument is made, it fails. Hernandez concerned a jury charged to determine a major drug offender specification; here the specification was never submitted to the jury, was not mentioned again, and was determined by the court. The reference was a single misstatement. It named the specification and nothing more: no prior offense, no date, and no underlying facts. The court’s admonition followed promptly. The appellant offers nothing beyond assertion to show that questioning the seated jurors would have produced a different verdict, and we cannot say the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise had it occurred. {¶34} For the proposition that a curative instruction alone is insufficient, the appellant relies principally on State v. Junod, 2019-Ohio-743 (3d Dist.). That case does not establish the rule he draws from it. Junod arose from an indictment charging, among other counts, felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) with attendant firearm and repeat violent offender specifications under R.C. 2941.145(A) and 2941.149(A). Id. at ¶ 3. On the first day of trial, the State, defense counsel, and the trial court were all under the mistaken impression that the repeat violent offender specification was an issue for the jury, and the State discussed the defendant’s prior conviction for attempted murder before the jury during voir dire and again in opening statement, without objection. Id. at ¶ 31. The State brought the matter to the court’s attention the following day; defense counsel moved for a mistrial; the court overruled the motion and gave a curative instruction. Id. at ¶ 32. The Third District overruled the assignments of error challenging both counsel’s performance and the denial of the mistrial. Id. at ¶ 55. It reversed in part on an unrelated ground concerning the imposition of court- appointed counsel fees without a determination of ability to pay. Id. at ¶¶ 64-69. {¶35} The passage that the appellant quotes appears in the Third District’s analysis of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Junod at ¶ 40. The court there observed that “in addition to the curative jury instruction given by the trial court,” the record was “somewhat unique” in also containing a direct dialogue with jurors on voir dire. Id. That was a description of an additional feature of that record, not a condition upon the efficacy of a curative instruction. When the same court turned to the mistrial claim, it applied the settled rule that a reference to a prior arrest or conviction that is fleeting and promptly followed by a curative instruction does not unfairly prejudice the accused, Id. at ¶ 45, together with the presumption that a jury follows the instructions given it, Id., citing State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59 (1995). Those are the same principles the State invokes here. {¶36} Junod differs from this case in a further respect that matters to the appellant’s argument. The defendant there moved for a mistrial and was denied one; his complaint was that he was left with an instruction he had not chosen over the remedy he had sought. The appellant chose not to pursue the remedy that would have eliminated the concern he raises on appeal, a mistrial and a new jury, and instead elected to proceed with the existing panel following a curative instruction. Moreover, the dialogue with prospective jurors in Junod was conducted by defense counsel, not by the trial court, Id. at ¶ 39, and it occurred during voir dire, before the jury was sworn. Here the misstatement came after the jury had been impaneled and sworn, so the procedure Junod describes was not available in the form the appellant invokes. What he seeks is a post-swearing examination of seated jurors, a remedy he did not request and one Junod did not address. {¶37} In any event, “[i]t is well-established that juries are presumed to follow and obey the limiting instructions given by the trial court * * * A curative instruction is presumed to be an effective remedy for the introduction of improper statements during the course of a trial.” State v. Hill, 2024-Ohio-1717, ¶ 76 (5th Dist.). The reference here occurred once, before any evidence was taken. It was not repeated. The State did not refer to it in examining any witness or in argument. The court’s admonition was prompt and unequivocal. See State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-1634, ¶¶ 37-38 (5th Dist.) (finding no prejudicial effect where an improper reference was isolated, unintentional, not exploited by the State, and followed by a swift and unequivocal admonishment). On this record the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the instruction the appellant requested was an adequate remedy. {¶38} The appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. II. {¶39} In his second assignment of error, the appellant argues that the trial court allowed a video from the Shorb Drive Thru into evidence without being properly authenticated. We disagree. STANDARD OF REVIEW {¶40} “Ordinarily, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the rule of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake County, 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271 (1991). The appellate court limits its review of the trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence to whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. The abuse of discretion standard is more than an error of judgment; it implies the court ruled arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983). ANALYSIS {¶41} Evid.R. 901(A) provides: “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” {¶42} “This threshold requirement for authentication of evidence is low and does not require conclusive proof of authenticity.” State v. Lewis, 2022-Ohio-1850, ¶ 30 (5th Dist.) (citation omitted). “The proponent of the evidence need show only a reasonable likelihood of authenticity.” Id. (citation omitted). “Circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence may be used to show authenticity.” Id. (citation omitted). In other words, “[t]he authentication requirement contemplated by Evid.R. 901(A) invokes a very low threshold standard, requiring only sufficient foundational evidence for the trier of fact to conclude that the item is what the proponent claims it to be.” Weisbecker v. Weisbecker, 2006-Ohio-5840, ¶ 22 (12th Dist.) (citation omitted). {¶43} At trial, Detective Brown testified that he had visited the Shorb Drive Thru in his capacity as a police officer “too many times to count” and was familiar with the area and with the inside of the store. He knew from that prior experience that the business maintained surveillance cameras. He responded to the scene on the day of the shooting, spoke with the owner, and personally watched the footage with her when she retrieved it on her phone. He requested footage from the morning of April 12 specifically, and the footage he received began shortly before 11:33 a.m. He recognized the area depicted in Exhibit 2c as the interior of the store. He testified that, based on his personal knowledge, including his visit that day, the videos fairly and accurately depicted the Shorb Drive Thru on April 12, 2025. {¶44} The appellant’s argument rests on three decisions of this Court in which law enforcement officers were found to have properly authenticated video: State v. Smith, 2024- Ohio-2416 (5th Dist.), where the officer was familiar with the business’s security and video system; State v. Hatfield, 2022-Ohio-2390 (5th Dist.), where the officer was present during the events depicted; and State v. Wynn, 2012-Ohio-3430 (5th Dist.), where the officer viewed the original footage from the store’s hard drive. The appellant candidly acknowledges that these decisions are “clearly not an exclusive list of when law enforcement authentication is permissible.” He likewise acknowledges that “[t]estimony from an individual with personal knowledge of the surveillance system’s recording process is not required.” State v. Vermillion, 2016-Ohio-1295, ¶¶ 17, 20 (4th Dist.). {¶45} Having conceded both propositions, the appellant nonetheless asks us to treat three illustrative decisions as a mandatory checklist and to hold that an officer who satisfies none of the three circumstances they describe can never authenticate video evidence. Evid.R. 901 imposes no such requirement. The rule asks whether the proponent has offered sufficient evidence to support a finding that the exhibit is what it is claimed to be. Detective Brown’s testimony met that standard. {¶46} As to the timestamp specifically, the record contains independent corroboration. Officer Karki testified that the date and time stamp on the city camera footage was accurate. And the GPS points report independently placed V.W. at 829 12th Street NW, the address of the Shorb Drive Thru, from 11:34 a.m. until 11:39 a.m., and in the immediate area at 11:43 a.m. {¶47} Accordingly, the trial court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in concluding that Detective Brown authenticated the video evidence from the Shorb Drive Thru. {¶48} The appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. III., IV. {¶49} In his third and fourth assignments of error, the appellant argues his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.  STANDARD OF REVIEW {¶50} The appellant challenges his conviction on both manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence grounds. Sufficiency of the evidence was addressed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Worley, 2021-Ohio-2207, ¶ 57: The test for sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 560 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by constitutional amendment on grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102, 1997-Ohio-355, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), fn. 4, and following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “ ‘Proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ is proof of such character that an ordinary person would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most important of the person’s own affairs.” R.C. 2901.05(E). A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge asks whether the evidence adduced at trial “is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Long, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 219. {¶51} Thus, a review of the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction requires a court of appeals to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  {¶52} Manifest weight of the evidence, on the other hand, addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). The Court stated: Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.” (Emphasis added.) Black’s, supra, at 1594. Id. at 387. The Court stated further: When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the fact finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 42, 102 S.Ct. at 2218, 72 L.Ed.2d at 661. See, also, State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 219, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720-721 (“The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power  to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against conviction.”). Id. “* * * [I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts. * * * “If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review Section 60, at 191-192 (1978). ANALYSIS {¶53} The appellant does not dispute that two men fired handguns at C.S.’s vehicle outside of the Shorb Drive Thru on April 12, 2025. For the purposes of these assignments of error, he does not contest any element of the offenses other than identity, and he does not separately challenge the firearm or repeat violent offender specifications. The sole issue posed by these assignments is whether the State proved that the appellant was one of those shooters. {¶54} Every criminal prosecution requires proof that the person accused committed the offense, and the State bears that burden beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tate, 2014- Ohio-3667, ¶ 15; State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 526 (1992). The identity of a perpetrator may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Tyo, 2018-Ohio-1374, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.). Circumstantial evidence carries the same probative value as direct evidence and the State is not required to prove identity through eyewitness testimony. State v. Berry, 2024- Ohio-5970, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.). Where the State relies on circumstantial evidence to establish an essential element, that evidence need not be irreconcilable with every reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction. State v. Stearns, 2024-Ohio-714, ¶ 28 (5th Dist.), quoting Jenks at paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶55} In the case at bar, two men walked to the Shorb Drive Thru together and entered the store at approximately 11:33 a.m. One wore a Guess hoodie; the other wore a Hilfiger jacket and a distinctive pair of tennis shoes. Approximately ten minutes later, the same two men, identifiable as the same men because they wore the same clothing, emerged from the side of the house at the corner of Shorb Avenue NW and Diana Place NW and fired handguns at C.S.’s departing vehicle before fleeing east. Sixteen spent casings were recovered from Diana Place NW. {¶56} Five days later, officers executed a search warrant at 1241 Worley Avenue NW, a residence the appellant and V.W. were known to frequent. The search produced a Guess hoodie matching the one worn by the first shooter, a Hilfiger jacket and tennis shoes matching the clothing worn by the second shooter, and a Glock 19 handgun. The Glock was subsequently identified as having fired six of the sixteen casings recovered from the scene. V.W.’s GPS data independently placed him at the drive thru and in the immediate area at the time of the shooting, and then tracked him back to 1241 Worley Avenue NW. Detective Diels testified that he identified the appellant as the second shooter after comparing the appellant’s CJIS and OHLEG photographs with video evidence.  {¶57} The appellant emphasizes that no witness identified him, that no photo array or lineup was conducted, that no seized item was tested for DNA or fingerprints, and that the GPS evidence pertained only to V.W. However, the State “need only have had sufficient evidence, not the best possible evidence, to survive a challenge on insufficiency grounds.” State v. Wilks, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 166. {¶58} The appellant further argues that the State failed to prove he resided at 1241 Worley Avenue NW, noting that Detective Diels testified only to his “understanding” that the appellant lived there and that no database listed that address for him. The argument misapprehends the State’s burden. Residence at 1241 Worley Avenue NW is not an element of any charged offense. Evidence that the appellant was present in the residence where the firearm used in the shooting and the clothing worn by the second shooter were recovered was probative of his identity; proof that he lived there was not required. {¶59} The appellant also asserts that no testimony established that the items recovered from the residence belonged to or were ever used by him. That assertion is not borne out by the record. Detective Diels testified that the Hilfiger jacket and the tennis shoes recovered from 1241 Worley Avenue NW were items worn by the second shooter in the videos. The jury viewed the video evidence and the recovered items and was entitled to determine the weight to be given that testimony. {¶60} We find that, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the jury could have found the essential elements of each offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was one of the two men who fired at C.S.’s vehicle. The appellant’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.  {¶61} In considering the manifest weight of the evidence, we acknowledge the absence of an eyewitness identification, DNA evidence, or fingerprint evidence directly tying the appellant to the firearm or clothing. Those deficiencies were before the jury, however, and did not render the State’s circumstantial evidence unreliable. The video evidence, the recovery of clothing corresponding to that worn by the second shooter at the residence where the appellant was later found with V.W., V.W.’s GPS data corroborating his movements before and immediately after the shooting, and Detective Diels’s identification of the appellant from known photographs provided a coherent evidentiary basis for the verdict. We cannot say the jury clearly lost its way in crediting that evidence. Furthermore, we find that this is not “the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175. {¶62} The appellant’s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶63} The appellant’s third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.  CONCLUSION {¶64} Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. {¶65} Costs to the appellant. By: Baldwin, J. King, P. J. and Gormley, J. concur.