State v. Johnson

[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2026-Ohio-2624.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SCIOTO COUNTY State of Ohio, : : Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 24CA4071 : v. : : DECISION AND Sashia M. Johnson, : JUDGMENT ENTRY : Defendant-Appellant. : _____________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES: James H. Banks and Nina M. Najjar, Dublin, Ohio, for appellant. Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew F. Loesch, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee. _____________________________________________________________ Smith, P.J. {¶1} Appellant, Sashia M. Johnson, appeals the judgment of the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas convicting her of one count of possession of cocaine, a first-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(f), as well as one count of possessing criminal tools, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A) and (C). On appeal, appellant contends 1) that her convictions must be reversed as a result of violations of her constitutional, legal, and due process rights at trial; 2) that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the cocaine obtained through the illegal search of the vehicle she was driving and the Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 2 illegal seizure of her in violation of the 14th Amendment; and 3) that she was denied a fair trial due to the cumulative effect of the errors below such that her convictions should be reversed. However, because we find no merit to the arguments raised under any of appellant’s assignments of error, they are all overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. FACTS {¶2} On June 29, 2020, Appellant was indicted, along with her co-defendant Adrienne Jordan, for the following offenses: Count One: Trafficking in Cocaine, a first-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(4)(g); Count Two: Possession of Cocaine, a first-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(f); and Count Three: Possessing Criminal Tools, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A) and (C). {¶3} Count One included two specifications. The first specification stated that appellant had possessed, sold, or had offered to sell approximately 170 grams of cocaine and that, as a result, she was major drug offender. The second specification stated that appellant was the owner or possessor of a Cadillac Escalade which was contraband and/or property derived from or through the commission or facilitation of the offense, and/or was an instrumentality the Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 3 offender used or intended to use in the commission of the offense and was subject to forfeiture pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417(A), R.C. 2981.02, and R.C. 2981.04. Count Two contained identical specifications. Count Three referenced the same Cadillac being used criminally in the commission of a felony. {¶4} The charges stemmed from a traffic stop that occurred on the night of June 9, 2020, while appellant was driving the Cadillac at issue. Trooper Nick Lewis with the Ohio State Highway Patrol initially began to follow the Cadillac after an anonymous tip had been related to him by dispatch stating that a black Cadillac SUV would be travelling south on U.S. Route 23, driven by appellant and Jordan, and that the two women were carrying narcotics. Lewis observed the Cadillac heading south on U.S. Route 23 while he was sitting stationery in the median talking to Trooper Kuehne, who was located in a different vehicle. Lewis pulled out and followed the Cadillac for three to four miles during which time he paced the vehicle traveling 65 m.p.h. in a 60-m.p.h. zone and then observed the vehicle enter into a construction zone at 55 m.p.h. despite being marked a 35- m.p.h. zone. {¶5} Trooper Lewis initiated a stop of the vehicle, initially approaching the passenger side of the vehicle to ask for identification. Trooper Kuehne arrived at that time and commented to Trooper Lewis when he approached that he could smell marijuana. Trooper Lewis then moved to the driver’s side of the vehicle and Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 4 briefly spoke to the driver before opening her vehicle door and ordering her to step out. When the door was opened, Lewis observed marijuana residue on a sock that was stuck inside the door. Both women were patted down, placed in the back of the cruiser, and a search of the vehicle followed. {¶6} The search ultimately yielded approximately 170 grams of cocaine which was found in the center front seat console of the vehicle, which was located between the driver and front passenger seats. A cell phone charging cord was plugged into the console where the bag of cocaine was found. Marijuana was also recovered from Jordan’s purse.1 Appellant and Jordan, her co-defendant, were both placed under arrest, read their Miranda rights, and taken to jail. While the two women were in jail, they each made several calls to their mothers attempting to locate money for a bond, a bondsperson, and an attorney who would represent both of them. {¶7} Appellant pled not guilty to the charges and the matter proceeded through discovery. It appears from the record that appellant and her co-defendant initially and intentionally hired the same attorney. The State filed a motion on August 3, 2020, on “Conflicting Representation,” claiming there was an indication there could be a conflict of interest with respect to the two defendants having the same counsel and suggesting the trial court had a duty to inquire into the matter. 1 Prior to being placed in the back of the cruiser, Jordan informed the trooper that she had marijuana in her purse. Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 5 Appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to the State’s motion on August 21, 2020, denying there was a conflict and attaching Conflict Waivers signed by herself and her co-defendant. Appellant argued that she and her co-defendant claimed innocence and wished to present a unified defense. She further claimed that neither had a desire to present a defense strategy in opposition to the other and that they were “in harmony” with one another. {¶8} While the conflict issue was still pending, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence on October 2, 2020. In her motion, she challenged the initial stop as well as the search of the vehicle and sought suppression of the results of the search. The motion also sought suppression of statements made by appellant. Thereafter, on November 9, 2020, the trial court issued a decision finding a “serious potential for a conflict of interest in dual representation of both defendants” and removed counsel from representing either appellant or her co- defendant. Appellant appealed that decision to this Court, but the appeal was unsuccessful, as evidenced by this Court’s decision issued on April 28, 2022. Appellant then appealed our decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which ultimately declined to accept jurisdiction on August 3, 2023. {¶9} The trial court appointed new counsel for appellant on October 17, 2023, however, a notice of appearance was filed by newly retained counsel the next day. Appellant’s newly retained counsel filed another motion to suppress on Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 6 November 6, 2023. The motion again challenged the stop, detention, and search of the vehicle. A suppression hearing was held on November 29, 2023. Trooper Nick Lewis testified on behalf of the State, explaining the speed violations he observed which led to the initial stop as well as the detection of an odor of marijuana which expanded the stop and led to the detention of both women. He also testified regarding the search of the vehicle and the eventual discovery of cocaine in the console. Trooper Lewis’ cruiser cam video was played and admitted into evidence along with several photographs, one of which demonstrated what the trooper described as marijuana residue on top of a sock that was stuck in the driver’s side vehicle door. The trial court issued a decision on December 19, 2023, denying appellant’s motion to suppress. {¶10} The matter thereafter proceeded to a jury trial. Appellant and her co- defendant were jointly tried, albeit with separate counsel. The State introduced four witnesses including Trooper Lewis, Lauren Ditto, Sergeant Drew Kuehne, and Captain Ron Davis. Trooper Lewis and Sergeant Kuehne both testified regarding their involvement in the initial stop, detention, search, discovery of drugs, and later review of the cruiser cam video. Portions of the cruiser cam videos were played for the jury and a listening aid was provided to assist the jurors in listening to the video. The troopers’ testimony will be further discussed below. Lauren Ditto, a forensic scientist with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation, testified Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 7 regarding her analysis of the substances sent for testing. She testified that the “white rock-like substance” was found to be cocaine with an approximate gram weight of 168.9770. {¶11} Captain Ron Davis is the Administrative Captain of the Scioto County Sheriff’s Office. He testified regarding the telephone system that is used to record inmate’s phone calls placed from the jail. During his testimony, he identified two different calls placed from appellant to her mother as well as two different calls placed by appellant’s co-defendant to her own mother. Excerpts from all four calls were played for the jury, over the objection of defense counsel. Although the trial court denied the objection, it provided a limiting instruction regarding the consideration of jail calls as part of its general jury instructions that were provided at the close of the case. The contents of those calls will be discussed in detail below. {¶12} The State rested its case, at which time appellant moved the court for an acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A). The trial court denied the motion and the defense rested without presenting any evidence. After the matter was submitted to the jury for deliberation, the jury sent a question back asking to be able to view the cruiser cam video again. The jury was brought back in and allowed to watch the video again. It was permitted once again to use the listening aid that it used during Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 8 trial, however, it was not permitted to take the video or the listening aid back to the jury room with it. {¶13} The jury ultimately acquitted appellant on the drug trafficking charge and found her guilty of possession of cocaine and criminal tools. However, the verdict form for possession of cocaine specified that the amount of cocaine possessed was less than 100 grams, which did not support the major drug offender specification as charged in the indictment. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 8 years to an indefinite maximum prison term of up to 12 years for the possession of cocaine charge. It sentenced her to a prison term of six months on the possession of criminal tools charge and ordered the two prison terms to be served concurrently to one another. The court further ordered the Cadillac at issue be forfeited to the State of Ohio and it imposed a fine of $20,000. {¶14} Appellant thereafter filed her timely appeal, setting forth three assignments of error for our review. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I. THE DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED AS A RESULT OF VIOLATION OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGAL, AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AT TRIAL. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPRESS THE COCAINE OBTAINED THROUGH ILLEGAL SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE THE Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 9 DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING AND ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF HER IN VIOLATION OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT. III. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS BELOW SUCH THAT DEFENDANT- APPELLANT JOHNSON’S CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II {¶15} For ease of analysis, we address appellant’s assignments of error out of order. In her second assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the cocaine obtained through what she characterizes as an illegal search of the vehicle she was driving, which occurred after what she characterizes as an illegal seizure of her person, in violation of her constitutional rights. Appellant’s brief contains five “Issues presented for review” under this assignment of error, which are as follows: 1. Whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion existed for the stop of the vehicle which Defendant Johnson was driving? 2. Whether an unverified anonymous tip supports probable cause or reasonable suspicion to follow, with intent to search, a vehicle? 3. Whether a traffic stop is unlawfully extended when the officer obtained information on the vehicle prior to the stop and placed the defendant in custody prior to verifying her license? Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 10 4. Whether the opening of the door of the vehicle Defendant Johnson was driving, patting her down and ordering her to remain in the trooper’s cruiser constitutes an unlawful search and seizure? 5. Whether the drugs obtained as a result of the search should have been suppressed? The State’s responses to each issue will be discussed in more detail below, however, it generally contends there is no merit to any of the arguments raised under this assignment of error. Standard of Review and Guiding Legal Principles {¶16} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-2146, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. The trial court acts as the trier of fact at a suppression hearing and is in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. See State v. Sheets, 2023-Ohio-2591, ¶ 45 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Leonard, 2017-Ohio-1541, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.), citing Burnside at ¶ 8. This is because the trial court is able to “ ‘gauge the witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and to use these observations to weigh their credibility.’ ” State v. Meadows, 2022-Ohio-287, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Hammond, 2019-Ohio-4253 ¶ 56 (4th Dist.). {¶17} However, as noted in Meadows, “ ‘[t]he trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness[.]’ ” Id. As a result, appellate Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 11 courts defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Sheets at ¶ 45, citing State v. Gurley, 2015-Ohio-5361, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.). Accepting the trial court's findings of fact as true, appellate courts then “independently determine whether the trial court reached the correct legal conclusion in analyzing the facts of the case.” Sheets at ¶ 45, citing Gurley at ¶ 16, in turn citing State v. Roberts, 2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 100. {¶18} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provide that persons have a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and that probable cause is necessary for searches. The exclusionary rule protects this constitutional guarantee and mandates the exclusion of evidence obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure. See State v. Shrewsbury, 2014-Ohio-716, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Emerson, 2012-Ohio-5047, ¶ 15. The same protection is provided by Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Legal Analysis Issues 1 and 2: Initial Stop {¶19} We begin with an analysis of appellant’s first and second issues presented for review, as they are interrelated. Considering these two issues together, appellant questions whether an anonymous tip provides reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to follow a vehicle with an intent to search, and Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 12 whether reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to stop the vehicle actually existed. Appellant presents a myriad of disorganized arguments under this assignment of error. To the best of our ability, we have gleaned two main arguments related to these two issues. {¶20} First, appellant alleges that because she was suspected of being engaged in criminal activity based upon an anonymous tip, the trooper claimed to have paced the vehicle and used an “alleged” speeding violation to stop and search the vehicle. She argues that the video footage does not support the trooper’s testimony and that the trial court’s reliance on the testimony was erroneous. Second, appellant argues there was no probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. The State responds by arguing that Ohio law does not require that police have probable cause before following a vehicle. The State further argues that the trooper possessed reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based upon his observation of a speeding violation. Based upon the following reasoning, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the anonymous tip received by law enforcement provided sufficient probable cause to stop the vehicle at issue. {¶21} A traffic stop is a type of seizure and constitutionally valid only if an officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. See State v. Williams, supra, at ¶ 17, citing State v. Mays, 2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 7 and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 13 663 (1979). Probable cause “is a stricter standard than reasonable and articulable suspicion” and “is a complete justification for a traffic stop[.]” Mays at ¶ 23, citing State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 411 (1993). The Supreme Court of the United States has held that probable cause is “ ‘defined in terms of facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.’ ” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-112 (1975), quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). See also State v. Jordan, 2021-Ohio-3922, ¶ 19. {¶22} “ ‘A police officer may stop the driver of a vehicle after observing a de minimis violation of traffic laws.’ ” Williams, supra, at ¶ 19, quoting State v. Guseman, 2009-Ohio-952, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.). One such traffic law is the requirement that a motorist drive within the posted speed limit, including within a construction zone. See R.C. 4511.21. “ ‘Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held “[w]here a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment ... even if the officer had some ulterior motive for making the stop[.]” ’ ” State v. Smith, 2025-Ohio-5752, ¶ 46 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-2803, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), in turn quoting Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 (1996), paragraph one of the syllabus. Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 14 {¶23} Trooper Lewis testified during the suppression hearing that upon following appellant’s vehicle, he paced appellant going 65 m.p.h. in a 60-m.p.h. zone. He then observed appellant enter a construction zone with a posted speed limit of 35 m.p.h. while traveling 55 m.p.h. These observations by Trooper Lewis were sufficient to establish probable cause to justify a traffic stop, aside from the anonymous tip that was received. Stated another way, even if the trooper initially began following appellant based upon an ulterior motive stemming from the anonymous tip, the subsequent observation of the traffic violations legitimized the stop and removed any requirement that the tip be determined to be reliable before acting upon it. {¶24} Contrary to appellant’s arguments, the video of the stop does not contradict Trooper Lewis’ testimony. Further, we must be mindful that “ ‘observing and evaluating the credibility of witnesses is the province of the trial court and we defer to the trial court’s judgment here.’ ” Williams at ¶ 23, quoting State v. Harris, 2012-Ohio-4237, ¶ 22. Moreover, as this Court stated in Williams, “there is no requirement for an officer’s observation of a traffic violation be recorded on video.” Williams at ¶ 23, citing State v. Lemaster, 2012-Ohio-971, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.) (“Competent, credible evidence in the form of the trooper’s testimony from the suppression hearing supports this finding despite the fact that Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 15 the violation was not caught on the video.”). Thus, based upon the foregoing, we conclude Trooper Lewis had probable cause to stop appellant’s vehicle. Issues 3 and 4: Detention and Search {¶25} Appellant’s third and fourth issues presented for review collectively challenge her detention after she was stopped, the order for her to exit the vehicle and Trooper Lewis’ opening of her door, the pat-down of her person, and the eventual search of her vehicle. Appellant raises several arguments in a stream of consciousness manner, often times out of chronological order, essentially claiming that the search of her vehicle was illegal because it was performed without a warrant, that it was not consensual, and that it was not incident to an arrest. Appellant argues that “even when it is arguably proper for an officer to request that a defendant step out of his/her vehicle,” such an order “does not automatically bestow upon a police officer the authority to search the vehicle.” Appellant appears to argue that the detention was unlawful, suggesting that the troopers’ testimony that they both observed an odor of raw marijuana was not reliable because it was not documented in the written report. She further contends that the prolonged detention was unjustified, especially considering that no traffic citation or warning was issued based upon the stated justification for the initial stop. {¶26} The State responds by arguing that because the troopers encountered an odor of raw marijuana upon approaching the vehicle, they immediately acquired Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 16 probable cause to search the vehicle. The State further argues that the order for appellant to get out of the car after she was lawfully detained was reasonable and permissible. Finally, the State argues that because the troopers detected an odor of raw marijuana and then plainly saw evidence of marijuana being illegally transported in the vehicle, any extension of the length of the stop at that point was lawful and appropriate in order to conduct a search for illegal controlled substances and contraband. {¶27} We have already determined that the initial stop of the vehicle appellant was driving was valid. Aside from the fact that law enforcement had received an anonymous tip that a vehicle fitting the description of the vehicle appellant was driving would be passing through and the occupants were carrying a large amount of narcotics, because Trooper Lewis observed two speeding violations, he had probable cause to stop the vehicle based upon the traffic violations alone. Furthermore, “[o]nce a driver has been lawfully stopped, an officer may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without any additional justification.” State v. Burkhart, 2016-Ohio-7534, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Kilbarger, 2012-Ohio-1521, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), in turn citing State v. Huffman, 2011- Ohio-4668, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.); State v. Jackson, 2022-Ohio-4365, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.) (officer may order driver out of car and needs no justification beyond that necessary for the initial stop). See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 17 111, fn. 6 (1977) and State v. Alexander-Lindsey, 2016-Ohio-3033, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.) (“Officers can order a driver and a passenger to exit the vehicle, even absent any additional suspicion of a criminal violation.”). {¶28} Even though Trooper Lewis had a valid reason to stop the vehicle, “[i]t is well-established that the scope and duration of a routine traffic stop ‘must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification * * * and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ ” State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-561, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.), quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). Therefore, “ ‘[w]hen a law enforcement officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer may detain the motorist for a period of time sufficient to issue the motorist a citation and to perform routine procedures such as a computer check on the motorist's driver's license, registration and vehicle plates.’ ” Jones at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Aguirre, 2003-Ohio-4909, ¶ 36 (4th Dist.). {¶29} However, “ ‘[a]n officer may expand the scope of the stop and may continue to detain the vehicle and its occupants without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment if the officer discovers further facts which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that additional criminal activity is afoot.’ ” Jones at ¶ 23, quoting State v. Rose, 2006-Ohio-5292, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), in turn citing State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St. 3d 234, 240 (1997). See also State v. Dunbar, 2024-Ohio-1460, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.). A reviewing court looks to the totality of the circumstances to determine Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 18 whether reasonable articulable suspicion exists when a traffic stop is extended. See State v. Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 17, citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). {¶30} Trooper Lewis clearly had reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle once he and Trooper Kuehne immediately detected an odor of marijuana when they approached the vehicle. These observations also provided the troopers with probable cause to search the vehicle. “Probable cause exists when there is a ‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” State v. Boykins, 2024-Ohio-5898, ¶ 15, (4th Dist.), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). “ ‘When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, the officer may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.’ ” Boykins at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Malone, 2022-Ohio- 1409, ¶ 30 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000). Additionally, Boykins explains that “ ‘Ohio courts have held that the production of drugs by an occupant of the vehicle independently provides an officer with additional probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of contraband.’ ” Boykins at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Donaldson, 2019-Ohio-232, ¶ 29 (6th Dist.). Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 19 {¶31} In fact, this Court has recently reaffirmed and acknowledged that “ ‘ “[t]he smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize this odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to conduct a search.” ’ ” State v. Smith, supra, at ¶ 55 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Jones, supra, at ¶ 29, in turn quoting State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 (2000), syllabus. We further explained as follows in Smith: [“ ‘]Any odor of marijuana emanating from a legally stopped vehicle creates probable cause to believe that a violation of the law has occurred.[’ ” State v. Jones, supra, at ¶ 29, quoting] State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-2880, ¶ 9, 90 N.E.3d 384 (2d Dist.). [“ ‘W]hen a police officer has probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of a crime, the officer may conduct a warrantless search of every part of the vehicle and its contents, including all movable containers and packages, that could logically conceal the objects of the search.[’ ”] State v. Farrow, 2023-Ohio-682, ¶ 18, 209 N.E.3d 830 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Maddox, 2021-Ohio-586, ¶ 20, 168 N.E.3d 613 (10th Dist.), citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). Smith at ¶ 55. {¶32} Just as in Smith, here the State demonstrated that Trooper Lewis had probable cause to search the vehicle. The State established that Lewis was familiar with the odor of raw marijuana through both training and experience. The State also introduced testimony from Trooper Lewis that when Sergeant Kuehne arrived and approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he commented to Lewis that he detected an odor of marijuana. Trooper Lewis explained that he had detected the Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 20 same odor upon his initial approach. The State also introduced evidence in the form of testimony from Trooper Lewis as well as photographs demonstrating that marijuana residue was observed on a sock located inside the driver’s side door when Trooper Lewis opened the door for appellant to step out of the vehicle. {¶33} It is appropriate at this juncture to note that we find no merit to appellant’s argument that Trooper Lewis’ act of opening the door of her vehicle for her to exit in accordance with a lawful order constituted a search by virtue of the fact that upon opening the door, he observed marijuana residue. In State v. Jackson, supra, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected an argument that an officer’s opening of a car door constituted a search. Jackson at ¶ 14. The Court held that Jackson’s argument was an attempt to circumvent Mimms, stating that arguing the act of an officer opening the car door, rather than the driver, constitutes not just a seizure, but a search, “miscomprehends” what constitutes a search. Id. The Court explained that “[t]he lead officer’s opening the door was not a search because he did not act with the purpose of finding out what was inside the car,” but instead the officer’s intent was to secure the driver. Id. at ¶ 16. The Jackson Court essentially held that if the initial stop is lawful, then the order to get out of the car is constitutionally permissible and the issue of who opened the door is irrelevant. Id. at ¶ 20, citing State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. 1978) (“there is little practical difference [under Mimms] between ordering a driver to open his Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 21 door and get out of his car, on the one hand, and opening the door for the driver and telling him to get out”). Moreover, in the present case the troopers’ detection of an odor of raw marijuana upon approaching the vehicle had already provided sufficient probable cause to justify a search of the vehicle. Trooper Lewis’ observation of marijuana residue on a sock located in the drivers’ side door when the door was opened did not provide the only probable cause to search the vehicle. {¶34} Before we conclude, we address appellant’s argument that Trooper Lewis did not have authority to conduct a pat down search upon removing her from the vehicle. We are mindful that “neither an order to exit the vehicle, nor the act of placing a motorist in a police cruiser, automatically entitles an officer to conduct a pat-down for weapons.” State v. Willoughby, 2021-Ohio-2611, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Dozier, 2010-Ohio-2918, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.), in turn citing State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 407 (1993). “Instead, to determine whether a person may be subjected to a pat-down search for weapons, ‘we must consider whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable, objective basis to believe that the motorist was armed and dangerous.’ ” Willoughby at ¶ 15, quoting Evans at 409. See also State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). The officer “need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; rather, the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in those circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or the safety of Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 22 others was in danger.” Andrews at 89. However, this Court has observed that the “right to frisk is virtually automatic when individuals are suspected of committing a crime, like drug trafficking, for which they are likely to be armed.” Willoughby at ¶ 16, citing State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.3d 58, 554 N.E.2d 108 (1990). {¶35} Here, the trial court found the trooper’s testimony that he detected an odor of raw marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle and then observed marijuana inside the vehicle to be credible. Further, the trooper testified that it is his normal practice to pat down individuals once they are removed from the vehicle due to the nexus between weapons and drugs. At the time appellant was removed from the vehicle, this was no longer simply a traffic stop based upon speeding but had turned into a criminal investigation. We find no error in the trial court’s decision denying appellant’s motion to suppress with respect to the pat- down search. Importantly, there was no evidence obtained as a result of the pat down that could have been suppressed. Issue 5: Results of the Search {¶36} Lastly, appellant argues that evidence seized should have been suppressed. Appellant’s argument is premised on her underlying arguments that the initial stop was invalid, that the detention was illegally prolonged, and that the search was unlawful. However, we have already considered those arguments and found no merit to them. In light of our determination that the search was based Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 23 upon probable cause and was lawfully conducted, appellant was not entitled to have the results of the search suppressed. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress the results of the search. {¶37} Having found no merit in any of the arguments raised under appellant’s second assignment of error, it is overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I {¶38} In her first assignment of error, appellant contends that her convictions must be reversed as a result of the violations of her constitutional, legal, and due process rights at trial. Appellant presents five issues for review under this assignment of error, as follows: 1. Whether the State’s repeated reference to Defendant’s silence during the alleged traffic stop violated her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent? 2. Whether conviction on the element of “knowingly” without evidence except that impermissibly based upon Defendant’s silence must be reversed? 3. Whether the admission of jail calls alleged to have been made by Defendant or her co-defendant violates Defendant’s due process rights when, as here, the alleged complicit action had ended and neither defendant testified at trial? 4. Whether the limiting instruction as to jail calls at the close of trial is insufficient to cure the improper admission of jail calls during trial? Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 24 5. Whether Defendant’s Rule 29A motion should have been granted based upon the properly admitted evidence at trial? The State’s response to each of these arguments will be discussed in more detail below, however, the State ultimately contends there is no merit to any of the arguments raised by appellant and that they should be overruled. Issue 1: State’s References to Appellant’s Post-Arrest Silence and Failure to Testify at Trial {¶39} Appellant argues, with very minimal and general citation to the record, that the State “repeatedly made reference to alleged silence of the defendant in order to establish the ‘knowingly’ element of the offense.” Aside from setting forth multiple different transcript page numbers under the main assignment of error, appellant’s argument fails to specify which specific statements by the State she takes issue with. After scouring the record, which this Court is not required to do, it appears that appellant’s argument focuses on the time period when appellant was in the back of the cruiser with her co-defendant, coupled with a comment the State made during its rebuttal closing argument. {¶40} A review of the cruiser cam video demonstrates that although appellant was very talkative and at times confrontational with law enforcement, once placed into the back of the cruiser, she said essentially nothing either to law enforcement or to her co-defendant, who was seated and handcuffed in the cruiser beside her. During cross-examination of Trooper Lewis, defense counsel was Scioto App. No. 24CA4071 25 attempting to establish that his client did not make any admissions or confessions in an attempt to contradict the trooper’s testimony that in his opinion and based upon his assessment of the video, appellant and her co-defendant had knowledge that cocaine was in the console. As part of this effort, he questioned Trooper Lewis as follows: Q: Okay. And nothing that you learn, whether its from the