State v. Thompson

[Cite as State v. Thompson, 2026-Ohio-3388.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 9-26-19 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. JULIANNE VETTE THOMPSON, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court General Division Trial Court No. 25-CR-185 Judgment Affirmed Date of Decision: August 31, 2026 APPEARANCES: William T. Cramer for Appellant Allison M. Kesler for Appellee Case No. 9-26-19 MILLER, J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Julianne V. Thompson (“Thompson”), appeals the February 17, 2026 judgment of sentence of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. {¶2} In April 2025, the Marion County Sheriff’s Office received a tip from the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force regarding Thompson. Law enforcement executed a search warrant at Thompson’s residence and seized her electronic devices. On Thompson’s phone, investigators found at least ten photographs or videos depicting Thompson’s two-year-old daughter in a state of nudity or engaged in sex acts. {¶3} On May 7, 2025, Thompson was indicted on five counts of pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired person (Counts One through Five) in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), second-degree felonies; and three counts of illegal use of minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented material or performance (Counts Six through Eight) in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(2), second-degree felonies. {¶4} Thompson initially entered pleas of not guilty. However, on January 9, 2026, pursuant to a negotiated-plea agreement, Thompson plead guilty to four counts of pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired person (Counts One through Four). In exchange, the State filed a nolle prosequi with respect to the remaining counts. The trial court accepted Thompson’s guilty pleas -2- Case No. 9-26-19 and found her guilty of Counts One through Four. The trial court continued the matter for the completion of a presentence investigation (“PSI”). {¶5} At the sentencing hearing held on February 13, 2026, the trial court sentenced Thompson to an indefinite term of 2 to 3 years in prison for each count. The trial court ordered the sentences for each of the four counts to be served consecutively to each other for an aggregate indefinite prison term of 8 to 9 years. Thompson was also advised of her duties to register as a Tier II sex offender. The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentencing on February 17, 2026. {¶6} On March 17, 2026, Thompson filed a notice of appeal. She raises a single assignment of error for our review. Assignment of Error The record clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court’s consecutive sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). {¶7} In her assignment of error, Thompson contends that her consecutive sentences are contrary to law. Specifically, she argues that the record does not support the trial court’s consecutive sentence findings. Thompson alleges that an extended prison term was not necessary to punish her or protect the public from further crime. Thompson also argues that the factors making her conduct more serious under R.C. 2929.12(B) were limited to her relationship with the victim and position of authority over the victim. -3- Case No. 9-26-19 Standard of Review {¶8} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence “only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. Relevant Authority {¶9} “Except as provided in . . . division (C) of section 2929.14, . . . a prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state, another state, or the United States.” R.C. 2929.41(A). R.C. 2929.14(C) provides: (4) [T]he court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following: (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. -4- Case No. 9-26-19 (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. {¶10} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make specific findings on the record when imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Hites, 2012-Ohio-1892, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.). Specifically, the trial court must find: (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to either protect the public or punish the offender, (2) the sentences would not be disproportionate to the offense committed; and (3) one of the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) applies. Id. {¶11} The trial court must state the required findings at the sentencing hearing prior to imposing consecutive sentences and incorporate those findings into its sentencing entry. State v. Sharp, 2014-Ohio-4140, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29. A trial court “has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings” and is not “required to give a talismanic incantation of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37. {¶12} Furthermore, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a), appellate court may only “modify or vacate consecutive sentences if it clearly and convincingly finds -5- Case No. 9-26-19 that the record does not support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings.” State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 24. Analysis {¶13} Thompson does not argue that the trial court failed to make the requisite consecutive-sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Rather, she contends the record does not support the trial court’s findings. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated: Finding consecutive sentences, I am finding it necessary to punish the offender, or to protect the public from future crime. That that sentence is not disproportionate to the conduct and to the danger posed, and that two or more of the offenses were part of a course of conduct, and the harm that was caused was so great or unusual that a single prison term would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the conduct. (Feb. 13, 2026 Tr. 18). {¶14} Further, the trial court memorialized those findings in its sentencing entry. Accordingly, the record reflects that the trial court made the appropriate R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings before imposing consecutive sentences and incorporated those findings into its sentencing entry. {¶15} Thompson concedes that the trial court made the requisite consecutive-sentencing findings. However, Thompson argues that the trial court’s consecutive-sentencing findings were not supported by the record. {¶16} Specifically, Thompson alleges that consecutive sentences were not necessary to punish her or protect the public because: (1) she had no criminal -6- Case No. 9-26-19 history; (2) her ORAS score was low-risk; (3) she may have acted under duress; (4) she experienced mental-health concerns; and (5) her husband spoke favorably of her parenting and asked the court to allow her to remain in her daughter’s life. Thompson further argues that the factors making her conduct more serious under R.C. 2929.12(B) were limited to her relationship with the victim and position of authority over the victim. {¶17} After reviewing the record, we find that Thompson has failed to demonstrate that the record clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court’s consecutive-sentencing findings. Thompson created at least ten images or videos depicting her two-year-old daughter in a state of nudity or engaged in sex acts. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated: And, you know, the one factor that makes this more serious and more egregious is the fact that this was your child. You know? You have one job as a parent, and that’s to protect your child. In reading through the facts of what happened here, are extremely disturbing to have a 2- year old being exploited by her mother in those ways. It was hard to read. (Feb. 13, 2026 Tr. at 17). {¶18} As the trial court emphasized, Thompson exploited her child and creating such material is more egregious than merely downloading it. {¶19} The trial court acknowledged that Thompson had no criminal history and a low ORAS score, and the trial court balanced those factors against the “extremely disturbing” nature of the offenses and the breach of parental duty. -7- Case No. 9-26-19 {¶20} With respect to the trial court’s finding that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of Thompson’s conduct and the danger she posed to the public, Thompson received the minimum prison term on each count. The total sentence of 8 to 9 years reflects four minimum-term sentences imposed consecutively. The seriousness of Thompson’s conduct—creating sexually explicit materials depicting her two-year old daughter—supports the finding that consecutive minimum sentences are not disproportionate. Notably, the trial court acknowledged that Thompson’s low ORAS number and lack of criminal history indicated a low risk of recidivism, but concluded that the serious nature of the offense outweighed the mitigating factors. {¶21} The trial court found that the harm caused by Thompson’s conduct was “so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.” The parental relationship, the victim’s extreme youth, and the nature of the exploitation support the trial court’s finding of great or unusual harm. As the trial court acknowledged, Thompson did not merely possess sexually explicit material, she created it by exploiting her two-year-old daughter. Specifically, the trial court stated “[W]hen we see this type of offense, usually it’s someone that’s downloading and looking at these types of things involving children. But actually creating the material yourself, coupled with the age of the victim, and that being your own child, kind of makes it weigh significantly on the more serious side from -8- Case No. 9-26-19 the Court’s point of view.” (Feb. 13, 2026 Tr. at 17). See State v. Shiveley, 2022- Ohio-4036, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.) (finding possessing sexually explicit photographs of children is a great or unusual harm and noting that the images “have the possibility of living on indefinitely” and “[a]s a result of this permanence, we find it difficult to describe this harm as anything other than extreme, uncommon, and exceptional.”). {¶22} Finally, the trial court found the offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct. The four offenses involved sexually explicit materials depicting the same victim, Thompson’s two-year-old daughter, and involved the same type of exploitation. {¶23} Accordingly, having reviewed the record, we find that Thompson has failed to demonstrate that the record clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings. See Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, at ¶ 22. {¶24} Thompson’s assignment of error is overruled. {¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas. Judgment Affirmed WILLAMOWSKI, and WALDICK, J. J., concur. -9- Case No. 9-26-19 JUDGMENT ENTRY For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment for costs. It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R. 27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30. Mark C. Miller, Judge John R. Willamowski, Judge Juergen A. Waldick, Judge DATED: /jlm -10-