State v. Hensley
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket2026-T-0037
JudgeEklund
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Hensley, 2026-Ohio-4545.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TRUMBULL COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2026-T-0037
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
CARLOS HENSLEY,
Trial Court No. 2025 CR 00710
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: November 16, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Charles L. Morrow, Assistant
Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Adam Parker, Goldberg Dowell & Associates, L.L.C., 323 West Lakeside Avenue, Suite
450, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Defendant-Appellant).
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Carlos Hensley, appeals from his judgment of conviction in the
Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas after pleading guilty to failure to stop after an
accident, a fifth-degree felony.
{¶2} Appellant raises three assignments of error arguing (1) the trial court erred
in ordering Appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $31,600; (2) Appellant’s guilty
plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court did not advise him
that it could order him to pay restitution; and (3) the trial court committed plain error by
imposing a license suspension based on the wrong statutory range.
{¶3} Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we find that Appellant’s
first assignment of error has merit. The record in this case clearly and convincingly
demonstrates that the trial court’s restitution order is contrary to law. In particular,
Appellant was not given an opportunity to provide proof of financial responsibility or
provided an evidentiary hearing; no competent evidence was presented regarding
restitution; and the trial court’s order exceeded the statutory maximum of $5,000.
{¶4} We also find that Appellant’s second and third assignments of error lack
merit. Regarding the second assigned error, the trial court erred by failing to inform
Appellant during the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy that he could be ordered to pay restitution;
however, Appellant has not shown prejudice, i.e., that he would not have otherwise
pleaded guilty. Regarding the third assigned error, Appellant has not clearly and
convincingly established that the trial court relied on the incorrect law at the sentencing
hearing when it suspended Appellant’s license.
{¶5} Therefore, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶6} On September 17, 2025, the Trumbull County Grand Jury indicted Appellant
on failure to stop after an accident, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)
and (B)(2)(a).
{¶7} On September 25, 2025, Appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
{¶8} The trial court held pretrial hearings on October 21, November 20, and
December 18, 2025, and on February 5, 2026.
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{¶9} On February 17, 2026, Appellant entered into a written agreement in which
he agreed to plead guilty to the charged offense and to undergo a presentence
investigation. The trial court held a plea hearing and engaged in a plea colloquy with
Appellant pursuant to Crim.R. 11. The trial court informed Appellant that he faced
potential penalties of a nonmandatory prison sentence of between six and 12 months, a
fine of up to $2,500, community control sanctions, a driver’s license suspension of
between two and five years, and post-release control. The State had misinformed the
trial court about the range for the license suspension; the actual legal range was between
six months and three years.
{¶10} Following the plea colloquy, Appellant pleaded guilty to the charged offense.
As a factual basis, the State informed the court:
“[O]n or about the date referenced in the indictment, in Trumbull County,
State of Ohio, this Defendant was operating a motor vehicle. He went left
of center and struck a motorcycle that was being operated by - - by [S.G.].
This caused broken bones in [S.G.]’s leg.
The Defendant immediately fled the scene. He drove home despite having
a blown tire. Troopers with the Ohio State Highway Patrol responded to his
residence and spoke to him. They noted that he had a strong odor of an
alcoholic beverage. When they spoke to him, he advised that he drank
when he got home, and he didn’t call the police because he thought he hit
a deer.
To prove these allegations, the State would have brought forth the
testimony of the victims in this case and troopers with the Ohio State
Highway Patrol.
{¶11} The trial court found that Appellant was making a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary guilty plea, accepted his guilty plea, and found him guilty. The trial court ordered
a presentence investigation and set the matter for sentencing. Prior to concluding the
plea hearing, the trial court warned Appellant that “if there’s any issues of restitution, you
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have to be prepared to pay those in full at sentencing or you will be going to prison.”
Appellant responded, “Yes, sir.”
{¶12} On April 21, 2026, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The victim,
S.G., addressed the court. S.G. stated that he had received three surgeries for broken
bones in his leg, foot, and hand; he was in the hospital for four days; and he had to use
a wheelchair for three months as well as a walker, cane, and crutches for another three
months. S.G. indicated that he was off work for seven months without pay; that he made
$54,000 per year; and that he owed $1,600 for physical therapy. S.G. also made some
limited references to insurance payments. In particular, S.G. stated that Appellant’s
insurance company paid him $25,000 “to cover everything”; however, he and Appellant
had the same level of insurance coverage, and his insurance company wanted to be
reimbursed.
{¶13} The trial court sentenced Appellant to three years of community control; 90
days in jail; a three-year license suspension; and $31,600 in restitution to be paid to S.G.
in monthly installments of not less than $200.
{¶14} Following the trial court’s pronouncement of sentence, defense counsel
stated that while S.G. was likely owed money, counsel had not received notice of
restitution; the parties should hold a restitution hearing; and given the amount of the
restitution requested, there should be an accounting. The trial court responded, “We just
had a hearing, and this Court’s satisfaction is enough. Restitution is granted as awarded.
Your request for an additional hearing is denied.”
{¶15} On April 22, 2026, the trial court filed Appellant’s judgment of conviction.
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{¶16} On April 28, 2026, Appellant timely appealed and raises three assignments
of error.
Guilty Plea
{¶17} We review Appellant’s assignments of error out of order for ease of
discussion.
{¶18} Appellant’s second assignment of error states: “[Appellant’s] guilty plea was
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the court did not advise him it could order
him to pay restitution.”
{¶19} Because of the seriousness of a defendant’s decision to enter a guilty plea,
due process requires that a defendant’s plea be made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily; otherwise, the defendant’s plea is invalid. State v. Fontanez, 2026-Ohio-3281,
¶ 22. “To ensure that pleas are constitutionally sound, Crim.R. 11(C) places certain
requirements on a court before it can accept a guilty plea in felony cases.” Crim.R.
11(C)(2) provides in relevant part:
In felony cases the court . . . shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first
addressing the defendant personally . . . and doing all of the following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty
involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or
for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court,
upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands
that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront
witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the
defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
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{¶20} The Supreme Court has stressed that literal compliance with Crim.R. 11 in
all respects remains preferable. Fontanez at ¶ 23. “However, inexact compliance does
not always render a plea not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (Emphasis in original.)
Id. “Although a court must provide the defendant with the information set forth in Crim.R.
11,” the Supreme Court of Ohio has “not required verbatim recitation of the colloquy.” Id.
at ¶ 24. Rather, the Court’s focus is “‘on whether the dialogue between the court and the
defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his plea.’”
Id., quoting State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 12.
{¶21} A defendant seeking to vacate his or her guilty plea must also typically show
prejudice by the trial court’s omission of any part of the Crim.R. 11 colloquy. Id. “The test
for whether a defendant has suffered prejudice by an omission in the plea colloquy” is
“‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’” Id., quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio
St.3d 106, 108 (1990).
{¶22} The Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions “when a trial court’s
failure to comply with Crim.R. 11 is so consequential that prejudice is presumed and a
defendant is relieved of the burden to show prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 25. “The first is when a
trial court fails to inform the defendant of the constitutional guarantees he or she is waiving
by pleading guilty.” Id. “These include the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront an accuser, among others.” Id.
{¶23} “The second exception is when a trial court’s plea colloquy with a defendant
demonstrates ‘[a] complete failure to comply with [Crim.R. 11].’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State
v. Sarkozy, 2008-Ohio-509, ¶ 22. “In Sarkozy, the trial court failed to inform the defendant
that his pleading guilty to certain offenses carried a lengthy mandatory period of
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postrelease control.” Id. “Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires a court to ensure that a defendant
understands ‘the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved’ by pleading
guilty.” Id. The Supreme Court determined that the defendant “‘could not have
subjectively understood that postrelease control was part of his sentence when the trial
court failed to advise him of postrelease control and its ramifications during the plea
colloquy,’ and his plea was therefore not made knowingly and intelligently.” Id., quoting
Sarkozy at ¶ 25-26.
{¶24} Previously, reviewing courts conducted a multi-tiered analysis when a trial
court deviated from a strict recitation of Crim.R. 11 to determine whether the trial court
had “substantially” complied with the rule and, if not, whether it had “partially” complied
with the rule or “failed” to comply with the rule. Id. at ¶ 27. In 2020, the Supreme Court
restated the test with the following three-part inquiry:
Properly understood, the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the
trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court
has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that
excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3)
if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?
Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 17.
{¶25} The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this three-part inquiry in Fontanez,
2026-Ohio-3281, at ¶ 30.
{¶26} This Court reviews de novo whether the trial court accepted a plea in
compliance with Crim.R. 11. State v. Willard, 2021-Ohio-2552, ¶ 51 (11th Dist.). “De
novo review generally means the appellate court independently reviews the record and
affords no deference to the trial court’s decision.” Holman v. Wiser, 2023-Ohio-4095, ¶
38 (11th Dist.).
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{¶27} Under the first prong of the Dangler inquiry, we must determine whether the
trial court complied with the relevant provision of Crim.R. 11. We find that the trial court
failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)’s requirement that it “address[ ] the defendant
personally and . . . [d]etermin[e] that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
understanding . . . of the maximum penalty involved . . . .”
{¶28} This Court has held that since “an order of restitution is a penalty and a
component of the defendant’s sentence,” it “constitutes part of the ‘maximum penalty
involved’ under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).” Willard at ¶ 81, citing R.C. 2929.01(EE) (definition
of “sentence”); 2929.01(DD) (definition of “sanction”). Therefore, the trial court was
required to inform Appellant during the plea colloquy that he could be ordered to pay
restitution.
{¶29} The plea hearing transcript demonstrates that the trial court made no
mention of restitution during the actual plea colloquy. Instead, the trial court referenced
restitution only after it had (1) completed the plea colloquy, (2) accepted Appellant’s guilty
plea, and (3) found him guilty. Specifically, just before concluding the plea hearing, the
court warned Appellant, “if there’s any issues of restitution, you have to be prepared to
pay those in full at sentencing or you will be going to prison.” Since the trial court was
required to mention restitution as a potential penalty during the plea colloquy and before
accepting Appellant’s guilty plea, the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).
See, e.g., State v. Brown, 2020-Ohio-4474, ¶ 14, 29 (8th Dist.) (noncompliance found
where “[a]fter [the defendant] entered his guilty pleas and the trial court accepted those
guilty pleas, the trial court informed [the defendant] that he would be classified as a Tier
III sex offender”).
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{¶30} Under the second prong of the Dangler inquiry, we must determine whether
the trial court’s failure to comply is “of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden
of demonstrating prejudice.” Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 17. The right to be informed
of the maximum penalty involved is not a constitutional right. Therefore, only the second
exception at issue, i.e., whether the trial court’s omission was a “complete failure to
comply” with the Crim.R. 11 plea requirements. We find that it was not.
{¶31} In Willard, 2021-Ohio-2552 (11th Dist.), this Court held that “in the context
of a non-prison sanction, we construe the second exception as applicable when the trial
court makes no mention of a mandatory component of a defendant’s sentence.”
(Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 95. Here, Appellant pleaded guilty to failure to stop after
an accident, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 4549.02. R.C. 4549.02(B)(4)
provides in relevant part:
The offender shall provide the court with proof of financial responsibility as
defined in section 4509.01 of the Revised Code. If the offender fails to
provide that proof of financial responsibility, then, in addition to any other
penalties provided by law, the court may order restitution pursuant to
section 2929.18 or 2929.28 of the Revised Code in an amount not
exceeding five thousand dollars for any economic loss arising from an
accident or collision that was the direct and proximate result of the
offender’s operation of the motor vehicle before, during, or after committing
the offense charged under this section.
{¶32} Since restitution was not a mandatory component of Appellant’s sentence,
he must demonstrate prejudice.1
1. Notably, the current version of R.C. 2929.18(A)(1), effective October 3, 2023, provides that “the court
imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony . . . shall sentence the offender to make restitution
pursuant to this section and section 2929.281 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.) However, R.C.
4549.02 is the specific statute that governs Appellant’s offense, and it does not mandate restitution. See
State v. Taylor, 2007-Ohio-1950, ¶ 12 (when a general statute conflicts with a specific statute on the same
subject, the latter controls).
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{¶33} Under the third and final prong of the Dangler inquiry, we must determine
whether Appellant has shown prejudice. The test for prejudice is “‘whether the plea would
have otherwise been made.’” Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 16, quoting Nero, 56 Ohio
St.3d at 108. Prejudice must be established on the face of the record. Id. at ¶ 24.
{¶34} Appellant argues that he “cannot be expected to make a record of the fact
that he has been misinformed about a crucial issue at the time he is operating under that
misinformation.” In support of his proposition, Appellant purports to cite the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s decision in State v. Bozso, 2020-Ohio-3779. However, Appellant actually
cites the dissenting opinion in Bozso. See id. at ¶ 44 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). Therefore,
Appellant’s stated proposition is not the governing law.
{¶35} Appellant next argues that he has shown prejudice based on the fact that
“the trial court imposed a substantial amount of restitution on an indigent defendant . . .
despite [Appellant’s] insurance already having compensated the victim for his loss.”
{¶36} Appellant’s argument involves the merits of the trial court’s restitution order.
While Appellant is clearly dissatisfied with the order, there is nothing in the record
establishing that Appellant would not have pleaded guilty had the trial court properly
informed him about potential restitution during the plea colloquy. For instance, Appellant
did not move to withdraw his guilty plea. See Willard, 2021-Ohio-2552, at ¶ 103 (11th
Dist.). Therefore, Appellant has failed to establish prejudice.
{¶37} Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit.
Restitution
{¶38} Appellant’s first assignment of error states: “The trial court erred in ordering
restitution in the amount of $31,600.
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{¶39} This court reviews restitution orders in felony cases pursuant to R.C.
2953.08(G)(2). State v. Ciresi, 2020-Ohio-5305, ¶ 5 (11th Dist.). That provision states:
The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section
shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or
modification given by the sentencing court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence
that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand
the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court's
standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this
division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under
division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section
2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever,
if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.2
{¶40} None of the statutory sections referenced in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) was
applicable. Therefore, our review is limited to whether we clearly and convincingly find
that the restitution order is otherwise contrary to law. Ciresi at ¶ 10.
{¶41} Upon review of the record, we answer that inquiry in the affirmative and
clearly and convincingly find the trial court’s restitution order to be contrary to law. First,
R.C. 4549.02(B)(4) provides that “[t]he offender shall provide the court with proof of
financial responsibility as defined in section 4509.01 of the Revised Code.” R.C.
4509.01(K), in turn, defines “proof of financial responsibility” as
proof of ability to respond in damages for liability, on account of accidents
occurring subsequent to the effective date of such proof, arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle in the amount of twenty-
five thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in
any one accident, in the amount of fifty thousand dollars because of bodily
2. Appellant asserts that this Court “sometimes” reviews restitution orders for an abuse of discretion, citing
State v. Thames, 2022-Ohio-1715, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.). Unlike this case, Thames involved a misdemeanor
offense, and “we review restitution . . . orders in a misdemeanor case for an abuse of discretion.” Id.
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injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and in the
amount of twenty-five thousand dollars because of injury to property of
others in any one accident.
{¶42} R.C. 4549.02(B)(4) then provides:
If the offender fails to provide that proof of financial responsibility, then, in
addition to any other penalties provided by law, the court may order
restitution pursuant to [R.C. 2929.18] . . . in an amount not exceeding five
thousand dollars for any economic loss arising from an accident or collision
that was the direct and proximate result of the offender’s operation of the
motor vehicle before, during, or after committing the offense charged under
this section.
{¶43} Here, there is no indication that Appellant had an opportunity to provide
proof of financial responsibility, which was a condition precedent to the trial court’s
ordering of restitution. In fact, S.G.’s statements during the sentencing hearing suggest
that Appellant may have possessed the requisite amount of financial responsibly to
preclude a restitution order.
{¶44} Second, R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) provides that “[t]he court shall hold a hearing
on restitution if the offender . . . disputes the amount.” Appellant disputed the amount of
restitution and requested a hearing; however, the trial court denied his request.
{¶45} Third, this Court has explained that “a trial court’s award of restitution must
be supported by competent evidence.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Reynoso, 2025-
Ohio-3119, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.). “Further, the individual seeking restitution must establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is entitled to the amount sought.”
(Emphasis in original.) Id. “Additionally, during an evidentiary hearing, a trial court must
hear evidence in order to determine an appropriate amount of restitution.” (Emphasis in
original). Id. “Unsworn statements are not evidence.” Id. at ¶ 18.
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{¶46} The trial court’s consideration of restitution did not occur at an “evidentiary”
hearing. The transcript demonstrates that no competent “evidence” was presented;
rather, S.G. provided unsworn statements. See Reynoso at ¶ 17-18.
{¶47} Fourth and finally, the trial court’s restitution order of $31,600 exceeds the
statutory maximum of $5,000. See R.C. 4549.02(B)(4).
{¶48} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error has merit.
License Suspension
{¶49} Appellant’s third assignment of error states: “The court committed plain
error by imposing a license suspension based on the wrong statutory range.”
{¶50} The imposition of a driver’s license suspension is subject to review pursuant
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), and, particularly, whether it is clearly and convincingly contrary to
law. State v. Doucette, 2026-Ohio-2426, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.); see State v. Delgros, 2020-Ohio-
4529, ¶ 5 (11th Dist.).
{¶51} At the plea hearing, the State incorrectly informed the trial court that
Appellant was subject to a driver’s license suspension between two and five years.
Pursuant to R.C. 4549.02(B)(4), Appellant was subject to “a class five suspension . . .
from the range specified in division (A)(5) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code.” The
range for a class five suspension is “a definite period of six months to three years.” R.C.
4510.02(A)(5).
{¶52} At sentencing, the trial court suspended Appellant’s license for three years,
which was the maximum amount within the statutory range. Appellant argues that “it is
not clear that the trial court would have imposed the same length suspension if it had not
been misinformed about the statutory range” during the plea hearing.
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{¶53} “A reviewing court must presume that the trial court applied the law
correctly.” State v. Coombs, 18 Ohio St.3d 123, 125 (1985). Since, as Appellant
concedes, it “not clear” that the trial court relied on an incorrect statutory range at the
sentencing hearing, this necessarily means that Appellant has failed to clearly and
convincingly establish that his license suspension is contrary to law.
{¶54} The case that Appellant cites is distinguishable. In State v. Bedell, 2018-
Ohio-721 (1st Dist.), the trial court referred to an incorrect sentencing range “when
announcing its sentencing decision.” Id. at ¶ 36. The appellate court found that “[t]his
record, therefore, unequivocally demonstrates the sentencing judge misunderstood the
applicable sentencing range for the offense and sentenced [the defendant] with that
misunderstanding.” Id. at ¶ 37. We cannot say the same in this case.
{¶55} Accordingly, Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit.
Conclusion
{¶56} The restitution order is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. Therefore,
the trial court’s judgment is reversed in part. This matter is remanded for the trial court’s
consideration of restitution in accordance with R.C. 4549.02 and, if applicable, R.C.
2929.18, as set forth above.
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{¶57} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed in part and reversed in part. This matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, Appellant’s second assignment
of error has merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the
Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part and reversed in part. This
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Costs to be taxed against the parties equally.
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
concurs
JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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