State v. Johnson
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketC-250594
JudgeBock
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2026-Ohio-4613.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250594
TRIAL NO. B-2400591-A
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
JUDGMENT ENTRY
JASHAWN JOHNSON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs shall be taxed 50% to Appellant and 50% to
Appellee.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 11/20/2026.
Pursuant to App.R. 30, the clerk is directed to send all parties, or their
counsel if represented, a copy of the court’s judgment and note such action
on the docket.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2026-Ohio-4613.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250594
TRIAL NO. B-2400591-A
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
OPINION
JASHAWN JOHNSON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 20, 2026
Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. Cummings,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Timothy J. McKenna, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BOCK, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Jashawn Johnson entered into a plea agreement
with plaintiff-appellee the State of Ohio in which the State agreed to dismiss or amend
several serious felony charges against Johnson in exchange for him pleading guilty to
two charges. The State and Johnson also agreed on a sentence, but they neglected to
tell the trial court before the sentencing hearing that they had further agreed that
Johnson would serve that sentence concurrently with a federal sentence he was
already serving.
{¶2} The trial court accepted Johnson’s pleas and imposed the agreed
sentence. It ordered Johnson to serve the state sentence consecutively to the federal
sentence. Johnson appealed, asserting his pleas were unknowing and involuntary, his
counsel provided ineffective assistance, and the record did not support the trial court’s
imposition of consecutive sentences.
{¶3} The record demonstrates that Johnson’s pleas were knowing and
voluntary, and Johnson was not prejudiced by his counsel’s performance, therefore we
overrule his first and second assignments of error. However, we sustain the portion of
Johnson’s third assignment of error challenging consecutive sentences and remand
the cause to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. We overrule the remainder
of Johnson’s third assignment of error.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
{¶4} In 2024, the State charged Johnson with (1) aggravated murder, (2)
aggravated robbery, (3) and (4) two counts of murder, (5) felonious assault, and (6)
having weapons under a disability (“WUD”).
{¶5} In October 2025, Johnson appeared in court for his second trial date
and requested a continuance to consider the State’s plea offer. The court denied the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
motion for a continuance, explaining that the case was nearly two years old and it was
Johnson’s second trial setting: “So you can have your trial, or you can enter your plea,
whatever you want to do. But today is the day.” During the exchange, Johnson
requested new legal counsel based on a lack of effective communication with his
counsel. The trial court denied the new-counsel motion.
{¶6} After a recess, Johnson indicated that he wanted to enter guilty pleas,
so the trial court held a plea hearing. The State and Johnson had reached an agreed
plea and sentence: the State would amend one of the two murder charges to voluntary
manslaughter with a firearm specification and dismiss all but one of the remaining
charges and their accompanying specifications. In exchange, Johnson agreed to plead
guilty to the amended voluntary-manslaughter charge, with a firearm specification,
and the WUD charge. The parties agreed to a 15-to-20-and-a-half-year indefinite
aggregate sentence: 11 years for voluntary manslaughter, three years on the firearm
specification, and 12 months for the WUD charge, all served consecutively. After the
trial court explained the plea agreement and recommended sentences and ensured
that Johnson wanted to move forward with pleading guilty, the State presented a
statement of facts. In addition to reciting the statutory language, the State asserted
that Johnson had texted the victim a time and place to meet for a drug deal and, when
the victim arrived, Johnson and three other people surrounded the victim’s vehicle to
rob him and then shot him.
{¶7} The court asked Johnson if the statement reflected what happened. He
replied that it was not what happened as there was no robbery and he had not killed
the victim. Johnson said he was pleading guilty only because he did not want to lose
his life by going to trial. The trial court said it could not accept Johnson’s pleas unless
he admitted to committing the offenses and told him to talk with his attorney.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶8} After speaking with his attorney, Johnson said he accepted the State’s
facts, he personally was not the shooter, but he wished to plead guilty. He repeated his
desire to plead guilty. The trial court reviewed the potential consequences of the pleas,
discussed the constitutional rights Johnson was foregoing by pleading guilty, and
ensured Johnson understood.
{¶9} Defense counsel told the court that Johnson was serving a federal
sentence and had agreed with the State that his federal sentence would run
concurrently with the agreed sentences. The trial court, however, had been unaware
of that agreement. It advised Johnson that it could order his state sentences to run
consecutively to the federal sentence. After Johnson affirmed that he still wanted to
plead guilty, the trial court accepted his pleas and found him guilty. The trial court
imposed the agreed 15-to 20-and-a-half-year aggregate sentence, to run consecutively
to the federal sentence.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR AND ANALYSIS
{¶10} On appeal, Johnson raises three assignments of error: (1) his pleas were
unknowing and involuntary; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; and
(3) the record did not support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences.
A. First Assignment of Error:
Johnson’s pleas were knowing and voluntary
{¶11} Johnson argues that he entered his guilty pleas (1) without agreeing
with the facts stated by the State during his plea hearing, (2) without understanding
the charges against him, (3) stating that he did not commit the acts to which he pled
guilty, and (4) under pressure on the morning of trial. Therefore, Johnson argues, he
entered his pleas unwillingly, unknowingly, and unintelligently.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
1. Trial courts may accept guilty pleas only when the defendant enters them
voluntarily and with sufficient knowledge
{¶12} Guilty pleas are valid only if the defendant enters them knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. McKinney, 2026-Ohio-2256, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.). If a
defendant’s plea is entered in the absence of any of these three requirements,
enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional under both the United States and Ohio
Constitutions. State v. Gowdy, 2025-Ohio-5575, ¶ 18.
{¶13} This court reviews de novo whether a defendant entered a plea
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. Savage, 2022-Ohio-3653, ¶ 16 (1st
Dist.), citing State v. Foster, 2018-Ohio-4006, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Tutt,
2015-Ohio-5145 ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). Thus, we examine anew the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the pleas. McKinney, 2026-Ohio-2256, at ¶ 6 (1st Dist.).
Guided by our evaluation of the trial court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11, we must
determine if the plea colloquy demonstrates that the defendant understood the plea
agreement itself, the rights being waived, and the consequences of the pleas. Id. at ¶ 6.
2. Johnson entered his pleas voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
{¶14} Johnson first asserts that his pleas were involuntary and unknowing
because he was pressured to enter his guilty pleas or go to trial. He cites the trial court’s
denial of two motions that he raised on the morning of trial: a motion for a continuance
so Johnson could consider a plea deal and a motion for new counsel because he had
not been able to talk with his current counsel. According to Johnson, because he had
only two options—to plead guilty or go to trial that day—the trial court pressured him
to move forward, agree to facts to which he disagreed, and enter the pleas without
understanding the charges or the pleas.
{¶15} But, as the trial court pointed out, Johnson’s case had been pending for
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
more than a year and had already been set for a trial once. Johnson does not suggest
that the trial court erroneously denied his motions for a continuance and new counsel.
Rather, he only asserts that its denial rendered his pleas involuntary and unknowing.
{¶16} Moreover, the trial court did not require him to plead guilty. Rather, it
told him he had a choice to plead or go to trial. The trial court reasonably denied the
requests for a continuance and new counsel because it did not wish to delay the case
further. And its denial of those requests did not render his pleas involuntary—he could
have chosen to go to trial.
{¶17} Next, Johnson maintains that he did not agree with the State’s
presentation of the facts. This is incorrect. Johnson initially disagreed with the facts
as recounted by the State, but he later admitted to those facts. While Johnson stated
he “personally was not the shooter,” he admitted he was present at the robbery and
murder. The State’s theory was complicity as police officers had recovered casings
from several firearms, so there was no way to know from which gun the fatal shot was
fired, or which person “pulled the trigger.” And Johnson’s representation that he did
not have a gun at all was made after the trial court accepted Johnson’s guilty pleas.
{¶18} Johnson entered his pleas voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. We
overrule this assignment of error.
B. Second Assignment of Error:
Johnson was not prejudiced by his counsel’s performance
1. Defendants are entitled to competent counsel
{¶19} The law governing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (“IAC”) claims is
rooted in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which guarantees
the right to the effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. U.S. Const.,
amend. VI. The right to the assistance of counsel applies to the states through the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. Moreover,
the Ohio Constitution guarantees the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions. Ohio
Const., art. I, § 10. Ohio courts evaluate IAC claims under the same standards as
federal courts. State v. Clinton, 2024-Ohio-4720 (6th Dist.).
{¶20} In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States
Supreme Court created a two-prong test whereby a defendant asserting an IAC claim
must show (1) deficient performance—that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) prejudice—counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at ¶ 687. “A defendant’s failure to satisfy
one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other.” State v.
Rainey, 2023-Ohio-4666, ¶ 43 (1st Dist.).
{¶21} In cases where, like here, the defendant asserting an IAC claim entered
a guilty plea below, the defendant must show both (1) counsel’s representation was
objectively unreasonable, and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
defendant would not have entered the guilty plea. State v. Mata, 2004-Ohio-6669, ¶
14 (3d Dist.).
2. Johnson did not show he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance
{¶22} Johnson points to his assertion during the hearing that he and his
counsel did not have good communication and argues that the lack of reasonable
communication violated “the most basic of attorney duties,” rendering his pleas
unknowing. Moreover, he asserts that counsel’s failure to inform the trial court before
the hearing of the agreement to run his state sentences concurrently to his federal
sentence constituted ineffective assistance.
{¶23} Assuming without deciding that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, Johnson cannot prevail because he fails to
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
satisfy Strickland’s second prong. Johnson makes no argument that but for counsel’s
ineffective assistance, he would not have entered guilty pleas. And absent that
showing, Johnson’s IAC claim must fail.
{¶24} Moreover, before accepting Johnson’s pleas, the trial court ensured he
was satisfied with his trial counsel and informed him that it was “going to do whatever
[it] want[s]” about Johnson’s sentences, stating that his sentences “can run
consecutive.” Johnson entered his pleas knowing his sentences could run
consecutively.
{¶25} Because Johnson cannot show that but for counsel’s allegedly deficient
assistance he would not have pleaded guilty, we overrule Johnson’s second assignment
of error.
C. Assignment of Error 3: The record supports consecutive sentences,
but the trial court failed to make required findings
{¶26} Johnson’s final assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred by
imposing consecutive sentences; specifically, he argues that the trial court ordered him
to serve his state sentences consecutively and to serve his federal sentence
consecutively to his state sentences “without making the proper findings.”
{¶27} R.C. 2929.41(A) contains a presumption that “a prison term, jail term,
or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other prison term,
jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state, another state,
or the United States.” But R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) allows a trial court to overcome that
presumption and impose consecutive sentences by making three findings: (1)
consecutive sentences are “necessary to protect the public from future crime or to
punish the offender,” (2) “consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
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public,” and (3) one or more of the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) factors apply.
1. Consecutive Sentences on State Counts
{¶28} When a “sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended jointly
by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing
judge,” R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) precludes appellate courts from reviewing the sentence.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Ohio deemed R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) “a statutory limit on a
court of appeals’ jurisdiction to hear an appeal.” State v. Noling, 2013-Ohio-1764, ¶
22.
{¶29} Because Johnson and the State jointly recommended the sentences for
the state offenses be served consecutively, and the trial court imposed that sentence,
we lack jurisdiction to consider Johnson’s argument.
2. Consecutive State and Federal Sentences
{¶30} At the plea hearing, the State and Johnson told the court that part of the
agreed sentence was that his state and federal sentences would be served concurrently.
But the trial court ordered Johnson to serve the sentences consecutively. Accordingly,
R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) does not apply to this portion of the sentence and we have
jurisdiction to review it.
{¶31} Under R.C. 2929.41(A), except as provided by R.C. 2929.41(B) (and
other provisions), “a prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be
served concurrently with any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment
imposed by a court of . . . the United States.”
{¶32} R.C. 2929.41(B)(4)’s exception to division (A)’s presumption provides,
as relevant here, that when an Ohio trial court imposes a sentence for a felony offense,
and a federal court has imposed a sentence for a federal felony offense, the trial court
may order the defendant to serve the state and federal felony prison terms
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consecutively. R.C. 2929.41(B)(2). Thus, under those circumstances, no presumption
exists that federal and state felony sentences should be served concurrently, and the
trial court is not obligated to make any R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings.
{¶33} But here, nothing in the record shows that the sentence imposed by the
federal court was for a felony offense. The State’s argument assumes R.C.
2929.41(B)(2) applies, but it points to nothing showing that Johnson’s federal
sentence was imposed for a felony offense.
{¶34} Because there is nothing showing that the federal court imposed a
sentence for a felony offense, R.C. 2929.41(B)(2)’s exception to R.C. 2929.41(A) does
not apply. Therefore, the trial court was required to make the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
findings, but it did not do so.
{¶35} As the trial court was required to make those findings, but failed to do
so, we sustain the portion of Johnson’s third assignment of error challenging the trial
court’s ordering Johnson to serve his federal sentence consecutively to the state
sentences it imposed and we remand the cause to the trial court for a new sentencing
hearing. We overrule the remainder of Johnson’s third assignment of error.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶36} We overrule Johnson’s first and second assignments of error and affirm
his convictions. But we sustain in part Johnson’s third assignment of error, reverse the
consecutive nature of his state and federal sentences, and remand the cause to the trial
court to determine whether consecutive sentences are appropriate, and if so, to make
the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
NESTOR and MOORE, JJ., concur.
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