State v. Hartle
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketL-25-00204
JudgeOsowik
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Hartle, 2026-Ohio-4620.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. {48}L-25-00204
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202500631
v.
Cole Hartle DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: November 20, 2026
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Michael H. Stahl, for appellant.
*****
OSOWIK, P.J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the August 18, 2025 judgment
of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the motion to dismiss of
defendant-appellee, Cole Hartle, on the basis that the statutes under which he was
charged violate the Second Amendment. For the following reasons, we affirm, in part,
and reverse, in part, the judgment of the trial court.
I. Background
{¶ 2} Cole Hartle was indicted on charges of carrying a concealed weapon, a
violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) and (F)(1), a fourth-degree felony (Count 1), and
improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, a violation of R.C. 2923.16(B) and (I), a
fourth-degree felony (Count 2). Count 1 of the indictment alleged that Hartle “did
knowingly carry or have concealed on his person or concealed ready at hand a handgun
other than a dangerous ordnance, to wit: Sig Sauer P320 .45 caliber pistol,” which was
“either loaded or for which the offender had ammunition ready at hand.” Count 2 alleged
that Hartle “did knowingly transport or have a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in such a
manner that the firearm [was] accessible to the operator or any passenger without leaving
the vehicle[.]” The conduct giving rise to these charges was alleged to have occurred on
or about March 27, 2025, when Hartle was 19 years old.
{¶ 3} On July 21, 2025, Hartle moved to dismiss both counts of the indictment on
the ground that the statutes under which he was charged are unconstitutional under the
Second Amendment, as applied. In his motion, Hartle explained that Ohio’s concealed-
carry and improper-handling statutes permit only “qualifying adults”—defined in R.C.
2923.111(A)(2)—to lawfully carry a concealed weapon or transport a loaded weapon in a
motor vehicle; adults ages 18- to 20-years old cannot be deemed “qualifying adults.”
Then-19-year-old Hartle argued that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New
York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 59 (2022), Ohio’s concealed-carry
2.
and improper-handling statutes violate his Second Amendment rights because they
restrict his possession of a firearm on the sole basis that he is not a qualifying adult.
{¶ 4} The State responded that the concealed-carry statute did not prohibit Hartle
from possessing a firearm; it merely restricted his right to carry a concealed firearm and
banned concealed carry without an appropriate license. The State urged that under the
analysis adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bruen, states may ban concealed carry so
long as open carry is still permitted. It also maintained that the concealed-carry law is a
temporary, age-based restriction consistent with the common law, and does not ban all
possession of firearms. The State contended that “youthful impulsivity” and “other
limitations of judgment” justify these restrictions and are consistent with founding era
laws disarming certain groups.
{¶ 5} The State also claimed that the improper-handling statute makes “no
mention of age” and is a reasonable regulation on the manner of carry. It argued that
having a firearm ready for discharge on the road and easily accessible can fuel road rage
and “create[] a symptom of problems likely to terrorize others,” and it emphasized that
under the common law, individuals could not carry deadly weapons in a manner likely to
terrorize others.
{¶ 6} The trial court granted Hartle’s motion to dismiss. It adopted the reasoning
and rationale of Judge Kenneth Walz in State v. Harris, Lucas County case No.
CR02025000080, who granted a similar motion to dismiss. There, the court dismissed
charges of carrying a concealed weapon and improper handling after finding that (1) 18-
3.
to-20-year-olds are part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, and (2) the
State failed to meet its burden under Bruen to justify its regulation by demonstrating that
it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
{¶ 7} The State appealed. It assigns the following errors for our review:
I. Ohio’s age-based firearms restrictions are consistent with the
historic tradition of firearms regulations.
II. Alternatively, those under the age of 21 are not within “the
people” protected by the Second Amendment.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 8} The State argues that Ohio’s CCW and improper-handling statutes do not
violate the Second Amendment as applied to Hartle because (1) age-based restrictions are
consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulations, and (2) people
under the age of 21 are not among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment.
We address these assignments of error in reverse order, and we separate our discussions
of the CCW and improper-handling statutes. Also, before addressing the State’s
assignments of error, we briefly explain the statutes at issue in this appeal and address the
applicable standard of review.
{¶ 9} In Ohio, a person may openly carry a handgun in public unless otherwise
prohibited by federal or state law. Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Clyde, 2008-
Ohio-4605, ¶ 20, citing R.C. 9.68(A); State v. Massingill, 2021-Ohio-2674, ¶ 15 (8th
Dist.). While open carry is generally permitted in Ohio, it is illegal under R.C.
2923.12(A)(2) to knowingly carry or have a concealed handgun. This prohibition does
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not apply if a person has a concealed handgun license. R.C. 2923.12(C)(2). Moreover,
under R.C. 2923.111(B)(1), a person who is a “qualifying adult” can carry a concealed
handgun without a license. A “qualifying adult” is a person who is (1) 21 years old or
older; (2) not legally prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm under 18 U.S.C.
922(g)(1) to (9), R.C. 2923.13, or any other Revised Code provision; and (3) satisfies all
of the criteria listed in R.C. 2923.125(D)(1)(a) to (j), (m), (p), (q), and (s). R.C.
2923.111(A)(2).
{¶ 10} Under R.C. 2923.111(A)(2), a person who is under 21 years old cannot be
deemed a “qualifying adult” even if he or she satisfies all the other criteria set forth in the
statute. A person under the age of 21 also cannot obtain a concealed handgun license.
R.C. 2923.125(D)(1)(b). The practical effect of these statutes is that a person under age
21 may openly carry a legally-possessed handgun, but he or she may not carry a
concealed handgun.
{¶ 11} The improper-handling statute—R.C. 2923.16(B)—provides that “[n]o
person shall knowingly transport or have a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in such a
manner that the firearm is accessible to the operator or any passenger without leaving the
vehicle.” As with the concealed-carry statute, this statute does not apply to a person who
“has been issued a concealed handgun license that is valid at the time in question[.]” See
R.C. 2923.16(F)(5)(a). Also, R.C. 2923.111 grants a qualifying adult the right to carry a
concealed handgun subject to the same restrictions that would apply to a person who has
been issued a license to carry a concealed handgun. State v. Barber, 2023-Ohio-2991, ¶
5.
20 (6th Dist.). Again, a person under age 21 cannot obtain a concealed-handgun license.
R.C. 2923.125(D)(1)(b). The long and short of this is that a “qualifying adult” is treated
as though he or she has been issued a concealed-handgun license and may transport or
have a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle to the same extent that a licensee may do so. In
other words, a “qualifying adult” is not subject to the restriction contained in R.C.
2923.16(B).
{¶ 12} Hartle’s motion to dismiss challenged the constitutionality of Ohio’s
restrictions on concealed carry and improper handling as applied. A party raising an as-
applied constitutional challenge must show that the contested legislation “is
unconstitutional as applied to a specific set of facts.” State v. Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535, ¶
11, citing Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329 (1944), paragraph six of
the syllabus. A holding that a statute is unconstitutional as applied “does not render the
statute wholly inoperative”; rather, it “prevents future application of the statute in a
similar context.” (Citations omitted.) McNalley v. Keiser, 2025-Ohio-5561, ¶ 10 (6th
Dist.), motion to certify and appeal allowed, 2026-Ohio-1248, quoting Simpkins v. Grace
Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio, 2016-Ohio-8118, ¶ 20.
{¶ 13} “Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law that we review de
novo.” Portage Cty. Educators Assn. for Dev. Disabilities-Unit B, OEA/NEA v. State
Emp. Relations Bd., 2022-Ohio-3167, ¶ 7. Likewise, we review de novo a trial court’s
decision granting a motion to dismiss based on a constitutional challenge to a statute.
State v. Storms, 2024-Ohio-1954, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.).
6.
A. Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 14} The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a] well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” In its second assignment of error, the State
argues that persons ages 18 to 20 are not included among “the people” to whom the
Second Amendment applies because (1) at the time the Second Amendment was ratified,
persons under age 21 were not considered adults, and (2) teenagers’ brains are not fully
developed in regions responsible for higher-order executive functions like impulse
control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance, therefore, justifying age-based firearm
restrictions.
{¶ 15} In Lara v. Commr. Pennsylvania State Police, 125 F.4th 428, 438 (3d Cir.
2025), cert. denied sub nom. Bivens v. Second Amdt. Found., 2026 WL 1871315 (U.S.
June 30, 2026), the Third Circuit observed that 18-to-20-year-olds have been deemed to
be among “the people” for other constitutional rights like the right to vote, freedom of
speech, the freedom to peaceably assemble and to petition the government, and the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 437. It concluded that they are also
among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. Id. at 438. The court reasoned
that to hold otherwise would render the Second Amendment right to bear arms “‘a
second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of
Rights guarantees.’” Id., quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 70, quoting McDonald v. Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010).
7.
{¶ 16} The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held similarly. See Reese v. Bur. of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 127 F.4th 583, 595 (5th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he
text of the Amendment’s prefatory clause considered along with the overwhelming
evidence of their militia service at the founding indicates that eighteen-to-twenty-year-
olds were indeed part of ‘the people’ for Second Amendment purposes.”); Worth v.
Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677, 689 (8th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 1924 (2025)
(“Ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens that are 18 to 20-year-olds are members of the
people because: (1) they are members of the political community under [D.C. v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008)]’s ‘political community’ definition; (2) the people has a fixed
definition, though not fixed contents; (3) they are adults; and (4) the Second Amendment
does not have a freestanding, extratextual dangerousness catchall.”). See also Bruen at
31-32 (observing that the petitioners were “two ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens,” and
as such, were “part of ‘the people’ whom the Second Amendment protects.”).
{¶ 17} We agree with the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits and hold that 18- to 20-
year-olds are included among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. We
find the State’s second assignment of error not well-taken.
B. First Assignment of Error
{¶ 18} In its first assignment of error, the State argues that Ohio’s age-based
firearms restrictions are constitutional under the Second Amendment because they are
consistent with the historical tradition of firearms restrictions. Before addressing the
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State’s specific arguments, we briefly summarize the seminal U.S. Supreme Court
decisions on this issue.
{¶ 19} In Heller, 554 U.S. 570, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the District of Columbia’s attempt to ban handguns, and it concluded
that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” guarantees “the individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation” regardless of service in the militia.
Id. at 592. Later, in Bruen, it considered the constitutionality of regulations restricting
the right to publicly carry handguns.
{¶ 20} In Bruen, New York state law required a license to possess or carry a
firearm. To carry a firearm outside the home, a person had to obtain “an unrestricted
license to ‘have and carry’ a concealed ‘pistol or revolver.’” Bruen at 12, quoting N.Y.
Penal Law Ann. § 400.00(2)(f ). To obtain that license, the applicant had to prove the
existence of “proper cause.” While “proper cause” was undefined, New York courts
interpreted it to mean “‘a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the
general community.’” Id., quoting In re Klenosky, 428 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (1980).
{¶ 21} In Bruen, the two petitioners wished to carry handguns for self-defense, but
did not claim any unique danger to justify their requests. They were granted only
restricted licenses for recreational activities. Petitioners sued the superintendent of the
New York State Police and a New York Supreme Court justice, alleging that their Second
and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when their applications for unrestricted
licenses were denied for failure to show proper cause. The district court dismissed
9.
petitioners’ complaint, and the court of appeal affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the denial of petitioners’ application violated the
Constitution.
{¶ 22} The Court adopted an analysis for courts to apply when considering Second
Amendment challenges to gun regulations. Under that analysis, courts must first consider
whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct[.]” Bruen at
17. If it does, “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct,” and the
government may not justify its regulation by “simply posit[ing] that the regulation
promotes an important interest.” Id. Instead, to overcome the presumption of
constitutional protection, “the government must demonstrate that the regulation is
consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. “Only if a
firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court
conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified
command.’” Id., quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50, fn. 10 (1961).
Put another way, the Court concluded that “the government must affirmatively prove that
its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of
the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 19.
{¶ 23} The Court explained that the analysis of the Nation’s historical tradition
“requires courts to assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the
Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.” Id. It observed that sometimes
“that inquiry will be fairly straightforward.” Id. For example, “when a challenged
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regulation addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century,”
its unconstitutionality may be suggested by (1) the absence of a historical regulation
addressing the problem; (2) earlier generations’ use of materially different means to
address the problem; or (3) the rejection on constitutional grounds of previous attempts to
enact analogous regulations. Id.
{¶ 24} In Heller, the Court had undertaken a review of gun rights spanning from
the late 1600s through the nineteenth century before ultimately concluding that the
handgun ban violated the Second Amendment. The Bruen Court observed that New
York’s proper-cause requirement concerned the same societal problem that the District of
Columbia sought to remedy with its handgun ban: handgun violence in urban areas. It
announced that as it did in Heller, it would consider “whether ‘historical precedent’ from
before, during, and even after the founding evinces a comparable tradition of
regulation.’” Bruen at 27, quoting Heller at 631.
{¶ 25} Before undertaking its analysis, the Court acknowledged that modern
challenges in regulating firearms “are not always the same as those that preoccupied the
Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868.” Id. It expressed that while
the meaning of the Second Amendment “is fixed according to the understandings of those
who ratified it, the Constitution can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the
Founders specifically anticipated.” Id. at 27-28. So, it explained, while modern
regulations may not have been imaginable at the founding, courts must employ
“reasoning by analogy.” Id. at 28. The Court instructed that reasoning by analogy
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requires courts to determine “whether a historical regulation is a proper analogue for a
distinctly modern firearm regulation,” which, in turn “requires a determination of
whether the two regulations are ‘relevantly similar.’” Id. at 29, quoting C. Sunstein, On
Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 773 (1993).
{¶ 26} To assist courts, the Court pointed to two metrics for determining whether
regulations are “relevantly similar” under the Second Amendment: “how and why the
regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” Id. The Court
identified individual self-defense as “‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment
right,” and emphasized that “whether modern and historical regulations impose a
comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is
comparably justified are central considerations when engaging in an analogical inquiry.”
(Internal quotations omitted. Emphasis in original.) Id. at 29, citing McDonald, 561 U.S.
at 767, quoting Heller at 599. It cautioned, however, that “analogical reasoning under the
Second Amendment is neither a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check.”
Id. at 30. It advised that “courts should not ‘uphold every modern law that remotely
resembles a historical analogue,’” but neither should it insist upon a “historical twin”
when identifying representative historical precursors. Id., quoting Drummond v.
Robinson, 9 F.4th 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2021).
{¶ 27} Against that backdrop, the Court performed the test it had adopted. Under
the first part of that inquiry—whether the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the
individual’s conduct—the Court found that the plain text of the Second Amendment
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protects the petitioners’ proposed conduct, which was to carry handguns publicly for self-
defense. Turning to the second inquiry—whether the government has demonstrated that
the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation—
the Court undertook a lengthy analysis of the history of public-carry rights.
{¶ 28} The Court recognized that the Second Amendment had been adopted in
1791. Id. It suggested that the focus in interpreting the Constitution should be on the
English common law and British institutions as they existed at the time the instrument
was framed and adopted. Id. at 39. On the other end of the spectrum, it warned that
reliance on late-nineteenth century evidence should be avoided due to its “temporal
distance from the founding” among other “serious flaws.” Id. at 66.
{¶ 29} Ultimately, the Court concluded that “apart from a handful of late-19th-
century jurisdictions, the historical record compiled by respondents does not demonstrate
a tradition of broadly prohibiting the public carry of commonly used firearms for self-
defense.” Id. at 38. Likewise, it found no historical tradition “limiting public carry only
to those law-abiding citizens who demonstrate a special need for self-defense.” Id. As
such, the Court held that the government had “failed to meet [its] burden to identify an
American tradition justifying New York’s proper-cause requirement,” and it invalidated
the proper-cause requirement as unconstitutional. Id. at 38-39.
{¶ 30} Important to the present case, in analyzing antebellum-era law, the Court
recognized that “the manner of public carry” had been subject to “reasonable regulation”
during that period. (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 59. It observed that states had been
13.
permitted to “lawfully eliminate one kind of public carry—concealed carry—so long as
they left open the option to carry openly.” Id. The Court remarked that “[n]one of these
historical limitations . . . operated to prevent law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-
defense needs from carrying arms in public for that purpose.” Id. at 60.
1. Concealed Carry
{¶ 31} The State argues that concealed-carry restrictions are presumptively valid
under Bruen because there is a historical tradition of eliminating this manner of carry and
because age-based restrictions are consistent with the historical tradition of regulation of
firearms access by categories of persons believed to present a special danger of misuse.
{¶ 32} We recently considered the constitutionality of Ohio’s concealed-carry
statute in State v. Byrd, 2026-Ohio-3664, ¶ 3 (6th Dist.). There, we concluded that
regardless of the precise reasons for gun-related restrictions imposed on 18- to 20-year-
olds, states can constitutionally prohibit all concealed carry as to all citizens so long as
open carry remains available. As an extension of this, “‘states today may impose
concealed-carry restrictions on subsets of that group for the same reason, so long as open
carry remains available, and the statutory classifications do not offend some other
constitutional provision, like the Equal Protection Clause.’” Id. at ¶ 69, quoting State v.
Reed, 2025-Ohio-4708, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.) (Crouse, P.J., concurring), appeal allowed, 2026-
Ohio-667, citing State v. Hall, 2025-Ohio-1644, ¶ 101-103, 108-109 (1st Dist.).
{¶ 33} Like the defendants in Reed and Byrd, Hartle has not raised an equal-
protection challenge, thus, to the extent that some other constitutional right may be
14.
implicated by Ohio’s age-based restrictions, that issue is not before us. We conclude that
the restrictions on Hartle’s manner of carry under R.C. 2923.12(A) did not violate his
Second-Amendment right to bear arms.
{¶ 34} We recognize that our conclusion here with respect to the CCW charge is in
conflict with the decision of the Second District in State v. Matosky, 2025-Ohio-5658, ¶
36 (2d Dist.), which held that the State had “failed its burden to demonstrate that Ohio’s
age-based restriction on carrying concealed weapons is consistent with the Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
{¶ 35} Section 3(B)(4), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution provides “[w]henever
the judges of a court of appeals find that a judgment upon which they have agreed is in
conflict with a judgment pronounced upon the same question by any other court of
appeals of the state, the judges shall certify the record of the case to the supreme court for
review and final determination.” Id. at ¶ 31. The Ohio Supreme Court set forth three
requirements which must be met in order to certify a case:
First, the certifying court must find that its judgment is in conflict
with the judgment of a court of appeals of another district and the asserted
conflict must be “upon the same question.” Second, the alleged conflict
must be on a rule of law-not facts. Third, the journal entry or opinion of the
certifying court must clearly set forth that rule of law which the certifying
court contends in conflict with the judgment on the same question by other
district courts of appeals. Whitelock v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 66 Ohio St.3d
594, 596 (1993).
15.
{¶ 36} Here, our conclusion is in conflict with the conclusion of the Second
District in Matosky, 2025-Ohio-5658, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.). We, therefore, sua sponte certify a
conflict to the Supreme Court of Ohio, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(4), Ohio
Constitution, on the following issue:
Is Ohio’s age-based restriction on carrying concealed weapons under
R.C. 2923.111 and 2923.12(A)(2) a reasonable regulation on the manner of
public carry that is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of
firearm regulation and, therefore, constitutional under the Second
Amendment?
2. Improper Handling
{¶ 37} Turning to the improper-handling charge, R.C. 2923.16(B) provides that
“[n]o person shall knowingly transport or have a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in
such a manner that the firearm is accessible to the operator or any passenger without
leaving the vehicle.” As previously explained, this statute does not apply to a person who
“has been issued a concealed handgun license that is valid at the time in question[.]” See
R.C. 2923.16(F)(5)(a). It also does not apply to “qualifying adults.”
{¶ 38} Hartle is not a “qualifying adult” solely because he was 19 years old at the
time of the offense. For Hartle to lawfully transport a firearm in a vehicle, the firearm
would have to have been unloaded and carried “(1) [i]n a closed package, box, or case;
(2) [i]n a compartment that can be reached only by leaving the vehicle; or (3) [i]n plain
sight and secured in a rack or holder made for the purpose[.]” R.C. 2923.16(C).
16.
{¶ 39} At the time of the founding, the age of majority was 21 years old. Reed,
2025-Ohio-4708, at ¶ 8 (1st Dist.) (Crouse, P.J., concurring). In most states, the age of
majority is now 18 years old. Id. at ¶ 15. In Byrd, in the context of the CCW statute, we
agreed with Judge Crouse’s concurring decision in Reed that “‘founding-era limitations
on firearm rights were imposed not because of any judgment that those under 21 years of
age were dangerous with arms, but because those under 21 were under the legal
limitations inherent in minority, and under the legal care and protection of a guardian or
parent.’” See Byrd at ¶ 31, quoting Reed at ¶ 17 (Crouse, P.J., concurring). “Any
tradition of firearm restrictions based on age and infancy, therefore, should be viewed as
tied to the line between minority and majority, not to the line between 20 and 21 years.”
Id. at ¶ 23.
{¶ 40} In State v. Baxter, 2025-Ohio-5722 (1st Dist.), Judge Crouse again
concurred and reiterated this rationale in the context of the improper-handling statute. As
she did with respect to the CCW statute in Reed, she concluded that the statute should be
upheld as a mere restriction on the manner of carry. She opined that “[j]ust as the State
may criminalize the carrying of concealed weapons generally, it may also criminalize
concealing them in a motor vehicle ‘to reduce the number of surprise shootings and to put
individuals around the arms-bearer on notice of the dangerous weapon they carry.’”
Baxter at ¶ 19 (Crouse, J., concurring), quoting Hall, 2025-Ohio-1644, at ¶ 87 (1st Dist.).
17.
{¶ 41} We do not agree that the improper-handling statute merely restricts the
manner of carry. The statute prohibited Hartle from having a loaded firearm in a vehicle
such that it could be accessed without leaving the vehicle. In other words, Hartle could
not have a loaded handgun on his person while occupying a motor vehicle, thus the
handgun would not be ready and available for use in self-defense should the need arise.
Rather, for the duration of his car ride, the gun would be rendered useless and Hartle
would be completely disarmed, thereby interfering with his right to armed self-defense.
{¶ 42} In addressing a challenge to a similar Pennsylvania law, the court in Suarez
v. Paris, 741 F.Supp.3d 237, 258 (M.D. Pa. 2024), articulated our concern. It observed
that “[i]f public carry necessarily extends beyond the home such that an individual may
lawfully bear a firearm in a public place, commonsense dictates that the Constitution’s
protections cannot simply evaporate whenever a vehicle is required to travel between the
two.” It opined that under Bruen, citizens “must be permitted to freely transport firearms
for their constitutional rights to have potency.” Id. It reasoned that “[j]ust as confining
the right to bear arms to the home would ‘nullify half of the Second Amendment’s
operative protections,’ . . . the court cannot countenance an interpretation whereby those
protections extend only as far as an individual can travel by foot.” Id. It concluded,
therefore, that “the conveyance of firearms in motor vehicles is conduct protected by the
Second Amendment.” Id.
{¶ 43} The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Suarez was more restrictive than R.C.
2923.16(B) in that it prohibited unlicensed persons from transporting a firearm—loaded
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or unloaded—in a motor vehicle except subject to limited exceptions. See 18 Pa. Stat.
Ann. § 6106. Nevertheless, the Second Amendment guarantees the right to armed self-
defense. Bruen at 21. Separating a person from their loaded handgun while he or she
occupies a motor vehicle effectively disarms that person. See People v. Thompson, 2025
IL 129965 (Ill.), as modified on denial of reh’g (Sept. 22, 2025), cert. denied sub nom.
Thompson v. Illinois, 146 S.Ct. 1628 (2026) (recognizing that possession of a “ready-to-
use firearm” in a vehicle is “presumptively protected under Bruen,” but finding Illinois’
shall-issue licensing scheme constitutional under the Second Amendment).
{¶ 44} Importantly, the State has not cited any historical analogue to support the
motor-vehicle restriction. Indeed, as the State maintains, motor vehicles did not exist at
the time of the founding and reconstruction eras. It does cite regulations from colonial
Massachusetts and New Hampshire authorizing the arrest of individuals who “ride or go
armed Offensively . . . by Night or by Day, in Fear or Affray of Their Majesties Liege
People.” But these were pre-1700 regulations that the Bruen Court explained away as
having codified the common-law offense of “bearing arms to terrorize the people.”
Bruen at 47. For people like 19-year-old Hartle, R.C. 2923.16(B) outlaws the mere
transportation of a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle if it is accessible without exiting the
vehicle, regardless of whether he is behaving menacingly.
{¶ 45} In sum, R.C. 2923.16(B) effectively disarms a person while occupying a
motor vehicle, and the State has failed to show that this regulation is consistent with this
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Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. As applied to 19-year-old Hartle, we
find the statute unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.
{¶ 46} We recognize that our conclusion here with respect to the improper-
handling charge is in conflict with the First District’s decisions in State v. Stonewall,
2025-Ohio-4974 (1st Dist.), appeal allowed, 2026-Ohio-475, and State v. Baxter, 2025-
Ohio-5722 (1st Dist.). In Stonewall, the court held that Ohio’s improper-handling statute
merely “regulates the manner in which a person under 21 may carry a firearm in a motor
vehicle,” and does “not deprive [the defendant] of the ‘right to carry a handgun for self-
defense outside the home.’” Id. at ¶ 39, quoting Bruen at 10. In Baxter, the court
characterized R.C. 2923.16(B) as a regulation on “the manner in which an individual may
possess a firearm in a vehicle” and held that it is constitutional, reasoning that “[t]he
restriction that R.C. 2923.16(B) places upon an unqualified adult . . . is limited to the
duration in which [he] is in a car.” Id. at ¶ 11-13. Accordingly, we also sua sponte certify
a conflict to the Supreme Court of Ohio on the following issue:
As applied to adults ages 18 to 20 years old, is Ohio’s improper-
handling statute, R.C. 2923.16(B), read together with 2923.111,
inconsistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation such
that it is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment?
In sum, we find the State’s first assignment of error well-taken as it relates to the CCW
charge, but we find it not well-taken as it relates to the improper-handling charge.
20.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 47} As to the State’s first assignment of error, the concealed-carry statute
restricts only the manner of carry, which the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear is
permissible under the Second Amendment. However, the improper-handling statute is
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to Hartle because it effectively
disarms him while he occupies a motor vehicle, and the State has failed to show that this
regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. We,
therefore, find the State’s first assignment of error well-taken, in part, and not well-taken,
in part. Because our conclusions are in conflict with decisions of our sister districts, we
certify a conflict on the following issues:
(1) Is Ohio’s age-based restriction on carrying concealed weapons
under R.C. 2923.111 and 2923.12(A)(2) a reasonable regulation on the
manner of public carry that is consistent with this Nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation and, therefore, constitutional under the
Second Amendment?
(2) As applied to adults ages 18 to 20 years old, is Ohio’s improper-
handling statute, R.C. 2923.16(B), read together with 2923.111,
inconsistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation such
that it is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment?
The parties are directed to Sup.R.Pract. 8.01 for instructions for how to proceed.
{¶ 48} As to the State’s second assignment of error, we conclude that adults under
age 21 are included among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. We find
the State’s second assignment of error not well-taken.
21.
{¶ 49} We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the August 18, 2025 judgment of
the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. The matter is remanded to the trial court
where the State may proceed against Hartle on Count 1 only. The State is ordered to pay
the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed, in part,
reversed, in part, and remanded.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
22.