State v. Carter

[Cite as State v. Carter, 2026-Ohio-3710.] STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 31688 Appellee v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE DONTE CARTER COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO Appellant CASE No. CR-2023-01-0001 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: September 23, 2026 HENSAL, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Donte Carter appeals the validity of his guilty plea to counts of assault and having weapons under disability in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms. I. {¶2} The Grand Jury indicted Mr. Carter on one count of grand theft, one count of having weapons under disability, one count of assault, and one count of menacing. On the day of trial, he agreed to plead guilty to the assault and having-weapons-under-disability counts. The trial court accepted his plea and sentenced him to a total of three years imprisonment. Mr. Carter has appealed, assigning as error that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR MR. CARTER’S PLEA OF GUILTY WAS NOT KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY AND IS THEREFORE INVALID.  2 {¶3} Mr. Carter argues that his guilty plea was not valid because the trial court did not inform him that he would be waiving his right to appeal his convictions. Criminal Rule 11(C) provides that, in felony cases, the trial court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest unless it does certain things first. The requirements include “[i]nforming the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea . . . .” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). According to Mr. Carter, the “effect of the plea” should include the fact that, by pleading guilty, the defendant waives his right to appeal his convictions. He also argues that the fact that Rule 32(B)(2) requires a court to advise a defendant at sentencing about the right to appeal the sentence is no substitute. He further argues that, because the trial court made a complete failure to advise him of the right he was waiving, he does not have to establish prejudice, even though the right at issue was a nonconstitutional right. {¶4} We will begin with Mr. Carter’s final argument because it is dispositive. Rule 11(B) defines what the “effect of the plea of guilty” is. State v. Jones, 2007-Ohio-6093, paragraph two of the syllabus (“To satisfy the requirement of informing a defendant of the effect of a plea, a trial court must inform the defendant of the appropriate language under Crim.R. 11(B).”). Regarding guilty pleas, Rule 11(B) advises that a “plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.” Crim.R. 11(B)(1). There is no indication in Rule 11(B) that the effect of a guilty plea relates to the waiver of the right to appeal a defendant’s conviction. See State v. Yerkey, 2025-Ohio-2289, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.). {¶5} At the plea hearing, the trial court advised Mr. Carter that by pleading guilty, he would be giving up his right to plead not guilty, his right to go forward with the trial that was scheduled, and his right to a bench or jury trial. It explained that, if the trial was a jury trial, all 12 people would have to agree that he was guilty before he could be found guilty. The court also  3 explained that it would be the State’s burden to prove each element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and that he would have the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him, to subpoena witnesses and compel them to testify, and to testify himself. It advised Mr. Carter that he would be found guilty of the offenses, the maximum fines and prison terms for the offenses, and the post-release control that would follow his completion of any prison term. {¶6} The trial court did not specifically inform Mr. Carter that a guilty plea was “a complete admission of [his] guilt.” Crim.R. 11(B)(1). Because this right to be informed is a nonconstitutional one, however, the trial court’s compliance is “subject to review under a standard of substantial compliance.” State v. Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 12. In addition, failure to comply with nonconstitutional rights does not invalidate a plea “unless the defendant thereby suffered prejudice.” Id. “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’” Id., quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107 (1990). {¶7} Mr. Carter argues that he should not have to establish prejudice because the trial court completely failed to advise him of the effect of a guilty plea. In support of his argument, he cites State v. Sarkozy, 2008-Ohio-509, which involved a trial court’s failure to advise the defendant about post-release control. Id. at ¶ 22. In Griggs, however, the trial court’s failure to advise a defendant of the effect of a guilty plea was the central issue and the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] defendant who has entered a guilty plea without asserting actual innocence is presumed to understand that he has completely admitted his guilt. In such circumstances, a court’s failure to inform the defendant of the effect of his guilty plea as required by Crim.R. 11 is presumed not to be prejudicial.” Griggs at syllabus; see also State v. Fontanez, 2026-Ohio-3281, ¶ 41 (“[A] court may presume that a defendant understands that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt . . . .”). Sarkozy discussed Griggs’s substantial compliance standard but did not modify or overrule  4 the Griggs decision as it relates to the effect of a plea. Sarkozy at ¶ 19-22; see State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 16-17 (citing Griggs test as the controlling standard for nonconstitutional aspects of a plea colloquy following Sarkozy). Accordingly, we reject Mr. Carter’s argument that he does not need to show prejudice. {¶8} Upon review of the record, we note that Mr. Carter did not assert actual innocence at his plea hearing and that he has not attempted to establish prejudice on appeal. See Fontanez at ¶ 47-48. We, therefore, conclude that, even if the trial court did not comply with Rule 11(C)(2)(b) at the plea hearing, Mr. Carter has not established that his guilty plea must be vacated. Mr. Carter’s assignment of error is overruled. III. {¶9} Mr. Carter’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to  5 mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.  6 Costs taxed to Appellant. JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT SUTTON, J. FLAGG LANZINGER, J. CONCUR. APPEARANCES: ALAN M. MEDVICK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and AMANDA R. FILIPPI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.