State v. White

[Cite as State v. White, 2026-Ohio-3481.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-26-00020 Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202500302 v. Kenneth White DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellant Decided: September 4, 2026 ***** Julia R. Bates, Prosecuting Attorney, and Randy L. Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant. ***** OSOWIK, J. The Plea {¶ 1} Appellant, Kenneth White, entered Alford pleas to the following offenses of his indictment in this case: Count 1: Aggravated trafficking in drugs, a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(d), with an attached firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.141(A);Count 3: Trafficking in heroin, a felony of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C.2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(6)(c); and Count 5: Trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(9)(c). The Sentence {¶ 2} At sentencing, the trial court found that White was not amenable to community control and that prison was consistent with the purposes of R.C. 2929.11. It further ordered him to serve a minimum prison term of 3 years as to count 1 and a maximum prison term of 4 1/2 years as to Count 1. He was further ordered to serve 12 months in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections as to Count 3 and 30 months in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections as to Count 5. An additional term was imposed as a mandatory and consecutive term pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) of 1 year. Mandatory years pursuant to 2929.13(F), 2929.14 or Chapter 2925, as to count 1. Pursuant to R.C. 2929. l 9(B)(2)(f), Defendant must not ingest or be injected with a drug of abuse and must submit to random drug-testing, the results of which must be negative. {¶ 3} The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The Court further found in its sentencing judgment entry: Defendant found to have, or reasonably may be expected to have, the means to pay all or part of the applicable costs of supervision, confinement, assigned counsel, and prosecution as authorized by law. 2.  Defendant ordered to reimburse the State of Ohio and Lucas County for such costs. This order of reimbursement is a judgment enforceable pursuant to law by the parties in whose favor it is entered. Defendant further ordered to pay the cost assessed pursuant to R.C. 9.92(C), 2929.18 and 2951.021. Notification pursuant to R.C. 2947.23 is given. The assessment of the court-appointed-council fees is a civil assessment and is not part of the defendant's sentence. Assignment of Error {¶ 4} On appeal, White sets forth a singular assignment of error: I. The trial court improperly assigned financial sanctions when it found appellant had, or reasonably could be expected to have, the ability to pay all or part of the applicable costs of supervision, confinement, assignment counsel and prosecution without finding that appellant had the ability to pay. {¶ 5} At the outset, White acknowledges that the trial court was required to impose the costs of prosecution without regard to his ability to pay those costs and is not challenging those costs in this appeal. He does challenge the costs of confinement and assigned counsel. White confines his argument before this court on the trial court’s finding of his present or future ability to pay. He claims that the Presentence Investigation Report provides insufficient information to support such a finding by the court. {¶ 6} Recently, these identical issues have been presented to this court. In State v. Heier, 2026-Ohio-2022 (6th Dist.), we addressed the costs of confinement and assigned counsel separately and will do so in like manner in this case. 3.  A. Costs of Confinement {¶ 7} We review a trial court judgment imposing the costs of confinement under R.C. 2953.08(A)(4) and (G)(2)(b) and will reverse if we find that the imposition of these costs was contrary to law. State v. Patterson, 2024-Ohio-2198, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.). {¶ 8} Under R.C. 2929.18(A)(5)(a)(ii) and (E), a trial court may require an offender to pay all or part of the costs of confinement if it finds that he or she is able to pay or is likely in the future to be able to pay. The court need not conduct a formal hearing to determine the defendant's ability to pay, and it need not explain its findings on the record. State v. Ivey, 2021-Ohio-2138, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.). {¶ 9} In this case, the court stated: THE COURT: You are to pay the costs of prosecution, fees under 2929.18 and costs under 9.92(C). Given your youth, health and employability, upon release, given the contents of the pre-sentence investigation, you are found to have or reasonably may be expected to have the means to pay all of or part of those applicable costs and you’ll have to reimburse the State and the county for them. {¶ 10} The court then incorporated these findings into its sentencing entry. As indicated above, the trial court was not required to state the basis for its finding. In fact, this court has explained that a trial court's indication that it reviewed a PSI that includes information about the defendant's financial, educational, and vocational background may support its imposition of discretionary costs. Id., Heier at ¶ 6-7. citing State v. Cantrill, 2020-Ohio-1235, ¶ 91 (6th Dist.). 4.  {¶ 11} Based upon our review in this case, we cannot find that the imposition of the costs of confinement is contrary to law. B. Appointed Counsel Costs {¶ 12} An order to pay appointed counsel fees is not part of the criminal sentence. Because the assessment of these fees is not part of a defendant's sentence, we do not review the issue under R.C. 2953.08 for appeals based on felony sentencing. Id., citing State v. Radabaugh, 2024-Ohio-5640, ¶ 79 (3d Dist.), appeal not allowed, 2025-Ohio- 231. Rather, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. {¶ 13} As for the assessment of appointed-counsel fees, like the argument presented in Heier, the appellant herein similarly argues that the trial court made only “a conclusory finding that he would have the ability to pay such costs in the future,” and he complains that there was vague and unverified information in the PSI about appellant’s actual earning potential. {¶ 14} The record establishes that the trial court considered White’s youth, health and employability before imposing these discretionary costs. Upon review of this record, we cannot find that the assessment of fees and expenses of appointed counsel to be an abuse of discretion by the trial court. C. The Judgment Entry {¶ 15} In contrast with the sentencing judgment entry in Heier, in this case, the trial court explicitly stated in the sentencing judgment entry that the assessment of these fees was a civil assessment and not part of the sentence. Accordingly, the judgment entry complies with the dictates of State v. Taylor, 2020-Ohio-6786, ¶ 37. 5.  {¶ 16} We find White’s single assignment of error to be found not well-taken and it is denied. Conclusion {¶ 17} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24. Judgment affirmed. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. Thomas J. Osowik, P.J. JUDGE Gene A. Zmuda, J JUDGE Myron C. Duhart, J CONCUR. JUDGE This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/. 6.