State v. Murphy

[Cite as State v. Murphy, 2026-Ohio-4443.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PORTAGE COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2026-P-0036 Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas SEAN THOMAS MICHAEL DAY MURPHY, Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00163 Defendant-Appellant. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Decided: November 9, 2026 Judgment: Affirmed in part and vacated in part Connie J. Lewandowski, Portage County Prosecutor, and James W. Armstrong, Assistant Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff- Appellee). Sean Thomas Michael Day Murphy, pro se, 508 Elbon Avenue, Akron, OH 44306 (Defendant-Appellant). MATT LYNCH, P.J. {¶1} Appellant, Sean Murphy, pro se, appeals two judgments of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas. Murphy challenges the trial court’s denial of his Crim.R. 32.1 postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without an evidentiary hearing despite his allegations that defense counsel failed to appear for the plea hearing and that he entered his guilty plea under coercive circumstances. Murphy further contends the trial court improperly construed his motion as a petition for postconviction relief and his counsel was ineffective.  {¶2} After careful consideration of Murphy’s arguments, the record, and the pertinent law, we find Murphy’s second assignment of error well taken. Murphy never filed a petition for postconviction relief. The State construed his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea as a petition for postconviction relief, and the trial court issued two separate entries: one denying Murphy’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea and one denying his nonexistent petition for postconviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying Murphy’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the trial court’s judgment denying the nonexistent petition for postconviction relief. Substantive Facts and Procedural History {¶3} On February 24, 2022, a Portage County Grand Jury indicted Murphy on two counts of violating a protection order, fifth-degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2919.27. At the arraignment hearing, Murphy pleaded not guilty and the court appointed him a public defender. Shortly thereafter, Murphy retained his own counsel. {¶4} In June 2022, after neither Murphy nor his counsel appeared for a pre-trial hearing, the trial court revoked Murphy’s bond and issued a warrant for his arrest. {¶5} On August 11, 2022, Murphy was brought before the court, and the court noted it would recall the warrant. Substitute counsel for Murphy indicated she was standing in for his counsel with his consent, which Murphy confirmed for the court. The State then made a plea offer on the record whereby Murphy would plead guilty to one count of violating a protection order. In exchange, the State would move to dismiss the remaining count and concur with the presentence investigation, so long as Murphy had PAGE 2 OF 12 Case No. 2026-P-0036 no contact with the victims. The court recessed the hearing so Murphy could discuss the offer with his substitute counsel. {¶6} Murphy agreed to the offer and voluntarily signed a written plea agreement and waiver of rights. He confirmed for the court that he had reviewed the document thoroughly with counsel and that he did not have any questions. After engaging Murphy in a Crim.R. 11(C)(2) colloquy advising him of his constitutional and nonconstitutional rights, the trial court accepted Murphy’s oral and written guilty plea, nolled the remaining count, and set the matter for a presentence investigation. Shortly before the sentencing hearing, Murphy obtained new counsel, and his former counsel withdrew. {¶7} In November 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Defense counsel explained the resolution of a pending case in Summit County, in which Murphy faced similar charges and was currently serving probation. Counsel informed the court Murphy was employed full time, actively seeking reconciliation with his children, and expected to be reunited with them at a domestic relations hearing later that day. Murphy acknowledged he violated the protection order and told the court he was almost finished with commercial truck driving school and obtaining a license, he has three jobs, he is trying to parent, and he started a fatherhood initiative program. {¶8} The trial court found Murphy amenable to community control sanctions and sentenced him to 12 months of intensive supervised adult probation and 24 months of adult probation provided he maintain full-time employment and follow the temporary protection order. {¶9} In February 2024, the trial court found Murphy violated the terms of his probation and added additional restrictions to his terms of community control. In April PAGE 3 OF 12 Case No. 2026-P-0036 2024, the court found Murphy again violated his terms of probation and placed him under intensive supervised adult probation for 12 months and an additional 12 months of adult probation. {¶10} On March 24, 2026, approximately three and one-half years after entering his guilty plea, Murphy, pro se, filed a “postsentence motion to withdraw guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1,” wherein he argued his counsel failed to maintain adequate communication and was unaware that Murphy was in jail in Summit County on the day of a pre-trial hearing. As a result, his counsel failed to inform the court of his custodial status and Murphy was arrested on a capias warrant. Murphy further alleged that on the day of the final pre-trial in August 2022, his counsel failed to appear and sent his secretary in his stead. “Without retained counsel present, without meaningful legal advice, and facing financial inability to pay additional trial fees previously discussed [by his attorney, Murphy] felt rushed, misled, and coerced into entering a guilty plea.” Murphy argued that but for his counsel’s ineffective assistance, he would not have entered a guilty plea and he would have proceeded to trial. Thus, the circumstances under which he entered his plea resulted in a manifest injustice under Crim.R. 32.1. Murphy attached an affidavit to his motion averring to his allegations. {¶11} On April 6, 2026, the State filed a “response to motion for postconviction relief,” in which the State argued Murphy did not meet either of the two exceptions set forth in R.C. 2953.23 to file an untimely petition for postconviction relief. {¶12} On April 8, 2026, the trial court denied Murphy’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without a hearing. PAGE 4 OF 12 Case No. 2026-P-0036  {¶13} On April 13, 2026, the trial court denied Murphy’s nonexistent petition for postconviction relief “without hearing due to untimely filing.” {¶14} On the same day, the court terminated Murphy’s probation, finding he complied with all the terms and conditions previously imposed, and restored his rights of citizenship. {¶15} Murphy timely appealed and raises four assignments of error for our review: {¶16} “[1.] The trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant-appellant’s post-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea without conducting an evidentiary hearing. {¶17} “[2.] The trial court erred by improperly construing defendant-appellant’s Crim.R. 32.1 motion as a petition for postconviction relief. {¶18} “[3.] Defendant-appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. {¶19} “[4.] The trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant-appellant’s Crim.R. 32.1 motion without an evidentiary hearing despite allegations that retained counsel failed to appear at the plea hearing and that the plea was entered under coercive circumstances.” {¶20} At the outset, we note Murphy’s appeal is not moot simply because he has completed his sentence. Murphy was convicted of a felony and thus “has a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the judgment imposed upon him.” State v. Golston, 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 227 (1994) (holding an appeal challenging a felony conviction is not moot even if the entire sentence has been satisfied before the matter is heard on appeal). PAGE 5 OF 12 Case No. 2026-P-0036  {¶21} We now turn to Murphy’s assignments of error, which we address out of turn for ease of discussion. Petition for Postconviction Relief {¶22} In his second assignment of error, Murphy contends the trial court erroneously construed his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea as a petition for postconviction relief. {¶23} We agree. As our review indicates, Murphy’s motion was properly captioned as a “postsentence motion to withdraw guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1,” and he alleged his plea was involuntary and unknowingly entered under “coercive circumstances” due to the ineffectiveness of his counsel. Inexplicably, the State counter- argued Murphy’s motion was an untimely petition for postconviction relief, which the State again argues on appeal. The trial court further confounded the matter by issuing two separate judgment entries, one denying Murphy’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, and one denying Murphy’s nonexistent petition for postconviction relief. {¶24} Contrary to the State’s argument, the Supreme Court of Ohio explicitly held that a Crim.R. 32.1 postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a distinct and separate remedy from a petition for postconviction relief. State v. Bush, 2002-Ohio-3993, ¶ 11. The Court explained, “R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23 do not govern a Crim.R. 32.1 postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Postsentence motions to withdraw guilty or no contest pleas and postconviction relief petitions exist independently. A criminal defendant can seek under Crim.R. 32.1 to withdraw a plea after the imposition of sentence. See State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. PAGE 6 OF 12 Case No. 2026-P-0036 R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23 do not govern the timeliness of such a motion. And Crim.R. 32.1 itself does not prescribe a time limitation. This is not to say that timeliness is not a consideration, however, as an ‘undue delay between the occurrence of the alleged cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea and the filing of a motion under Crim.R. 32.1 is a factor adversely affecting the credibility of the movant and militating against the granting of the motion.’ Smith at paragraph three of the syllabus.” Id. at ¶ 14. {¶25} Accordingly, Murphy’s second assignment of error has merit, and the trial court’s erroneous judgment entry denying a petition that was never filed is vacated. Crim.R. 32.1 Postsentence Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea {¶26} In his first and fourth assignments of error, Murphy contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without a hearing despite his allegations that counsel was ineffective because he failed to appear for the plea hearing and Murphy was forced to enter his plea under coercive circumstances. {¶27} “Appellate courts review a trial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a plea under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. DiTomaso, 2025-Ohio-4913, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.). An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62 (2d Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004). {¶28} “‘A defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of sentence has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice.’” State v. Straley, 2019-Ohio-5206, ¶ 14, quoting Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d at paragraph one of the syllabus. “A ‘manifest injustice’ is a ‘clear or openly unjust act,’ State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208 (1998), and relates to a fundamental flaw in the plea PAGE 7 OF 12 Case No. 2026-P-0036 proceedings resulting in a miscarriage of justice, State v. Tekulve, 2010-Ohio-3604, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), citing Kreiner at 208 and Smith at 264. The term ‘has been variously defined, but it is clear that under such standard, a postsentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases.’ Smith at 264.” Id. Generally, res judicata bars a defendant from raising claims in a Crim.R. 32.1 postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea that he raised or could have raised on direct appeal from the conviction. Id. at ¶15; see State v. Ketterer, 2010-Ohio-3831, ¶ 59. {¶29} Murphy waited approximately three and one-half years from the date he entered his plea to file his motion to withdraw his plea, which is a factor adversely militating against the granting of his motion. See Smith at paragraph one of the syllabus. Further, he neglected to address the delay in his motion. {¶30} We also note Murphy did not file a direct appeal of his conviction. Although Murphy would be generally barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising claims he could have filed on direct appeal, ineffective assistance of counsel is a valid ground for filing a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Gibson, 2007-Ohio-6926, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.). To demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel in this context, Murphy was required to show “(1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have ple[added] guilty.” State v. Madeline, 2002 WL 445036, *3 (11th Dist. Mar. 22, 2002); accord Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). {¶31} Murphy specifically contends his counsel was ineffective because he failed to appear for the plea hearing and sent his secretary to represent Murphy, forcing Murphy PAGE 8 OF 12 Case No. 2026-P-0036 to enter his plea under coercive circumstances. However, as our review of the plea hearing indicates, Murphy confirmed he assented to be represented by substitute counsel (who was not his retained counsel’s secretary), confirmed he understood the trial court’s advisements and the nature of the charges against him, and did not ask any questions or seek any clarifications during the entirety of the hearing. A guilty plea is deemed to have been entered knowingly and voluntarily where, as here, the record demonstrates that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C). See State v. Wilmington, 2023-Ohio-512, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.); accord DiTomaso, 2025-Ohio-4913, at ¶ 24 (11th Dist.). Further, the court recessed the hearing for Murphy’s substitute counsel to explain the plea offer to him. Upon his return to the hearing, Murphy indicated he was satisfied with substitute counsel’s representation, he understood the plea offer and written plea agreement, and he voluntarily signed the plea agreement. Thus, Murphy failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel and that but for his counsel’s ineffectiveness, the outcome of trial would have been different. {¶32} Lastly, Murphy was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he did not demonstrate a manifest injustice that would entitle him to any relief. “A hearing is required on a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea only if the defendant alleges facts that, if accepted as true by the trial court, would require withdrawal of the plea.” DiTomaso at ¶ 25. See also State v. Onusic, 2026- Ohio-2767, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), quoting Madeline at *6 (an evidentiary hearing is not required where the record conclusively and irrefutably contradicts a defendant’s allegations in his motion); State v. Zendarski-Metcalf, 2024-Ohio-780, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.) (if the record demonstrates the movant is not entitled to relief and the movant failed to submit PAGE 9 OF 12 Case No. 2026-P-0036 evidentiary documents sufficient to demonstrate a manifest injustice, the trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing). {¶33} In sum, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying Murphy’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the circumstances presented herein. {¶34} Accordingly, Murphy’s first and fourth assignments of error are without merit. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel {¶35} In his third assignment of error, Murphy contends he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because the record reflects multiple substitutions of counsel, counsel failed to adequately consult with him regarding trial strategy, counsel failed to inform the court of Murphy’s custodial status, and counsel failed to personally appear at the plea hearing. {¶36} This assignment of error is not well taken. The instant appeal is not a direct appeal from Murphy’s conviction, but an appeal from his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Murphy cannot appeal a trial court judgment issued in 2026 and bootstrap errors that occurred under a separate judgment issued in 2022. As the Eighth District Court of Appeals aptly remarked on this very circumstance: “The utilization of an appeal of a subsequent order (here, the denial of the motion to withdraw a guilty plea) to indirectly and untimely appeal prior judgments (here, appellant’s convictions and sentences) which were never directly appealed is procedurally anomalous and inconsistent with the appellate rules which contemplate a direct relationship between the order from which the appeal is taken and the error assigned as a result of the order.” State v. Kavlich, 2000 PAGE 10 OF 12 Case No. 2026-P-0036 WL 777011, *5 (8th Dist. June 15, 2000); see also App.R. 3(D) and 4(A); State v. Church, 1995 WL 643794, *1 (8th Dist. Nov. 2, 1995). {¶37} Accordingly, Murphy’s third assignment of error is without merit. {¶38} The judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas denying Murphy’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea is affirmed, and the judgment of the trial court denying the nonexistent petition for postconviction relief is vacated. EUGENE A. LUCCI, J., SCOTT LYNCH, J., concur. PAGE 11 OF 12 Case No. 2026-P-0036  JUDGMENT ENTRY For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, it is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas denying Murphy’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea is affirmed, and the judgment of the trial court denying the nonexistent petition for postconviction relief is vacated. Costs to be taxed against the parties equally. PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI, concurs JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH, concurs THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. PAGE 12 OF 12 Case No. 2026-P-0036