State v. Hagwood

[Cite as State v. Hagwood, 2026-Ohio-2564.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-L-113 Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas KING ISAIAH HAGWOOD, JR., Trial Court No. 2025 CR 000497 Defendant-Appellant. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Decided: July 6, 2026 Judgment: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Teri R. Daniel, Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). Paul M. Kelley, 44 Nancy Avenue, Akron, OH 44319 (For Defendant-Appellant). EUGENE A. LUCCI, J. {¶1} Appellant, King Isaiah Hagwood, Jr., appeals the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, after a trial to the bench, convicting him of aggravated robbery and receiving stolen property, with several firearm specifications. Mr. Hagwood was sentenced to an indefinite, aggregate term of 11 to 13 years. Mr. Hagwood challenges various issues, including the sufficiency and weight of the evidence; the admissibility of certain evidence; trial counsel’s effectiveness; as well as the trial court’s eventual sentence. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for the limited purpose of the trial court to correct a basic aspect of Mr. Hagwood’s sentence.  I. Substantive Facts and Procedural Posture {¶2} On July 3, 2024, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Nicholas Northup was driving a 2021 red Ford Explorer SUV in Shaker Heights, Cuyahoga County, Ohio. A gold sedan in front of Mr. Northup stopped next to a parked vehicle blocking the Explorer. A hooded individual with a medical mask exited the passenger side of the gold sedan. He pointed a silver handgun at Mr. Northup and demanded he surrender the Explorer. Mr. Northup complied, and he was advised to lay on the ground, count to 100, and not to look back. {¶3} After the incident, because his cell phone was still in the Explorer, Mr. Northup walked to a nearby house and called police. Once police arrived, Mr. Northup advised officers that his assailant was a black male, wearing a black hood, with a surgical mask. He also stated the male had dreadlocks approximately 10-inches long. Officers obtained information relating to the color, make, and model of the SUV. They also obtained the license-plate number. A “be-on-the-lookout” (“BOLO”) was issued for the stolen vehicle. {¶4} At approximately 8 p.m. on July 3, 2024, Beena Bandwalker was in her vehicle, in the parking lot of her apartment complex (located in Willoughby Hills, Lake County, Ohio), waiting for a FedEx delivery. Two men approached the driver’s side of her car from behind and demanded her keys and phone. Although frightened, she did not comply. One of the men made a second demand and brandished a handgun from his waistband. He held the firearm to Ms. Bandwalker’s head, but a red SUV appeared, and a person in the driver’s side of that vehicle yelled “let’s go, let’s go.” The men retreated to the SUV which sped off without Ms. Bandwalker’s belongings. PAGE 2 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113  {¶5} Ms. Bandwalker immediately alerted the security officer patrolling her apartment complex, who notified police of the incident. Ms. Bandwalker described the man with the firearm as an African American male, with dreadlocks, and a hoodie. She indicated the suspect had a medium to slim build and appeared to be between 20-25 years old. Although she stated she was not generally familiar with firearms, the handgun the suspect brandished was a “silver-gray looking gun.” Ms. Bandwalker was shown a photo array and identified Mr. Hagwood with 80-85 percent certainty. Mr. Hagwood was 18 years old at the time of the incident(s).1 {¶6} Flock cameras around Ms. Bandwalker’s apartment complex recorded the vehicle she described entering the complex at 8:03 p.m. and exiting at 8:06 p.m. Lake County Sheriff Sergeant Sarah McCulloug, stated: “The Flock system is a web based program that we get alerts from that send[s] us . . . with warrants, stolen vehicles, stolen license plate, missing people that will alert us. We can also utilize that in searching for license plates that were given to see if we can find, locate a vehicle.” {¶7} Sergeant McCulloug pointed out that the information is sent through LEADS (Law Enforcement Automated Data System) and “hits” on cameras in the Flock system to alert, inter alia, if a stolen vehicle has been potentially identified. The license plate on the vehicle matched the plate number of the SUV stolen from Mr. Northup earlier that day. {¶8} Shaker Heights Detective Volodymyr Savka stated that, after receiving the BOLO, he responded to reports of “pinging” from Mr. Northup’s phone. Detective Savka stated that “pinging” referred to the location of a cell phone in a particular location. According to the detective, Mr. Northup was using “an iPhone app to locate his phone.” 1. The underlying matter pertains only to the specific crimes committed in Lake County, Ohio. PAGE 3 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113 He noted that the pinging was traced to a location “going in the westbound direction” into Cleveland. Shaker Heights officers ultimately recovered Mr. Northup’s phone. It is unclear whether the phone was discarded or found in Mr. Northup’s Explorer. {¶9} In the early hours of July 4, 2024, the Explorer was found traveling in Cleveland, Ohio. Officer Jeremiah Jones, a patrolman for the Cleveland Police Department, stated he received a BOLO from Shaker Heights Police Department. Officer Jones asserted: “They advised us there was a red Ford SUV that was stolen out of their city as an aggravated robbery indicating that it was done violently and they just wanted to make us aware that it was last seen heading into our city.” Officer Jones and his partner observed a red Ford Explorer SUV matching the description and confirmed that the license plate number was registered to Mr. Northrup’s vehicle. {¶10} The Cleveland officers initiated a pursuit. Ultimately, the passenger in the vehicle left (or “bailed”) the vehicle and was apprehended. The driver of the vehicle left the vehicle as well, leaving the SUV still in “drive.” Officer Jones observed, “we heard that the passenger of a vehicle had bailed and had been quickly apprehended and detained. The driver of the vehicle then fled from the driver’s side and continued running westbound towards where we were at.” As a result, the officer observed “a black male[,] black hoodie[,] black pants running westbound from the vehicle that’s when me and my partner then engaged in a foot pursuit.” {¶11} Officer Jones noted that his partner chased an individual whom he caught. Officer Jones’ partner radioed that he had the male at gunpoint. Officer Jones located his partner who was in the process of arresting an individual later identified as Mr. Hagwood. Officer Jones identified Mr. Hagwood in court and also stated he found a black hoodie PAGE 4 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113 approximately 15 feet away from the suspect. Officer Jones repeatedly stated that throughout the arrest process as well as the booking or “intake” process, he did not observe any tattoos on Mr. Hagwood. {¶12} Seth Dodson, a public-safety-intelligence analyst for the Ohio State Highway Patrol Intelligence Unit, reviewed the cell phone and geo-location data analysis provided by AT&T, Mr. Hagwood’s cell phone carrier. Mr. Dodson stated he is a “subject matter expert” in this area (referred to as Trax) and, since 2017, has been involved in “well over 300” cases relating to geo-location records analysis. Trax is a program created to trace separate phone records provided by cell-phone providers—in this case, AT&T. {¶13} Mr. Dodson observed that he received the certificate of authenticity of the records from AT&T. No objection was made to the introduction of these records or to Mr. Dodson’s eventual analysis of the same. {¶14} Mr. Dodson received data from AT&T which provided the name of the person on the account, the phone number, and the subscriber’s address. This data matched Mr. Hagwood’s device. The data also allowed Mr. Dodson to review the locations assigned to the phone during particular time frames which permitted him to know “what cell site or cell tower and sector [that] was utilized for specific communications . . . .” Mr. Dodson stated that the “towers” are not necessarily physical towers but involve subsets of hardware that can “be on buildings, they can be in trees, [the provider] can move them around depending on if there’s a large event going on [around] these cell sites . . . for their subscribers to be able to utilize their devices” seamlessly. {¶15} Mr. Dodson indicated the most important aspects of the data he assessed are “the cell tower latitude and cell tower longitude, the cell ID, the sector orientation that’s PAGE 5 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113 going to show us which sector was utilized for that particular timing [when] events hit.” (Sic.) He also noted that the “latitude and longitude” provides “AT&T’s estimate of where that device is at the time.” {¶16} Mr. Dodson explained he utilized Google Earth, in conjunction with Trax, to trace a cell site or cell tower. Trax then maps the radio frequency for a cell phone reading. Mr. Dodson stated that “[o]nce you download the Google Earth file from Trax this is call[ed] the time bar slider so it will show where we’re at in time within these records.” {¶17} Mr. Dodson emphasized that the timing-evidence-data technology is used “all the time, not just in criminal cases[,] we use it in exigent cases where we have maybe a missing elderly person[;] as the highway patrol we deal with those a lot where we’re trying to locate someone. We used [sic] them in cases where we have a missing person, maybe an Amber alert we’ve used them. We’ve recovered dead bodies I guess for a lack of a better term with this type of data.” {¶18} Mr. Dodson provided the estimated time frame coverage and location from the cell phone ascribed to Mr. Hagwood, observing, among other things, that “between 6:00 p.m. and 6:30 the device continues to move west. From 6:31 to 6:59 the device moves south. From 7:00 p.m. to 7:50 the device moves north and then northeast. From 7:51 p.m. until 8:05 p.m. the device continues to move northeast and then starts moving south.” At approximately 8:05 p.m., Mr. Hagwood’s cell phone was “likely in [the] general vicinity” of 2250 Par Lane—near the Par Lane Flock camera that captured the red Explorer SUV going into Ms. Bandwalker’s apartment complex at 8:03 p.m. and exiting the same at 8:06 p.m. PAGE 6 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113  {¶19} As part of the investigation, Mr. Hagwood’s phone was analyzed, and DNA was taken from the Explorer. Analysis of Mr. Hagwood’s phone revealed a photograph of him sitting on a vehicle matching the stolen Explorer as well as videos from July 3, 2024, of Mr. Hagwood with a co-defendant. Also, as noted, the analysis of Mr. Hagwood’s cell phone-location data placed him in the location of the attempted theft of Ms. Bandwalker’s vehicle. Significantly, the same data placed him in the same general vicinity as his co- defendant throughout the day. Finally, DNA found inside the Explorer was deemed statistically more likely to be that of Mr. Hagwood and Mr. Northup than Mr. Northup and unknown persons. {¶20} On May 23, 2025, Mr. Hagwood was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), with an accompanying firearm specification, pursuant to R.C. 2941.145 (the incident involving Ms. Bandwalker); one count of attempted grand theft of a motor vehicle, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of 2913.02(A)(1), with an accompanying firearm specification, pursuant to R.C. 2941.145 (again, pertaining to the incident relating to Ms. Bandwalker); and one count of receiving stolen property, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A), with an accompanying firearm specification, pursuant to R.C. 2941.141 (this count related to the initial theft of Mr. Northup’s Explorer). Mr. Hagwood pleaded “not guilty” to the counts and specifications. {¶21} The matter proceeded to trial where, after voir dire, Mr. Hagwood elected to be tried to the bench. After receiving evidence, the trial court found Mr. Hagwood guilty as charged in the indictment. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report and, after a sentencing hearing, Mr. Hagwood was sentenced to an indefinite term of PAGE 7 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113 imprisonment of four to six years on the aggravated robbery count and a definite term of 18 months on the receiving stolen property count. The trial court determined the attempted grand theft of a motor vehicle count would merge with the aggravated robbery count, and the State elected to proceed to sentencing on the aggravated robbery count. Regarding the specifications, Mr. Hagwood was ordered to serve mandatory firearm specifications as follows: three years on the aggravated robbery count, three years on the attempted grand theft of a motor vehicle count, and one year on the receiving stolen property count. This appeal follows. {¶22} Mr. Hagwood assigns eleven errors for this court’s review. His first assignment of error provides: II. Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence {¶23} “The State failed to present sufficient evidence of identity.” {¶24} Although Mr. Hagwood nominally makes a sufficiency challenge, he also, however, challenges the weight of the evidence in his brief. We shall address each aspect of his argument(s). {¶25} “In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry, the question is whether the evidence presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Dent, 2020-Ohio-6670, ¶ 15, citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶26} Unlike the standard for the sufficiency of the evidence, the “[w]eight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence . . . to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. PAGE 8 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113 Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 24, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). When considering challenges to the weight of the evidence, an appellate court reviews “‘the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [fact- finder] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). “‘The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting Martin at 175. {¶27} Thus, a conclusion that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence necessarily includes a determination that the State produced sufficient evidence in support of the conviction. State v. DiBiase, 2012-Ohio-6125, ¶ 38 (11th Dist.). {¶28} In this matter, Mr. Hagwood asserts the conviction is unsupported by the evidence because Ms. Bandwalker did not make an in-court identification and her testimony confirmed “deep uncertainty.” He additionally takes issue with the description of his hair length, and the victims’ descriptions of the firearm, his clothing, and his physical size. {¶29} First, Mr. Hagwood challenges the lack of any in-court identification by an eyewitness. {¶30} “It is well-settled that, in order to warrant a conviction, the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the accused as the person who actually committed the crime.” State v. Lawwill, 2008-Ohio-3592, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Scott, 3 Ohio App.2d 239, 244 (7th Dist. 1965). There is no general PAGE 9 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113 requirement, however, “that the defendant must be visually identified in court by a witness.” Lawwill at ¶ 11, citing Scott at 244. Rather, direct or circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish the identity of the accused as the person who committed the crime. State v. Irby, 2004-Ohio-5929, ¶ 16-21 (7th Dist.). {¶31} “[C]ircumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value.” State v. Fasline, 2015-Ohio-715, ¶ 39 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Biros, 1997-Ohio-204, ¶ 65. “Circumstantial evidence has been defined as testimony not grounded on actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of other facts from which inferences are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought to be established.” State v. Payne, 2014-Ohio-4304, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 150 (1988). “An inference is ‘a conclusion which, by means of data founded upon common experience, natural reason draws from facts which are proven.’” State v. Windle, 2011-Ohio-4171, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263 (1947). “It consequently follows that ‘when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of a conviction, that evidence must prove collateral facts and circumstances, from which the existence of a primary fact may be rationally inferred according to common experience.’” State v. Armstrong, 2016-Ohio-7841, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.), quoting Windle at ¶ 34. {¶32} “While it is unquestionably the better practice to obtain an in-court identification of a defendant, the state is not precluded from proving identity by indirect means when a witness cannot or will not provide such identification.” State v. Nicholson, 2009-Ohio-518, ¶ 52 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Porter, 1999 WL 1271722 (8th Dist. Dec. 30, 1999). In effect, the lack of an in-court identification, in light of other surrounding PAGE 10 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113 evidence, simply goes to the weight of the evidence offered in support of the State’s burdens of persuasion. {¶33} Consequently, the absence of a defendant’s in-court identification at trial does not imply there was insufficient evidence of identity or that the conviction is against the weight of the evidence. Lawwill, 2008-Ohio-3592, at ¶ 13. {¶34} In this matter, Ms. Bandwalker perceived her assailant to be an African American, younger man, with a slim build, wearing a hoodie, with shoulder length dreadlocks. She also observed he pointed a “silver-gray” handgun to her head. Ms. Bandwalker picked Mr. Hagwood from a photo array after the attempted robbery. There is no indication that the photo array was unfairly or even remotely suggestive, a fact that Mr. Hagwood eventually concedes in his brief. And, given the circumstances of the incident and considering Ms. Bandwalker’s perception of Mr. Hagwood’s appearance at the time of the attempted robbery, she identified Mr. Hagwood in the array with an 80-85 percent degree of certainty. This evidence goes to the weight of the victim’s testimony. {¶35} Moreover, there was in-court identification by Cleveland Police Officer Jeremiah Johns that Mr. Hagwood was one of two individuals arrested after abandoning the stolen red Explorer. The vehicle had the license plates of the vehicle that caused the initial BOLO. Officer Johns described Mr. Hagwood at the time of arrest, and his physical description of Mr. Hagwood substantially traced the (albeit limited) physical description provided by Ms. Bandwalker. {¶36} Mr. Hagwood also takes issue with the lack of tattoos observed by Ms. Bandwalker, as well as the arresting officer’s testimony that he observed no tattoos on Mr. Hagwood’s person at booking. He maintains he is “covered in tattoos, especially in PAGE 11 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113 the facial area . . . .” In Mr. Hagwood’s interview, which occurred over nine months after the date of the offenses, he had tattoos on his neck. In an interview that was played for the trial court, Mr. Hagwood discusses his tattoos; he first indicates he recently obtained the neck tattoo, then changed his story. {¶37} Similarly, the initial victim, Mr. Northrup, stated that the thief of his red Explorer had shoulder length dreadlocks. Ms. Bandwalker’s and Officer Johns’ description matched this description. Additionally, although Mr. Northrup could not conclusively identify the thief, he testified the man was an African American male, with a hoodie, who brandished a silver firearm. Ms. Bandwalker testified that the firearm her assailant brandished was a “silver-gray looking gun.” The testimony of both victims, in this respect, match. {¶38} Furthermore, Flock cameras identified Mr. Northrup’s stolen vehicle near the scene of the attempted robbery of Ms. Bandwalker’s apartment at or near the time of the incident. Within hours, the same vehicle was stopped in Cleveland where the occupants, one of whom was identified as Mr. Hagwood, fled and were subsequently arrested. {¶39} Mr. Hagwood asserts that his clothes did not match the descriptions offered by victims or the testifying officer. This, however, ignores Officer Johns’ testimony that he and his partner arrested Mr. Hagwood after they observed him abandoning the stolen Explorer. It also ignores the fact that Officer Johns noted that Mr. Hagwood, matching the physical description offered by the victims, was arrested near a cast-aside black hoodie and the stolen Explorer SUV. PAGE 12 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113  {¶40} Additionally, the State presented evidence of cell-phone-location movements ascribed to Mr. Hagwood’s phone on the day and evening in question. These records demonstrated that Mr. Hagwood traveled from Cleveland to Willoughby Hills and then back to Cleveland during the time of the offenses. Mr. Hagwood’s cell phone also disclosed a photo of him on the hood of what appeared to be the stolen Explorer on the day of the incident. {¶41} Considering the foregoing, there was evidence by which the trial court could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Hagwood was the individual who attempted to take Ms. Bandwalker’s vehicle and her personal effects at the time of the incident. There was ample evidence, direct and circumstantial, to support the trial court’s verdict. {¶42} Mr. Hagwood’s first assignment of error is without merit. III. Alleged Error in Admitting DNA Evidence {¶43} Mr. Hagwood’s second assigned error provides: {¶44} “The trial court erred in admitting unreliable DNA evidence consisting of partial and mixed profiles without conducting a Daubert hearing, in violation of Evid. R. 702(C).” {¶45} Under this assignment of error, Mr. Hagwood asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to, sua sponte, hold a hearing pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-590 (1993) and Evid.R. 702(C), relating to the “mixed sample” DNA evidence submitted by the State at trial. Curiously, Mr. Hagwood “essentially challenges DNA testimony as if trial courts had never accepted DNA evidence before.” State v. Adams, 2004-Ohio-5845, ¶ 79. Courts have, and the Supreme Court of PAGE 13 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113 Ohio has, emphasized that a Daubert hearing is not prima facie necessary because “DNA evidence, premised on valid scientific principles, has been widely accepted as reliable and admissible evidence.” Adams at ¶ 86, citing State v. Pierce, 1992-Ohio-53, ¶ 12. The Court emphasized: Courts throughout the nation and in Ohio routinely accept DNA evidence. [See] George Bundy Smith & Janet A. Gordon, The Admission of DNA Evidence in State and Federal Courts (1997), 65 Fordham L.Rev. 2465, 2482-2483, 2488. [See also] State v. Satta, 2002-Ohio-5049, . . .¶ 44 [(3d Dist.)] (“the credibility of the D.N.A. testing . . . is a matter to [be] determined by the trier of fact”); State v. Martin . . . 2000 WL 1145465 [(12th Dist. Aug. 14, 2000)] (“Questions regarding the reliability of DNA evidence . . ., including alleged defects or limitations of DNA population frequency statistics, go to weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility[.]”); State v. Honzu . . . 1995 WL 326214, * 8 [(10th Dist. June 1, 1995)] (questions regarding DNA testing procedures go to weight not admissibility). [See also] Smith & Gordon, 65 [Fordham ]L.Rev. at 2470 (PCR analysis [one of several DNA typing techniques] “has received overwhelming acceptance in the scientific community and the courts”). Adams at ¶ 86. {¶46} Accordingly, because DNA evidence has been used in criminal cases for many decades and is no longer considered to be novel or unusual, Daubert hearings are not fundamentally necessary. Adams at ¶ 80. Rather, considering the established scientific strength and reliability of DNA evidence, defense attorneys are expected to educate themselves regarding DNA evidence to sufficiently conduct cross-examination of the state’s witnesses. State v. Alltop, 2014-Ohio-1695, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.) (“[T]here are ample materials available by which resourceful counsel can educate himself [or herself] sufficiently to formulate an effective cross-examination.”). PAGE 14 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113  {¶47} We consider these points to be equally applicable to mixed-DNA profiles when an adequate foundation is set forth by a qualified expert witness. {¶48} Considering this backdrop, trial counsel did not object, and as a result, we review Mr. Hagwood’s argument for plain error. State v. Lang, 2011-Ohio-4215, ¶ 108. “An alleged error is plain error only if the error is ‘obvious,’ and ‘but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.’” Id., quoting State v. Barnes, 2002-Ohio-68, ¶ 20; and State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph two of the syllabus. Notice of plain error “is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Barnes at paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶49} Pursuant to Evid.R. 702, a witness may testify as an expert if: (1) the testimony “relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception common among lay persons;” (2) “[t]he witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the testimony;” and (3) the “testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized information . . . .” Mr. Hagwood takes issue with the third prong of the foregoing test claiming “the State presented no testimony establishing the reliability of interpreting [the DNA] mixtures.” We do not agree. {¶50} In this matter, Jessica Ritchie, a forensic technician for the Lake County Crime Laboratory (“LCCL”), testified she received DNA samples from investigators. Ms. Ritchie testified the LCCL is an accredited institution in DNA analysis and testified to the chain of custody of all evidence received by the lab. Ms. Ritchie stated she examines the evidence and provides data to the DNA analyst for interpretation. PAGE 15 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113  {¶51} Dr. Karen Zavarella is the DNA supervisor for LCCL. She analyzes and performs DNA casework which includes DNA interpretation of the DNA samples prepared by a technician. Dr. Zavarella testified she has a master’s degree and a PhD in molecular biology and has been qualified as an expert in cases “upwards 50 approximate times.” Dr. Zavarella testified that, once she provides a DNA interpretation she is “confident and certain that [her] results are reliable and accurate.” {¶52} Mr. Hagwood claims certain “red flags” should have prompted the trial court to hold a hearing on the reliability of Dr. Zavarella’s interpretations. The alleged “red flags,” however, were discussed by Dr. Zavarella and, indeed, parts of the evidence were favorable to Mr. Hagwood. {¶53} Specifically, Mr. Hagwood asserts: “the State introduced DNA evidence (State’s Ex. 16) consisting of partial and mixed profiles. No Daubert hearing was held, and . . . [t]he analyst testified to obtaining merely partial mixed profiles of DNA . . . The report stated some results we[r]e inconclusive due to mixture . . . Importantly, the analyst conceded on cross-examination that as to the DNA profile collected from the driver’s side door at least, defendant Hagwood was entirely excluded as a contributor.” {¶54} Dr. Zavarella explained that LCCL does not interpret genetic profiles that indicate greater than three contributors. Accordingly, if there were more than three contributors, LCCL does not make any interpretation or comparisons. {¶55} Even if Mr. Hagwood was excluded from the door handle, however, the DNA swabs taken from the Explorer’s gear shift and steering wheel demonstrate a mixture which allowed interpretation. Dr. Zavarella stated: A portion of this mixture matches the standard from Nicholas Northrup as would be expected as the primary operator of the PAGE 16 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113  vehicle. And assuming that Nicholas Northup is one of those contributors this DNA mixture profile is 1.2 million times more likely to occur if the mixture consists of DNA from Nicholas Northup, King Isaiah Hagwood and one unidentified contributor than it just derives from Nicholas Northup and two unidentified contributors. {¶56} Given the mixture, Dr. Zavarella was able to exclude Mr. Hagwood’s co- defendant and Mr. Northup’s girlfriend. The State asked Dr. Zavarella whether this meant that those people never touched these areas in the vehicle. She responded: “What this means is I could not detect them within the profile in terms of a statistical association . . . [And] [w]e report anything greater than a million times more likely and in the field of forensics a very conservative reporting because a million times more likely is considered in the field of forensics a strong association.” {¶57} Dr. Zavarella discussed the nuances of the process of interpreting the data received from the technician. She also testified to the scientific reliability of the process and to her qualifications as an expert. We find no error in the trial court’s admission of Dr. Zavarella’s testimony and reports. The introduction of the evidence, in effect, went to the weight accorded the testimony and data, not its admissibility. See Adams, 2004-Ohio- 5845, at ¶ 79, 86. {¶58} Moreover, and significant to the plain error analysis, Mr. Hagwood cannot demonstrate the outcome of the trial would have been different if the DNA evidence was not admitted. If the DNA evidence was not introduced, Mr. Hagwood was identified by Ms. Bandwalker with 80-85 percent certainty. The stolen Explorer was placed near Ms. Bandwalker’s apartment complex via Flock cameras at or near the time of the incident in question, and Mr. Hagwood was apprehended leaving/fleeing the stolen Explorer. Even PAGE 17 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113 if the DNA evidence were excluded, we cannot conclude the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise. {¶59} Mr. Hagwood’s second assignment of error lacks merit. IV. Alleged Error in Admitting Cell-Site Location Analysis {¶60} For his third assignment of error, Mr. Hagwood asserts: {¶61} “The trial court erred in admitting historical cell-site location analysis without confrontation of the underlying data analyst, in violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.” {¶62} Under this assigned error, Mr. Hagwood argues the trial court erred by not sua sponte excluding AT&T cell-site records because the “mapping analysis” offered by the State was “testimonial” in nature. Hence, Mr. Hagwood maintains the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause was violated. We do not agree. {¶63} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in its Confrontation Clause, preserves the right of a criminal defendant “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004), the Supreme Court of the United States stated that the Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” The key issue is what constitutes a testimonial statement: “It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). PAGE 18 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113  {¶64} In Crawford, the Court suggested that business records are “by their nature” non-testimonial. Id. at 56. In State v. Craig, 2006-Ohio-4571, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that business records “‘are not testimonial in nature because they are prepared in the ordinary course of regularly conducted business and are “by their nature” not prepared for litigation.’” Id. at ¶ 82, quoting People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (2005). {¶65} The United States Supreme Court, however, clarified that a Confrontation Clause issue can arise “if the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321 (2009). Considering this point, in State v. Hood, 2012-Ohio-6208, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered the impact of cell-phone records in the context of business records. In Hood, the Court observed: [T]he regularly conducted business activity of cell-phone companies is not the production of evidence for use at trial. The fact that records are used in a trial does not mean that the information contained in them was produced for that purpose. Even when cell-phone companies, in response to a subpoena, prepare types of records that are not normally prepared for their customers, those records still contain information that cell-phone companies keep in the ordinary course of their business. Id. at ¶ 36. {¶66} Because cell-phone records reflect “only a formatting of information that already exists as a part of the company’s day-to-day business[,]” the Court determined such records, when properly authenticated, are non-testimonial. Id. at ¶ 38, 42. {¶67} Mr. Hagwood challenges the State’s use of the testimony provided by Seth Dodson. Mr. Dodson is a member of the Ohio State Highway Patrol Intelligence Unit. His main responsibility is cell-phone and geo-location analysis. He uses a system called Trax, PAGE 19 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113 which assists him in mapping data provided by cell phone companies. Mr. Dodson has been deemed a subject-matter expert in the use of the Trax program and thus an expert in the use of such data mapping. {¶68} Using his expertise, Mr. Dodson used “the electronic records and . . . put them into Trax which then produces a Google or file list, most if not all [of] the analysis is done within Google Earth.” He stated, in the course of his analysis, the phone attributed to Mr. Hagwood’s cell-phone number was in the same vicinity as the underlying incident as well as the same vicinity as his co-defendant’s phone. {¶69} Mr. Dodson used authenticated AT&T business records and analyzed them using a program that he has been declared a subject-matter expert to examine and draw conclusions. He was cross-examined and did not rely upon testimonial records for either his analysis or testimony. {¶70} It bears emphasis that the use of Google Earth technology has been held acceptable for purposes of judicial notice. In State v. Bradford, 2018-Ohio-1417, ¶ 68-70 (8th Dist.), the Eighth Appellate District observed: “Generally, an appellate court may take judicial notice of any fact of which the trial court could have taken notice, even where the trial court failed to do so.” Twinsburg v. Wesby, [2012-Ohio-569, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.)], citing Day v. Day, 40 Ohio App.3d 155, 160, [fn. 4 (10th Dist. 1988)]. An appellate court has authority to take judicial notice regarding the characteristics of the streets of the jurisdiction. State v. Thomas, [1993 WL 9719, 3, fn. 2 (11th Dist.] Jan. 8, 1993), citing Day at fn. 4, Orose v. Hodge Drive- It-Yourself Co., Inc., 132 Ohio St. 607 . . . (1937); and Bonbright v. Biller, 67 Ohio App. 421. . . (1st Dist.[ 1941]). “[W]e take judicial notice of a Google map and satellite image as a ‘source[] whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1216, fn. 1 (10th Cir.[ 2013]), quoting United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 PAGE 20 OF 47 Case No. 2025-L-113  F.3d 1179, 1182, fn. 1 (9th Cir. 2012) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)); see Citizens for Peace in Space v. Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1218, fn. 2 (10th Cir. 2007) (taking judicial notice of an online distance calculation that relied on Google Maps data). “‘Geography has long been peculiarly susceptible to judicial notice for the obvious reason that geographic locations are facts which are not generally controversial