State v. Small
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket8-26-05
JudgeWillamowski
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Small, 2026-Ohio-4527.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
LOGAN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 8-26-05
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
ABBY L. SMALL, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR 25 01 0004
Judgment Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: November 16, 2026
APPEARANCES:
William T. Cramer for Appellant
Nathan Yohey for Appellee
Case No. 8-26-05
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Abby L. Small (“Small”) appeals the judgment of
the Logan County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that her conviction is against
the manifest weight of the evidence and that her sentence is contrary to law. For the
reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and
affirmed in part.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} Small resided with her daughters, Q. and J., in a house that was owned
by her parents and was just around the corner from where her mother, Terri, lived
in West Mansfield, Ohio. After having a falling out with Small in August of 2024,
Terri did not see Q. for a few months, even though Terri regularly babysat Q. and J.
prior to this family dispute. As a result, Terri did not see Q. until Small asked Terri
to babysit J. and Q. in November of 2024.
{¶3} At around noon on November 13, 2024, Q. and J. walked with Small to
Terri’s house. When they arrived, Terri noticed that Q. looked “very thin” and had
two black eyes. (Tr. 81). Terri asked Q. if she got her black eyes from falling down.
Terri testified that Q. denied getting these injuries from a fall; that Small then
prompted Q. to explain what happened; and that Q. said, “[T]his is what happens
when you ignore your mom.” (Tr. 82).
-2-
Case No. 8-26-05
{¶4} After Small left, Q. ate a whole banana; a hot dog; two large helpings
of macaroni and cheese; green beans; and muffins in a forty-five-minute period.
Terri testified that this was more than Q. usually ate and that Q. was acting rather
“lethargic.” (Tr. 84). She stated that Q. went back and forth between chatting with
her and laying down to rest.
{¶5} Terri also observed that Q. was unable to turn the water faucet in the
bathroom during this visit. Terri testified that she had to turn the faucet for Q.; that
Q. had previously been able to perform this task; and that Q. “just didn’t have any
strength. . . .” (Tr. 86). Terri stated that this behavior was unusual because she was
usually “flipping around doing cartwheels in my room. . . .” (Tr. 88).
{¶6} On November 14, 2024, Terri contacted the Logan County Sheriff’s
Office to report her concerns about Q.’s welfare. On the following day, Deputy
Michael Martz (“Deputy Martz”) went to Small’s house with a social worker, Molly
Vance (“Vance”), to perform a welfare check on the children. Unbeknownst to
them, Terri and her husband were at the Logan County Family Court, seeking a
limited temporary order that granted them emergency custody of the children.
{¶7} When Deputy Martz and Vance arrived at the house, Small was
carrying bags of groceries on her front porch. On seeing them, Small left several
bags on the ground, went inside the house, and slammed the door. In response,
Deputy Martz knocked on the front door and attempted to make contact with Small.
At this point, Small called Terri to ask why law enforcement was at her house and
-3-
Case No. 8-26-05
was informed that a limited temporary order granting emergency custody of the
children to Terri had just been issued.
{¶8} While he was still standing outside of the house, Deputy Martz could
hear Small yelling on the phone with Terri. Around this time, he was notified that
Terri and her husband had temporary custody of the children. Since Small’s parents
owned her residence, they knew the code to unlock the front door and gave this
information to Vance. Deputy Martz used the code to open the door and began to
speak to Small.
{¶9} Deputy Martz testified that Small was behaving erratically and pushed
against the front door as he tried to communicate with her. He testified that he could
hear Small saying: “You’re not taking my f**king kids.” (Tr. 139). Once inside,
Deputy Martz placed Small under arrest for impeding an investigation. Q. and J.
were then located in a bedroom in the house.
{¶10} Q. was then taken to Nationwide Children’s Hospital where she
received a medical examination from Dr. Constance Christian (“Dr. Christian”).
During the evaluation, Dr. Christian observed bruising on her chest, cheek, upper
right thigh, backside, right shin, and around her eyes. She also noted “healing
wounds” on Q.’s lower back and an abrasion on her lip. (Tr. 202). During the
assessment, Q. reported that Small had smacked and spanked her on the mouth, face,
butt, and hands.
-4-
Case No. 8-26-05
{¶11} Dr. Christian also determined that Q. was at risk for refeeding
syndrome. She testified that this condition comes after a patient experiences an
increase in caloric intake after a prolonged period of malnutrition. She further
testified that, in cases of refeeding syndrome, the body can have severe, adverse
reactions to a sudden increase in caloric intake. For this reason, Q. was hospitalized
for eight days.
{¶12} On January 14, 2025, Small was indicted on one count of endangering
children in violation R.C. 2919.22(A), a third-degree felony; one count of
endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), a first-degree
misdemeanor; and one count of obstructing official business in violation of R.C.
2921.31(A), a second-degree misdemeanor.
{¶13} On February 25, 2026, these charges proceeded to a jury trial. The
State introduced the recording from Deputy Martz’s body camera and called Terri
as a witness. Ex. A. Dr. Christian also testified that, after examining Q.’s medical
history and performing her medical examination, she could conclude within a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Q.’s bruising and malnutrition was
consistent with physical abuse.
{¶14} On February 26, 2026, the jury found Small guilty on all three charges
in the indictment. For the first count of endangering children, the jurors additionally
found that Small’s violation of her duty of care resulted in serious physical harm to
Q. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a prison term of thirty-six months. The
-5-
Case No. 8-26-05
trial court then said the following to Small: “After your release from prison you may
be placed on up to two years of post-release control, or PRC.” (Emphasis added.)
(Mar. 31 Tr. 13).
{¶15} On March 31, 2026, the trial court issued its judgment entry of
sentencing. While the trial court had notified Small at the sentencing hearing that
post-release control was discretionary in this case, its judgment entry of sentencing
stated that she “will be subject to up to three years, but not less than one year of
Post-Release Control.” (Emphasis added.) (Doc. 176).
{¶16} Small filed her notice of appeal on April 3, 2026 and raises the
following two assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error
The weight of the evidence did not support a finding of serious
physical harm as necessary to elevate endangering children to a
felony offense.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court violated due process and imposed a sentence
contrary to law in violation of R.C. 2953.08 by imposing
mandatory postrelease control of one to three years when R.C.
2967.28 only authorized discretionary postrelease control of up to
two years.
First Assignment of Error
{¶17} Small argues that the additional finding that the jurors made on the
first count in the indictment was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
-6-
Case No. 8-26-05
Legal Standard
{¶18} “A manifest-weight analysis examines whether the State has carried
its burden of persuasion at trial.” State v. Carroll, 2024-Ohio-1626, ¶ 58 (3d Dist.).
On review, “an appellate court’s function . . . is to determine whether the greater
amount of credible evidence supports the verdict.” State v. Harvey, 2020-Ohio-329,
¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, ¶ 73 (3d Dist.).
Appellate courts “must review the entire record, weigh the evidence
and all of the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of
witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the factfinder ‘clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed
and a new trial ordered.’”
State v. Schmidt, 2026-Ohio-2678, ¶ 38 (3d Dist.), quoting Plott at ¶ 73, quoting
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387 (1997).
{¶19} The State can establish a conviction for endangering children in
violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) by proving that the defendant “is the parent . . . of a
child under eighteen years of age” and “create[d] a substantial risk to the health or
safety of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection, or support.” If the State
proves that the violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) “result[ed] in serious physical harm to
the child involved,” the offense is elevated from a first-degree misdemeanor to a
third-degree felony. R.C. 2919.22(E)(2)(c).
{¶20} In turn, the Ohio Revised Code defines “serious physical harm” as
including the following:
-7-
Case No. 8-26-05
(a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as would normally
require hospitalization or prolonged psychiatric treatment;
(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;
(c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity,
whether partial or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial
incapacity;
(d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement
or that involves some temporary, serious disfigurement;
(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to
result in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged
or intractable pain.
R.C. 2901.01(A)(5). “The degree of harm that rises to level of ‘serious’ physical
harm is not an exact science, particularly when the definition includes such terms as
‘substantial,’ ‘temporary,’ ‘acute,’ and ‘prolonged.’” State v. Irwin, 2007-Ohio-
4996, ¶ 37 (7th Dist.). For this reason, “[t]he extent or degree of a victim’s injuries
is ‘normally a matter of the weight rather than the sufficiency of the evidence.’”
State v. Sanabria, 2019-Ohio-2869, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Rogers, 2018-
Ohio-3495, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).
Legal Analysis
{¶21} On appeal, Small argues that the serious-physical-harm finding made
by the jury was against the manifest weight of the evidence. At trial, the State
introduced medical records that indicated that Q. was treated in November of 2024
for “severe malnutrition” and was “[a]t risk for refeeding syndrome.” (Ex. G, 210).
-8-
Case No. 8-26-05
Dr. Christian testified that refeeding syndrome arises when a person experiences an
increase in caloric intake after a “prolonged period” of malnutrition. (Tr. 205).
{¶22} Dr. Christian explained that, after a prolonged period of malnutrition,
a person enters “a starvation mode” in which the body begins to use its “muscle and
fat” as its source of nutrition. (Tr. 205). If a person in this condition rapidly
reintroduces adequate nutrition into his or her system, the body can shift nutrients
at a cellular level.
{¶23} In turn, this shift can lead to a drop in a person’s magnesium,
potassium, and phosphorous levels that is so severe that the person can experience
“respiratory issues, heart issues, heart failure,” and seizures. (Tr. 205). Dr.
Christian underscored the seriousness of this condition by emphasizing that these
assorted complications “ultimately can lead to death.” (Tr. 205).
{¶24} The tests performed on Q. indicated that she had low potassium, low
phosphorus, and a low heart rate. As a result, Q. was admitted to the hospital for
eight days so that her heart rate, potassium levels, phosphorous levels, and
magnesium levels could be monitored while she was given nutrients. Dr. Christian
testified that these interventions were undertaken to avert the complications that
could come if she progressed into refeeding syndrome.
{¶25} Dr. Christian’s testimony indicated that Q.’s condition was the result
of a prolonged period of malnutrition. See State v. Snyder, 2025-Ohio-4444, ¶ 223
(1st Dist.). She then explained that her use of the word “prolonged” or “chronic” in
-9-
Case No. 8-26-05
this context would refer to a period that was longer than “a month.” (Tr. 244). In
addition to the lab results, she stated that Q. had reached the point of being
“cachectic,” having “low muscle tone, no body fat.” (Tr. 209). She indicated Q.
was “severely underweight” and was not merely thin or small. (Tr. 215).
{¶26} According to Dr. Christian, Q.’s medical history indicated that her
condition was not the result of an underlying medical condition. In particular, she
pointed to Q.’s growth chart to explain this conclusion. Q.’s medical records
indicate that she was at the 21st percentile for her weight in February of 2022; the
27th percentile in November of 2022; the 24th percentile in February of 2023; and
the 6th percentile in November of 2024.1
{¶27} Dr. Christian stated that Q. had been following her growth curve
before she took a sharp drop in 2024 at the age of four. She stated that Q.’s medical
history and subsequent medical examinations contained no indication of an
underlying medical condition that would result in rapid weight loss or
malnourishment. She also noted that Q.’s situation reversed once she was receiving
adequate nutrition. See State v. Fitzgerald, 2017-Ohio-2717, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.).
{¶28} As Q. was showing visible signs of malnutrition, Terri testified that
Q.’s sister, J., did not exhibit these same symptoms and did not need medical
attention at the hospital. She testified that, while she was estranged from Small
1
These figures are rounded to the nearest whole number.
-10-
Case No. 8-26-05
between August and November of 2024, she saw J. on one occasion but was not
permitted to see Q. because “she was in trouble.” (Tr. 119).
{¶29} Similarly, Terri testified that, on November 13, 2024, Q. was unable
to turn the faucet, even though she had been able to perform this task three months
earlier. She also noticed that Q. was tired and lethargic where she had typically
been active. Dr. Christian testified that the large meal that Q. ate at Terri’s house
could have pushed her towards refeeding syndrome and that this would not have
happened if Q. had been receiving adequate nutrition.
{¶30} On cross-examination, Dr. Christian indicated that, while she
concluded that Q.’s condition was consistent with abuse, she could not rule out all
other possible alternative causes. However, she also indicated that her conclusions
were within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. She also acknowledged that
Q. was only four at the time of her statements but noted that she was able to speak
clearly for a child.
{¶31} Dr. Christian also admitted that, while she could give an opinion as to
whether a child had suffered from abuse, she could not identify who caused the
injuries from a medical examination. On this point, the State introduced a recording
from Deputy Martz’s body camera in which Small can be heard saying that the
children had been in her care. Terri also testified that the Q. and J. had been in the
care of Small in the relevant timeframe.
-11-
Case No. 8-26-05
{¶32} In summary, the evidence presented in this case established that a
prolonged period of malnutrition put Q.’s body into “a starvation mode” and caused
several adverse side effects. (Tr. 205). While more than one of the conditions that
are listed in R.C. 2901.01(A)(5) may be applicable in this case, a rational trier of
fact could, at a minimum, find that this prolonged period of malnutrition constituted
“physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result in substantial
suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain.” R.C.
2901.01(A)(5)(e). See Snyder, 2025-Ohio-4444, ¶ 214 (1st Dist.) (finding the
symptoms associated with starvation constitute serious physical harm under R.C.
2901.01(A)(5)); Fitzgerald, 2017-Ohio-2717, at ¶ 24 (12th Dist.). Further, the
record contains no indication that the jury lost its way and made a serious-physical-
harm finding that was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly,
the first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶33} Small argued that the judgment entry improperly ordered a mandatory
period of post-release control.
Standard of Review
{¶34} “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) establishes the scope of appellate review for
felony sentences.” State v. Morgan, 2024-Ohio-625, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.). Under this
provision, an appellate court has the authority to increase, reduce, or modify a
sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds that the sentence is contrary to law.
-12-
Case No. 8-26-05
State v. Brill, 2023-Ohio-404, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). “Clear and convincing evidence is that
measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a
firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.” Cross v.
Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477 (1954). As used in this statute, “contrary to law”
means “in violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.” State v. Bryant,
2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 22, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990).
Legal Standard
{¶35} “‘Post-release control’ involves a period of supervision by the Adult
Parole Authority after an offender’s release from prison that includes one or more
post-release control sanctions imposed under R.C. 2967.28.” State v. Collins, 2018-
Ohio-4760, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). At sentencing, “[t]he trial court must advise the offender
at the sentencing hearing of the term of supervision, whether postrelease control is
discretionary or mandatory, and the consequences of violating postrelease control.”
State v. Bates, 2022-Ohio-475, ¶ 11.
{¶36} Post-release control can be mandatory or discretionary depending on
the nature and degree of the offense. State v. Manzi, 2023-Ohio-732, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.).
Where a person is convicted of a sex offense or an offense of violence that is a third-
degree felony, post-release control is generally going to be mandatory. R.C.
2967.28(B)(1), (4). Otherwise, post-release control for a third-degree felony will
generally be discretionary and could last for a period of “up to two years.” R.C.
2967.28(C).
-13-
Case No. 8-26-05
{¶37} Crim.R. 36 provides that “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or
other parts of the record . . . may be corrected by the court at any time.” A trial
court may issue a nunc pro tunc entry to rectify a clerical mistake. State v. Newsome,
2025-Ohio-3102, ¶ 9 (6th Dist.). “Nunc pro tunc entries cannot be used to
resentence a defendant or to impose a sanction on a defendant that was not imposed
as part of the sentencing hearing.” Id. Rather, “[a] nunc pro tunc entry is permitted
to correct the record to accurately reflect what happened in a hearing when a
judgment entry is inaccurate.” State v. Brown, 2019-Ohio-1696, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.).
Legal Analysis
{¶38} In this case, Small was convicted of endangering children in violation
of R.C. 2919.22(A). On appeal, she points out that this third-degree felony is not
classified as an offense of violence in R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(a) and that the imposition
of post-release control should, therefore, be discretionary in this case pursuant to
R.C. 2967.28(C). However, the judgment entry of sentencing employs mandatory
language, stating that she “will be subject to up to three years, but not less than one
year of Post-Release Control.” (Emphasis added.) (Doc. 176).
{¶39} In response, the State concedes that the judgement entry of sentencing
incorrectly states that Small will have to serve one to three years on post-release
control. The State also points out that the trial court provided the correct notification
at the sentencing hearing, stating that Small “may” be placed on post-release control
for “up to two years. . . .” (Mar. 31 Tr. 13).
-14-
Case No. 8-26-05
{¶40} The language in the judgment entry that imposes a mandatory period
of post-release control is erroneous. For this reason, this portion of Small’s sentence
is reversed. Since the trial court gave a correct post-release control notification at
sentencing, the erroneous statement in the judgment entry can be cured with a nunc
pro tunc entry. See Newsome, 2025-Ohio-3102, at ¶ 11 (6th Dist.). Accordingly,
the second assignment of error is sustained.
Conclusion
{¶41} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued in the first assignment of error, the judgment of the Logan
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed as to these issues.
{¶42} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued in the second assignment of error, the judgment of the Logan
County Court of Common Pleas is reversed as to these issues.
{¶43} This cause of action is hereby remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment Affirmed in Part
Reversed in Part
And Cause Remanded
MILLER and WALDICK, J.J., concur.
-15-
Case No. 8-26-05
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, it is the judgment and
order of this Court that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed
in part with costs assessed equally between Appellant and Appellee for which
judgment is hereby rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings and for execution of the judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
John R. Willamowski, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
DATED:
/hls
-16-