State v. Aldemur

[Cite as State v. Aldemur, 2026-Ohio-3628.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115677 v. : MOHAMAD ALDEMUR, : Defendant-Appellant. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 17, 2026 Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-694938-A Appearances: Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Patrick J. Lipaj, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Jaye M. Schlachet and Eric M. Levy, for appellant. EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.: Defendant-appellant Mohamad Aldemur (“Aldemur”) appeals his convictions for strangulation and other charges. He raises the following errors: Assignment of Error No. 1 The trial court erred and violated [Aldemur’s] due process rights by failing to conduct a competency hearing after ordering an evaluation and where the record contains no evidence that a competency report was completed or considered. Assignment of Error No. 2 The trial court erred in permitting an eight-year-old child, [Daughter], to testify without conducting a voir dire examination or in camera interview to determine her competency to testify as required by Evid.R. 601(A). Assignment of Error No. 3 The trial court erred to the prejudice of [Aldemur] by permitting the State to use a doll as demonstrative evidence which was highly prejudicial and inflammatory. Assignment of Error No. 4 [Aldemur] was denied a fair trial and due process due to the State’s failure to provide material exculpatory evidence including video of the alleged victim striking [Aldemur] and verification of photographic evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. Assignment of Error No. 5 The trial court erred in failing to merge allied offenses of similar import for purposes of sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2941.25. Assignment of Error No. 6 The evidence was insufficient to support the convictions as a matter of law. Assignment of Error No. 7 The convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.  Assignment of Error No. 8 The trial court erred in issuing a nunc pro tunc entry imposing full court costs contrary to the oral pronouncement at sentencing waiving half the costs. Assignment of Error No. 9 The trial court erred when it denied [Aldemur’s] motion to represent himself pro se. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate the sentences for Counts 6, 7, 9, and 10, and remand for resentencing and correction of the sentencing entry. I. Factual and Procedural History In September 2024, a grand jury convened and issued a 12-count indictment against Aldemur. Counts 1 through 5 and 12 listed Aldemur’s wife (“Wife”) as the alleged victim and charged felonious assault, a felony of the second degree (Count 1); two counts of strangulation as felonies of the third and fourth degree (Counts 2 and 3); and three counts of domestic violence with a prior conviction, two felonies of the fourth degree and one misdemeanor of the second degree (Counts 4, 5, and 12). Counts 6, 7, 9, and 10 listed the couple’s daughter (“Daughter”) as the victim and included two counts of domestic violence, felonies of the fourth degree with a prior conviction (Counts 6 and 9), and two counts of endangering children, misdemeanors of the first degree (Counts 7 and 10). Counts 8 and 11 involved a family member (“Family Member”) and the couple’s son (“Son”) and charged Aldemur with domestic violence with a prior conviction, a felony of the fourth degree (Count 8), and endangering children, a misdemeanor of the first degree (Count 11). Initially, Aldemur was represented by retained counsel. However, he became dissatisfied with his lawyer’s representation and filed a pro se motion to disqualify counsel. Retained counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw. At a hearing on the matter, retained counsel alleged that there was “an increasing tendency on [Aldemur’s] part to distrust me, to not believe things that I’m telling him.” Additionally, retained counsel relayed that he and Aldemur had constant arguments about how to proceed with the case. Counsel also notified the trial court that Aldemur wished to represent himself. The trial court addressed Aldemur directly, presented him with a waiver-of-counsel form, and proceeded to review its contents. However, the trial court stopped its colloquy when it appeared that Aldemur was not paying attention. This led the court to question his “mental capacity” for self-representation. The court held the decision in abeyance and ordered an evaluation at the court’s psychiatric clinic to determine whether Aldemur was competent to represent himself. Towards the end of the hearing, the trial court noted that Aldemur was making facial expressions and gave a “disrespectful gesture.” The trial court advised that this behavior might be taken into consideration when deciding whether to allow Aldemur to represent himself. Subsequently, the trial court conducted a pretrial hearing addressing the report from the court’s psychiatric clinic. The report stated that they were unable to complete the evaluation because the clinic refused to allow Aldemur to record the session and Aldemur refused to answer the evaluator’s questions. Aldemur claimed that he was willing to cooperate with the evaluation of his competency to represent himself but that he refused to answer the remaining questions, which addressed his competency to stand trial. The court denied Aldemur’s request to represent himself noting that it must consider whether self-representation would unnecessarily disrupt the proceedings and that thus far Aldemur had not demonstrated an ability to cooperate with the court’s directives. Finally, the trial court granted retained counsel’s motion to withdraw and appointed the public defender’s office to represent Aldemur. At a subsequent pretrial, Aldemur’s two public defenders represented that there was no longer a need for a competency evaluation because Aldemur no longer wished to proceed pro se. Thereafter, Aldemur filed two pro se motions: a motion to reinstate his bond, which had been revoked because of GPS violations, and a motion to dismiss the case because his right to a speedy trial had been violated. A few months later, Aldemur’s public defenders filed a motion to withdraw from the case. Aldemur subsequently filed a pro se motion to disqualify counsel, alleging that counsel had agreed to continuances against his wishes and refused to file motions he requested. At a subsequent hearing on the matter, the public defenders represented that there was a breakdown in communication, Aldemur had “fired” them, and they did not think it was ethical to continue to represent him. The trial court explained to Aldemur that prior to allowing him to represent himself, the court needed to ensure the decision was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Aldemur addressed the court and accused the judge of presiding over a civil matter in which he was involved. Aldemur claimed that this presented a conflict of interest. He further alleged that there were discrepancies in the docket and “disappearing” transcripts. He also claimed that he complied with the advice of counsel to appease the court although he disagreed with his counsel’s recommendations. Finally, Aldemur asked the trial court judge to “step down” from the case because of the alleged conflict of interest. The court disagreed that it presided over any civil matter involving Aldemur but agreed to check its records. The trial court stated it would require an evaluation by the court’s psychiatric clinic before proceeding further, noting that there were perils to self-representation, that Aldemur continued to “over talk” and interrupt the court, and the court had no faith or confidence that Aldemur was making a voluntary and intelligent decision to waive counsel. Ultimately, the trial court granted the public defenders’ motion to withdraw and appointed new counsel. Thereafter, Aldemur’s newly appointed counsel moved to withdraw from the case citing Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(b)(9), a catchall provision, which allows withdrawal if “other good cause” exists. The trial court granted the motion and appointed another lawyer (“trial counsel”) to handle the case, who represented Aldemur throughout the remaining proceedings.  Later that month, Aldemur appeared with trial counsel. The trial court addressed several pretrial motions, including a new motion filed by Aldemur to represent himself, pro se. Trial counsel alleged that Aldemur still wished to represent himself with trial counsel acting as standby. The court then provided Aldemur with a waiver-of-counsel form and proceeded to review its contents on the record. According to the transcripts, the trial court stopped speaking midsentence and Aldemur’s counsel issued an apology. Subsequently, Aldemur apologized and was unable to answer when the trial court asked him to repeat the last thing he heard the trial court say prior to the interruption. Aldemur told the trial court that his desire for self-representation was spurred by the belief it would allow him to be released from jail and quicken the proceedings. The trial court noted that its ruling would have no impact on whether Aldemur remained in jail. The trial court called a recess to allow Aldemur to review the waiver of counsel and consider his decision. On returning to the record, the trial court asked Aldemur if he had any questions. Aldemur indicated that he did not have questions, but he would not sign the waiver form because his speedy trial rights had been violated. The trial court denied Aldemur’s motion to represent himself. The trial was set to commence in September 2025. Prior to calling the jury into the courtroom, the State dismissed Counts 1 and 8, felonious assault of Wife and domestic violence of Family Member. Next, the parties stipulated to the admission of the journal entry of Aldemur’s prior conviction for assault against a family member. Finally, trial counsel claimed that the State failed to provide video evidence of Wife assaulting Aldemur. The State responded that it was not in possession of the original videos; however, they were in Aldemur’s possession and he played them for the police officers, which was noted in the police report. Nevertheless, the State had secured copies of the videos that Aldemur had used in a temporary protection order hearing in a separate civil matter and had provided them to the defense. The court found that trial counsel could address any discrepancies between the video and the police report during testimony. The trial commenced with the State calling Wife as its first witness. Wife testified that in June 2021, Aldemur was convicted of domestic violence after an incident that occurred between them. Wife relayed three additional incidents that occurred in their home in Cleveland. Between December 8, 2023, and December 10, 2023, she was sleeping on the couch with Son when Aldemur began yelling and threw a smoking cigarette on her. When she stood up, carrying Son, Aldemur “hit [her] with his head,” causing a nosebleed. Wife testified that she grabbed the car keys and drove to Aldemur’s parents’ house. During her testimony, the State sought to use a “doll” to allow Wife to demonstrate how Aldemur hit her.1 The trial court allowed the demonstrative evidence over the defense’s objection. After the demonstration, the State referred to Aldemur’s actions as a “headbutt.” Wife and Aldemur later exchanged text messages, which were mostly in Arabic. Wife testified that in the messages, Aldemur 1 During testimony, the props were universally referred to as “dolls.” Later, the trial court described the “dolls” as a “Barbie sized” doll and a life-size mannequin, that emulated the top of the shoulders upwards. initially denied everything. Wife replied that he hit her in the head. Per Wife, Aldemur then admitted that he hit her and told her to call the police. The last line of the text exchange is a message from Aldemur in English that said, “fucking snitch.” The second incident occurred on December 16, 2023, during and after a party at Aldemur’s parents’ home. Wife relayed that Aldemur became angry and accused Wife of hitting Son during the party. Wife testified that Son was playing with one of his cousins when the cousin accidently hit Son in the mouth. Wife called her sister-in-law who confirmed Wife’s version of events. Aldemur then began blaming Daughter, told her she was not a good sister, and threw his shoes at her. Daughter began crying and went to her room. Wife followed Daughter and tried to calm her down. Aldemur then came to Daughter’s room to get Wife. When Wife refused, Aldemur grabbed her hand and Daughter began crying and yelling. Aldemur responded by slapping Daughter’s face. Wife then tried to run out of the front door but Aldemur grabbed her and pulled her by her hair. Wife asked if she could demonstrate what happened using the doll. The defense objected, and the trial court overruled the objection. Using the doll to demonstrate, Wife testified that Aldemur pulled her hair and brought her down to the floor. Wife’s back was on the floor, her neck was on the coffee table, “and he grabbed my hand to our room.” Wife testified that Aldemur grabbed her forcefully and she had bruises for two weeks. The State introduced pictures of Wife’s arm that she took approximately four days after the incident. The pictures displayed yellow and black bruising on the inside of her wrist to mid forearm. Wife then alleged that Aldemur tried to rape her the morning after the party. He put her on their bed, tried to take off her clothes, and hit her back with his elbow. She tried to move and open a nearby window to call for help, but Aldemur pulled her back and began to “choke” her. She testified that he used both hands and applied a lot of pressure to her neck. Wife began yelling and screaming. Aldemur placed a pillow and blanket over her head and sat on top of her. She could not see anything, everything went black, and she could not breathe or move because he had all of his weight on her. Wife testified that Daughter began yelling and screaming, causing Aldemur to get up and tell Daughter to stop. Around the same time, Aldemur’s sister arrived at their home because Daughter called Aldemur’s sister during the incident. Wife testified that she wanted to leave the house with her sister- in-law, but Aldemur forbade it. Aldemur then became angry again, pulled Wife’s hand, started to kick her in her back, and “kicked” her, Daughter, and his sister out of the house. Wife testified that she sustained a scratch on her neck and visible redness during the incident. Wife was permitted to demonstrate the assault with a “doll.” Afterwards, Wife explained that Aldemur’s father arranged for Wife and the children to fly to Jordan right before Christmas. While in Jordan, Wife had surgery on her nose because she could not breathe, and it was “big, swollen, and bloody.” While still recovering from the surgery, she participated in a video conference with staff from Cuyahoga Community College (“Tri-C”) where she was taking classes and told them what happened to her. Wife remained in Jordan until May 2024. Wife elected to come back to the U.S. because Aldemur told her family that he wanted a last chance to make things work. When Wife and the children returned to the U.S., her mother came with her. The final incident occurred in June 2024. Wife testified that Aldemur became angry when Wife was driving an untitled vehicle, got caught in traffic, and was unable to immediately follow behind him on the way to their home. Aldemur claimed that she had deliberately lost him because she wanted him to go to jail. The couple then began arguing about whether Aldemur could take the children out to eat without Wife. Aldemur refused to allow Wife to come, and Wife refused to allow the children to go without her. Wife claimed that Aldemur had taken their passports and threatened to take the children from Wife and leave the country. Wife stated Aldemur yelled, threatened to kill her, pushed her hand, and held her nose when she refused to allow the children to accompany him. Wife believed the threat because Aldemur had pointed a gun at her head many times. Additionally, the day she came back to the U.S. he told her he would kill her the same way an Arabic man in the news had done. When Aldemur began to make threats, Daughter went to get Wife’s mother. Wife testified that when Daughter returned with her mother, her mother began talking to Aldemur and he responded by stating, “I will kill your daughter. I will kill your brother. I will make you cry in your entire life.” Wife took her phone, left the house, and called the police. Wife later learned that after she left the house, Aldemur pushed her mother and hit Daughter. She observed a bruise on her mother’s chest and a bruise on Daughter’s leg. She took pictures of Daughter’s leg the next day. Near the end of Wife’s testimony, Aldemur made an outburst claiming that Wife’s mother harmed Son and the incident was “on camera.” The trial court urged the State to continue, but the State had no further questions. Trial counsel apologized on behalf of Aldemur. On cross-examination, trial counsel explored potential bias asking whether Wife’s testimony was motivated by anger that Aldemur had a girlfriend. Wife responded that this was not his first girlfriend and that she did not like it. Wife also agreed that some aspects of her testimony did not appear in the police report, like her allegation of rape. After Wife concluded her testimony, the trial court allowed the defense to make a record of its objection to the use of dolls to demonstrate the alleged assaults. The defense argued that Wife spoke decent English and the dolls were an overdramatization of the events. The State countered that English was not Wife’s first language and using the dolls clarified what happened. The trial court described the “dolls” for the record and again noted that the defense objection was overruled. After a recess and during an on-the-record discussion with counsel prior to Aldemur entering the courtroom, the trial court noted that Aldemur was doodling rather than taking notes, had an outburst “or two,” and appeared to be more animated and argumentative with his lawyer. The court pointed out that these actions raised a safety concern, and the court took certain precautions in response. Trial counsel noted that Aldemur “seemed okay” in comparison to a prior incident where Aldemur was “dragged” out of the courtroom, but agreed that Aldemur was “very argumentative” with him and that Aldemur had an outburst with him during the recess. Next, the State called Cleveland Police Officers Ashley Robinson (“Officer Robinson”) and William McConnell (“Officer McConnell”). They responded to Wife’s 9-1-1 call on June 13, 2024. Per department policy, they kept the parties separated, and Officer Robinson spoke to Wife while Officer McConnell spoke to Aldemur. Officer Robinson testified that Wife was upset and “not really angry” but seemed like she was “going to cry.” On cross-examination, Officer Robinson agreed that the police report for the incident did not mention a rape. Officer McConnell testified that they were unable to determine the primary aggressor in the incident because both parties alleged physical violence and threats against the other. Officer McConnell stated that Aldemur showed him a video that Officer McConnell initially believed was Wife assaulting Aldemur. On redirect, the State showed Officer McConnell a video of the alleged incident. Officer McConnell identified the woman in the video as Wife’s mother and identified the video as the one Aldemur played for him at the crime scene. He also testified that only one of the videos Aldemur showed him was of an assault.  Two employees from Tri-C testified that they interacted with Wife numerous times during her enrollment at the college. They both testified regarding an online meeting with Wife in January 2024, which was held to assist her to enroll in classes when she came back to the U.S. Both noticed that she had bandages on her nose during the call. Each witness had little to no contact with Aldemur and the only information they had about Aldemur and Wife’s relationship came from their discussions with Wife. Daughter also testified. However, the trial court did not conduct a voir dire examination of the child before allowing her to testify. Daughter was sworn in, and the defense did not object to her testimony. The State asked Daughter to recite her parents’ names. Daughter testified that she did not know how to say her father’s name in English. Aldemur then burst out, “Brain washed, brain washed.” The trial court admonished him to stop and informed him that if there were any more outbursts, the trial court would find that Aldemur voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings and would have him removed. When she resumed testifying, Daughter could remember talking to the police but not the subject of their conversation. She did however remember a time when her mother was screaming. She, her brother, and cousin were playing at a family member’s house when the cousin bumped into her brother. After they got home, Daughter heard Wife screaming. She saw Aldemur “dragging” Wife to the bedroom and saw Aldemur put a pillow on Wife’s head and cover her with a blanket. She knew Wife was in danger when she stopped hearing Wife scream. Daughter then yelled at Aldemur who slapped her in the face. Afterward, Daughter called Aldemur’s sister, who came over and got them away from the house. Daughter also recalled how her leg became bruised. Aldemur asked Daughter for Wife’s phone. He repeatedly asked Daughter to tell him the passcode, and she repeatedly told him that she did not know the passcode. In response, he hit her on the leg and she felt “sharp” pains. Cleveland Police Detective Sam Ortiz (“Det. Ortiz”) was assigned to the case after the June 13, 2024 incident. He reviewed body-camera footage and could hear the audio from the video Aldemur played for the on-scene officers, which depicted the alleged assault between Aldemur and Wife’s mother. He eventually watched the video and identified the person in the video as Wife’s mother, not Wife. On cross-examination, Det. Ortiz acknowledged that Wife did not call the police after the alleged incidents in December 2023. The State rested subject to the admission of exhibits. The defense objected to admission of some of the State’s exhibits claiming they were duplicative but did not challenge the authenticity of any pictures. The defense moved for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29, as to all counts. The trial court granted the motion with respect to Count 11, endangering children involving Son, and denied the motion for the remaining charges. Aldemur elected to testify on his own behalf. Aldemur testified that the December 2023 incidents did not occur. Wife wanted to go back to Jordan but he opposed it. He alleged that Wife abducted the children and went to Jordan, anyway. He begged her to come back, which she did in May 2024. When they returned, Aldemur alleged that he planned to take the whole family to Disneyland, which is why he took everyone’s passports. Throughout his testimony, Aldemur alleged that Wife and her mother were plotting to put him in jail. He claimed that Wife had done it before, stating that “whenever she doesn’t like something that I don’t do, she goes to the police and puts me in jail.” He also mentioned that he had several recordings to support his testimony; however, none were introduced. Aldemur testified that the first time Wife called the police, he was planning a trip to Florida with his friends. Wife was pregnant with Son at the time; therefore, she could not go and did not want Aldemur to go. Aldemur went on the trip anyway without telling Wife that he was leaving. Aldemur later clarified that there was one altercation between him and Wife in December 2023. He claimed to have called the police because Wife tried to attack him with a knife and broke his car window in front of 13 witnesses. He also relayed an incident where Wife allegedly punched Son in the mouth and alleged that the incident was captured on cameras at his brother’s house. When asked to explain the photos of Wife’s injuries, Aldemur claimed that they were old pictures related to the 2021 case. Regarding the June 2024 incident, Aldemur agreed that he had told Daughter he wanted to take them to a restaurant. However, he alleged the argument occurred because Wife wanted their passports back, but he refused to give them to her because he had not seen his children in two years. After his refusal, Aldemur alleged that both Wife and her mother began to attack him. They smacked him and spat on him and told him they were going to put him in jail like they had two years prior. Ultimately, Aldemur denied ever assaulting Wife or Daughter. On cross-examination, Aldemur admitted that he accepted a plea deal for assaulting Wife in 2021, but claimed that he “admitted it just to get it over with.” When asked about the video the State introduced from June 2024, Aldemur claimed that it was not the same video that he originally showed to police. To explain the inconsistences between his testimony and Officer McConnell’s testimony, Aldemur claimed that the officer was not lying when he testified he only saw one assault video, but rather Officer McConnell did not remember the video displaying Wife assaulting him. After the conclusion of Aldemur’s testimony, the defense rested its case and renewed its Crim.R. 29 motion. The trial court denied the motion. The jury found Aldemur guilty on all remaining charges. Prior to sentencing, the defense made an oral motion for the court to merge charges involving the same victim for the same incident. The trial court did not rule on the motion and did not merge the offenses. The trial court sentenced Aldemur as follows: 30 months on Count 2, strangulation; 17 months on Count 3, strangulation; 17 months on Count 4, domestic violence; 17 months on Count 5, domestic violence; 17 months on Count 6, domestic violence; 30 days on Count 7, endangering children; 17 months on Count 9, domestic violence; 30 days on Count 10, endangering children; and 30 days on Count 12, domestic violence. The court ran Counts 2 through 5 concurrently with one another, and Counts 6, 7, 9, 10, and 12 were also run concurrently with one another, but consecutively to Counts 2 through 5. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 47 months in prison. The defense requested that the court waive all fines and costs. The trial court agreed to waive all “fines and fees” but required Aldemur to pay “one half” of the court costs. In its October 8, 2025 sentencing entry, the court waived the fines, required Aldemur to pay “only half of costs and fees,” and entered judgment against Aldemur “in an amount equal to the costs of this prosecution.” Aldemur filed a notice of appeal. Subsequently, the trial court filed a nunc pro tunc entry, which corrected an omission in the appearances. Aldemur filed a second notice of appeal after that entry. II. Law and Analysis For ease of analysis, we will address the assignments of error out of order and/or in combination. A. Competency and the Right to Waive Counsel In his first and ninth assignments of error, Aldemur challenges the trial court’s decision denying his right to self-representation and failing to hold a hearing on his competency to stand trial. Because there are aspects of these claims that overlap, we will consider them together. In the instant case, both Aldemur’s competence to stand trial and his competence to waive counsel were addressed by the trial court. Incompetency is a defendant’s “inability to understand ‘the nature and objective of the proceedings against him [or her] or of presently assisting in his [or her] defense.’” State v. Lynch, 2025-Ohio-2769, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), quoting R.C. 2945.37(A) and citing State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 110 (1986). There is a rebuttable presumption that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial. Id. citing State v. Barton, 2006-Ohio-1324, ¶ 56. The trial court, the prosecution, or the defense may raise the defendant’s competency at any time. R.C. 2945.37(B). Moreover, when a defendant whose competency is questioned requests to waive counsel, the trial court must determine whether the defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel. State v. Cedeno, 2015-Ohio-5412, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Watson, 132 Ohio App.3d 57, 63 (8th Dist. 1998), citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-402 (1993). “[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his [or her] right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself [or herself].” Godinez at 399. Competence to waive the right to counsel requires similar considerations necessary for competence to stand trial. State v. Jordan, 2004- Ohio-783, ¶ 27. Thus, the court must determine “whether a defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his [or her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has a ‘rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him [or her].’” Id., quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). If deemed competent, a defendant may waive the right to counsel if the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Degenero, 2016-Ohio-8514, ¶ 13 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366, 377-378 (1976). Here, the trial court requested a competency evaluation twice in response to Aldemur’s request to waive his right to counsel. However, the court did not hold a hearing on the issue. Accordingly, we begin with an evaluation of the trial court’s failure to hold a competency hearing for Aldemur’s competence to stand trial. Preliminary, we note that the trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing was error. R.C. 2945.37(B) provides that “[i]n in a criminal action in a court of common pleas, a county court, or a municipal court, the court, prosecutor, or defense may raise the issue of the defendant’s competence to stand trial.” When the issue is raised before trial, “the court shall hold a hearing on the issue as provided in this section.” Id. The General Assembly’s use of “shall” imposes a mandatory duty. Thus, the relevant threshold question is whether Aldemur’s competency to stand trial was raised before trial. Aldemur’s mental capacity was questioned by the trial court when addressing his request to represent himself. The court stopped its waiver-of-counsel colloquy and ordered an evaluation through the court psychiatric clinic. Aldemur’s competency was not determined because the evaluation was not completed. According to the trial record, the clinic refused to permit Aldemur to record the evaluation, and Aldemur refused to answer certain questions, including questions concerning his competency to stand trial. Later, when Aldemur again sought to represent himself the trial court stated that it would require another psychiatric evaluation before proceeding. Consequently, once competency to stand trial was raised, R.C. 2945.37(B) required a hearing despite defense counsel’s subsequent representation that a competency evaluation was no longer necessary. Competency to stand trial and the right to waive counsel are related but distinct trial court inquiries. Defendants are competent to stand trial when they possess sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and possess a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against them. State v. Jordan, 2004-Ohio-783, ¶ 27, citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). By contrast, once a competent defendant seeks to waive counsel, the court must separately determine whether that wavier is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-400 (1993). The withdrawal of Aldemur’s request for self-representation did not eliminate the competency-to-stand-trial issue that was raised by the trial court. Nevertheless, a trial court’s failure to hold a competency hearing is harmless error unless the reviewing court finds sufficient indicia of incompetency in the trial record. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d at 111. This court must consider evidence of both the defendant’s competence and incompetence to determine whether the failure to hold a hearing was harmless error. State v. Mills, 2023-Ohio-4716, ¶ 21. While Aldemur was clearly disruptive and transitioned through several attorneys, none of those attorneys raised any alleged incompetence to stand trial. Rather, they alleged that Aldemur distrusted them and disagreed with their trial strategy and decisions made on his behalf. Aldemur also alleged that he followed the advice of counsel even when he disagreed with that advice because his lawyers told him it would appease the trial court. This suggests that Aldemur was capable of receiving the advice of counsel and making a rational decision to follow it even when he disagreed with that advice. Notably, Aldemur’s conduct at trial was not indicative of incompetence. While Aldemur disrupted the trial more than once, his outbursts were directed towards specific testimony, suggesting that Daughter was brainwashed or that Wife or her mother had assaulted Son. Additionally, when the trial court warned Aldemur that he would be removed from the courtroom if there were any more disruptions, the outbursts ceased. Moreover, Aldemur points to his claims that the trial judge presided over a civil case as indicia of incompetence. Aldemur alleged that the trial judge signed something in his civil case. The trial court did not deny any involvement in such a case but indicated it was unaware of any involvement and would investigate the claim. This issue was never revisited on the record. Finally, Aldemur referred to one set of lawyers as “public pretenders” who were “more of the prosecutor’s lawyers than they are mine or your lawyers.” Aldemur argues that these statements were signs of his inability to understand the roles of the lawyers. We disagree. When viewed in context, these statements explained Aldemur’s dissatisfaction with his lawyers, not confusion regarding their specific roles.  Since our review of the record reveals that there are indicia of Aldemur’s competence and no indicia of incompetency to stand trial, the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing was harmless error. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled. Now, we turn to the question of whether Aldemur’s decision to waive his right to counsel was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The right to self-representation is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. State v. Orr, 2014-Ohio-4814, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366, at paragraph one of the syllabus, citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942) (the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel includes a “correlative right to dispense with a lawyer’s help”). “‘If a trial court denies the right to self-representation, when properly invoked, the denial is per se reversible error.’” State v. Marshall, 2010-Ohio-1958, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Cassano, 2002-Ohio-3751, ¶ 32; State v. Parks, 2026-Ohio-1253, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.) (“If a trial court denies the right of self-representation, when properly invoked, such error constitutes a structural error, which is per se reversible.”). Although an important hallmark of the criminal justice system, “[t]he right of self-representation is not absolute.” Orr at ¶ 8, citing Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171 (2008). Trial courts must “indulge in every reasonable presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right such as the right to be represented by counsel.” Id., citing State v. Dyer, 117 Ohio App.3d 92, 95 (2d Dist. 1996). We review the trial court’s pretrial decision regarding a timely waiver of the right to counsel de novo. State v. Newman, 2020-Ohio-5087, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.); Parks at ¶ 22 (“Generally, appellate courts conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s denial of a request for self-representation asserted prior to the commencement of trial, whereas the request made after trial commences is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”). A defendant’s assertion of the right to self-representation must be timely, clear, and unequivocal. State v. Thomas, 2024-Ohio-3387, ¶ 30 (5th Dist.); State v. Townsend, 2019-Ohio-1134, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), citing Cassano at ¶ 38. Further guidance is provided in the Ohio Criminal Rules. Crim.R. 44(A) provides: Where a defendant charged with a serious offense is unable to obtain counsel, counsel shall be assigned to represent the defendant at every stage of the proceedings from their initial appearance before a court through appeal as of right, unless the defendant, after being fully advised of their right to assigned counsel, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives their right to counsel. When addressing the defendant, a trial court must demonstrate substantial compliance with Crim.R. 44(A) by engaging in sufficient inquiry with the defendant to determine whether the defendant fully understands and is intelligently relinquishing his right to counsel. State v. West, 2017-Ohio-7521, ¶ 47 (2d Dist.). The “‘judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand.’” West at id, quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724 (19