State v. Lynch
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket26 MA 0055
JudgeDickey
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Lynch, 2026-Ohio-4558.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MAHONING COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RANDY J. LYNCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 26 MA 0055
Criminal Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio
Case No. 2012 CR 01098
BEFORE:
Katelyn Dickey, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.
JUDGMENT:
Reversed and Remanded.
Atty. Lynn Maro, Mahoning County Prosecutor, Atty. Brian P. Kish and Atty. John B.
Juhasz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for Plaintiff-Appellee and
Atty. Thomas E. Lyden, James E. Lanzo LLC, for Defendant-Appellant.
Dated: November 16, 2026
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DICKEY, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Randy J. Lynch, appeals from the May 4, 2026 judgment of the
Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas denying his application to seal the record of
his 2013 conviction for possession of cocaine without scheduling or holding a hearing.
On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his application without
conducting a hearing as required under R.C. 2953.32(C). Appellee, the State of Ohio,
concedes error. See (9/25/2026 Appellee’s Brief, p. 3) (“The record in this matter does
not indicate that a hearing was held on Appellant’s Application [and] [t]he statute plainly
requires one”). Thus, the trial court’s judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded
for the court to set and conduct a hearing in accordance with R.C. 2953.32(C) and (D)(1)
and to make the statutory determinations on the record before ruling on the application.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} On October 11, 2012, the Mahoning County Grand Jury indicted Appellant
on one count of possession of cocaine, a felony of the fourth degree in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A)(C)(4)(b), with a forfeiture specification under R.C. 2981. Appellant was
appointed counsel, pled not guilty at his arraignment, and waived his right to a speedy
trial. On January 30, 2013, Appellant withdrew his former not guilty plea and pled guilty
to the charge as contained in the indictment.
{¶3} On February 13, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to three years of
community control, to run consecutively with the community control imposed in Case
No. 2011 CR 736, for a total of five years; 500 hours of community service; and a
one-year driver’s license suspension. Appellant was discharged from supervision on
May 25, 2017.
{¶4} On March 5, 2026, Appellant filed an application to seal the record of his
2013 conviction. The State filed a response in opposition on March 17, 2026.
{¶5} On May 4, 2026, without scheduling or holding a hearing, the trial court
denied Appellant’s application in a three-sentence judgment entry: “Defendant Filed a
Motion for Sealing of Records. The State of Ohio objects to said Motion. Upon review of
this matter, the Motion is hereby overruled.” (Emphasis in original). (5/4/2026 Judgment
Entry).
Case No. 26 MA 0055
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{¶6} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and raises a single assignment of
error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DENYING THE
APPELLANT’S APPLICATION FOR SEALING RECORD OF
CONVICTION WITHOUT SCHEDULING OR HOLDING A HEARING AS
REQUIRED BY R.C. 2953.32(C).
{¶7} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
denying his application to seal the record of his 2013 conviction without scheduling or
holding a hearing as required under R.C. 2953.32(C).
{¶8} “Generally, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s disposition of a motion
to seal a record under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Singh, 2020-Ohio-5604,
¶ 11 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Burnside, 2009-Ohio-2653, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.). “But when
questions of law are in dispute, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s determination
de novo.” Id. Because the present question is whether the statute required the trial court
to hold a hearing, it presents a legal question subject to de novo review. State v. W.A.R.,
2024-Ohio-256, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
{¶9} R.C. 2953.32(C) is unambiguous. It provides that “[u]pon the filing of an
application under this section, the court shall set a date for a hearing[,]” and that “[t]he
court shall hold the hearing not less than forty-five days and not more than ninety days
from the date of the filing of the application.” R.C. 2953.32(C). The statute then directs
that “[a]t the hearing held under division (C) of this section, the court shall” make a series
of determinations:
(a) Determine whether the applicant is pursuing sealing or expunging
a conviction of an offense that is prohibited under division (A) of this section
or whether the forfeiture of bail was agreed to by the applicant and the
prosecutor in the case, and determine whether the application was made at
the time specified in division (B)(1)(a) or (b) or division (B)(2)(a) or (b) of this
Case No. 26 MA 0055
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section that is applicable with respect to the application and the subject
offense;
(b) Determine whether criminal proceedings are pending against the
applicant;
(c) Determine whether the applicant has been rehabilitated to the
satisfaction of the court;
(d) If the prosecutor has filed an objection in accordance with division
(C) of this section, consider the reasons against granting the application
specified by the prosecutor in the objection;
(e) If the victim objected, pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, consider
the reasons against granting the application specified by the victim in the
objection;
(f) Weigh the interests of the applicant in having the records
pertaining to the applicant’s conviction or bail forfeiture sealed or expunged
against the legitimate needs, if any, of the government to maintain those
records;
(g) Consider the oral or written statement of any victim, victim’s
representative, and victim’s attorney, if applicable;
(h) If the applicant was an eligible offender of the type described in
division (A)(3) of section 2953.36 of the Revised Code as it existed prior to
April 4, 2023, determine whether the offender has been rehabilitated to a
satisfactory degree. . . .
R.C. 2953.32(D)(1)(a)-(h).
{¶10} The hearing is thus the statutory mechanism through which the trial court
develops the record and makes the findings that any ruling on the application must rest
upon. The Supreme Court of Ohio has described the hearing’s function in precisely these
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terms. A sealing hearing “provides the court with the opportunity to review matters of
record and to make largely subjective determinations” regarding rehabilitation and the
balance of interests, gathering information “from the applicant, the prosecutor, and
through independent court investigation conducted with the aid of probation officials.”
State v. Hamilton, 75 Ohio St.3d 636, 640 (1996). Its “essential purpose” is “to provide a
reviewing court with all relevant information bearing on an applicant’s eligibility[.]” Id.
Most recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed that under R.C. 2953.32(C), “[t]he
trial court is to hold a hearing before deciding whether to grant the application.” State v.
J.B., 2026-Ohio-1405, ¶ 11.
{¶11} Consistent with this statutory command, Ohio appellate courts have held
that the failure to set and hold a hearing before ruling on an application to seal is reversible
error. In State v. Myrick, the Fifth District held that R.C. 2953.32(C) “expressly requires
the trial court to set a hearing[,]” “conduct a hearing on the application, and make the
determinations enumerated in R.C. 2953.32(D)(1)[,]” and that “[o]nly after the trial court
acts in accordance with the statute by setting and conducting a hearing on an application,
and making the requisite statutory determinations and considerations, may the court
render a decision[.]” State v. Myrick, 2025-Ohio-694, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.). The court reversed
and remanded because the trial court had “improperly denied Appellant’s application
‘without first setting a hearing and conducting a hearing in concert with the statutory
requirements.’” (Citation omitted). Id. at ¶ 11, 13. The Eighth District reached the same
conclusion in W.A.R., holding that R.C. 2953.32 “definitively requires the trial court to set
a hearing[,]” “hold a hearing[,]” and “make the determinations enumerated in R.C.
2953.32(D)(1)[,]” such that only after doing so could the court “render a decision on the
motion to seal.” W.A.R., 2024-Ohio-256, at ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). The requirement that a
hearing be held is “mandatory[.]” State v. Potts, 2020-Ohio-989, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.).
{¶12} Measured against this framework, the trial court’s summary denial cannot
stand. Appellant filed his application to seal the record of his 2013 conviction on
March 5, 2026. The trial court denied his application on May 4, 2026 in a three-sentence
entry reflecting only that Appellant moved to seal, the State objected, and the motion was
overruled “[u]pon review of this matter.” (5/4/2026 Judgment Entry). The record contains
no indication that the trial court set a hearing, held a hearing within the statutory 45-to-
Case No. 26 MA 0055
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90-day window, directed a probation inquiry, or made any of the determinations R.C.
2953.32(D)(1) requires. A court speaks through its journal entries and nothing on the
docket or in the entry reflects that a hearing occurred. See State v. Dirocco, 2022-Ohio-
3221, ¶ 9 (7th Dist.). The trial court therefore disposed of Appellant’s application without
satisfying the statute’s threshold procedural requirement.
{¶13} The narrow exception to the hearing requirement does not apply on this
record. Ohio courts have recognized that a hearing “is not required when it ‘simply would
serve no purpose’” — that is, where no factual issues bear on eligibility, as when the
offense is statutorily ineligible to be sealed, the applicant concedes a disqualifying prior
conviction, or a successive application is barred by res judicata. (Emphasis in original).
Potts at ¶ 15. None of those circumstances is present here. Appellant’s offense — a
fourth-degree felony drug-possession conviction — is of the type for which the statute
authorizes a sealing application one year after final discharge, and he applied nearly nine
years after his May 2017 discharge. See R.C. 2953.32. The record before the trial court
disclosed no conceded ineligibility. We note that the State mischaracterizes the matter
as a successive filing. However, the record before the trial court disclosed no prior
application that could trigger res judicata.
{¶14} It bears emphasis that this is not a contested appeal on the controlling point.
The State does not defend the summary denial and, in fact, concedes error. See
(9/25/2026 Appellee’s Brief, p. 3) (“The record in this matter does not indicate that a
hearing was held on Appellant’s Application [and] [t]he statute plainly requires one”). Both
parties thus agree that R.C. 2953.32(C) obligated the trial court to hold a hearing and that
no hearing was held.
CONCLUSION
{¶15} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s sole assignment of error is well-
taken. The May 4, 2026 judgment of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas
denying Appellant’s application to seal the record of his 2013 conviction for possession
of cocaine without scheduling or holding a hearing is reversed and the matter is remanded
for the trial court to set and conduct a hearing in accordance with R.C. 2953.32(C) and
Case No. 26 MA 0055
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(D)(1) and to make the statutory determinations on the record before ruling on the
application.
Waite, P.J., concurs.
Robb, J., concurs.
Case No. 26 MA 0055
[Cite as State v. Lynch, 2026-Ohio-4558.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error
is sustained and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is reversed. We hereby remand
this matter to the trial court to set and conduct a hearing in accordance with R.C.
2953.32(C) and (D)(1) and to make the statutory determinations on the record before
ruling on the application. Costs to be taxed against the Appellee.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that
a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into
execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.