State v. Waver
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket116006
JudgeKeough
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Waver, 2026-Ohio-4575.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 116006
v. :
JAMES L. WAVER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 19, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-97-351032-ZA
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Gregory J. Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Marein & Bradley, LLC, and John T. Martin, for
appellant.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
Defendant-appellant James L. Waver appeals the trial court’s
decision denying his motion requesting that the trial court issue a final, appealable
order. Finding no merit to the appeal, this court affirms the trial court’s decision.
I. Procedural History and Background
In 1998, a jury found Waver guilty of two counts of rape and one
count of felonious assault. The trial court subsequently found him to be a sexually
violent predator and that he acted with sexual motivation — specifications
attendant to each count. The trial court ordered Waver to serve a total prison
sentence of 28 years to life. To memorialize these findings and sentence, the trial
court filed three separate judgment entries. On January 14, 1998, the trial court
filed two judgment entries announcing the jury’s findings of guilt and the court’s
determination that Waver was a sexual predator. On February 6, 1998, the trial
court issued a sentencing entry that did not restate the jury’s findings of guilt, but
stated that the court found Waver to be a sexually violent predator and that he
acted with sexual motivation. Additionally, the court noted that Waver’s
“conviction for rape” justified a prison sentence — the entry, however, did not
mention the felonious-assault offense. The court then sentenced Waver “pursuant
to R.C. 2971.03 indef[inite] term of imprisonment as follows: Ct. 1 — 10 yrs, Ct. 2
— 10 yrs, Ct. 3 — 8 yrs, Lorain Correctional Institution, w[ith] maximum of life
imprisonment.” The court ordered that the sentences “be served consecutive to
one another.”
Waver filed a direct appeal, claiming that (1) his convictions for rape
and both sexually violent predator and sexual motivation specifications were not
supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the
evidence, (2) he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct, (3) the
State relied on improper Evid.R. 404(B) evidence, (4) he was deprived of the right
of allocution, and (5) the trial court (a) failed to merge allied offenses, (b) did not
comply with R.C. 2929.19 when imposing sentence, and (c) erred in imposing
maximum, consecutive sentences. State v. Waver, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3860
(8th Dist. Aug. 19, 1999) (“Waver I”). He did not raise any argument regarding
Crim.R. 32 — that the judgment entry of conviction was unlawful or not a final,
appealable order.
The Waver I Court upheld the findings of guilt, including the trial
court’s determination that the rape offenses did not merge for sentencing, but
found that the trial court denied Waver his right to allocution. Id. at *26. As such,
the court found his remaining challenges regarding his sentence moot.
Accordingly, the court reversed his sentence and remanded for a resentencing
hearing. Id. at *26-27.
On September 16, 1999, the trial court conducted a resentencing
hearing. At the hearing, the trial court stated that a jury found Waver guilty “of
rape as indicted in Counts 1 and 2, and guilty of felonious assault as indicted in
Count 3.” (Sept. 16, 1999, tr. 3.)1 The court did not restate its findings regarding
the sexually-violent predator or sexual-motivation specifications, nor did the court
make any finding about Waver’s designation as a sexual predator or his reporting
1 Waver attached the 1999 resentencing transcript to his May 18, 2011 filing,
“Defendant’s courtesy copy of the 1998 original transcripts [sic] pages 5 and 6, and 1999
resentencing transcripts in support of omnibus motion.” See docket No. 53.
requirements as a result. After Waver offered his allocution, the trial court
announced its sentence — “Count 1 to a term of ten years, on Count 2 to a term of
ten years[,] and on Count 3 to a term of 8 years at the Lorain Correctional
Institution with a maximum of life imprisonment.” (Tr. 6.) The court ordered
those sentences to be served consecutively.
The court’s resentencing entry was dated September 16, 1999 (“1999
resentencing”). The entry did not include the pronouncements made in open
court, but provided, “[Waver] resentenced to Lorain Correctional Institution for a
term of 10 years on Counts 1 and 2 and 8 years on Count 3 with a maximum life
imprisonment, sentence[s] to be served consecutive to each other.” See docket
No. 37.
Waver did not appeal his 1999 resentencing.2 Instead, on October
17, 1999, he petitioned this court pursuant to App.R. 26(B) to reopen Waver I,
contending that his appellate counsel was ineffective because counsel (1) did not
raise a speedy-trial-violation claim, (2) failed to submit a full record showing that
Waver raised speedy trial in the trial court, and (3) did not argue that trial counsel
was ineffective for not moving to dismiss based on a speedy-trial violation. State
v. Waver, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3921 (8th Dist. Aug. 28, 2000) (“Waver II”).
This court denied his application.
2 We recognize that the trial court’s 1999 resentencing judgment entry was not
journalized until 2002, but even after it was journalized, Waver did not seek to appeal his
resentencing.
In 2004, this court dismissed Waver’s petition for a writ of
mandamus, or in the alternative, a writ of prohibition that sought to compel the
trial judge to vacate Waver’s original 1998 sentence and to prohibit the trial court
from enforcing a void sentence. State ex rel. Waver v. Gallagher, 2004-Ohio-4355
(8th Dist.). He claimed that the sentence was void because he did not file a jury-
trial waiver on the specifications that were tried to the bench. Id. Waver did not
raise any challenge regarding Crim.R. 32.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed this court’s decision finding (1)
the 1998 sentence was already vacated by the court of appeals through his direct
appeal; and (2) even if it construed his claims as challenging his 1999 resentencing,
his jury-trial-waiver claims were not cognizable in mandamus or prohibition; they
could only be remedied in a direct appeal. State ex rel. Waver v. Gallagher, 2005-
Ohio-780, ¶ 6-7.
In 2004, Waver filed another petition for a writ of mandamus in this
court, contending that his judgment of conviction was “void” pursuant to State v.
Smith, 2004-Ohio-6238. In Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court held, “Conviction of
a sexually violent offense cannot support the specification that the offender is a
sexually violent predator as defined . . . if the conduct leading to the conviction and
the sexually violent predator specification are charged in the same indictment.” Id.
at syllabus. Accordingly, the Smith Court concluded that “the trial court erred in
relying on the jury’s convictions of the underlying rape and kidnapping charges to
prove the sexually-violent-predator specification alleged in the same indictment.”
(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 33.
This court dismissed Waver’s writ of mandamus, finding that the
Smith Court’s usage of the word “erred” meant that Smith’s judgment of conviction
was not “void.” State ex rel. Waver v. Gallagher, 2006-Ohio-1743, ¶ 4-5 (8th Dist.)
(“Waver III”). Accordingly, this court held that his remedy was an appeal, not
mandamus relief. Id. Waver did not appeal this decision.
In 2005, Waver filed a motion for a delayed appeal of Waver I in the
Ohio Supreme Court; the Court denied the motion and dismissed the case. See
State v. Waver, Ohio Supreme Court No. 2005-Ohio-0644.
In December 2010, Waver, pro se, filed an “Omnibus Motion for
Appropriate Relief/Motion for New Sentencing Hearing,” (hereinafter “2010
omnibus motion”) requesting the trial court to issue a series of orders granting him
relief. See docket No. 53. He contended that his conviction was void because (1)
the trial court’s 1999 resentencing entry did not properly advise him of mandatory
postrelease control, (2) the court erred when it found him to be a sexually violent
predator, and (3) the court erred when it found him guilty of the sexual-motivation
specification. Waver also requested the trial court to issue “an order to set forth a
final, appealable order in compliance with Crim.R. 32(C) of the Ohio Rules of
Criminal Procedure.” Relying on Crim.R. 32 and the Ohio Supreme Court’s
decision in State v. Baker, 2008-Ohio-3330, Waver contended that the 1999
resentencing journal entry did not contain the means of conviction. He claimed
that his resentencing entry was therefore void, and thus, res judicata did not bar
his argument.
In response, the State conceded that the trial court did not properly
advise Waver of postrelease control during the 1999 resentencing hearing but
contended that the Ohio Supreme Court’s sentence-correction mechanism in State
v. Singleton, 2009-Ohio-6434, and State v. Fischer, 2010-Ohio-6238, allowed the
trial court to conduct a limited hearing to correct only the flawed imposition of
postrelease control. Regarding Waver’s other challenges in his 2010 omnibus
motion, the State argued that his motion was an untimely petition for
postconviction relief, or alternatively, res judicata barred his arguments because
those issues — lack of a final, appealable order, sexually violent predator finding,
and the sexual motivation specification — could have been or were raised on direct
appeal.
Waver filed a reply, challenging the State’s failure to acknowledge
that the 1999 resentencing order did not comply with Crim.R. 32 and Baker, and
thus was not a final, appealable order. He further maintained that he was not
advised of his appeal rights at resentencing. According to Waver, res judicata did
not bar his challenge to the 1999 resentencing order because he was unable to
effectuate an appeal, i.e. the appeals court would have been without jurisdiction to
consider the appeal. Waver therefore requested a complete de novo resentencing
hearing, not just a limited hearing on postrelease control.
On June 2, 2011, the trial court issued a journal entry ordering
Waver to the court for a hearing to advise him that he was subject to mandatory
postrelease control. This journal entry also denied the remainder of his requests
in the 2010 omnibus motion, finding that the requests were either untimely or not
well taken on the merits of the law and facts. On June 20, 2011, the trial court
conducted a limited resentencing hearing and advised Waver regarding
postrelease control.
On July 6, 2011, Waver, with the assistance of counsel, appealed the
trial court’s decision regarding his 2010 omnibus motion. This court, however,
dismissed the appeal as untimely. State v. Waver, No. 97000 (8th Dist. July 21,
2011) (“Waver IV”). He did not seek leave to file a delayed appeal, but moved for
reconsideration, which this court also denied. Waver then filed a motion to reopen
the appeal, but again, this court denied his application. See State v. Waver, 2011-
Ohio-6480 (8th Dist.) (“Waver V”) (denying his application for reopening because
App.R. 26 could not be used to reopen an appeal regarding a denial of a
postconviction motion).
Waver appealed Waver V to the Ohio Supreme Court, contending
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely notice of appeal and that
App.R. 26 is not limited to direct appeals. See State v. Waver, Ohio Supreme Court
No. 2012-0010. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the appeal “as not involving
any substantial constitutional question.” Id.
Over the next 14 years, Waver filed multiple motions in the trial
court, including a motion for jail-time credit and multiple applications for DNA
testing. See State v. Waver, 2019-Ohio-1444 (8th Dist.) (affirming the trial court’s
denial of Waver’s motion for relief from judgment); State v. Waver, 2020-Ohio-
2724 (8th Dist.), appeal not accepted, 05/25/2021 Case Announcements, 2021-
Ohio-1721 (affirming the trial court’s denial of Waver’s application for DNA
testing).
In 2025, Waver, with the assistance of counsel, filed a motion for a
final, appealable order, asserting that at the time of his conviction, the trial court
never issued a final, appealable order because neither the 1998 judgment nor the
1999 resentencing entry complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 32 that were
in effect at the time. Regarding the 1998 judgment, he claimed that the order did
not contain the fact of conviction for the offenses, although the judgment provided
that there were “convictions” for rape, and also that it was unclear from the
judgment which count received the life tail.3 Regarding the 1999 resentencing,
Waver again argued that the judgment entry did not contain the fact of conviction
for any count, did not mention the attendant specifications, and was unclear as to
which count received the life tail. He maintained that by issuing a final order,
Waver would have the opportunity to seek correction of an illegal sentence by
3 The term “life tail” means an indefinite sentence with a maximum term of life in
prison.
vacating the life tail imposed on the rape offenses, as mandated in Smith, 2004-
Ohio-6238.
The State responded that Waver’s request was barred by res judicata
because his arguments could have been raised on direct appeal, but that his
argument was in fact raised, and rejected, in Waver III — 2004 writ of mandamus
and then again in his 2010 omnibus motion. The State also noted that because
Waver’s case was closed, Smith did not apply retroactively pursuant to State v.
Stansell, 2014-Ohio-1633 (8th Dist.).4 Finally, the State maintained that any
Crim.R. 32 violation could be corrected with a nunc pro tunc judgment order.
Waver disagreed with the State’s application of Stansell, finding that
addressing the issue was premature and that it needed to be raised on appeal after
a final, appealable order was issued. He further disagreed that a nunc pro tunc
judgment entry could cure the jurisdictional defect, citing State v. Yeaples, 2009-
Ohio-184 (3d Dist.). Waver did not advance any argument regarding the effect of
res judicata.
The trial court conducted a hearing on Waver’s motion. During the
hearing, the State admitted that the 1999 resentencing entry did not comply with
Crim.R. 32, but maintained that the entry could be corrected by a nunc pro tunc
4 See State v. Stansell, 2021-Ohio-2036 (8th Dist.) (holding en banc that “where a
defendant’s sentence exceeds the statutory limitations, the sentence is voidable, but not
void unless the sentencing court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or
personal jurisdiction over the defendant”), appeal dismissed as improvidently accepted,
2022-Ohio—2064.
judgment entry because the trial judge made all necessary Crim.R. 32 findings
during the 1999 resentencing hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court issued
a written decision, denying Waver’s motion. The court relied on State v. Coffman,
91 Ohio St.3d 125, 129 (2001), and held that the appellate court, by issuing a
decision in Waver I — Waver’s direct appeal— and again in Waver II — his
application to reopen his direct appeal — implicitly determined that the judgments
were final and appealable.
II. The Appeal
Waver now appeals, contending in his sole assignment of error that
the trial court erred when it denied Waver’s request to enter a judgment of
conviction that constituted a final, appealable order. He claims that the trial court
never issued an order that complied with Crim.R. 32, and thus this court lacked
jurisdiction over his prior appeals.
The State asserts that the law-of-the-case doctrine and res judicata
bar Waver’s claims on appeal because (1) he filed a direct appeal from the 1998
judgment entry and did not raise any argument regarding Crim.R. 32 and (2) he
failed to perfect an appeal of the trial court’s denial of his 2010 omnibus motion
that sought a final, appealable order under Crim.R. 32 and thus any challenge to
the 1999 resentencing is barred.
In response, Waver clarified that “the instant appeal addresses
whether the [1998 judgment] was final and appealable and also discusses how the
[1999 resentencing] did not cure the problem.” (Appellant’s Reply Brief, p. 6).
An appellate court may only review final orders. R.C. 2505.02(B).
Under Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution, courts of appeals have
jurisdiction only to “affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the
courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district.” As a result,
“[i]t is well-established that an order must be final before it can be reviewed by an
appellate court. If an order is not final, then an appellate court has no jurisdiction.”
Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20 (1989).
In State v. Lester, 2011-Ohio-5204, ¶ 8, the Supreme Court of Ohio
held that for a judgment of conviction to be a final, appealable order subject to
appeal, it must comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 32. The purpose of
Crim.R. 32 is to ensure that a defendant is on notice concerning when a final
judgment has been entered and the time for filing an appeal has begun to run.
State v. Tripodo, 50 Ohio St.2d 124, 127 (1977); App.R. 4(A).
Waver contends that his 1998 judgment did not comply with Crim.R.
32 because (1) it did not contain the fact of conviction for the offenses, although he
admitted that the judgment provided that there were “convictions” for rape, and
(2) it was unclear from the judgment which count received the life tail.
At the time of conviction in 1998, Crim.R. 32(B) provided that “[a]
judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings and sentence.
. . . The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk.”5 Reviewing
5 When Crim.R. 32(B) was amended in 1999, it was renumbered to Crim.R. 32(C).
the three separate judgment entries issued by the trial court, we find that a final,
appealable order existed in 1998. The trial court’s two January 14, 1998 judgment
entries accurately reflected the jury’s findings of guilt on the counts of rape and
felonious assault and the court’s designation of Waver as a sexual predator. The
trial court’s subsequent February 6, 1998 judgment set forth the sentence imposed.
Although Baker and Lester now require a judgment of conviction to be a “single
document,” that requirement did not exist in 1998. See State ex rel. Henley v.
Langer, 2018-Ohio-5204 (addressing and rejecting a final, appealable order
challenge when a trial court in 2004 issued four documents as its sentencing
order); State ex rel. Daniels v. Russo, 2016-Ohio-8060, ¶ 7-8 (8th Dist.), aff’d on
other grounds, 2018-Ohio-5194 (rejecting the argument that the one-document rule
announced in Baker should apply retroactively and thus finding that res judicata
applied because the 1989 original sentencing entry satisfied Crim.R. 32, as it existed
at the time of sentencing). Accordingly, the 1998 judgment entries, taken as a
whole, complied with Crim.R. 32(B), as it existed at that time. Because the 1998
judgment was a final, appealable order, this court had subject-matter jurisdiction
over his direct appeal. Waver’s argument to the contrary is rejected.
Notwithstanding, even if the combined judgment entries did not
create a final, appealable order, res judicata would bar Waver’s argument. “‘Under
the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars the convicted
defendant from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that
judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could
have been raised by the defendant at the trial which resulted in that judgment of
conviction or on an appeal from that judgment.’” State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175,
180 (1967).
On this point, we find the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Griffin, 2013-Ohio-5481, instructive. In Griffin, the defendant was charged with
aggravated murder and an accompanying felony-murder death-penalty
specification. Id. at ¶ 6. The State agreed not to pursue the death penalty if the
defendant waived her right to be tried by a jury or three-judge panel. In 1989, a
single judge found Griffin guilty and sentenced her to life imprisonment,
memorializing these findings in two separate judgment entries — guilt phase and
sentencing. In 1990, Griffin appealed, challenging the trial court’s sentencing
entry that did not comply with the sentencing mandates for a death-penalty
specification. The appeals court rejected her appeal, and the Ohio Supreme Court
declined jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 9-11.
For 15 years, Griffin challenged her convictions, including her
sentence, without success. Those challenges included federal habeas claims and
an application to reopen her direct appeal. In 2009, Griffin requested the trial
court to issue a final, appealable order pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2008
decision in Baker, holding that Crim.R. 32(C) required the judgment of conviction
to be a “single document.” The State agreed with Griffin, and the trial court issued
a new judgment entry, imposing the same sentence it imposed in 1989.
Griffin then appealed, contending that because her original 1990
judgment was not a final, appealable order, the appeals court lacked jurisdiction
over her 1990 direct appeal. The Fifth District agreed, addressed her assignments
of error, reversed her conviction, and ordered a new trial based on newly enacted
law regarding when a capital specification is dismissed.
The Ohio Supreme Court accepted the State’s discretionary appeal,
and noted that the “pivotal question” was “whether 24 years ago the trial court
issued a final, appealable order.” Griffin, 2013-Ohio-5481, at ¶ 22. Finding that
Ohio’s death-penalty statutory framework at the time of Griffin’s 1989 conviction
did not apply to her, the Court stated, “[T]he trial court afforded Griffin all the
proper procedural protections guaranteed by law in 1990, and its sentencing entry
was the final judgment of the case. Therefore . . . the sentencing entry issued in
1990 was a final, appealable order.” Id. at ¶ 22, 47. The Griffin Court focused on
“the law in place and the convictions based on it at the time of trial.” Id. at ¶ 46.
Significant and relevant to Waver’s appeal, the Griffin Court stated:
Even if in 1992 the court of appeals was wrong in assuming that a final,
appealable order existed in 1990, its holding was subject to res judicata
principles and therefore could have been challenged only on direct
appeal. Consequently, Griffin is precluded from reopening her appeal
by res judicata, “a rule of fundamental and substantial justice.”
Id., quoting State v. Simpkins, 2008-Ohio-1197.
The Griffin Court observed, “Both Griffin and defense counsel
believed that the sentencing entry was a final, appealable order, because Griffin
filed her direct appeal on February 1, 1990.” Id. at ¶ 48-49. The Court stated that
in her 1990 direct appeal, Griffin “never challenged the lack of a Crim.R. 32(B)
entry . . . and therefore, these claims are forever barred. . . . Res judicata precludes
a litigant from using a resentencing entry issued pursuant to Baker[, 2008-Ohio-
3330] to litigate an issue when that defendant has already litigated or could have
litigated the issue on direct appeal.” Id. at ¶ 49.
Applying Griffin’s statements and holdings to Waver’s appeal, we
find that the trial court’s 1998 judgment was a final, appealable order, properly
vesting this court with subject-matter jurisdiction over Waver’s direct appeal in
1998. Just as in Griffin, both Waver and his counsel believed the 1998 judgment
entry was a final, appealable order because Waver timely filed his direct appeal in
1999. See Tripodo, 50 Ohio St.2d at 127 (finding that Crim.R. 32(C) ensures that
a defendant is on notice concerning when a final judgment has been entered and
the time for filing an appeal has begun to run). At no time until 2010 did Waver or
any other court perceive the 1998 judgment to be anything but final. Accordingly,
any challenge to the 1998 judgment would also be barred by res judicata because
Waver did not challenge the lack of a Crim.R. 32(B) entry in his direct appeal. See
Griffin, 2013-Ohio-5481, at ¶ 49.
We recognize, however, that in Waver I, this court reversed Waver’s
sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The findings of guilt,
however, remained unaffected, and when Waver did not timely appeal Waver I and
the Ohio Supreme Court subsequently denied his 2005 application for a delayed
appeal of Waver I, the findings of guilt became the law of the case. See Nolan v.
Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 (1984) (stating that the law-of-the-case doctrine provides
that the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the
legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case, both at the trial
and reviewing levels).
We further find that res judicata also bars any challenge Waver
makes regarding whether the 1999 resentencing entry was a final, appealable
order. By the time the resentencing hearing occurred in 1999 and the trial court’s
resentencing entry was journalized in 2002, Crim.R. 32 had been amended, and at
that time, required that “[i]n the judgment of conviction, the court must set forth
the fact of conviction and the sentence. . . . The judgment shall be signed by the
judge and entered by the clerk.”
Although the trial court stated during the resentencing that Waver
was found guilty of felonious assault and two counts of rape, the trial court did not
memorialize the fact of conviction in its resentencing entry. On its face, the 1999
resentencing entry, alone, did not comply with Crim.R. 32(C) — a fact conceded by
the State in the trial court. Nevertheless, as stated, Waver never attempted to
appeal from his resentencing.
Waver did not raise any concern about the 1999 resentencing entry
until he filed his 2010 omnibus motion. Even after the trial court denied the
motion requesting the court to issue a final, appealable order, Waver did not
properly perfect an appeal of this issue. See Waver IV (dismissing his appeal as
untimely); Waver V (denying his request to reopen his appeal to assert that counsel
was ineffective for failing to file a timely appeal; Ohio Supreme Court also declined
review of the appeal). Accordingly, Waver’s challenge to the 1999 judgment entry
is also barred by res judicata.
III. Conclusion
Ohio courts have consistently applied res judicata or the law-of-the-
case doctrine to reject arguments made by defendants who have unsuccessfully
requested that trial courts issue final, appealable orders long after pursuing state
and federal appeals on other merit-based or procedural challenges. See Griffin,
2013-Ohio-5481; State ex rel. Woods v. Dinkelacker, 2017-Ohio-9124 (finding that
even if an appellant could seek mandamus relief, res judicata barred him from
raising his Crim.R. 32 claim because he unsuccessfully raised the same argument in
an earlier proceeding challenging his sentence); State v. Ramsey, 2023-Ohio-2389,
¶ 16 (8th Dist.) (finding res judicata bars a Crim.R. 32 challenge because it was an
issue that was “readily apparent on the record as it existed in 1998. In this regard,
Ramsey could have challenged the adequacy of his sentencing journal entry in a
direct appeal from that judgment; but failed to do so”); State v. Bridgewater, 2023-
Ohio-1211 (10th Dist.) (finding that the law of the case barred appellant from
claiming that the original judgment entry of conviction and sentence was not a final,
appealable order in the subsequent appeal); State v. Bates, 2019-Ohio-1172 (10th
Dist.) (recognizing that even though the original sentencing entry did not comply
with Crim.R. 32(C), the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded appellant from making
that claim in a subsequent proceeding); State v. Fowler, 2015-Ohio-1053 (7th Dist.)
(holding any argument regarding compliance with Crim.R. 32 or appellate
jurisdiction should have been raised on direct appeal or in the Ohio Supreme Court).
See also State ex rel. Henley v. Langer, 2018-Ohio-5204 (Kennedy, [C.]J.,
concurring in judgment only), and State ex rel. Daniels v. Russo, 2018-Ohio-5194
(Kennedy, [C.]J., concurring in judgment only) (relying on Dinkelacker to find that
res judicata barred petitioners from seeking relief after he unsuccessfully raised the
same argument in a prior motion to correct his sentence that he did not appeal);
State ex rel. Newell v. Gaul, 2013-Ohio-68 (finding res judicata barred Newell
from raising a Crim.R. 32 argument that could have been raised in a prior action).
Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in denying Waver’s
motion for a final, appealable order because res judicata precludes him from raising
his claims that both the 1998 judgment and 1999 resentencing entry did not comply
with Crim.R. 32. His assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR