State v. Lamb
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket8-25-32
JudgeWillamowski
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Lamb, 2026-Ohio-4526.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
LOGAN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 8-25-32
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
TODD A. LAMB, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR 24 07 0134
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: November 16, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Stephen E. Palmer for Appellant
Nathan Yohey for Appellee
Case No. 8-25-32
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Todd A. Lamb (“Todd”) appeals the judgment of
the Logan County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that (1) inadmissible hearsay
was introduced at trial; (2) his right of confrontation was violated; (3) the trial court
gave inaccurate jury instructions; (4) he was deprived of his right to the effective
assistance of counsel; (5) seven of his convictions were not supported by sufficient
evidence; (6) seven of his convictions were against the manifest weight of the
evidence; and (7) cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial. For the reasons set
forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} Todd owned and operated a company called Screaming Eagle Boats
(“Screaming Eagle”) that manufactured boats in Bellefontaine, Ohio. In 2018, Todd
changed the name of his company from Screaming Eagle to Spectre Powerboats
(“Spectre”). His wife, Karen Lamb (“Karen”), was involved in the routine
operations of this company, performing a number of administrative functions and
frequently collecting payments. Between filing the articles of incorporation for
Screaming Eagle in 2015 and declaring personal bankruptcy several years later,
Todd drew funds into his business through seven transactions with purchasers,
lenders, and other business entities that led to the criminal charges brought against
him in this case.
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{¶3} In the first transaction, a customer named Michael Evans
Caradimitropoulo (“Michael”) was looking to purchase a high performance boat and
reached out to Todd. In December of 2017, Michael signed a build agreement
(“agreement”) for a custom thirty-foot Screaming Eagle boat with two Mercury
400R engines that was to cost approximately $194,000.00. While the agreement
did not expressly provide a completion date, Michael testified that Todd indicated
that his boat would be finished by May of 2018.
{¶4} Under the agreement, Michael was to pay the $194,000.00 price of the
boat in five installment payments by March 1, 2018. Michael testified that he made
the first payment of $10,000.00 to reserve the build slot and then made the second
payment of $35,000.00 in December of 2017 to begin the build process. But before
Michael made the third payment of $115,000.00, his beach house suffered some
damage. As a result, he did not believe that his property would be ready to
accommodate his new boat in May of 2018.
{¶5} Michael then communicated with Todd about delaying the completion
date of the boat while the condition of his property was being addressed. The Lambs
indicated that the boat completion could be delayed but that they would need
$25,000.00 of the third scheduled payment to cover the costs of the motors. For this
reason, Michael sent another payment of $25,000.00 in January of 2019.
{¶6} When Michael sought to restart the build, Todd offered to upgrade
Michael’s boat from a thirty-foot vessel to a thirty-two-foot vessel at no additional
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cost. Todd also sent an email to Michael that indicated the completion of the vessel
could be timed with the start of the next boating season. Based on these new
arrangements, Michael and Spectre Powerboats entered into a new agreement on
July 19, 2018 for a thirty-two-foot boat with Mercury 400R engines that cost of
$194,000.00. Michael then made a fourth payment of $62,000.00 in July of 2018.
{¶7} Todd issued a receipt that stated this $62,000.00 payment was applied
to the cost of the Mercury 400R engines. While Todd was recovering from a
surgical procedure, Karen emailed Michael pictures of two Mercury engines along
with a message that read as follows: “I just wanted you to know that your motors
have arrived! I’ve attached pictures of them, and the serial numbers are 2B583436
and 2B585472. They will be covered up and in the crates until we are ready for
them. I’m also attaching a receipt for your payment.” (Ex. 15). Todd also began
texting him pictures and videos of the progress that had been made in building his
boat.
{¶8} In April of 2019, Michael made a fifth payment of $11,650.00. Todd
told Michael that this sum was for jack plates and a trailer. Michael testified that
these parts of the boat were added towards the end of the construction process and
that he believed that the boat was “very close to the end of the build.” (Tr. 247). In
or around May of 2019, Michael told Todd that he was traveling through Ohio and
wanted to stop by Spectre to see the progress that had been made on the boat.
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Michael testified that, in response, Todd said, “don’t show up to my place, you’ll
be trespassing.” (Tr. 249).
{¶9} Michael stated that he did not receive anything from Spectre in
exchange for the $143,650.00 he had paid for his boat. He then clarified that he did
not receive the boat motors, trailer, or jack plates even though several of his
payments were designated for the acquisition of these specific parts. Michael told
Todd to have his attorney draft a settlement agreement that presented a plan to repay
the $143,650.00 that had been paid for the boat.
{¶10} Todd and Michael then signed a settlement agreement that stated Todd
owed Michael $143,650.00. The boat hull, the motors, and jack plates were listed
as collateral in this agreement. Michael received $16,200.00 before Todd stopped
making payments in April of 2020. Michael then filed a lawsuit and hired a receiver
to take inventory of the Spectre’s assets.
{¶11} During this lawsuit, Michael learned that the hull of the boat and the
Mercury 400R motors were not in Todd’s possession. Special Agent Steven
Seitzman (“Special Agent Seitzman”) of the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation
testified that, during his investigation into this matter, he learned that the Mercury
400R engines that had been purchased by Michael had been sold to someone in
Florida. Michael testified that he did not receive any of the proceeds from the sale
of the assets that were listed as collateral in the settlement agreement, even though
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such agreement stated he was to receive these funds. Michael testified that he had
not received anything towards the civil judgment that he received against Todd.
{¶12} In the second transaction, a customer named Dean Anderson
(“Anderson”) called Todd and discussed the process of building a twenty-two-foot
Talon XL boat with two Mercury 300XS engines. In February of 2018, Todd issued
a customer quote that stated this boat could be completed at a cost of $129,664.80.
Anderson testified that Todd indicated this process could be completed in four to
six months.
{¶13} The quote from Todd included a payment schedule under which
$3,500.00 was due to secure a build slot; twenty-five percent of the total cost was
due one week before construction began; fifty percent of the total cost was due when
the project was halfway to completion; and the remaining balance was to be paid
when the boat was set for rigging. Anderson then paid $3,500.00 to reserve a build
slot for his boat.
{¶14} On May 9, 2018, Anderson received an email from Todd in which he
indicated that “he and Karen were in a pinch” and inquired into whether Anderson
was interested in investing in their business. (Tr. 314). Todd floated the idea of
Anderson investing in three sets of molds that could be used to manufacture Talon
boats. Two sets of these molds—the Talon 22 SS and the Talon 22 XL—already
existed. But Todd also proposed building molds for a new twenty-six-foot Talon
boat.
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{¶15} In response, Anderson indicated that he was interested in starting his
own business called Talon Powerboats, LLC (“TPL”) instead of simply investing in
Screaming Eagle. On June 15, 2018, Todd and Anderson signed an agreement in
which Anderson agreed to pay $45,000.00 for the Talon 22 SS molds; $45,000.00
for the Talon 22 XL molds; $95,000.00 for the construction of the Talon 26 molds;
and $5,000.00 for the Talon brand.
{¶16} Under this arrangement, the molds for the Talon boats would remain
in Screaming Eagle’s possession but would be owned by TPL. Todd would
manufacture the Talon boats in Bellefontaine using these molds while Anderson
would sell the Talon boats through TPL. As the owner of the Talon brand, TPL was
to be the exclusive seller of the Talon boats that were manufactured in these molds.
{¶17} In July of 2018, Todd asked Anderson if he was interested in
purchasing the Screaming Eagle Boat 24 molds so that TPL could also offer a
twenty-four-foot Talon boat. On July 17, 2018, Todd and Anderson then signed an
agreement in which Anderson agreed to pay $20,000.00 for this set of molds. At
this point, Anderson decided to change the boat that he had previously ordered from
a Talon 22 XL to a twenty-four-foot boat since he now owned the molds for a vessel
of this size.
{¶18} The price for the twenty-four-foot boat was $136,079.00. In addition
to the $3,500.00 deposit for the build slot, Anderson was to pay $28,300.00 at the
start of the build; $40,025.00 for the Mercury 300XS motors; $52,115.00 when the
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build was halfway complete; and the remaining balance when the vessel was set for
rigging. The new agreement did not state when Anderson’s boat was to be
completed, but Anderson testified that Todd indicated that the process would be
completed in November of 2018.
{¶19} In August of 2018, Spectre Powerboats posted a picture on Facebook
in which Todd can be seen in front of a plug that was used in the initial stages of
shaping a mold. The caption under this picture read: “The new Talon 26X coming
along nicely.” (Ex. 28). Anderson paid roughly $95,934.00 for the construction of
this mold.
{¶20} On November 28, 2018, Anderson received the invoice for the final
payment that was due when the boat that he had ordered was ready for rigging.
After making this final payment, Anderson had tendered a total of $111,196.00 to
Spectre. He explained that he ended up paying less than the quoted price of
$136,079.00 because he decided to purchase $26,000.00 of hardware directly from
vendors. He then had this hardware shipped to Todd’s place of business for
installation during the rigging process.
{¶21} Since the final invoice was to come when the vessel was in the final
stages of construction, Anderson assumed that his boat was nearing completion in
November of 2018. But when he had not received a boat seven months later,
Anderson sent a cure letter to Todd via email on June 28, 2019 that requested he
comply with the terms of their agreements within thirty days. In response, Todd
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sent an email that referred Anderson to Spectre’s attorney and told him not to contact
the Lambs absent instructions from their attorney. Anderson then initiated a civil
proceeding against Todd.
{¶22} During the civil litigation, Todd admitted that he had sold the Mercury
300XS engines that Anderson had purchased to another person. Todd also admitted
that he sold the hull of Anderson’s vessel to another person, even as TPL had
exclusive rights to sell this line of boats. Through this civil action, Anderson was
able to recover the molds for the Talon 22 SS, the Talon 22 XL, and the Talon 24
from Spectre’s possession. However, Anderson was not able to recover the boat
that cost him $111,196.00 or the molds for the Talon 26 that cost him $95,934.00.
{¶23} In the third transaction, a customer named William “Bill” Phelps
(“Phelps”) signed a build agreement (“agreement”) on November 19, 2019 for a
thirty-two-foot Spectre boat with two Mercury 450R engines. The price for this
boat, after several modifications, was ultimately set at $308,918.50. Over the next
year, Phelps made a series of payments that totaled $300,461.50.
{¶24} On February 20, 2020, Todd posted a picture on Facebook with the
following caption: “Brand new Mercury 450’s just landed at the shop today. Both
of these are going on a new 32’ Spectre.” (Ex. 3). In response, Phelps posted:
“Guess who’s [sic] 32’ they’re going on.” (Ex. 3). On March 10, 2020, Todd posted
a picture of a hull with a “black gelcoated bottom” that fit the description of the
custom boat that Phelps had ordered. (Ex. 5). On September 24, 2020, Todd posted
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a picture with the following caption: “Bill New 32’ Spectre hull with twin 450’s
seeing sun for the first time.” (Ex. 6). In response, Bill Phelps posted: “It’s going
to be freaking awesome.” (Ex. 6).
{¶25} But when Phelps did not receive a boat, he instituted a civil proceeding
against Todd. While Phelps had issued a payment to fund the purchase of two
Mercury 450R engines, he learned that Todd did not ultimately apply these funds to
the purchase of these motors. Through this action, Phelps was able to recover the
thirty-two-foot hull of his boat and sold this item for roughly $100,000.00.
{¶26} The fourth transaction was related to a 304E2CR mini hydraulic
excavator that Todd obtained through a loan from the Caterpillar Financial Services
Corporation (“Caterpillar Financial”). On August 30, 2019, Todd entered into an
installment contract with the Ohio Machinery Company, doing business as Ohio
CAT, for the purchase of a $41,500.00 mini excavator. In this agreement, Todd
made $8,300.00 down payment and borrowed $33,700.00 from Caterpillar
Financial to cover the remainder of the purchase price and fees. The mini excavator
served as the collateral for this loan.
{¶27} On September 13, 2019, Caterpillar Financial filed a Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”) Financing Statement with the Ohio Secretary of State’s
Office. Payments were made on this installment contract until December 17, 2020.
When Caterpillar Financial contacted him in February 2021, Todd indicated that he
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intended to pay off the loan balance. Caterpillar than discovered that a receivership
had been filed for Spectre.
{¶28} In May of 2021, Caterpillar Financial learned that the 304E2CR mini
hydraulic excavator had been sold to a person named Matt Braun at Diamond
Maintenance, LLC in Michigan. Special Agent Seitzman later connected the sale
of this mini excavator to a $39,500.00 payment that Spectre received on March 2,
2020. However, Caterpillar Financial did not receive any of the proceeds from this
sale. At this time, the loan payoff amount on this machine was $33,566.00.
{¶29} The fifth transaction at issue was related to a 305E2CR mini hydraulic
excavator that Todd obtained with a loan from Caterpillar Financial. On October
20, 2020, Todd entered into a rental conversion agreement with Ohio Machinery
Company for a $50,000.00 mini excavator. Todd made a $5,000.00 down payment
and borrowed $45,500.00 through Caterpillar Financial to cover the remainder of
the purchase price and fees. The mini excavator served as the collateral for this
loan.
{¶30} On October 23, 2020, Caterpillar Financial filed a UCC Financing
Statement with the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office. Three payments were made
under this agreement through February 2, 2021. At this point, Caterpillar Financial
contacted Todd, who indicated that he intended to pay off his loans. However,
Caterpillar Financial then learned that the mini excavator had already been
purchased by Robert Rabenstein (“Rabenstein”) at Rabenstein Electrical in Ohio.
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{¶31} Rabenstein testified that he was interested in purchasing a mini
excavator for his business and saw an online post in which Todd indicated that he
was selling a mini excavator. Rabenstein went to Todd’s place of business on
December 11, 2020; gave him a check for $48,000.00 to pay for the mini excavator;
and took possession of the machine on that date. He later testified that Todd never
mentioned that this machine was a subject to a lien.
{¶32} In November of 2021, Rabenstein received a letter that informed him
that Caterpillar Financial had a lien on his mini excavator. He testified that he then
attempted to contact Todd but could not reach him. Rabenstein then went to Todd’s
place of business and found that the facility was empty. At this time, the payoff
amount for Todd’s loan on this machine was $48,760.00. Eventually, Rabenstein
entered into a settlement agreement with Caterpillar Financial in which he paid them
$25,000.00 to discharge the lien and keep the 305E2CR mini hydraulic excavator.
{¶33} The sixth transaction at issue is a loan of $110,944.00 that Richwood
Bank (“Richwood”) made with Todd, Karen, and Spectre in 2019. Todd and Karen
signed the loan documents individually and on behalf of Spectre. The chief credit
officer with Richwood, Brian Gehres (“Gehres”), testified that this loan had a term
of seven years and was secured with collateral that was identified in the agreement.
{¶34} Gehres testified that, among other assets, the collateral listed in the
agreement included two Mercury boat engines with these serial numbers: 2B585472
and 2B583436. The collateral agreement stated that Richwood was to receive the
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proceeds from the sale or transfer these assets. Gehres stated that a UCC Statement
that identified this collateral was filed with the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office and
gave Richwood a lien on these assets.
{¶35} While the loan documents that identified these two engines as
collateral were executed in February of 2019, Michael Caradimitropoulo had
already received an email from Karen in August of 2018 that stated he had
purchased the two Mercury 400R engines with the serial numbers of 2B585472 and
2B583436. Michael was also presented with a receipt for his purchase, though this
document did not include the serial numbers for the two engines. At the time the
loan was issued, Richwood was unaware that these motors had already been
purchased by another person.
{¶36} Gehres testified that Richwood received payments on this loan through
January of 2023. At this point, the principal and interest that was owed to Richwood
on this loan was roughly $100,000.00. The Mercury 400R engines with the serial
numbers 2B585472 and 2B583436 had not only been purchased by Michael before
the loan in August of 2018 but were also sold after the loan to another person in
Florida in November of 2020. While these engines were subject to the collateral
agreement, Richwood did not receive any proceeds from the sale of these assets.
{¶37} The seventh transaction at issue was a business arrangement with
Robert Kenney (“Kenney”) and his company, DR Performance. Kenney had a
lifelong interest in boats and became interested in Spectre after he saw one of their
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vessels online. He called the company and spoke with Karen about his interest in
becoming a dealer for their boats. Kenney and his business partner, Dane Sweatman
(“Sweatman”), traveled to Todd’s place of business in Bellefontaine, Ohio to talk
with Todd and Karen about potentially making DR Performance a dealer for Spectre
boats.
{¶38} On September 13, 2020, Kenney, Sweatman, and Karen signed a
dealership agreement. Under this agreement, DR Performance would pay a
$10,000.00 deposit per build slot and roughly $100,000.00 for each hull that Spectre
manufactured for them. DR Performance was also going to purchase the boat
engines through Spectre for Todd to mount on the hulls. After receiving the hull
and engines, DR Performance would then complete the process by rigging the
vessels and selling the boats. While the agreement was open ended, DR
Performance committed to an initial purchase of four boat hulls.
{¶39} Kenney, Sweatman, and Todd then signed a collateral agreement that
gave DR Performance a security interest in the molds that Todd used to make the
32 Spectre and the 36 Spectre. Sweatman and Kenney then made a series of
payments to Spectre that totaled $148,132.48. Kenney testified that he had not
received any hulls by April of 2021 and that Todd had been giving reasons why the
hulls were delayed or not yet ready for transport.
{¶40} After Kenney communicated his concerns, Todd responded by
indicating that he was influential in his town; that he could “control[]” any
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investigation that might be opened; that “it was all just some mistake”; and that he
would only speak with Sweatman in the future. (Tr. 461). On May 14, 2021,
Kenney had his attorney file a UCC Financing Statement with the Ohio Secretary
of State’s Office for the molds at Spectre that were listed as collateral in their
agreement. However, Kenney was never able to locate the molds. Kenney testified
that he learned that Todd had put the molds for the Spectre 36 boats up for sale on
Facebook marketplace for $100,000.00.
{¶41} Todd had also sent Kenney the hull and 450R Mercury engines for the
boat that Phelps had ordered and asked Kenney to complete the rigging process.
But when Kenney reached out to Phelps to discuss the price of rigging the boat,
Phelps indicated that he had already paid Todd in full for a completed boat. Kenney
testified that he then contacted Todd, who “demand[ed]” the return Phelps’s boat to
his facility but stated that Kenney could retain the 450R engines if he wanted to
purchase them.
{¶42} Kenney explained that Mercury had a program that did not require
boat manufactures to pay for their engines for one year after delivery. He then
testified that Todd indicated that this one-year period was about to expire and that
Mercury would be demanding payment. After speaking with Sweatman, Kenney
wired $90,000.00 directly to Mercury to pay for the 450R engines that had come
with Phelps’s boat.
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{¶43} After he received the certificate of ownership from Mercury, Kenney
sold these engines to a person in California. However, Kenney had not been made
aware that Phelps had already paid Todd for these engines. Kenney eventually
began to receive calls from investigators who were looking into Todd’s activities.
After Kenney mentioned these calls during a conversation, Todd just gave him
“endless threats.” (Tr. 472).
{¶44} On July 9, 2024, Todd was indicted on four counts of grand theft in
violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2), fourth-degree felonies; one count of aggravated
theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2), a third-degree felony; one count of theft
from a person in a protected class in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2), a first-degree
felony; one count of defrauding creditors in violation of R.C. 2913.45(A)(1), a
fourth-degree felony; one count of telecommunications fraud in violation of R.C.
2913.05(A), a second-degree felony; and one count of engaging in a pattern of
corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), a first-degree felony.
{¶45} A jury trial on these charges commenced on October 27, 2025. DAt
this time, the trial court dismissed the charge of telecommunications fraud on
motion of the State. At trial, the State called Michael, Anderson, Phelps,
Rabenstein, Gehres, and Kenney to testify. Special Agent Seitzman also testified at
trial about the results of his investigation. He indicated that, while the Lambs had
filed for personal bankruptcy, the Ohio businesses involved in these transactions
had been dissolved by the time of trial.
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{¶46} Special Agent Seitzman further testified that his investigation
concluded that the total known losses incurred by the victims identified in this case
was $937,862.99. He also testified that, during his investigation, he examined
Spectre’s business account at Richwood and the Lambs’ personal account at Fifth
Third Bank. He stated that he observed “a lot of commingling between the
accounts,” making it “difficult to follow some of the money.” (Tr. 564).
{¶47} On October 29, 2025, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all eight
of the remaining charges against Todd. The trial court issued its judgment entry of
sentencing on December 1, 2025.
{¶48} Todd filed his notice of appeal on December 19, 2025 and raises the
following seven assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error
The Trial Court violated Appellant’s rights to Due Process and a
fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendments [sic] to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio
Constitution by admitting extensive inadmissible hearsay through
the out-of-court statements of non-testifying codefendant Karen
Lamb.
Second Assignment of Error
The Trial Court violated Appellant’s rights under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the
Ohio Constitution by admitting testimonial out-of-court
statements from non-testifying co-defendant Karen Lamb
through surrogate witnesses and documentary evidence.
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Third Assignment of Error
The Trial Court violated Appellant’s right to due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution by instructing the
jury that it could draw inferences from facts proven by the
‘greater weight of the evidence,’ thereby improperly lowering the
State’s burden of proof in a criminal case.
Fourth Assignment of Error
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to provide
constitutionally effective representation, in violation of
Appellant’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and comparable provisions of
the Ohio Constitution.
Fifth Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred and thereby deprived Appellant of due
process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and comparable provisions of the
Ohio Constitution by overruling Appellant’s Crim. R. 29 motion
for judgment of acquittal, as the State failed to offer sufficient
evidence to prove each and every element of the charges beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Sixth Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred by finding Appellant guilty and thereby
deprived Appellant of due process of law as guaranteed by
provisions of the Ohio Constitution because the verdict of guilty
was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Seventh Assignment of Error
The cumulative effect of multiple errors deprived Appellant of a
fair trial, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and comparable provisions of the
Ohio Constitution.
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For the sake of clarity, we will examine the fifth and sixth assignments of error
together in one analysis.
First Assignment of Error
{¶49} Todd argues that several statements introduced at trial constituted
inadmissible hearsay.
Legal Standard
{¶50} “Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C).
Hearsay is inadmissible under Evid.R. 802, unless a particular
statement fails to meet the two-part definition in Evid.R. 801(C), or
fully satisfies the conditions for nonhearsay prior statements under
Evid.R. 801(D)(1) or (2), or falls within one of recognized exceptions
under Evid.R. 803 or 804.
State v. Richcreek, 2011-Ohio-4686, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.). Evid.R. 801(D)(2) addresses
several classes of out-of-court statements that do not qualify as hearsay.
{¶51} Under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(d), “[a] statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he
statement is offered against a party and is . . . a statement by the party’s agent or
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship. . . .” For Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(d) to apply, the
agent or servant did not need to have “specific authorization to make” the statement
at issue and only needed authorization “to take action regarding the matter to which
the statement relates.” State v. Parham, 2019-Ohio-358, ¶ 54 (10th Dist.).
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Standard of Review
{¶52} In general, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision as to the
admissibility of out-of-court statements for an abuse of discretion. State v. Berry,
2021-Ohio-1132, ¶ 100 (3d Dist.). However, if no objection is raised to the
admission of these statements at trial, all but plain error is forfeited on appeal. State
v. Cook, 2020-Ohio-3411, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.).
For plain error to apply, the trial court must have deviated from a legal
rule, the error must have been an obvious defect in the proceeding,
and the error must have affected a substantial right. . . . Under the
plain error standard, the appellant must demonstrate that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for the trial court’s error, the outcome
of the proceeding would have been otherwise.
(Citation omitted.) State v. Bradshaw, 2023-Ohio-1244, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.). “Plain error
is recognized ‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only
to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State v. Treece, 2025-Ohio-4319, ¶
15 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 97 (1978).
Legal Analysis
{¶53} On appeal, Todd points to the testimony that Michael gave about an
email that he received from Karen. This email read as follows:
Hi Mike,
I just wanted to let you know your motors have arrived! I’ve attached
pictures of them, and the serial numbers are 2B583436 and 2B585472.
They will stay covered up and in the crates until we are ready for them.
I’m also attaching a receipt for your payment.
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I’m not sure if you are aware, but Todd [Lamb] just had surgery this
past Tuesday July 31st. He had 2 hernia repairs and they removed his
gallbladder. He is recovering as well as can be expected, even though
the gallbladder was way worse than the surgeon anticipated, and the
hernia repairs are very painful. Todd wanted you to know that once
he is back to his old self, he is going to get started on your boat.
Hope all is well with you. Have a great weekend!
-Karen
(Ex. 15). Attached to this email were two pictures of the Mercury engines on pallets
and a receipt that was signed by Todd. This receipt stated that Michael’s recent
$62,000.00 payment “will be applied to the new Mercury 400R offshore motors for
his new 32’ Spectre Powerboat. . . .” (Ex. 18A).
{¶54} Todd asserts that the statements in this email were inadmissible
hearsay because Karen did not testify at trial. In his brief, he admits that no
objection was raised to this testimony at trial. For this reason, we will review these
arguments for plain error only. In response, the State argues that Karen sent this
email in her capacity as “agent or servant” within the meaning of Evid.R.
801(D)(2)(d) and that her statements were, therefore, admissible as nonhearsay.
{¶55} In this case, the prosecution presented evidence that Karen was an
integral part of the operations of the business and that Todd “leaned on Karen to
take care of administrative tasks” for the business. (Tr. 475-478). See City of
Hamilton v. Premier Auto Mart, Inc., 2019-Ohio-2493, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). The
testimony at trial indicates that, in her capacity at the business, Karen issued
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invoices for the work that Todd had reportedly performed; signed a dealership
agreement negotiated by Todd; signed a promissory note alongside Todd on behalf
of the business; attended meetings with Todd; was able to write checks that drew on
the company account; and communicated with customers about the payment
process.1
{¶56} Turning to the email at issue, we note that Karen sent this message
from her company email account as part of the administrative functions that she
performed while working for the business. This email was sent to confirm a
payment that was made pursuant to an agreement that Michael had with the
company. In part of the email, Karen indicated that she was relaying a message
from Todd to Michael. Further, attached to the email was a receipt that had been
signed by Todd and that confirmed Michael’s most recent payment was going to be
specifically applied to the Mercury 400R engines for his boat. Having reviewed the
relevant evidence in the record, we conclude that the challenged evidence was
nonhearsay under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(d).2
{¶57} The State also argues that the email was also admissible pursuant to
Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(c) as a statement from an authorized person and Evid.R.
801(D)(2)(e) as a statement from a co-conspirator. However, we need not consider
1
One question asked by defense counsel suggested that Karen was also a co-owner of the business, but this
was not expressly confirmed by the witness.
2
We also note that the State introduced a picture from Todd’s place of business that depicts two Mercury
engines on a shelf. In this picture, the serial numbers from the email, though blurry, can be made out on the
packaging for these engines. Written on the packaging next to these serial numbers was the following phrase:
“Mike Evans 32’ Spectre.” (Ex. 40).
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these arguments to conclude that Todd has failed to demonstrate that the admission
of this evidence constitutes plain error. Accordingly, the first assignment of error
is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶58} Todd argues that his right of confrontation was violated by Michael’s
references to his communications with Karen.
Legal Standard
{¶59} “The Confrontation Clause guarantees the right of defendants in
criminal cases ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” (Emphasis sic.)
State v. Little, 2016-Ohio-8398, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.), quoting U.S. Const., Amend. VI.
In turn, a witness is a person who “bear[s] testimony.” Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004), quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the
English Language (1828). For this reason, “the Confrontation Clause applies only
to testimonial statements.” State v. Muttart, 2007-Ohio-5267, ¶ 59.
{¶60} “To rank as ‘testimonial,’ a statement must have a ‘primary purpose’
of ‘establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.’” Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, fn. 6 (2011), quoting
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). Thus, if the speaker was essentially
making “an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony,” the statement is testimonial.
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011). In determining whether a statement
is testimonial, courts generally examine whether the utterance was made “which
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would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial.” Little at ¶ 24, quoting Crawford at 52.
Standard of Review
{¶61} Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review to challenges that
allege Confrontation Clause violations. State v. Burns, 2026-Ohio-544, ¶ 14 (3d
Dist.). However, the failure to raise an objection to an alleged violation of a
defendant’s right of confrontation at trial forfeits all but plain error on appeal. State
v. Thomas, 2020-Ohio-5379, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.).
Legal Analysis
{¶62} Todd did not object at trial to the evidence that he now challenges as
violative of his right of confrontation on appeal. For this reason, we review his
arguments for plain error only. On appeal, Todd identifies a number of instances at
trial where different witnesses described various administrative functions that Karen
performed in their dealings with Screaming Eagle or Spectre.
{¶63} However, Todd only identifies one instance in which a witness relayed
a statement from Karen at trial. During his testimony, Kenney stated: “And when I
started to pull back, Todd became increasingly aggressive, and then he started
putting Karen on the phone to make these collection calls: You’ve got to do this,
you told us you were going to do this.” (Tr. 460). Even if we assume that this was
a testimonial statement that was admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause,
we note that this was one statement in a three-day trial on eight different charges
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with multiple victims. On appeal, Todd has not advanced an argument that
establishes how the outcome of this proceeding could have been different in the
absence of this one statement. In short, we do not find any prejudice.
{¶64} In the remainder of the trial testimony that Todd identifies in support
of this argument, witnesses were describing various actions that Karen undertook.
These actions included attending meetings, giving payment instructions, receiving
payments on Venmo, answerin