Full Opinion

[Cite as State v. Lamb, 2026-Ohio-4526.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT LOGAN COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 8-25-32 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. TODD A. LAMB, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR 24 07 0134 Judgment Affirmed Date of Decision: November 16, 2026 APPEARANCES: Stephen E. Palmer for Appellant Nathan Yohey for Appellee Case No. 8-25-32 WILLAMOWSKI, J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant Todd A. Lamb (“Todd”) appeals the judgment of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that (1) inadmissible hearsay was introduced at trial; (2) his right of confrontation was violated; (3) the trial court gave inaccurate jury instructions; (4) he was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel; (5) seven of his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence; (6) seven of his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (7) cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Facts and Procedural History {¶2} Todd owned and operated a company called Screaming Eagle Boats (“Screaming Eagle”) that manufactured boats in Bellefontaine, Ohio. In 2018, Todd changed the name of his company from Screaming Eagle to Spectre Powerboats (“Spectre”). His wife, Karen Lamb (“Karen”), was involved in the routine operations of this company, performing a number of administrative functions and frequently collecting payments. Between filing the articles of incorporation for Screaming Eagle in 2015 and declaring personal bankruptcy several years later, Todd drew funds into his business through seven transactions with purchasers, lenders, and other business entities that led to the criminal charges brought against him in this case. -2- Case No. 8-25-32 {¶3} In the first transaction, a customer named Michael Evans Caradimitropoulo (“Michael”) was looking to purchase a high performance boat and reached out to Todd. In December of 2017, Michael signed a build agreement (“agreement”) for a custom thirty-foot Screaming Eagle boat with two Mercury 400R engines that was to cost approximately $194,000.00. While the agreement did not expressly provide a completion date, Michael testified that Todd indicated that his boat would be finished by May of 2018. {¶4} Under the agreement, Michael was to pay the $194,000.00 price of the boat in five installment payments by March 1, 2018. Michael testified that he made the first payment of $10,000.00 to reserve the build slot and then made the second payment of $35,000.00 in December of 2017 to begin the build process. But before Michael made the third payment of $115,000.00, his beach house suffered some damage. As a result, he did not believe that his property would be ready to accommodate his new boat in May of 2018. {¶5} Michael then communicated with Todd about delaying the completion date of the boat while the condition of his property was being addressed. The Lambs indicated that the boat completion could be delayed but that they would need $25,000.00 of the third scheduled payment to cover the costs of the motors. For this reason, Michael sent another payment of $25,000.00 in January of 2019. {¶6} When Michael sought to restart the build, Todd offered to upgrade Michael’s boat from a thirty-foot vessel to a thirty-two-foot vessel at no additional -3- Case No. 8-25-32 cost. Todd also sent an email to Michael that indicated the completion of the vessel could be timed with the start of the next boating season. Based on these new arrangements, Michael and Spectre Powerboats entered into a new agreement on July 19, 2018 for a thirty-two-foot boat with Mercury 400R engines that cost of $194,000.00. Michael then made a fourth payment of $62,000.00 in July of 2018. {¶7} Todd issued a receipt that stated this $62,000.00 payment was applied to the cost of the Mercury 400R engines. While Todd was recovering from a surgical procedure, Karen emailed Michael pictures of two Mercury engines along with a message that read as follows: “I just wanted you to know that your motors have arrived! I’ve attached pictures of them, and the serial numbers are 2B583436 and 2B585472. They will be covered up and in the crates until we are ready for them. I’m also attaching a receipt for your payment.” (Ex. 15). Todd also began texting him pictures and videos of the progress that had been made in building his boat. {¶8} In April of 2019, Michael made a fifth payment of $11,650.00. Todd told Michael that this sum was for jack plates and a trailer. Michael testified that these parts of the boat were added towards the end of the construction process and that he believed that the boat was “very close to the end of the build.” (Tr. 247). In or around May of 2019, Michael told Todd that he was traveling through Ohio and wanted to stop by Spectre to see the progress that had been made on the boat. -4- Case No. 8-25-32 Michael testified that, in response, Todd said, “don’t show up to my place, you’ll be trespassing.” (Tr. 249). {¶9} Michael stated that he did not receive anything from Spectre in exchange for the $143,650.00 he had paid for his boat. He then clarified that he did not receive the boat motors, trailer, or jack plates even though several of his payments were designated for the acquisition of these specific parts. Michael told Todd to have his attorney draft a settlement agreement that presented a plan to repay the $143,650.00 that had been paid for the boat. {¶10} Todd and Michael then signed a settlement agreement that stated Todd owed Michael $143,650.00. The boat hull, the motors, and jack plates were listed as collateral in this agreement. Michael received $16,200.00 before Todd stopped making payments in April of 2020. Michael then filed a lawsuit and hired a receiver to take inventory of the Spectre’s assets. {¶11} During this lawsuit, Michael learned that the hull of the boat and the Mercury 400R motors were not in Todd’s possession. Special Agent Steven Seitzman (“Special Agent Seitzman”) of the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation testified that, during his investigation into this matter, he learned that the Mercury 400R engines that had been purchased by Michael had been sold to someone in Florida. Michael testified that he did not receive any of the proceeds from the sale of the assets that were listed as collateral in the settlement agreement, even though -5- Case No. 8-25-32 such agreement stated he was to receive these funds. Michael testified that he had not received anything towards the civil judgment that he received against Todd. {¶12} In the second transaction, a customer named Dean Anderson (“Anderson”) called Todd and discussed the process of building a twenty-two-foot Talon XL boat with two Mercury 300XS engines. In February of 2018, Todd issued a customer quote that stated this boat could be completed at a cost of $129,664.80. Anderson testified that Todd indicated this process could be completed in four to six months. {¶13} The quote from Todd included a payment schedule under which $3,500.00 was due to secure a build slot; twenty-five percent of the total cost was due one week before construction began; fifty percent of the total cost was due when the project was halfway to completion; and the remaining balance was to be paid when the boat was set for rigging. Anderson then paid $3,500.00 to reserve a build slot for his boat. {¶14} On May 9, 2018, Anderson received an email from Todd in which he indicated that “he and Karen were in a pinch” and inquired into whether Anderson was interested in investing in their business. (Tr. 314). Todd floated the idea of Anderson investing in three sets of molds that could be used to manufacture Talon boats. Two sets of these molds—the Talon 22 SS and the Talon 22 XL—already existed. But Todd also proposed building molds for a new twenty-six-foot Talon boat. -6- Case No. 8-25-32 {¶15} In response, Anderson indicated that he was interested in starting his own business called Talon Powerboats, LLC (“TPL”) instead of simply investing in Screaming Eagle. On June 15, 2018, Todd and Anderson signed an agreement in which Anderson agreed to pay $45,000.00 for the Talon 22 SS molds; $45,000.00 for the Talon 22 XL molds; $95,000.00 for the construction of the Talon 26 molds; and $5,000.00 for the Talon brand. {¶16} Under this arrangement, the molds for the Talon boats would remain in Screaming Eagle’s possession but would be owned by TPL. Todd would manufacture the Talon boats in Bellefontaine using these molds while Anderson would sell the Talon boats through TPL. As the owner of the Talon brand, TPL was to be the exclusive seller of the Talon boats that were manufactured in these molds. {¶17} In July of 2018, Todd asked Anderson if he was interested in purchasing the Screaming Eagle Boat 24 molds so that TPL could also offer a twenty-four-foot Talon boat. On July 17, 2018, Todd and Anderson then signed an agreement in which Anderson agreed to pay $20,000.00 for this set of molds. At this point, Anderson decided to change the boat that he had previously ordered from a Talon 22 XL to a twenty-four-foot boat since he now owned the molds for a vessel of this size. {¶18} The price for the twenty-four-foot boat was $136,079.00. In addition to the $3,500.00 deposit for the build slot, Anderson was to pay $28,300.00 at the start of the build; $40,025.00 for the Mercury 300XS motors; $52,115.00 when the -7- Case No. 8-25-32 build was halfway complete; and the remaining balance when the vessel was set for rigging. The new agreement did not state when Anderson’s boat was to be completed, but Anderson testified that Todd indicated that the process would be completed in November of 2018. {¶19} In August of 2018, Spectre Powerboats posted a picture on Facebook in which Todd can be seen in front of a plug that was used in the initial stages of shaping a mold. The caption under this picture read: “The new Talon 26X coming along nicely.” (Ex. 28). Anderson paid roughly $95,934.00 for the construction of this mold. {¶20} On November 28, 2018, Anderson received the invoice for the final payment that was due when the boat that he had ordered was ready for rigging. After making this final payment, Anderson had tendered a total of $111,196.00 to Spectre. He explained that he ended up paying less than the quoted price of $136,079.00 because he decided to purchase $26,000.00 of hardware directly from vendors. He then had this hardware shipped to Todd’s place of business for installation during the rigging process. {¶21} Since the final invoice was to come when the vessel was in the final stages of construction, Anderson assumed that his boat was nearing completion in November of 2018. But when he had not received a boat seven months later, Anderson sent a cure letter to Todd via email on June 28, 2019 that requested he comply with the terms of their agreements within thirty days. In response, Todd -8- Case No. 8-25-32 sent an email that referred Anderson to Spectre’s attorney and told him not to contact the Lambs absent instructions from their attorney. Anderson then initiated a civil proceeding against Todd. {¶22} During the civil litigation, Todd admitted that he had sold the Mercury 300XS engines that Anderson had purchased to another person. Todd also admitted that he sold the hull of Anderson’s vessel to another person, even as TPL had exclusive rights to sell this line of boats. Through this civil action, Anderson was able to recover the molds for the Talon 22 SS, the Talon 22 XL, and the Talon 24 from Spectre’s possession. However, Anderson was not able to recover the boat that cost him $111,196.00 or the molds for the Talon 26 that cost him $95,934.00. {¶23} In the third transaction, a customer named William “Bill” Phelps (“Phelps”) signed a build agreement (“agreement”) on November 19, 2019 for a thirty-two-foot Spectre boat with two Mercury 450R engines. The price for this boat, after several modifications, was ultimately set at $308,918.50. Over the next year, Phelps made a series of payments that totaled $300,461.50. {¶24} On February 20, 2020, Todd posted a picture on Facebook with the following caption: “Brand new Mercury 450’s just landed at the shop today. Both of these are going on a new 32’ Spectre.” (Ex. 3). In response, Phelps posted: “Guess who’s [sic] 32’ they’re going on.” (Ex. 3). On March 10, 2020, Todd posted a picture of a hull with a “black gelcoated bottom” that fit the description of the custom boat that Phelps had ordered. (Ex. 5). On September 24, 2020, Todd posted -9- Case No. 8-25-32 a picture with the following caption: “Bill New 32’ Spectre hull with twin 450’s seeing sun for the first time.” (Ex. 6). In response, Bill Phelps posted: “It’s going to be freaking awesome.” (Ex. 6). {¶25} But when Phelps did not receive a boat, he instituted a civil proceeding against Todd. While Phelps had issued a payment to fund the purchase of two Mercury 450R engines, he learned that Todd did not ultimately apply these funds to the purchase of these motors. Through this action, Phelps was able to recover the thirty-two-foot hull of his boat and sold this item for roughly $100,000.00. {¶26} The fourth transaction was related to a 304E2CR mini hydraulic excavator that Todd obtained through a loan from the Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation (“Caterpillar Financial”). On August 30, 2019, Todd entered into an installment contract with the Ohio Machinery Company, doing business as Ohio CAT, for the purchase of a $41,500.00 mini excavator. In this agreement, Todd made $8,300.00 down payment and borrowed $33,700.00 from Caterpillar Financial to cover the remainder of the purchase price and fees. The mini excavator served as the collateral for this loan. {¶27} On September 13, 2019, Caterpillar Financial filed a Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) Financing Statement with the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office. Payments were made on this installment contract until December 17, 2020. When Caterpillar Financial contacted him in February 2021, Todd indicated that he -10- Case No. 8-25-32 intended to pay off the loan balance. Caterpillar than discovered that a receivership had been filed for Spectre. {¶28} In May of 2021, Caterpillar Financial learned that the 304E2CR mini hydraulic excavator had been sold to a person named Matt Braun at Diamond Maintenance, LLC in Michigan. Special Agent Seitzman later connected the sale of this mini excavator to a $39,500.00 payment that Spectre received on March 2, 2020. However, Caterpillar Financial did not receive any of the proceeds from this sale. At this time, the loan payoff amount on this machine was $33,566.00. {¶29} The fifth transaction at issue was related to a 305E2CR mini hydraulic excavator that Todd obtained with a loan from Caterpillar Financial. On October 20, 2020, Todd entered into a rental conversion agreement with Ohio Machinery Company for a $50,000.00 mini excavator. Todd made a $5,000.00 down payment and borrowed $45,500.00 through Caterpillar Financial to cover the remainder of the purchase price and fees. The mini excavator served as the collateral for this loan. {¶30} On October 23, 2020, Caterpillar Financial filed a UCC Financing Statement with the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office. Three payments were made under this agreement through February 2, 2021. At this point, Caterpillar Financial contacted Todd, who indicated that he intended to pay off his loans. However, Caterpillar Financial then learned that the mini excavator had already been purchased by Robert Rabenstein (“Rabenstein”) at Rabenstein Electrical in Ohio. -11- Case No. 8-25-32 {¶31} Rabenstein testified that he was interested in purchasing a mini excavator for his business and saw an online post in which Todd indicated that he was selling a mini excavator. Rabenstein went to Todd’s place of business on December 11, 2020; gave him a check for $48,000.00 to pay for the mini excavator; and took possession of the machine on that date. He later testified that Todd never mentioned that this machine was a subject to a lien. {¶32} In November of 2021, Rabenstein received a letter that informed him that Caterpillar Financial had a lien on his mini excavator. He testified that he then attempted to contact Todd but could not reach him. Rabenstein then went to Todd’s place of business and found that the facility was empty. At this time, the payoff amount for Todd’s loan on this machine was $48,760.00. Eventually, Rabenstein entered into a settlement agreement with Caterpillar Financial in which he paid them $25,000.00 to discharge the lien and keep the 305E2CR mini hydraulic excavator. {¶33} The sixth transaction at issue is a loan of $110,944.00 that Richwood Bank (“Richwood”) made with Todd, Karen, and Spectre in 2019. Todd and Karen signed the loan documents individually and on behalf of Spectre. The chief credit officer with Richwood, Brian Gehres (“Gehres”), testified that this loan had a term of seven years and was secured with collateral that was identified in the agreement. {¶34} Gehres testified that, among other assets, the collateral listed in the agreement included two Mercury boat engines with these serial numbers: 2B585472 and 2B583436. The collateral agreement stated that Richwood was to receive the -12- Case No. 8-25-32 proceeds from the sale or transfer these assets. Gehres stated that a UCC Statement that identified this collateral was filed with the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office and gave Richwood a lien on these assets. {¶35} While the loan documents that identified these two engines as collateral were executed in February of 2019, Michael Caradimitropoulo had already received an email from Karen in August of 2018 that stated he had purchased the two Mercury 400R engines with the serial numbers of 2B585472 and 2B583436. Michael was also presented with a receipt for his purchase, though this document did not include the serial numbers for the two engines. At the time the loan was issued, Richwood was unaware that these motors had already been purchased by another person. {¶36} Gehres testified that Richwood received payments on this loan through January of 2023. At this point, the principal and interest that was owed to Richwood on this loan was roughly $100,000.00. The Mercury 400R engines with the serial numbers 2B585472 and 2B583436 had not only been purchased by Michael before the loan in August of 2018 but were also sold after the loan to another person in Florida in November of 2020. While these engines were subject to the collateral agreement, Richwood did not receive any proceeds from the sale of these assets. {¶37} The seventh transaction at issue was a business arrangement with Robert Kenney (“Kenney”) and his company, DR Performance. Kenney had a lifelong interest in boats and became interested in Spectre after he saw one of their -13- Case No. 8-25-32 vessels online. He called the company and spoke with Karen about his interest in becoming a dealer for their boats. Kenney and his business partner, Dane Sweatman (“Sweatman”), traveled to Todd’s place of business in Bellefontaine, Ohio to talk with Todd and Karen about potentially making DR Performance a dealer for Spectre boats. {¶38} On September 13, 2020, Kenney, Sweatman, and Karen signed a dealership agreement. Under this agreement, DR Performance would pay a $10,000.00 deposit per build slot and roughly $100,000.00 for each hull that Spectre manufactured for them. DR Performance was also going to purchase the boat engines through Spectre for Todd to mount on the hulls. After receiving the hull and engines, DR Performance would then complete the process by rigging the vessels and selling the boats. While the agreement was open ended, DR Performance committed to an initial purchase of four boat hulls. {¶39} Kenney, Sweatman, and Todd then signed a collateral agreement that gave DR Performance a security interest in the molds that Todd used to make the 32 Spectre and the 36 Spectre. Sweatman and Kenney then made a series of payments to Spectre that totaled $148,132.48. Kenney testified that he had not received any hulls by April of 2021 and that Todd had been giving reasons why the hulls were delayed or not yet ready for transport. {¶40} After Kenney communicated his concerns, Todd responded by indicating that he was influential in his town; that he could “control[]” any -14- Case No. 8-25-32 investigation that might be opened; that “it was all just some mistake”; and that he would only speak with Sweatman in the future. (Tr. 461). On May 14, 2021, Kenney had his attorney file a UCC Financing Statement with the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office for the molds at Spectre that were listed as collateral in their agreement. However, Kenney was never able to locate the molds. Kenney testified that he learned that Todd had put the molds for the Spectre 36 boats up for sale on Facebook marketplace for $100,000.00. {¶41} Todd had also sent Kenney the hull and 450R Mercury engines for the boat that Phelps had ordered and asked Kenney to complete the rigging process. But when Kenney reached out to Phelps to discuss the price of rigging the boat, Phelps indicated that he had already paid Todd in full for a completed boat. Kenney testified that he then contacted Todd, who “demand[ed]” the return Phelps’s boat to his facility but stated that Kenney could retain the 450R engines if he wanted to purchase them. {¶42} Kenney explained that Mercury had a program that did not require boat manufactures to pay for their engines for one year after delivery. He then testified that Todd indicated that this one-year period was about to expire and that Mercury would be demanding payment. After speaking with Sweatman, Kenney wired $90,000.00 directly to Mercury to pay for the 450R engines that had come with Phelps’s boat. -15- Case No. 8-25-32 {¶43} After he received the certificate of ownership from Mercury, Kenney sold these engines to a person in California. However, Kenney had not been made aware that Phelps had already paid Todd for these engines. Kenney eventually began to receive calls from investigators who were looking into Todd’s activities. After Kenney mentioned these calls during a conversation, Todd just gave him “endless threats.” (Tr. 472). {¶44} On July 9, 2024, Todd was indicted on four counts of grand theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2), fourth-degree felonies; one count of aggravated theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2), a third-degree felony; one count of theft from a person in a protected class in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2), a first-degree felony; one count of defrauding creditors in violation of R.C. 2913.45(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony; one count of telecommunications fraud in violation of R.C. 2913.05(A), a second-degree felony; and one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), a first-degree felony. {¶45} A jury trial on these charges commenced on October 27, 2025. DAt this time, the trial court dismissed the charge of telecommunications fraud on motion of the State. At trial, the State called Michael, Anderson, Phelps, Rabenstein, Gehres, and Kenney to testify. Special Agent Seitzman also testified at trial about the results of his investigation. He indicated that, while the Lambs had filed for personal bankruptcy, the Ohio businesses involved in these transactions had been dissolved by the time of trial. -16- Case No. 8-25-32 {¶46} Special Agent Seitzman further testified that his investigation concluded that the total known losses incurred by the victims identified in this case was $937,862.99. He also testified that, during his investigation, he examined Spectre’s business account at Richwood and the Lambs’ personal account at Fifth Third Bank. He stated that he observed “a lot of commingling between the accounts,” making it “difficult to follow some of the money.” (Tr. 564). {¶47} On October 29, 2025, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all eight of the remaining charges against Todd. The trial court issued its judgment entry of sentencing on December 1, 2025. {¶48} Todd filed his notice of appeal on December 19, 2025 and raises the following seven assignments of error: First Assignment of Error The Trial Court violated Appellant’s rights to Due Process and a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendments [sic] to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution by admitting extensive inadmissible hearsay through the out-of-court statements of non-testifying codefendant Karen Lamb. Second Assignment of Error The Trial Court violated Appellant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution by admitting testimonial out-of-court statements from non-testifying co-defendant Karen Lamb through surrogate witnesses and documentary evidence. -17- Case No. 8-25-32 Third Assignment of Error The Trial Court violated Appellant’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution by instructing the jury that it could draw inferences from facts proven by the ‘greater weight of the evidence,’ thereby improperly lowering the State’s burden of proof in a criminal case. Fourth Assignment of Error Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to provide constitutionally effective representation, in violation of Appellant’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution. Fifth Assignment of Error The Trial Court erred and thereby deprived Appellant of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution by overruling Appellant’s Crim. R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, as the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove each and every element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Sixth Assignment of Error The Trial Court erred by finding Appellant guilty and thereby deprived Appellant of due process of law as guaranteed by provisions of the Ohio Constitution because the verdict of guilty was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Seventh Assignment of Error The cumulative effect of multiple errors deprived Appellant of a fair trial, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution. -18- Case No. 8-25-32 For the sake of clarity, we will examine the fifth and sixth assignments of error together in one analysis. First Assignment of Error {¶49} Todd argues that several statements introduced at trial constituted inadmissible hearsay. Legal Standard {¶50} “Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C). Hearsay is inadmissible under Evid.R. 802, unless a particular statement fails to meet the two-part definition in Evid.R. 801(C), or fully satisfies the conditions for nonhearsay prior statements under Evid.R. 801(D)(1) or (2), or falls within one of recognized exceptions under Evid.R. 803 or 804. State v. Richcreek, 2011-Ohio-4686, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.). Evid.R. 801(D)(2) addresses several classes of out-of-court statements that do not qualify as hearsay. {¶51} Under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(d), “[a] statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is . . . a statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. . . .” For Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(d) to apply, the agent or servant did not need to have “specific authorization to make” the statement at issue and only needed authorization “to take action regarding the matter to which the statement relates.” State v. Parham, 2019-Ohio-358, ¶ 54 (10th Dist.). -19- Case No. 8-25-32 Standard of Review {¶52} In general, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision as to the admissibility of out-of-court statements for an abuse of discretion. State v. Berry, 2021-Ohio-1132, ¶ 100 (3d Dist.). However, if no objection is raised to the admission of these statements at trial, all but plain error is forfeited on appeal. State v. Cook, 2020-Ohio-3411, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.). For plain error to apply, the trial court must have deviated from a legal rule, the error must have been an obvious defect in the proceeding, and the error must have affected a substantial right. . . . Under the plain error standard, the appellant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the trial court’s error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been otherwise. (Citation omitted.) State v. Bradshaw, 2023-Ohio-1244, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.). “Plain error is recognized ‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State v. Treece, 2025-Ohio-4319, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 97 (1978). Legal Analysis {¶53} On appeal, Todd points to the testimony that Michael gave about an email that he received from Karen. This email read as follows: Hi Mike, I just wanted to let you know your motors have arrived! I’ve attached pictures of them, and the serial numbers are 2B583436 and 2B585472. They will stay covered up and in the crates until we are ready for them. I’m also attaching a receipt for your payment. -20- Case No. 8-25-32 I’m not sure if you are aware, but Todd [Lamb] just had surgery this past Tuesday July 31st. He had 2 hernia repairs and they removed his gallbladder. He is recovering as well as can be expected, even though the gallbladder was way worse than the surgeon anticipated, and the hernia repairs are very painful. Todd wanted you to know that once he is back to his old self, he is going to get started on your boat. Hope all is well with you. Have a great weekend! -Karen (Ex. 15). Attached to this email were two pictures of the Mercury engines on pallets and a receipt that was signed by Todd. This receipt stated that Michael’s recent $62,000.00 payment “will be applied to the new Mercury 400R offshore motors for his new 32’ Spectre Powerboat. . . .” (Ex. 18A). {¶54} Todd asserts that the statements in this email were inadmissible hearsay because Karen did not testify at trial. In his brief, he admits that no objection was raised to this testimony at trial. For this reason, we will review these arguments for plain error only. In response, the State argues that Karen sent this email in her capacity as “agent or servant” within the meaning of Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(d) and that her statements were, therefore, admissible as nonhearsay. {¶55} In this case, the prosecution presented evidence that Karen was an integral part of the operations of the business and that Todd “leaned on Karen to take care of administrative tasks” for the business. (Tr. 475-478). See City of Hamilton v. Premier Auto Mart, Inc., 2019-Ohio-2493, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). The testimony at trial indicates that, in her capacity at the business, Karen issued -21- Case No. 8-25-32 invoices for the work that Todd had reportedly performed; signed a dealership agreement negotiated by Todd; signed a promissory note alongside Todd on behalf of the business; attended meetings with Todd; was able to write checks that drew on the company account; and communicated with customers about the payment process.1 {¶56} Turning to the email at issue, we note that Karen sent this message from her company email account as part of the administrative functions that she performed while working for the business. This email was sent to confirm a payment that was made pursuant to an agreement that Michael had with the company. In part of the email, Karen indicated that she was relaying a message from Todd to Michael. Further, attached to the email was a receipt that had been signed by Todd and that confirmed Michael’s most recent payment was going to be specifically applied to the Mercury 400R engines for his boat. Having reviewed the relevant evidence in the record, we conclude that the challenged evidence was nonhearsay under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(d).2 {¶57} The State also argues that the email was also admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(c) as a statement from an authorized person and Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e) as a statement from a co-conspirator. However, we need not consider 1 One question asked by defense counsel suggested that Karen was also a co-owner of the business, but this was not expressly confirmed by the witness. 2 We also note that the State introduced a picture from Todd’s place of business that depicts two Mercury engines on a shelf. In this picture, the serial numbers from the email, though blurry, can be made out on the packaging for these engines. Written on the packaging next to these serial numbers was the following phrase: “Mike Evans 32’ Spectre.” (Ex. 40). -22- Case No. 8-25-32 these arguments to conclude that Todd has failed to demonstrate that the admission of this evidence constitutes plain error. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled. Second Assignment of Error {¶58} Todd argues that his right of confrontation was violated by Michael’s references to his communications with Karen. Legal Standard {¶59} “The Confrontation Clause guarantees the right of defendants in criminal cases ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Little, 2016-Ohio-8398, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.), quoting U.S. Const., Amend. VI. In turn, a witness is a person who “bear[s] testimony.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004), quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828). For this reason, “the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial statements.” State v. Muttart, 2007-Ohio-5267, ¶ 59. {¶60} “To rank as ‘testimonial,’ a statement must have a ‘primary purpose’ of ‘establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’” Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, fn. 6 (2011), quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). Thus, if the speaker was essentially making “an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony,” the statement is testimonial. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011). In determining whether a statement is testimonial, courts generally examine whether the utterance was made “which -23- Case No. 8-25-32 would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Little at ¶ 24, quoting Crawford at 52. Standard of Review {¶61} Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review to challenges that allege Confrontation Clause violations. State v. Burns, 2026-Ohio-544, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.). However, the failure to raise an objection to an alleged violation of a defendant’s right of confrontation at trial forfeits all but plain error on appeal. State v. Thomas, 2020-Ohio-5379, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.). Legal Analysis {¶62} Todd did not object at trial to the evidence that he now challenges as violative of his right of confrontation on appeal. For this reason, we review his arguments for plain error only. On appeal, Todd identifies a number of instances at trial where different witnesses described various administrative functions that Karen performed in their dealings with Screaming Eagle or Spectre. {¶63} However, Todd only identifies one instance in which a witness relayed a statement from Karen at trial. During his testimony, Kenney stated: “And when I started to pull back, Todd became increasingly aggressive, and then he started putting Karen on the phone to make these collection calls: You’ve got to do this, you told us you were going to do this.” (Tr. 460). Even if we assume that this was a testimonial statement that was admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause, we note that this was one statement in a three-day trial on eight different charges -24- Case No. 8-25-32 with multiple victims. On appeal, Todd has not advanced an argument that establishes how the outcome of this proceeding could have been different in the absence of this one statement. In short, we do not find any prejudice. {¶64} In the remainder of the trial testimony that Todd identifies in support of this argument, witnesses were describing various actions that Karen undertook. These actions included attending meetings, giving payment instructions, receiving payments on Venmo, answerin