State v. Summers
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket116408
JudgeKeough
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Summers, 2026-Ohio-4585.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 116408
v. :
ARNELL SUMMERS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 19, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-26-708711-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Michael J. Stechschulte, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Patrick S. Lavelle, for appellant.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
Defendant-appellant Arnell Summers (“Summers”) appeals his
convictions following a guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, this court affirms.
I. Procedural History and Background
In January 2026, the State named Summers in a 15-count indictment,
charging him with having weapons while under disability (Counts 1, 2, 13, and 14);
aggravated menacing (Count 3); safecracking (Counts 4 and 15); aggravated
burglary (Count 5); burglary (Count 6); felonious assault (Count 7); strangulation
(Counts 8-10); domestic violence (Count 11); and criminal damaging or endangering
(Count 12). Counts 7 through 11 contained one-year firearm specifications.
The indictment stemmed from two incidents involving the same
female victim that occurred in November 2025. During the first incident, Summers
arrived at the victim’s home, retrieved a firearm from the victim’s car, and
demanded entry into the victim’s home while making deadly threats. Approximately
ten days after this incident, Summers broke into the victim’s home, demanded
money, and physically assaulted the victim.
In March 2026, the State and Summers entered into a plea
agreement. The State amended Counts 10 and 11 — strangulation and domestic
violence, respectively — by deleting the one-year firearm specification attendant to
each count. Summers agreed to plead guilty to those amended counts and to having
weapons while under disability as charged in Counts 1, 2, 13, and 14, and burglary
as charged in Count 6. The State nolled the remaining counts. At the sentencing
hearing, the trial court ordered Summers to serve a minimum prison term of six
years and a maximum term of seven years and six months.
II. The Appeal
Summers now appeals, raising two assignments of error.
A. Crim.R. 11 — Right to Compulsory Process
In his first assignment of error, Summers contends that he did not
enter a knowing, intelligent, or voluntary plea because the trial court did not
properly advise him of his right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses.
Specifically, he contends that the advisement that he could “bring in your own
witnesses to testify on your behalf,” was insufficient under Crim.R. 11.
A guilty plea involves a waiver of constitutional rights; thus, a
defendant’s decision to enter a plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 10, citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29
(1992); State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 25. “If the plea was not made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional.” Id.
Crim.R. 11 outlines the procedures that trial courts are to follow when accepting
pleas; its purpose is to convey certain information to defendants so they can make a
voluntary and intelligent decision regarding whether to plead guilty. Id. at ¶ 11-12;
State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480 (1981). When reviewing guilty pleas,
a court is to focus on whether “the dialogue between the court and the defendant
demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his [or her] plea.”
Dangler at ¶ 12, citing State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 15-16.
“[A] defendant who challenges [a] guilty plea on the basis that it was
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made” is generally not entitled to have
the plea vacated unless it is demonstrated that an error occurred and that prejudice
arose from the failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11.
State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). The test for prejudice is “‘whether the
plea would have otherwise been made.’” Dangler at ¶ 16, quoting Nero at id.
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that there are two
instances in which a defendant is excused from the burden of demonstrating
prejudice: (1) when a trial court fails to inform a defendant of the constitutional
rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), and (2) when a trial court completely fails to
advise a defendant of the nonconstitutional requirements of Crim.R. 11. State v.
Fontanez, 2026-Ohio-3281, ¶ 25-26. Thus, the questions that need to be addressed
are (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the
court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that
excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a
showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden? Dangler at
¶ 17.
When a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights that a
defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, a reviewing court can presume
that the plea was not entered voluntarily and knowingly, and thus no showing of
prejudice is required. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, at ¶ 31; Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, at
syllabus. Those constitutional rights as set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) include the
right to a jury trial, the right to confront one’s accusers, the privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, and the right to
require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-
2765, at ¶ 14, citing Veney at ¶ 19. To strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), the
court must advise the defendant of each of the enumerated constitutional rights that
the defendant is giving up by pleading guilty or no contest. State v. Miller, 2020-
Ohio-1420, ¶ 17. The court, however, need not recite the language in
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) verbatim to strictly comply with the rule, but the record must
show “that the trial court explained or referred to the right in a manner reasonably
intelligible to that defendant.” Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d at 480.
In this case, Summers contends that the trial court failed to advise
him pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) of his constitutional right to compulsory
process to obtain witnesses. During the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, the trial court
asked Summers about the constitutional rights he would be waiving by pleading
guilty, including the right to compulsory process.
THE COURT: If you had a trial, your lawyer would get to ask questions
of any witness who came in to court to testify. Do you understand
you’re giving up that right?
[SUMMERS]: Yes.
THE COURT: You also have the right to bring in your own witnesses to
testify on your behalf. Do you understand you’re giving up that right?
[SUMMERS]: Yes.
(Tr. 17-18.)
Summers contends that the trial court’s advisement was insufficient
because the court was required to advise him that “he had a right to compel the
attendance of a witness at a trial if they were not voluntarily willing to appear.” In
support, Summers relies on State v. Shropshire, 2025-Ohio-881 (12th Dist.), and
State v. Phillips, 2025-Ohio-1235 (10th Dist.), in which both courts declared the
pleas invalid because the respective trial courts completely failed to address or even
mention that the defendant had the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses.
The State directs this court to State v. Barker, 2011-Ohio-4130,
wherein the Ohio Supreme Court examined whether the phrase “right to call
witnesses to speak on your behalf” sufficiently notified a defendant of their right to
compulsory process. Id. at ¶ 1. The Court held that such language was a “reasonably
intelligible” explanation of a defendant’s right to compulsory process. Id. at ¶ 20.
The Court explained that “to call” means to summon or command and conveys the
idea that someone is required to appear or perform and the term was more
understandable than legal terms such as “compulsory process,” “subpoena,” and
“compel witnesses.” Id.
In State v. Jenkins, 2016-Ohio-8563 (7th Dist.), the Seventh District,
relying on Barker, found that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 when it
advised the defendant that “you can bring witnesses in on your own behalf.” Id. at
¶ 12. Recognizing that the words “call” and “bring” were not synonymous, the court
found, however, that the usage of the words was a matter of “semantics” because the
record was “clear that the trial court was attempting to use common verbiage instead
of legalese.” Id.
In this case, unlike Shropshire, 2025-Ohio-881 (12th Dist.), and
Phillips, 2025-Ohio-1235 (10th Dist.), but more akin to Barker, 2011-Ohio-4130,
and Jenkins, the trial court mentioned Summers’s right to compulsory process but
did not use Crim.R. 11’s exact language. Although the trial court did not explicitly
say “compulsory process,” a deviation from the exact language suffices if “the record
shows that the trial court explained or referred to the right in a manner reasonably
intelligible to that defendant.” Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d at 480.
We find that the court’s statement was sufficient, and Summers has
not directed this court to anything in the record to allow this court to conclude that
the trial court’s statement was not “done in a manner reasonably intelligible” to
Summers. Our review of the record reveals that Summers stated during the plea
colloquy that he had attended college and understood the nature of the proceedings.
(Tr. 15-16.) He did not express any confusion or ask any questions during the
colloquy that would indicate to this court that he did not understand his rights that
he was waiving by pleading guilty.
Based on the foregoing, we find that Summers entered a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary plea. Accordingly, we find no merit to Summers’s first
assignment of error, and it is overruled.
B. Postrelease Control
Summers contends in his second assignment of error that the trial
court erred when it sentenced him “without complying with R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)
[that] required the court to notify [him] that he is subject to the postconviction [sic]
control provisions of [R.C.] 2967.28.” In support, Summers directs this court to
R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(d) and (e) and caselaw from 1998 and 1999.
In State v. Miller, 2025-Ohio-5350 (8th Dist.), this court considered
this identical argument and supporting legal authority. This court noted:
The exact quoted verbiage that Miller claims was omitted [from the
trial court’s advisement] has not appeared in R.C. 2929.19 since 2009.
Since that time, the statute has been amended numerous times. All of
the caselaw that Miller relies on in support of this assigned error are
pre-2009 cases that do not account for the language that was added in
2010 and as amended since.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Notwithstanding his reliance on former law, Summers has also not
directed this court to a specific portion of the transcript indicating that the court’s
sentencing advisement about postrelease control was incorrect or misleading. See
App.R. 16(A)(7). Our review of the sentencing transcript reveals that Summers was
properly advised about the mandatory nature of postrelease control and any
potential consequences for violating postrelease control upon his release from
prison. Accordingly, his second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR