Full Opinion

[Cite as State v. Summers, 2026-Ohio-4585.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 116408 v. : ARNELL SUMMERS, : Defendant-Appellant. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 19, 2026 Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-26-708711-A Appearances: Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael J. Stechschulte, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Patrick S. Lavelle, for appellant. KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: Defendant-appellant Arnell Summers (“Summers”) appeals his convictions following a guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, this court affirms. I. Procedural History and Background In January 2026, the State named Summers in a 15-count indictment, charging him with having weapons while under disability (Counts 1, 2, 13, and 14); aggravated menacing (Count 3); safecracking (Counts 4 and 15); aggravated burglary (Count 5); burglary (Count 6); felonious assault (Count 7); strangulation (Counts 8-10); domestic violence (Count 11); and criminal damaging or endangering (Count 12). Counts 7 through 11 contained one-year firearm specifications. The indictment stemmed from two incidents involving the same female victim that occurred in November 2025. During the first incident, Summers arrived at the victim’s home, retrieved a firearm from the victim’s car, and demanded entry into the victim’s home while making deadly threats. Approximately ten days after this incident, Summers broke into the victim’s home, demanded money, and physically assaulted the victim. In March 2026, the State and Summers entered into a plea agreement. The State amended Counts 10 and 11 — strangulation and domestic violence, respectively — by deleting the one-year firearm specification attendant to each count. Summers agreed to plead guilty to those amended counts and to having weapons while under disability as charged in Counts 1, 2, 13, and 14, and burglary as charged in Count 6. The State nolled the remaining counts. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Summers to serve a minimum prison term of six years and a maximum term of seven years and six months. II. The Appeal Summers now appeals, raising two assignments of error. A. Crim.R. 11 — Right to Compulsory Process In his first assignment of error, Summers contends that he did not enter a knowing, intelligent, or voluntary plea because the trial court did not properly advise him of his right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses. Specifically, he contends that the advisement that he could “bring in your own witnesses to testify on your behalf,” was insufficient under Crim.R. 11. A guilty plea involves a waiver of constitutional rights; thus, a defendant’s decision to enter a plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 10, citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992); State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 25. “If the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional.” Id. Crim.R. 11 outlines the procedures that trial courts are to follow when accepting pleas; its purpose is to convey certain information to defendants so they can make a voluntary and intelligent decision regarding whether to plead guilty. Id. at ¶ 11-12; State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480 (1981). When reviewing guilty pleas, a court is to focus on whether “the dialogue between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his [or her] plea.” Dangler at ¶ 12, citing State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 15-16. “[A] defendant who challenges [a] guilty plea on the basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made” is generally not entitled to have the plea vacated unless it is demonstrated that an error occurred and that prejudice arose from the failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11. State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). The test for prejudice is “‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’” Dangler at ¶ 16, quoting Nero at id. However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that there are two instances in which a defendant is excused from the burden of demonstrating prejudice: (1) when a trial court fails to inform a defendant of the constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), and (2) when a trial court completely fails to advise a defendant of the nonconstitutional requirements of Crim.R. 11. State v. Fontanez, 2026-Ohio-3281, ¶ 25-26. Thus, the questions that need to be addressed are (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden? Dangler at ¶ 17. When a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, a reviewing court can presume that the plea was not entered voluntarily and knowingly, and thus no showing of prejudice is required. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, at ¶ 31; Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, at syllabus. Those constitutional rights as set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) include the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one’s accusers, the privilege against self- incrimination, the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, and the right to require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Dangler, 2020-Ohio- 2765, at ¶ 14, citing Veney at ¶ 19. To strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), the court must advise the defendant of each of the enumerated constitutional rights that the defendant is giving up by pleading guilty or no contest. State v. Miller, 2020- Ohio-1420, ¶ 17. The court, however, need not recite the language in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) verbatim to strictly comply with the rule, but the record must show “that the trial court explained or referred to the right in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant.” Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d at 480. In this case, Summers contends that the trial court failed to advise him pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) of his constitutional right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses. During the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, the trial court asked Summers about the constitutional rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty, including the right to compulsory process. THE COURT: If you had a trial, your lawyer would get to ask questions of any witness who came in to court to testify. Do you understand you’re giving up that right? [SUMMERS]: Yes. THE COURT: You also have the right to bring in your own witnesses to testify on your behalf. Do you understand you’re giving up that right? [SUMMERS]: Yes. (Tr. 17-18.) Summers contends that the trial court’s advisement was insufficient because the court was required to advise him that “he had a right to compel the attendance of a witness at a trial if they were not voluntarily willing to appear.” In support, Summers relies on State v. Shropshire, 2025-Ohio-881 (12th Dist.), and State v. Phillips, 2025-Ohio-1235 (10th Dist.), in which both courts declared the pleas invalid because the respective trial courts completely failed to address or even mention that the defendant had the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses. The State directs this court to State v. Barker, 2011-Ohio-4130, wherein the Ohio Supreme Court examined whether the phrase “right to call witnesses to speak on your behalf” sufficiently notified a defendant of their right to compulsory process. Id. at ¶ 1. The Court held that such language was a “reasonably intelligible” explanation of a defendant’s right to compulsory process. Id. at ¶ 20. The Court explained that “to call” means to summon or command and conveys the idea that someone is required to appear or perform and the term was more understandable than legal terms such as “compulsory process,” “subpoena,” and “compel witnesses.” Id. In State v. Jenkins, 2016-Ohio-8563 (7th Dist.), the Seventh District, relying on Barker, found that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 when it advised the defendant that “you can bring witnesses in on your own behalf.” Id. at ¶ 12. Recognizing that the words “call” and “bring” were not synonymous, the court found, however, that the usage of the words was a matter of “semantics” because the record was “clear that the trial court was attempting to use common verbiage instead of legalese.” Id. In this case, unlike Shropshire, 2025-Ohio-881 (12th Dist.), and Phillips, 2025-Ohio-1235 (10th Dist.), but more akin to Barker, 2011-Ohio-4130, and Jenkins, the trial court mentioned Summers’s right to compulsory process but did not use Crim.R. 11’s exact language. Although the trial court did not explicitly say “compulsory process,” a deviation from the exact language suffices if “the record shows that the trial court explained or referred to the right in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant.” Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d at 480. We find that the court’s statement was sufficient, and Summers has not directed this court to anything in the record to allow this court to conclude that the trial court’s statement was not “done in a manner reasonably intelligible” to Summers. Our review of the record reveals that Summers stated during the plea colloquy that he had attended college and understood the nature of the proceedings. (Tr. 15-16.) He did not express any confusion or ask any questions during the colloquy that would indicate to this court that he did not understand his rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty. Based on the foregoing, we find that Summers entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. Accordingly, we find no merit to Summers’s first assignment of error, and it is overruled. B. Postrelease Control Summers contends in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred when it sentenced him “without complying with R.C. 2929.19(B)(3) [that] required the court to notify [him] that he is subject to the postconviction [sic] control provisions of [R.C.] 2967.28.” In support, Summers directs this court to R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(d) and (e) and caselaw from 1998 and 1999. In State v. Miller, 2025-Ohio-5350 (8th Dist.), this court considered this identical argument and supporting legal authority. This court noted: The exact quoted verbiage that Miller claims was omitted [from the trial court’s advisement] has not appeared in R.C. 2929.19 since 2009. Since that time, the statute has been amended numerous times. All of the caselaw that Miller relies on in support of this assigned error are pre-2009 cases that do not account for the language that was added in 2010 and as amended since. Id. at ¶ 9. Notwithstanding his reliance on former law, Summers has also not directed this court to a specific portion of the transcript indicating that the court’s sentencing advisement about postrelease control was incorrect or misleading. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Our review of the sentencing transcript reveals that Summers was properly advised about the mandatory nature of postrelease control and any potential consequences for violating postrelease control upon his release from prison. Accordingly, his second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR