State v. Mosley
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledOctober 27, 2026
Docket25AP-852
JudgeBeatty Blunt
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Mosley, 2026-Ohio-4254.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State of Ohio, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 25AP-852
v. : (C.P.C. No. 17CR-3225)
Kayode W. Mosley, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellant. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on October 27, 2026
On brief: Shayla D. Favor, Prosecuting Attorney, and
Kimberly M. Bond, for appellee.
On brief: Carpenter Lipps, LLP, Kort Gatterdam, and
Michael Rogers, for appellant.
On brief: Kayode W. Mosley, pro se.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Kayode W. Mosley, appeals the September 23, 2026
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty of the
stipulated lesser offense of nonsupport of dependents in violation of R.C. 2919.21 as a
misdemeanor of the first degree, pursuant to his plea of guilty in accordance with N.
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). The trial court imposed a sentence of nine days of
incarceration but granted Mosley jail-time credit for the entire term. The court did not
impose a fine or court costs and did not impose any community control sanctions on
Mosley.
{¶ 2} Mosley appealed, and his appointed counsel filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Appointed counsel stated that they had
No. 25AP-852 2
“conscientiously reviewed the entirely of the 823-page record to determine if there is
arguable merit in challenging Mosley’s guilty plea and sentence,” but found that “there is
none.” (Appellant’s Anders Brief at 6.) In accordance with Anders, appointed counsel
identified a single potential arguable assignment of error:
The trial court erred in accepting Mosley’s guilty plea because
it was not entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.
Upon receipt of his appointed counsel’s Anders brief, Mosley filed a pro se brief and argued
that his appointed counsel’s brief “Does Not Establish That Appellant’s Appeal Is Wholly
Frivolous.” Mosley asserted that the record “Demonstrates Numerous Arguable Issues
That Required Adversarial Briefing [sic],” that “Multiple Appointed Attorneys Reached the
Same Conclusion Without Demonstrating Why Appellant’s Defenses Were Frivolous [sic].”
(Appellant’s Supp. Brief at 1.) Mosley went on to assert that the record contained numerous
arguable issues, specifying that these issues included, “among others”:
• whether appointed trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by repeatedly refusing to investigate or present
Appellant’s asserted defenses;
• whether the trial court improperly restricted the presentation
of evidence concerning Appellant’s inability to pay, willfulness,
and statutory affirmative defense under R.C. 2919.21(D);
• whether Appellant’s compliance with court-directed Title IV-
A work-participation activities was adequately investigated;
• whether the prosecution failed to disclose or investigate
governmental records allegedly favorable to the defense;
• whether the record before this Court is complete for purposes
of meaningful appellate review;
• whether counsel accurately advised Appellant concerning the
scope of the indictment and the legal consequences of the plea
proceedings; and
• whether Appellant’s repeated factual assertions, many of
which were never rebutted by the prosecution, present issues
requiring adversarial briefing rather than summary dismissal.
Id. at 8.
No. 25AP-852 3
{¶ 3} In response, the state filed a supplemental brief arguing that no non-frivolous
issues existed for this court’s review. Addressing the above arguments, the state observed
that Mosley was essentially arguing “that appellate litigation is needed because there is no
authority in the record to show that his claims were meritless and because counsel did not
explain on the record why his defense lacked merit.” (Appellee Supp. Brief at 2.) But the
state properly noted that by entering a plea of guilty, even a so-called Alford plea, Mosley
forfeited those arguments, citing, inter alia, State v. Vale, 2023-Ohio-4287 (10th Dist.):
Appellant pled guilty to the offenses at issue here, which limits
the claims he may bring. As the United States Supreme Court
explained in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S. Ct. 1602,
36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973), “a guilty plea represents a break in the
chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.
When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open
court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is
charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred
prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Id. at 267.
Vale at ¶ 24 (10th Dist.). Mosley, in turn, argued that his arguments were not forfeited,
“[b]ecause Appellant’s arguments challenge the adequacy of counsel’s investigation and the
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the plea itself . . . .” (Appellant’s Reply to the
State’s Supp. Brief at 3.)
{¶ 4} But on review of the record and briefs, we do not believe it is necessary to
address the merits of this appeal, as it is moot. It is firmly established that if a defendant
“convicted of a misdemeanor has not moved for a stay of his sentence, and has completed
the sentence and paid any fine or costs, his appeal is moot unless he is subject to a collateral
legal disability stemming from the conviction.” State v. Thatcher, 2024-Ohio-5993, ¶ 9
(10th Dist.), quoting State v. Collins, 2013-Ohio-5642, ¶ 16 (7th Dist.). Accord State v.
Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 236, 325 (1975), syllabus.
{¶ 5} Because Mosley has not identified any collateral disability to which he would
be subject to, and because he has completed his misdemeanor jail sentence and was not
No. 25AP-852 4
required to pay a fine or court costs, under longstanding Ohio law, his appeal is moot. We
have found nothing in the law or record to indicate a contrary conclusion.
{¶ 6} Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal is moot and must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
BOGGS, P.J., and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.