Full Opinion

[Cite as State v. Watts, 2026-Ohio-4579.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 116134 v. : MARTINIS WATTS, : Defendant-Appellant. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 19, 2026 Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-16-606515-A Appearances: Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Timms and Carla Neuhauser, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. Jaye M. Schlachet and Eric M. Levy, for appellant. KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: Martinis Watts (“Watts”) appeals his convictions and sentence for two counts of rape. He maintains that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered and assigns error related to such. After a thorough review of the facts and law, we affirm. In May 2016, a grand jury charged Watts in a six-count indictment with four counts of rape, three of which contained sexually violent predator specifications, and two counts of kidnapping that contained sexually violent predator and sexual motivation specifications. The indictment related to offenses committed against two victims between January 26, 1997, and June 5, 1997. Watts had been incarcerated in Florida and was not arrested in connection with this indictment until October 2023. At a pretrial held on November 21, 2023, Watts was referred to the court psychiatric clinic and placed on the mental health docket. The court held a competency hearing on April 18, 2024, where it was determined that Watts was not competent to stand trial but could be restored to competency with a course of inpatient treatment under R.C. 2945.38. Following treatment at Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare, Watts was found competent to stand trial in a competency-restoration report dated November 6, 2024. In December 2024, the parties stipulated to the competency report and the trial court set trial for March 2025. At a status hearing in February 2025, the court’s resulting journal entry provides that during the hearing, Watts requested a new attorney, and the trial court granted this request. Trial was continued for Watts’s new counsel to prepare for trial. In January 2026, on the date trial was to commence, Watts presented a pro se motion to disqualify his trial counsel, who was unaware of Watts’s prepared motion or decision to disqualify him. The court questioned Watts about the motion, to which Watts responded that he had filed a grievance against his counsel “because he won’t file a motion that I asked him to file a motion on.” (Tr. 64.) The court admonished Watts, stating, “[T]his is the day of trial. This isn’t the time to have these little motions filed. . . . You had ample opportunity to discuss this with your attorney, and you have not. Why are you bringing it up right now?” (Tr. 65.) Watts’s counsel explained that Watts indeed had requested that he file a speedy-trial motion. Counsel explained, however, that he reviewed the grounds for a speedy-trial motion and a statute-of-limitations defense and determined that neither were viable. Counsel explained: I believe it is his frustration with my disagreement with him in terms of what the state of the law is, and the fact that I have not filed those motions because I’m bound as an officer of the Court not to file what I believe to be spurious motions. I know he is frustrated by that issue, and I think that is what he is referring to. But I’ll put my record or place upon the record my belief that, after carefully review[ing] those issues, I don’t believe . . . we have a claim for any relief there. (Tr. 66-67.) The court noted that it had already assigned Watts new counsel once before and that Watts’s grievances appeared to be with the laws, not with counsel. Watts contested this notion, repeatedly arguing that his constitutional rights had been violated because “I don’t want him as my lawyer, and you all not letting me put in a motion for a speedy trial and a statute of limitations period.” (Tr. 69.) The court again denied his request, and Watts requested to take the case to trial. After a lunch recess, the parties informed the court that they had reached a plea agreement where Watts would plead guilty to two counts of rape without any attendant specifications. The court engaged in a lengthy colloquy where Watts acknowledged that (1) he had not been threatened or forced into entering his plea, (2) he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation, (3) he was waiving various trial-related rights by entering a guilty plea, and (4) he understood that the felonies to which he was pleading were each punishable by three to 11 years in prison. On January 29, 2026, the parties convened for sentencing. The court addressed that it had received another filing from Watts asking for new counsel as well as a motion to withdraw his plea. The court denied these motions, citing the detailed colloquy during the plea hearing and reiterating that counsel believed his defensive motions would be frivolous. Watts voiced his dissatisfaction with the court’s denial and was sentenced to a total prison term of ten years and is required to register as a sex offender. On February 17, 2026, Watts filed the instant appeal and assigned the following three errors for our review. I. Appellant’s guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court denied his motion to disqualify counsel prior to forcing a plea, failed to advise him that a guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt and waives appellate rights regarding pretrial motions, and failed to properly advise him of the consequences of post-release control. II. The trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s pre- sentencing motion to withdraw guilty plea. III. Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel which caused him to enter a plea that was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. For ease of discussion, we address the first and third assignments of error together and the second separately. Watts’s first assignment of error contests the validity of his plea, arguing that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily “because the trial court denied his motion to disqualify counsel prior to forcing a plea, failed to advise him that a guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt and waives appellate rights regarding pretrial motions, and failed to properly advise him of post-release control.” Likewise, his third assignment of error contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel caused him to enter a plea that was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Under Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial court is forbidden from accepting a guilty plea without first engaging the defendant in a colloquy. Not only must the trial court “determin[e] that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved,” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), but [a] trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally advise a defendant before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives (1) the right to a jury trial, (2) the right to confront one’s accusers, (3) the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, (4) the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (5) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. When a trial court fails to strictly comply with this duty, the defendant’s plea is invalid. State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, syllabus. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that analyzing compliance with Crim.R. 11 is accomplished via a three-part test. (1) [H]as the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden? State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 17. Except in some limited circumstances, a defendant wishing to vacate his or her plea must show prejudice by the trial court’s omission of any part of the Crim.R. 11 colloquy and the test for whether a defendant has suffered prejudice by an omission in the plea colloquy is “whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” State v. Fontanez, 2026-Ohio-3281, ¶ 24, citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). “A trial court does not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) so as to render a guilty plea invalid when it fails to explicitly state that a guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt as long as the trial court otherwise complies with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2). . . .” Fontanez at ¶ 47. Here, even though trial counsel stated on the record that the motions lacked merit, Watts maintained his belief that such motions would have been successful. Watts’s brief argues the merits of his speedy-trial motion, including arguing that the State knew that he was incarcerated in Florida and “made no effort to have him brought to Ohio and tried within the applicable time frame,” but Watts does not demonstrate that these speedy-trial arguments would have been meritorious or “not spurious” as his trial counsel had determined. The record contains Watts’s counsel’s explanation as to why Watts’s requested motions were not filed, and counsel stated that the motion would have been improper to file because it would be frivolous. Watts has not shown that the trial court did not comply with Crim.R. 11(C) but argues that he would not have pled guilty had he known that his guilty plea would waive his ability to appeal certain pretrial motions. He does not provide any citations or case law suggesting that waiver of pretrial motions is a required disclosure during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy or that omitting such information may invalidate a plea. Moreover, he admits in his appellate brief that taking this matter to trial could have exposed him to 70 years to life, undercutting a claim that he would have insisted on trial instead. In fact, this court has held, “[W]here a trial court carries out the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), no prejudice accrues to the appellant where the court fails to inform him of the effect of his plea on pretrial motions.” State v. Brusiter, 2013-Ohio-1445, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Marshall, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 4953 (8th Dist. Nov. 3, 1994) and State v. Kelly, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4628 (8th Dist. Oct. 25, 1990). Watts also argues that he was not properly advised about postrelease control, stating that the trial court did not advise him “of the specific penal consequences he would face if he violated the terms of that control.” He cites to State v. Sarkozy, 2008-Ohio-509, and argues that this omission specifically warrants vacating his plea and remanding the case. But Sarkozy addresses a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11, i.e., situations where the trial court completely “fail[s] to advise him of postrelease control and its ramifications during the plea colloquy.” Fontanez at ¶ 36, citing Sarkozy at ¶ 25. Here, the trial court stated during its colloquy, “Do you understand you will have five years of post- release control after your release?” (Tr. 78.) Watts responded, “Yes.” Id. Additionally, Watts’s alleged prejudice related to this omission suggested that it was prejudicial in the totality of all of the alleged omissions, all of which we have already determined were not prejudicial. Moreover, Watts did not raise any specific concerns about postrelease control at the change-of-plea or sentencing hearings that could have suggested that he would not have pled but for the advisement. For these reasons, we overrule Watts’s first assignment of error. Watts’s third assignment of error similarly argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel caused him to enter a plea that was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. A defendant who pleads guilty waives all appealable issues, including the right to assert an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, except the defendant may claim ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that counsel’s deficient performance caused the plea to be less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Spates, 1992-Ohio-130, ¶ 12, citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). In such cases, a defendant can prevail only by demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 (1992); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Since this standard is consistent with the standard we applied above — that prejudice is shown by demonstrating that the defendant would not have pled guilty but for counsel’s alleged deficient performance — we must conclude that Watts has not met his burden of demonstrating that but for counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have entered a plea because his plea would have been less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Watts’s attempt to address the merits of his speedy-trial and statute-of- limitations motions is unpersuasive; at best, he demonstrates that a speedy-trial defense could have been argued but he does not demonstrate that such argument would have been successful or in Watts’s best interest. In fact, it contradicts counsel’s statements on the record that both of Watts’s personally chosen defenses were fully investigated and determined to be frivolous. This court is not persuaded that there is a “reasonable probability” that Watts would not have pled guilty had the speedy-trial and statute-of-limitations defenses been raised in motions and considered by the trial court. Watts’s speculative defense motions were addressed by counsel, on the record, and counsel explained that he declined to file them because after investigating the issues, he found that they were frivolous and unmeritorious. For these reasons, we cannot find that Watts has met his burden in establishing a reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial had his attorney filed his defensive motions. We thus cannot find that Watts received ineffective assistance of counsel and overrule his third assignment of error. In his second assignment of error, Watts argues that the trial court erred in denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. “[A] presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and liberally granted.” Xie at 527. However, there is no absolute right to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. “Absent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in making the ruling, its decision must be affirmed.” Id. Even though the trial court considered and rejected the motion, we note that Watts’s motion to withdraw his plea was made pro se while Watts was represented by counsel. His counsel denied discussing the motion with his client and did not join or advocate for the motion. While defendants have a right to counsel or the right to act pro se, a defendant does not have a right to assert both simultaneously. State v. Mongo, 2015-Ohio-1139, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). “We have previously determined that when counsel represents a criminal defendant, a trial court may not entertain a defendant’s pro se motion.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing State v. Washington, 2012-Ohio-1531, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). Thus, we cannot and do not find that the court erred in denying Watts’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR