State v. Watts
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket116134
JudgeKeough
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Watts, 2026-Ohio-4579.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 116134
v. :
MARTINIS WATTS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 19, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-16-606515-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Michael Timms and Carla Neuhauser,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Jaye M. Schlachet and Eric M. Levy, for appellant.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
Martinis Watts (“Watts”) appeals his convictions and sentence for
two counts of rape. He maintains that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or
voluntarily entered and assigns error related to such. After a thorough review of the
facts and law, we affirm.
In May 2016, a grand jury charged Watts in a six-count indictment
with four counts of rape, three of which contained sexually violent predator
specifications, and two counts of kidnapping that contained sexually violent
predator and sexual motivation specifications. The indictment related to offenses
committed against two victims between January 26, 1997, and June 5, 1997. Watts
had been incarcerated in Florida and was not arrested in connection with this
indictment until October 2023.
At a pretrial held on November 21, 2023, Watts was referred to the
court psychiatric clinic and placed on the mental health docket. The court held a
competency hearing on April 18, 2024, where it was determined that Watts was not
competent to stand trial but could be restored to competency with a course of
inpatient treatment under R.C. 2945.38.
Following treatment at Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare, Watts was
found competent to stand trial in a competency-restoration report dated November
6, 2024. In December 2024, the parties stipulated to the competency report and the
trial court set trial for March 2025. At a status hearing in February 2025, the court’s
resulting journal entry provides that during the hearing, Watts requested a new
attorney, and the trial court granted this request. Trial was continued for Watts’s
new counsel to prepare for trial. In January 2026, on the date trial was to
commence, Watts presented a pro se motion to disqualify his trial counsel, who was
unaware of Watts’s prepared motion or decision to disqualify him. The court
questioned Watts about the motion, to which Watts responded that he had filed a
grievance against his counsel “because he won’t file a motion that I asked him to file
a motion on.” (Tr. 64.) The court admonished Watts, stating, “[T]his is the day of
trial. This isn’t the time to have these little motions filed. . . . You had ample
opportunity to discuss this with your attorney, and you have not. Why are you
bringing it up right now?” (Tr. 65.) Watts’s counsel explained that Watts indeed
had requested that he file a speedy-trial motion. Counsel explained, however, that
he reviewed the grounds for a speedy-trial motion and a statute-of-limitations
defense and determined that neither were viable. Counsel explained:
I believe it is his frustration with my disagreement with him in terms of
what the state of the law is, and the fact that I have not filed those
motions because I’m bound as an officer of the Court not to file what I
believe to be spurious motions.
I know he is frustrated by that issue, and I think that is what he is
referring to. But I’ll put my record or place upon the record my belief
that, after carefully review[ing] those issues, I don’t believe . . . we have
a claim for any relief there.
(Tr. 66-67.) The court noted that it had already assigned Watts new counsel once
before and that Watts’s grievances appeared to be with the laws, not with counsel.
Watts contested this notion, repeatedly arguing that his constitutional rights had
been violated because “I don’t want him as my lawyer, and you all not letting me put
in a motion for a speedy trial and a statute of limitations period.” (Tr. 69.) The court
again denied his request, and Watts requested to take the case to trial.
After a lunch recess, the parties informed the court that they had
reached a plea agreement where Watts would plead guilty to two counts of rape
without any attendant specifications. The court engaged in a lengthy colloquy where
Watts acknowledged that (1) he had not been threatened or forced into entering his
plea, (2) he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation, (3) he was waiving
various trial-related rights by entering a guilty plea, and (4) he understood that the
felonies to which he was pleading were each punishable by three to 11 years in
prison.
On January 29, 2026, the parties convened for sentencing. The court
addressed that it had received another filing from Watts asking for new counsel as
well as a motion to withdraw his plea. The court denied these motions, citing the
detailed colloquy during the plea hearing and reiterating that counsel believed his
defensive motions would be frivolous. Watts voiced his dissatisfaction with the
court’s denial and was sentenced to a total prison term of ten years and is required
to register as a sex offender. On February 17, 2026, Watts filed the instant appeal
and assigned the following three errors for our review.
I. Appellant’s guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily because the trial court denied his motion to
disqualify counsel prior to forcing a plea, failed to advise him that
a guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt and waives
appellate rights regarding pretrial motions, and failed to
properly advise him of the consequences of post-release control.
II. The trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s pre-
sentencing motion to withdraw guilty plea.
III. Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he
received ineffective assistance of trial counsel which caused him
to enter a plea that was not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made.
For ease of discussion, we address the first and third assignments of
error together and the second separately.
Watts’s first assignment of error contests the validity of his plea,
arguing that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
“because the trial court denied his motion to disqualify counsel prior to forcing a
plea, failed to advise him that a guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt and
waives appellate rights regarding pretrial motions, and failed to properly advise him
of post-release control.” Likewise, his third assignment of error contends that his
trial counsel was ineffective because counsel caused him to enter a plea that was not
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Under Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial court is forbidden from accepting a
guilty plea without first engaging the defendant in a colloquy. Not only must the
trial court “determin[e] that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved,”
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), but
[a] trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally
advise a defendant before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives
(1) the right to a jury trial, (2) the right to confront one’s accusers, (3)
the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, (4) the right to
require the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (5) the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. When a trial court
fails to strictly comply with this duty, the defendant’s plea is invalid.
State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, syllabus.
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that analyzing compliance with
Crim.R. 11 is accomplished via a three-part test.
(1) [H]as the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the
rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the
purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of
demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required,
has the defendant met that burden?
State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 17.
Except in some limited circumstances, a defendant wishing to vacate
his or her plea must show prejudice by the trial court’s omission of any part of the
Crim.R. 11 colloquy and the test for whether a defendant has suffered prejudice by
an omission in the plea colloquy is “whether the plea would have otherwise been
made.” State v. Fontanez, 2026-Ohio-3281, ¶ 24, citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d
106, 108 (1990).
“A trial court does not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)
so as to render a guilty plea invalid when it fails to explicitly state that a guilty plea
constitutes a complete admission of guilt as long as the trial court otherwise
complies with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2). . . .” Fontanez at ¶ 47. Here,
even though trial counsel stated on the record that the motions lacked merit, Watts
maintained his belief that such motions would have been successful. Watts’s brief
argues the merits of his speedy-trial motion, including arguing that the State knew
that he was incarcerated in Florida and “made no effort to have him brought to Ohio
and tried within the applicable time frame,” but Watts does not demonstrate that
these speedy-trial arguments would have been meritorious or “not spurious” as his
trial counsel had determined. The record contains Watts’s counsel’s explanation as
to why Watts’s requested motions were not filed, and counsel stated that the motion
would have been improper to file because it would be frivolous.
Watts has not shown that the trial court did not comply with Crim.R.
11(C) but argues that he would not have pled guilty had he known that his guilty plea
would waive his ability to appeal certain pretrial motions. He does not provide any
citations or case law suggesting that waiver of pretrial motions is a required
disclosure during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy or that omitting such information may
invalidate a plea. Moreover, he admits in his appellate brief that taking this matter
to trial could have exposed him to 70 years to life, undercutting a claim that he would
have insisted on trial instead.
In fact, this court has held, “[W]here a trial court carries out the
mandates of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), no prejudice accrues to the appellant where the court
fails to inform him of the effect of his plea on pretrial motions.” State v. Brusiter,
2013-Ohio-1445, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Marshall, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS
4953 (8th Dist. Nov. 3, 1994) and State v. Kelly, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4628 (8th
Dist. Oct. 25, 1990).
Watts also argues that he was not properly advised about postrelease
control, stating that the trial court did not advise him “of the specific penal
consequences he would face if he violated the terms of that control.” He cites to
State v. Sarkozy, 2008-Ohio-509, and argues that this omission specifically
warrants vacating his plea and remanding the case. But Sarkozy addresses a
complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11, i.e., situations where the trial court
completely “fail[s] to advise him of postrelease control and its ramifications during
the plea colloquy.” Fontanez at ¶ 36, citing Sarkozy at ¶ 25. Here, the trial court
stated during its colloquy, “Do you understand you will have five years of post-
release control after your release?” (Tr. 78.) Watts responded, “Yes.” Id.
Additionally, Watts’s alleged prejudice related to this omission suggested that it was
prejudicial in the totality of all of the alleged omissions, all of which we have already
determined were not prejudicial. Moreover, Watts did not raise any specific
concerns about postrelease control at the change-of-plea or sentencing hearings that
could have suggested that he would not have pled but for the advisement. For these
reasons, we overrule Watts’s first assignment of error.
Watts’s third assignment of error similarly argues that his trial
counsel was ineffective because counsel caused him to enter a plea that was not
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
A defendant who pleads guilty waives all appealable issues, including
the right to assert an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, except the defendant
may claim ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that counsel’s deficient
performance caused the plea to be less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
State v. Spates, 1992-Ohio-130, ¶ 12, citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267
(1973). In such cases, a defendant can prevail only by demonstrating that there is a
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, he would not
have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d
521, 524 (1992); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Since this standard is consistent with the standard we applied above
— that prejudice is shown by demonstrating that the defendant would not have pled
guilty but for counsel’s alleged deficient performance — we must conclude that
Watts has not met his burden of demonstrating that but for counsel’s alleged
ineffective assistance, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have
entered a plea because his plea would have been less than knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. Watts’s attempt to address the merits of his speedy-trial and statute-of-
limitations motions is unpersuasive; at best, he demonstrates that a speedy-trial
defense could have been argued but he does not demonstrate that such argument
would have been successful or in Watts’s best interest. In fact, it contradicts
counsel’s statements on the record that both of Watts’s personally chosen defenses
were fully investigated and determined to be frivolous.
This court is not persuaded that there is a “reasonable probability”
that Watts would not have pled guilty had the speedy-trial and statute-of-limitations
defenses been raised in motions and considered by the trial court. Watts’s
speculative defense motions were addressed by counsel, on the record, and counsel
explained that he declined to file them because after investigating the issues, he
found that they were frivolous and unmeritorious. For these reasons, we cannot find
that Watts has met his burden in establishing a reasonable probability that he would
have gone to trial had his attorney filed his defensive motions. We thus cannot find
that Watts received ineffective assistance of counsel and overrule his third
assignment of error.
In his second assignment of error, Watts argues that the trial court
erred in denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
“[A] presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely
and liberally granted.” Xie at 527. However, there is no absolute right to withdraw
a plea prior to sentencing. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. “Absent an abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in making the ruling, its decision must be
affirmed.” Id.
Even though the trial court considered and rejected the motion, we
note that Watts’s motion to withdraw his plea was made pro se while Watts was
represented by counsel. His counsel denied discussing the motion with his client
and did not join or advocate for the motion. While defendants have a right to
counsel or the right to act pro se, a defendant does not have a right to assert both
simultaneously. State v. Mongo, 2015-Ohio-1139, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). “We have
previously determined that when counsel represents a criminal defendant, a trial
court may not entertain a defendant’s pro se motion.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing State v.
Washington, 2012-Ohio-1531, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). Thus, we cannot and do not find that
the court erred in denying Watts’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR