State v. Nichols
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket30824
JudgeHanseman
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Nichols, 2026-Ohio-4608.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. No. 30824
Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 2025 CR 02552
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
ANGELA S. NICHOLS : Court)
:
Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 20, 2026, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
LEWIS, P.J., and EPLEY, J., concur.
OPINION
MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30824
ROBERT ALAN BRENNER, Attorney for Appellant
MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant-Defendant Angela S. Nichols appeals from a judgment entry revoking
her community control and imposing a 12-month prison sentence. For the following reasons,
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} Nichols was indicted by a Montgomery County grand jury on October 22, 2025,
and charged with assault on a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service
provider, a fourth-degree felony, obstructing official business, a fifth-degree felony, and
resisting arrest, a first-degree misdemeanor. The charges arose from events which occurred
on August 28, 2025, when Nichols knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm
to “Officer D.C.” while he was performing his official duties. Nichols pled guilty to the assault
charge as indicted, and the trial court dismissed the other two charges on November 19,
2025.
{¶ 3} Nichols was later sentenced to a term of community control sanctions on
January 27, 2026. One of the sanctions required Nichols to complete the “B track” or “short
track” of the MonDay program, a community-based correctional facility. The sentencing entry
advised that if Nichols violated the terms of community control, the court could “impose a
longer time under the same sanction, impose a more restrictive sanction, or a prison term of
6 to 18 months.” (Emphasis deleted.) Nichols was ordered to report to the Montgomery
County Jail on February 9, 2026, for transportation to the program.
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{¶ 4} About two weeks after entering MonDay, Nichols self-terminated from the
program on February 24, 2026. A revocation of community control was subsequently filed,
and Nichols admitted the violation of refusing to complete the program. The trial court
revoked community control and sentenced Nichols to a 12-month prison term on March 10,
2026. Prior to imposing the sentence, the trial court stated that it considered the purposes
and principles of sentencing contained in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism
factors contained in R.C. 2929.12. Nichols filed a timely notice of appeal and raises one
assignment of error for review:
ASSIGNED ERROR NO. I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED
NICHOLS TO TWELVE MONTHS IN PRISON.
Analysis
{¶ 5} In her sole assignment of error, Nichols claims that her 12-month prison
sentence is contrary to law. Specifically, she argues that “the prison term is longer than
necessary to accomplish the purposes of felony sentencing, and therefore it imposes an
unnecessary burden on state resources.” The State contends Nichols’ 12-month sentence
is within range for a fourth-degree felony and that the trial court considered the purposes
and principles of felony sentencing before it imposed the sentence. According to the State,
Nichols’ sentence is not contrary to law.
{¶ 6} “[A] court sentencing an offender at a revocation hearing ‘sentences the
offender anew and must comply with the relevant sentencing statutes.’” State v. Howard,
2020-Ohio-3195, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Fraley, 2004-Ohio-7110, ¶ 17.
{¶ 7} Appellate review of felony sentences is governed by the standards contained in
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). “While R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that ‘[t]he court hearing an appeal
under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section shall review the record, including the findings
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underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing court,’” this section “further
instructs that ‘[t]he appellate court’s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court
abused its discretion.’” State v. Kintz, 2026-Ohio-1584, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), quoting R.C.
2953.08(G)(2). Instead, “[t]he appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a
sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the
matter to the sentencing court for resentencing . . . if it clearly and convincingly finds . . .
[t]hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).
{¶ 8} Clear and convincing evidence is evidence “which will provide in the mind of the
trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v.
Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477 (1954). “Where the degree of proof required to sustain an
issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine
whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of
proof.” Id.
{¶ 9} The term “contrary to law” means “‘in violation of statute or legal regulations at
a given time.’” State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 34, citing Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.
1990). “A sentence is contrary to law when it falls outside the statutory range for the offense
or if the sentencing court does not consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Burt, 2025-
Ohio-1758, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Bartley, 2023-Ohio-2325, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), citing State
v. Dorsey, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 10} Here, Nichols was sentenced for a fourth-degree felony. If a trial court elects
a prison term for a fourth-degree felony, the term “shall be a definite term of six, seven, eight,
nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen months.”
R.C. 2929.14(A)(4). Nichols’ 12-month prison term is one of the authorized definite prison
terms contained in R.C. 2929.14(A)(4) and is therefore not contrary to law for that reason.
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{¶ 11} Additionally, the record establishes that the trial court considered the
overriding purposes and principles of felony sentencing. Before imposing any felony
sentence, trial courts are guided by the overriding purposes contained in R.C. 2929.11. This
section provides that “[t]he overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public
from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the
effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines
accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local
government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). “To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court
shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others
from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the
offense, the public, or both.” Id. Trial courts have discretion to determine the most effective
way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing and in exercising that
discretion, must consider statutory factors listed in R.C. 2929.12 which relate to the
seriousness of the offenders and the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism. R.C. 2929.12(A).
{¶ 12} While a trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the
authorized statutory range, appellate courts hold that “the court is not required to make any
findings or give its reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State
v. King, 2013-Ohio-2021, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Foster, 2006-Ohio-856, paragraph
seven of the syllabus. All that is required of a trial court is its consideration of the statutory
factors, including those set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. State v. Mathis, 2006-Ohio-
855, ¶ 38.
{¶ 13} At Nichols’ sentencing hearing, the trial court orally stated that it “consider[ed]
the purposes and principles of sentencing and the Revised Code in 2929.11 and the
seriousness and recidivism factors in 2929.12, including using the minimum sanctions to
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accomplish those purposes without unnecessarily burdening governmental resource[s].” Tr.
32.
{¶ 14} While Nichols argues that the 12-month sentence she received was longer
than necessary to accomplish the purposes of felony sentencing, the Supreme Court of Ohio
prohibits a court of appeals from independently weighing the evidence and substituting its
judgment for that of the trial court when it concerns the sentence that best reflects
compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42.
Therefore, we may not reweigh the evidence, the statutory factors, or the overriding
purposes of felony sentencing to determine a different result. Because the record indicates
the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, Nichols’ sentence is not contrary
to law for this reason as well. As a result, we overrule Nichols’ sole assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶ 15} Having overruled Nichols’ assignment of error, the trial court’s judgment is
affirmed.
.............
LEWIS, P.J., and EPLEY, J., concur.
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