State v. Jones

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-2790.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT State of Ohio, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 25AP-368 v. : (C.P.C. No. 22CR-991) Jamale S. Jones, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) Defendant-Appellant. : D E C I S I O N Rendered on July 21, 2026 On brief: Shayla D. Favor, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jeffrey D. Devereaux, for appellee. Argued: Jeffrey D. Devereaux. On brief: Dennis C. Belli, for appellant. Argued: Dennis C. Belli. APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas BEATTY BLUNT, J. {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jamale S. Jones, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty, pursuant to jury verdict, of one count of murder and one count of felonious assault, both with firearm specifications. For the following reasons, we affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} On May 24, 2021, Raymond Sims and his 16-year-old nephew, Ty’sean Finch, went to the Popeye’s restaurant on West Broad Street in Columbus, Ohio so Finch could apply for a job. As Sims and Finch walked through the Popeye’s parking lot, a group of three young men approached them. One of the young men wore a gray hooded sweatshirt (“gray hoodie”) pulled up tightly around his face and dark pants; one wore a dark-colored No. 25AP-368 2 shirt and pants and white shoes; and the other wore a white shirt and jeans. As the young men approached, Sims saw the individual in the dark-colored clothing hand the individual in the gray hoodie a gun. The young men indicated they wanted to fight Finch, so the group walked across the street from the Popeye’s to the parking lot of a former Burger King restaurant. {¶ 3} Once they arrived in the other parking lot, Finch and the individual in the dark-colored clothing began to fight. Sims and the other two young men stood off to the side watching the fight. As the two fought, the individual in the gray hoodie walked away from Sims and the other young man and approached the fight. When the individual in the dark-colored clothing stepped to the side, the individual in the gray hoodie took out a gun and fired multiple shots directly at Finch. Finch fell to the ground and the other two young men ran from the scene. Sims ran toward the gray hoodie shooter and punched him on the side of his face, causing him to drop his gun. The gray hoodie shooter then produced a second gun with an “extender clip” and began shooting at Sims. (Tr. at 243-245.) Sims picked up the gun the shooter dropped, noting the gun was black and white. The individual in the gray hoodie shot Sims in his neck and shoulder and then fled the scene. {¶ 4} After being shot, Sims ran out into the street and signaled to passing cars for help. Several vehicles pulled over to render assistance. As cars were pulling into the parking lot, the individual in the dark-colored clothing returned to the scene and began firing shots at Sims. Sims jumped into the window of a passing SUV to escape the gunfire. {¶ 5} Officers arrived shortly after the incident and found Finch unresponsive, “laying on the ground, suffering from gunshot wounds.” (Mar. 11, 2025 Tr. Vol. 2 at 172- 173.) Finch had been shot multiple times in different areas on his torso. Medics transported Finch to the hospital where he died from his injuries. {¶ 6} When Sims left the shooting, he went to the home of his sister and Finch’s mother, Terri Sims. Sims was still in possession of the black and white gun he picked up during the incident when he entered the house. Terri took the gun from Sims and placed it in her bedroom closet because her brother was “on parole and probation and [she] didn’t want [him] to get in trouble.” Id. at 210. Terri then drove Sims to the hospital for treatment. {¶ 7} On May 27, 2021, police took appellant into custody. At the time of his arrest, appellant had abrasions on his lip and forehead and was in possession of an Apple iPhone No. 25AP-368 3 12 Pro (“iPhone”). Police subsequently obtained a warrant to search the contents of the iPhone. {¶ 8} On May 29, 2021, officers presented Sims with photo arrays, but Sims did not identify anyone from the arrays. Detective Michael Huffman, the lead detective on the case, noted the surveillance videos of the May 24, 2021 shooting demonstrated that Sims had “face-to-face contact with the male in the hooded sweatshirt prior to the shooting. So to [Detective Huffman], [Sims] should have been able to make an identification off of anything that was put in front of him.” (Mar. 12, 2025 Tr. Vol. 3 at 592.) As such, Detective Huffman decided to present Sims with another set of photo arrays. {¶ 9} On June 6, 2021, Officer Luke Veile presented Sims with three photo arrays containing six photographs each. Sims selected the photo of Dalyne Coleman from the first photo array and told Officer Veile that Coleman “was the shooter ‘might have been.’ ” (Mar. 11, 2025 Tr. Vol. 2 at 322; State’s Ex. W1.) Sims selected the photograph of Shedrick Miller from the second photo array and told Officer Veile that Miller was “in background with suspects, shot once at me.” (State’s Exs. W4, 6.) Sims selected appellant’s photograph from the third photo array and told Officer Veile appellant “was the shooter, dark blue hoody, jeans, black shoes, hoody was pulled up tight, ‘for sure, guaranteed.’ ” (State’s Ex. W7.) {¶ 10} Police eventually recovered the black and white firearm from the closet at Terri Sims’ house. The firearm was a 9mm Taurus pistol with serial number ABE602111 that was partially “spray painted white.” (Mar. 12, 2025 Tr. Vol. 3 at 400, 524; State’s Ex. C42.) On June 1, 2021, police apprehended Dalyne Coleman as he was walking out of the rear of a house located on North Central Avenue in Columbus, Ohio. Coleman was in possession of a 9mm Taurus pistol with serial number ABN336839 when he was apprehended. The firearm had an extended magazine. Ballistics testing revealed that both Taurus pistols fired multiple shots during the May 24, 2021 incident. A police database also revealed that both Taurus pistols were stolen. {¶ 11} On June 8, 2021, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Branch alleging appellant was a delinquent minor for having committed the offenses of murder and felonious assault, both with firearm specifications. The complaint alleged appellant was 16 years old at the time of No. 25AP-368 4 the offenses. On June 9, 2021, the state moved the juvenile court to relinquish jurisdiction and transfer the case to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, General Divsion pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(A) and/or (B). Following hearings held on January 18 and 19, 2021, the juvenile court granted the state’s motion and transferred the case to the general division of the court of common pleas. {¶ 12} By indictment filed March 17, 2022, the state charged appellant with one count of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02, an unclassified felony, and one count of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11, a felony of the second degree. Both charges carried firearm specifications. The indictment alleged appellant purposely caused the death of Finch and knowingly caused serious physical harm to Sims during the May 24, 2021 shooting incident. Appellant pled not guilty to the charges. {¶ 13} On March 10, 2025, a jury trial on the charges commenced. The state presented surveillance videos to the jury depicting the May 24, 2021 incident. Detective Huffman testified at trial explaining that his investigation into the shooting led him to identify certain juveniles living at the house on North Central Avenue as persons of interest. North Central Avenue is located approximately 500 feet from where the shooting occurred. The individuals living at North Central Avenue included appellant, Shedrick Miller, Jayontay Hoskins-Battle, and Dalyne Coleman. Sims testified at trial and identified appellant as the individual who shot him and killed Finch on May 24, 2021. (Mar. 11, 2025 Tr. Vol. 2 at 258-259.) {¶ 14} During deliberations, the jury informed the trial court they could not come to an agreement on a verdict. The court provided the jury with the instruction stated in State v. Howard, 42 Ohio St.3d 18 (1989), at paragraph two of the syllabus (“Howard charge”). Following the Howard charge, the jury returned verdicts finding appellant guilty on all counts and specifications charged in the indictment. {¶ 15} On April 10, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The court sentenced appellant to a prison term of 15 years to life on the murder charge, a minimum prison term of 6 years and a maximum prison term of 9 years on the felonious assault charge, and respective prison terms of 36 months each on the firearm specifications. The court ordered all counts to run consecutive to each other and consecutive to the No. 25AP-368 5 specifications for a total minimum prison sentence of 27 years and a total maximum prison sentence of 30 years. II. Assignments of Error {¶ 16} Appellant appeals, assigning the following errors for our review: Assignment of Error No. 1: The proceedings to transfer defendant-appellant from juvenile court to the court of common pleas for adult prosecution violated R.C. 2152.12 and deprived him of his right to fundamental fairness under the due process protections of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. Assignment of Error No. 2: The admission of false testimony implicating defendant- appellant in an uncharged drive-by shooting violated the rules of evidence and deprived him of his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial under the Fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Assignment of Error No. 3: Defendant-appellant was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, due to the combined prejudicial impact of multiple instances of deficient performance. Assignment of Error No. 4: The trial court’s erroneous Evid.R. 613(A) ruling and interference with defense counsel’s cross-examination deprived defendant-appellant of his rights of confrontation and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Assignment of Error No. 5: The trial court violated defendant-appellant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by requiring him to appear for trial wearing leg irons. III. First Assignment of Error–Bindover Proceeding {¶ 17} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts the proceeding to transfer his case from juvenile court to adult court for criminal prosecution violated R.C. 2152.12 and deprived him of his right to due process. Appellant contends the juvenile court’s order No. 25AP-368 6 relinquishing jurisdiction was not supported by probable cause, was obtained through prosecutorial misconduct, and was not accompanied by an adequate statement of reasons. {¶ 18} “Juvenile courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over children alleged to be delinquent for committing acts that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.” State v. Lucas, 2011-Ohio-3450, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.), citing In re M.P., 2010-Ohio-599, ¶ 11. Under certain circumstances, however, the juvenile court “has the duty” to transfer a case, or bind a juvenile over, to the adult criminal system. In re M.P. at ¶ 11. Ohio’s juvenile justice system provides for two types of transfers: discretionary and mandatory. State v. D.W., 2012-Ohio-4544, ¶ 10. {¶ 19} “ ‘Discretionary transfer, as its name implies, allows judges the discretion to transfer or bind over to adult court certain juveniles who do not appear to be amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system or appear to be a threat to public safety.’ ” D.W. at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Hanning, 2000-Ohio-436, ¶ 19. R.C. 2152.12(B) governs discretionary transfers and directs the juvenile court to determine whether the factors in R.C. 2152.12(D), “indicating that the case should be transferred,” outweigh the factors in R.C. 2152.12(E), “indicating that the case should not be transferred.” R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). {¶ 20} “Mandatory transfer, on the other hand, removes discretion from judges and requires the transfer of a juvenile to adult court in certain situations.” State v. Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-4276, ¶ 3, citing Hanning at ¶ 20. See State v. J.T.S., 2015-Ohio-1103, ¶ 41 (10th Dist.) (noting that “substantive due process did not prevent the General Assembly from removing the [amenability] factors from consideration” for mandatory bindover offenses). R.C. 2152.12(A) governs mandatory transfers and provides, in relevant part, that after a complaint has been filed alleging a child is delinquent for committing an offense that would have been murder if committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall transfer the case to adult court so long as the child was “sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of the act charged . . . and there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged.” R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i). Appellant stipulated he was 16 years old on May 24, 2021. Accordingly, because appellant was charged with murder, R.C. 2152.12(A) required the juvenile court to transfer the case to adult court so long as there was probable cause to believe appellant committed the offense. See State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 15. No. 25AP-368 7 {¶ 21} Probable cause is a “ ‘ “fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.” ’ ” Martin, at ¶ 16, quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). Probable cause “requires ‘more than bare suspicion,’ ” as the “circumstances must demonstrate a ‘fair probability’ that a crime has been committed.” Id. at ¶ 18, quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) and Gates at 238. The probable cause determination involves questions of both law and fact. In re A.J.S., 2008-Ohio-5307, ¶ 51. As such, we defer to the juvenile court’s “determinations regarding witness credibility, but we review de novo the legal conclusion whether the state presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the acts charged.” Id. at ¶ 51. Accord Martin at ¶ 23. {¶ 22} To establish probable cause, the state “must produce evidence that raises more than a mere suspicion of guilt, but [it] need not provide evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 93 (2001). The juvenile court must “assess the credibility of the evidence and [] determine whether the state has presented credible evidence going to each element of the charged offense,” but the juvenile court “is not permitted to exceed the limited scope of the bindover hearing or to assume the role of the ultimate fact-finder.” In re A.J.S. at ¶ 44. See also State v. Zarlengo, 2021-Ohio-4631, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.) (stating that “[a]s to credibility and weight, a juvenile court has a limited role and is not to discount testimony presented by the state so as to intrude on the role of a jury at a later trial”). (1) Probable Cause {¶ 23} On January 18, 2022, the juvenile court held a bindover hearing in appellant’s case. The state initially called Sims to testify, but Sims was a volatile witness. Sims told the court he was “scared of [him]self,” because he “don’t do this snitching shit.” (Jan. 18, 2022 Jones Bindover Tr. at 15-16.) Sims then stated that what he “really want[ed] to do [was] kill [appellant’s mother],” telling her, “I want your kid . . . I want your dog. I want your cat. Your goldfish. . . I could kill you. . . . I’m crazy. I’m crazy.” Id. at 16-17.) Shortly after these statements, the court went off record. When the hearing resumed, Sims had left the witness stand and the state called Detective Huffman to testify. Although Detective Huffman attempted to state that appellant was the gray hoodie shooter on May 24, 2021, and that No. 25AP-368 8 Sims identified appellant as the gray hoodie shooter from the June 6, 2021 photo array, the juvenile court sustained defense counsel’s objections to both statements. Id. at 26, 34. {¶ 24} Following appellant’s bindover hearing on January 18, 2022, the juvenile court held another bindover hearing in Hoskins-Battle’s case. The state had charged Hoskins-Battle with one count of felonious assault, alleging he knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to Sims by means of a deadly weapon on May 24, 2021. Sims testified at Hoskins-Battle’s bindover hearing, stating that during the May 24, 2021 incident his nephew had a “little fist fight” with the “dude in the blue shirt” and that the “taller one in the grey hoodie” then approached and shot his nephew. (Jan. 18, 2022 Hoskins-Battle Hearing Tr. at 16-17.) Sims stated he began “shootin’ ” once “one of ‘em, the younger one, he comes back” and “start shootin’.” Id. at 20. The prosecutor asked Sims if the “person that came back and was shooting at [him] . . . [was] he in the courtroom today?” Id. at 20-21. Sims asked for the deputies to stand next to him, noting it would take “everything in [his] power to get to this man.” Id. at 22. Sims then identified Hoskins- Battle and stated “he shot my nephew. He killed him.” Id. at 23. The prosecutor asked, “Okay. Did he shoot at you?” Id. at 23. Sims responded stating, “Yeah, he shot me twice.” Id. at 23. {¶ 25} On cross-examination, Hoskins-Battle’s attorney asked Sims if the person who shot his nephew was wearing “the blue shirt,” and Sims responded stating, “[n]o, the grey one. . . . The hoodie.” Id. at 25. When Hoskins-Battle’s attorney told Sims his client was wearing “all black [that] day,” Sims responded stating “your client wasn’t wearing black that day. . . . Your client was wearing a grey hoodie . . . .” Id. at 26. {¶ 26} Detective Huffman also testified at Hoskins-Battle’s bindover hearing. Detective Huffman explained he interviewed Hoskins-Battle during his investigation and went over the surveillance video footage of the incident with him. Detective Huffman stated Hoskins-Battle admitted he was the individual in the dark-colored clothing who fought Finch prior to the shooting and who fired shots at Sims at the end of the incident. Id. at 47- 54. Detective Huffman identified appellant as the individual wearing the gray hoodie on the surveillance video. Id. at 49. At the conclusions of Hoskins-Battle’s hearing, the juvenile court found probable cause to believe Hoskins-Battle committed the felonious assault charge. No. 25AP-368 9 {¶ 27} On January 19, 2022, the juvenile court resumed the bindover hearing in appellant’s case. The state again called Sims to testify, and Sims identified appellant as the person who shot him and killed Finch on May 24, 2021. Sims also stated he selected appellant’s photo from a photo array presented to him on June 6, 2021, because appellant “killed [his] nephew” and “shot [him].” (Jan. 19, 2022 Jones’ Hearing Tr. at 21.) On cross- examination, defense counsel asked Sims if he identified another individual as being the gray hoodie shooter at Hoskins-Battle’s bindover hearing the prior day. Sims responded stating he “pointed out the same person that [the prosecutor showed him on the photo array]. And [he] told her the same thing that, like, the one in the gray hoodie.” Id. at 45. At the conclusion of the January 19, 2022 hearing, the juvenile court found probable cause to believe appellant committed the offenses charged in the complaint. {¶ 28} Appellant contends Sims’ identification of him as the shooter was “incredible as a matter of law,” and insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, because Sims identified both appellant and Hoskins-Battle as the gray hoodie shooter in juvenile court. (Appellant’s Brief at 15-16.) However, the juvenile court judge was free to believe all, part, or none of each witness’s testimony. In re A.E., 2008-Ohio-1375, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.); State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964). Thus, the judge was free to believe Sims’ testimony identifying appellant as the gray hoodie shooter, and to disbelieve Sims’ testimony identifying Hoskins-Battle as the gray hoodie shooter. The juvenile court found Sims’ identification of appellant to be credible, and we defer to the juvenile court’s assessment of Sims’ credibility. In re A.J.S., 2008-Ohio-5307, at ¶ 51. See also State v. Tucker, 2016- Ohio-1033, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Reed, 2008-Ohio-6082, ¶ 48 (10th Dist.) (stating that “ ‘[w]hile identity is an element that must be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt [at trial], the credibility of witnesses and their degree of certainty in identification are matters affecting the weight of the evidence’ ”). {¶ 29} Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “the resolution of the conflicting theories of the evidence, both of which were credible, is a matter for the trier of fact at a trial on the merits of the case, not a matter for exercise of judicial discretion at a bindover hearing in the juvenile court.” In re A.J.S. at ¶ 64. Accord Iacona, 93 Ohio.St.3d at 96 (stating that deciding the merits of competing prosecution and defense theories of the No. 25AP-368 10 case is “a matter for a factfinder at trial”). Accordingly, the juvenile court was under no obligation to resolve the conflict between Sims’ contradictory identifications. {¶ 30} Because Sims identified appellant as the individual who shot him and killed Finch on May 24, 2021 during appellant’s bindover hearing, the record contained sufficient, credible evidence demonstrating that appellant committed the offenses of murder and felonious assault and the attendant firearm specifications. As such, the evidence supported the juvenile court’s probable cause determination in the present case. Because the murder charge was subject to mandatory transfer under R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i), and the trial court also found probable cause to believe appellant committed the felonious assault charge, R.C. 2152.12(F)(2) required the juvenile court to transfer the felonious assault charge to adult court as well. (2) Prosecutorial Misconduct {¶ 31} Appellant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct at the successive bindover hearings in juvenile court by deliberately eliciting contradictory identifications from Sims. The same prosecutor represented the state at both appellant’s and Hoskins- Battle’s bindover hearings. {¶ 32} When evaluating allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we determine whether (1) the prosecutor’s conduct was improper, and (2) if so, whether it prejudicially affected the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Thompson, 2014-Ohio-4751, ¶ 162. Because prosecutorial misconduct inherently concerns due process, the touchstone of the analysis “is the ‘fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’ ” State v. Newton, 2006-Ohio-81, ¶ 92, quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). See also State v. Buck, 2017-Ohio-8242, ¶ 76 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Widmer, 2013-Ohio-62, ¶ 41 (12th Dist.) (noting that “[m]ere inconsistencies in testimony do not establish the knowing use of false testimony by the prosecutor”). {¶ 33} Appellant claims the prosecutor at Hoskins-Battle’s bindover hearing asked Sims to “confirm that ‘[t]he person you just pointed to’ was the gray-hooded killer.” (Appellant’s Brief at 16-17, citing Hoskins-Battle Hearing at 23.) However, the record demonstrates the prosecutor asked Sims if the “person that came back and was shooting at you . . . [was] he in the courtroom today?” (Emphasis added.) (Jan. 18, 2022 Hoskins- Battle Probable Cause Hearing 20-21.) Sims identified Hoskins-Battle and the prosecutor No. 25AP-368 11 asked Sims to explain, “[w]hat is it that Mr. Battle did? The person you just pointed to, what was he doing that day?” Id. at 23. Sims responded stating that Hoskins-Battle shot his nephew and killed him. The prosecutor then asked Sims, “Okay. Did he shoot at you?” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 23. Sims responded stating “Yeah, he shot me twice.” Id. at 23. {¶ 34} Thus, the prosecutor asked Sims if Hoskins-Battle was the person who came back and shot at him. The prosecutor never asked Sims to confirm that Hoskins-Battle was the gray hoodie shooter. Rather, Sims stated that Hoskins-Battle wore the gray hoodie during the May 24, 2021 incident in response to Hoskins-Battle’s attorney’s question on cross-examination. Id. at 26. {¶ 35} The prosecutor also attempted to clarify Sims’ testimony. On re-direct examination at Hoskins-Battle’s hearing, the prosecutor presented Sims with the June 6, 2021 photo array where Sims identified appellant as the gray hoodie shooter. The prosecutor asked Sims to describe appellant’s role in the May 24, 2021 incident, and Sims responded stating, he “shot me twice” and “killed my nephew; shot my nephew four times.” Id. at 30. The prosecutor also elicited testimony from Detective Huffman at Hoskins- Battle’s hearing explaining that Hoskins-Battle wore the dark-colored clothing while appellant wore the gray hoodie during the May 24, 2021 incident. Accordingly, appellant fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor engaged in any misconduct when she subsequently asked Sims if appellant was the gray hoodie shooter during appellant’s bindover hearing. (3) Statement of Reasons {¶ 36} Appellant lastly contends the juvenile court failed to issue a statement of reasons for transferring the case to adult court. To satisfy due process in the bindover context, the juvenile court must “issue[] a decision stating its reasons for the transfer after conducting a hearing at which the juvenile is represented by counsel.” State v. Aalim, 2017- Ohio-2956, ¶ 24, citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). Juv.R. 30(G) provides that the “order of transfer shall state the reasons for transfer.” See also D.W., 2012-Ohio-4544, ¶ 20, quoting Kent at 554 (stating that the transfer of a juvenile to adult court should not occur without “ ‘ceremony -- without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons’ ”). {¶ 37} On January 24, 2022, the juvenile court issued an entry stating that, based on the stipulations and evidence presented at appellant’s bindover hearing, the court found No. 25AP-368 12 appellant was 16 years old at the time of the offenses and probable cause to believe appellant committed the acts of murder and felonious assault and the firearm specifications. As such, the juvenile court granted the state’s motion and transferred the case to adult court for prosecution. {¶ 38} Appellant claims the juvenile court’s statement of reasons was insufficient because the court failed to “reconcile contradictory testimony from [Sims] identifying two different persons as being the lone killer.” (Appellant’s Brief at 18.) As noted, however, the juvenile court was free to believe Sims’ identification of appellant as the gray hoodie shooter and was under no obligation to resolve conflicting theories of evidence. In re A.J.S., 2008- Ohio-5307, at ¶ 64. Accordingly, the court did not need to reconcile Sims’ contradictory identifications in its statement of reasons. Because the present case involved a mandatory transfer, the juvenile court adequately stated its reasons for the transfer by finding appellant was 16 years old at the time of the offenses and probable cause to believe appellant committed the offenses charged in the complaint. {¶ 39} Based on the foregoing, we overrule appellant’s first assignment of error. IV. Second Assignment of Error–Evid.R. 404(B) {¶ 40} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court violated Evid.R. 404(B) and deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial by admitting testimony implicating him in an uncharged drive-by shooting. “Evid.R. 404(B) categorically prohibits evidence of a defendant’s other acts when its only value is to show that the defendant has the character or propensity to commit a crime.” State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-4441, ¶ 36. However, other acts evidence may be admissible “for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid.R. 404(B)(2). See also State v. Echols, 2024-Ohio-5088, ¶ 31, citing State v. Morris, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 18 (noting that the non-propensity examples in the rule are illustrative, not exclusive). “The key is that the evidence must prove something other than the defendant’s disposition to commit certain acts.” State v. Hartman, 2020-Ohio- 4440, ¶ 22. The admissibility of other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Worley, 2021-Ohio-2207, ¶ 117. {¶ 41} In determining whether to admit other-acts evidence, a court must consider whether the evidence is relevant to the particular purpose for which it is offered, and No. 25AP-368 13 whether the non-propensity purpose relates to a material issue in dispute between the parties. Hartman, at ¶ 26-27. A court must also determine whether the party offering the evidence has provided “ ‘substantial proof that the alleged [other] act was committed by the defendant.” Id. at ¶ 28, quoting State v. Carter, 26 Ohio St.2d 79, 83 (1971). Accord State v. Grate, 2020-Ohio-5584, ¶ 136 (stating that “[a]dmission of other-acts evidence requires substantial proof that the defendant committed those acts”). Other-acts evidence “ ‘is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.’ ” Hartman at ¶ 28, quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988). See also State v. Hignite, 2015-Ohio-5204, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.) (noting that “[o]ther acts evidence need be proved only by substantial proof, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt”). {¶ 42} Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intention to admit evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B). The state asked the court to allow it to introduce evidence demonstrating that one of the firearms used during the May 24, 2021 shooting also fired a bullet at the home of Finch and Terri Sims during a drive-by shooting on May 23, 2021. The state noted that “one of the persons of interest in regard to the May [] 23rd, 2021 drive by shooting at [] S. Princeton Avenue, who was known by the street name of ‘Fat Cat,’ was in actuality Jayontay Hoskins-Battle.” (Notice of Intention at 3.) The state argued the matching ballistics evidence established identity, possession, intent, plan, motive, and lack of mistake in the case against appellant. See State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 73 (1975). {¶ 43} Appellant opposed the state’s request to introduce the ballistics evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B). Appellant argued the drive-by shooting had “nothing to do with the [him],” noting he “was never charged” with any crime related to the drive-by shooting. (Req. to Deny at 1.) The state responded explaining that, while “no one was charged, nor did anyone plead to the [drive-by] shooting,” the “only person of interest that was identified during the investigation by Columbus Police was the Defendant in this case, Jamale Jones.” (State’s Resp. at 2.) At a December 16, 2024 pre-trial hearing, the trial court granted the state’s request to admit the drive-by shooting evidence as “outlined in its motion.” (Dec. 16, 2024 Tr. at 77.) {¶ 44} At trial, Terri Sims stated she contacted police on or about May 23, 2021 to report that her house at South Princeton Avenue “was shot at.” (Mar. 11, 2025 Tr. Vol. 2 at No. 25AP-368 14 212.) Terri noted no one was home when the shooting occurred. Terri told police that someone named “Fat Cat” was a potential suspect in the drive-by shooting “based off an issue that one of [her] children was having with someone.” Id. at 214. {¶ 45} Officer Justin Frisco stated at trial that he responded to a house on South Princeton Avenue on a report of a drive-by shooting. Officer Frisco collected shell casings and spent projectiles near the house and spoke to the residents of the house. Officer Frisco stated the residents of the house “named a nickname of a person that they thought may be responsible for what occurred. The nickname they gave was Fat Cat.” (Mar. 13, 2025 Tr. Vol. 4 at 741.) The prosecutor asked Officer Frisco whether he became aware of a “name being attached to that person of interest’s nickname,” and Officer Frisco responded stating he did and that the name was “Jamale Jones.” Id. at 741. {¶ 46} Defense counsel attempted to question Officer Frisco about a police summary report from the drive-by shooting, but the state objected. At a side-bar discussion outside the hearing of the jury, the prosecutor explained that Officer Frisco “wrote down who the person of interest was and then at a later point, another officer [went] back in and connect[ed] Jones to this incident.” Id. at 749. When defense counsel asked how the police connected appellant to the drive-by, the prosecutor admitted she did not know. Id. at 749- 750. {¶ 47} A forensic firearms examiner explained at trial that the Taurus pistol with serial number ABN336839 fired one of the shell casings recovered from the drive-by shooting at South Princeton Avenue. Id. at 809-810; State’s Ex. M. {¶ 48} Although appellant did not object to the admission of the drive-by shooting evidence at trial, the court’s pre-trial decision granting the state’s request to admit the evidence was a definite ruling on the record. As such, appellant did not need to object to the evidence at trial to preserve the issue. See Evid.R. 103(A) (stating that “[o]nce the court rules definitely on the record, either before or at trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal”); Echols, 2024-Ohio-5088, ¶ 28. {¶ 49} Appellant contends Officer Frisco’s testimony identifying him as Fat Cat was false, and that Officer Frisco’s testimony indicating he was a “ ‘person of interest’ in the uncharged drive-by shooting fell well short of satisfying the substantial proof requirement” of Evid.R. 404(B). (Appellant’s Brief at 23.) While Officer Frisco stated his investigation No. 25AP-368 15 demonstrated appellant was Fat Cat, Detective Huffman testified at trial that Hoskins- Battle’s “nickname was Fat Cat.” (Mar. 13, 2025 Tr. Vol. 4 at 520.) Detective Huffman explained he was “advised by the family” that Hoskins-Battle’s “street name” was Fat Cat. Id. at 654. As noted, the state also identified Fat Cat as the nickname of Hoskins-Battle in its notice of intention to admit the evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B). {¶ 50} Regardless, even if the jury believed Officer Frisco’s testimony, that testimony established only that the Sims family suspected appellant may have been responsible for the drive-by shooting. There were no eyewitnesses to the drive-by shooting. While the state indicated in a pre-trial filing and at a side-bar discussion that the police identified appellant as the primary suspect in the drive-by shooting, the state never presented evidence to explain why the police identified appellant as their primary suspect. Indeed, the prosecutor admitted she did not know how the police connected appellant to the drive-by shooting. Compare State v. Elliott, 2024-Ohio-3376, ¶ 133-135 (10th Dist.) (finding the victim’s statements to police reporting that the defendant pulled her by her hair and shoved her into a bedroom wall “provide[d] substantial proof of the other acts”). {¶ 51} The state argues that because one of the shell casings from the May 23, 2021 drive-by shooting came “from the firearm Jones brought to the May 24, 2021 [shooting],” the matching ballistics evidence “link[ed] Jones to the May 23, 2021 shooting.” (Appellee’s Brief at 22.) However, the state’s argument in this regard assumes appellant was the gray hoodie shooter on May 24, 2021. Detective Huffman testified that stolen firearms tended to be passed around with great frequency and that juveniles tended to “pass [firearms] around very frequently.” (Mar. 13, 2025 Tr. Vol. 4 at 530.) The Taurus pistol with serial number ABN336839 was a stolen firearm, and the suspects in the present case were all juveniles. Accordingly, the matching ballistics evidence demonstrated only that the second firearm used by the gray hoodie shooter during the May 24, 2021 shooting also fired a shot during the May 23, 2021 drive-by shooting. The matching ballistics evidence did not, on its own, demonstrate that appellant committed the drive-by shooting. {¶ 52} Accordingly, because the state failed to present substantial proof that appellant committed the drive-by shooting, the trial court erred by admitting the drive-by shooting evidence under Evid.R. 404(B). As such, we must determine whether the admission of the evidence amounted to harmless error. State v. Smith, 2017-Ohio-9283, No. 25AP-368 16 ¶ 39 (10th Dist.), citing Morris, at 2014-Ohio-5052, ¶ 28. See Crim.R. 52 (A) (defining harmless error as “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights” and providing that such error “shall be disregarded”). “Error in the admission of other act testimony is harmless when there is no reasonable possibility that the testimony contributed to the accused’s conviction.” State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391 (1976), paragraph th