State v. Neagos
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledSeptember 23, 2026
Docket2026 CA 00017
JudgeHoffman
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Neagos, 2026-Ohio-3725.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2026 CA 00017
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion and Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Licking County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 24-CR-00575
APRIL M. NEAGOS
Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant - Appellant
Date of Judgment Entry: September 23, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Jenny Wells, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, Kenneth W.
Oswalt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Todd W. Barstow, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant April Neagos appeals her conviction and sentence entered
by the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, on one count of murder, following a jury
trial. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
{¶2} On August 12, 2024, Detective Jon Mills of the Licking County Sheriff’s Office
filed a criminal complaint against Appellant in connection with the stabbing death of her
father, 75-year-old Nick Neagos (“the Victim”). An arrest warrant was issued the same day.
Subsequently, on August 22, 2024, the Licking County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on one
count of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), an unclassified felony. Appellant appeared
before the trial court via video conference without counsel for an initial appearance on
September 12, 2024. The trial court appointed Attorney Stephen Wolfe to represent
Appellant. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty at her arraignment on September 17, 2024.
{¶3} On October 23, 2024, Appellant filed a motion moving the trial court to enter
a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to R.C. 2945.391 and a motion requesting
the trial court order an evaluation to determine her competency pursuant to R.C. 2945.371.
Via Judgment Entry filed the same day, the trial court ordered Appellant be examined by the
Forensic Evaluation Service Center in Fairfield, Ohio, to determine Appellant’s sanity at the
time of the offense as well as her competency to stand trial.
{¶4} On December 2, 2024, after receiving the November 20, 2024 report of Erin
Nichting, Psy.D., Director and Forensic Psychologist at the Forensic Evaluation Service
Center, the trial court conducted a hearing on December 2, 2024. The parties stipulated to
Dr. Nichting’s report, which “generally” found Appellant “competent to stand trial pursuant
to 2945.371 and 2945.38.” Transcript of December 2, 2024 Hearing at p.4. Via Judgment
Entry filed December 2, 2024, the trial court accepted the Forensic Evaluation Service Center
report and adopted the finding Appellant “is capable of understanding the nature and
objective of the proceedings and assisting in her defense and is, therefore, competent to stand
trial.” December 2, 2024 Judgment Entry.
{¶5} On January 29, 2025, Appellant file a motion for a second evaluation of her
mental condition at the time of the offense pursuant to R.C. 2945.371(B). Therein, Attorney
Wolfe explained:
In a report dated November 20, 2024, a report authored by Erin
Nichting, Psy.D. indicated that examiner Joy McGhee, Psy.D. had attempted
to interview [Appellant], and that she had declined to participate. The report
further stated that if [Appellant’s] cooperation could be gained, [McGhee]
would gladly conduct the evaluation at a later time. After lengthy discussions
with [Appellant], she has assured counsel that she would participate in future
evaluations.
January 29, 2025 Motion for Second Evaluation of Defendant’s Mental
Condition at the Time of the Offense at pp. 1-2, unpaginated.
{¶6} The trial court granted the motion and ordered Appellant again be examined
by the Forensic Evaluation Service Center. See February 3, 2025 Judgment Entry. The trial
court received a report from the Forensic Evaluation Service Center on April 18, 2025, and a
second report on April 24, 2025. The trial court conducted a hearing on May 9, 2025, at which
the parties stipulated to, and the trial court accepted, the reports. Via Judgment Entry filed
May 9, 2025, the trial court adopted the findings in the report Appellant “is capable of
understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings and assisting in her defense and is,
therefore, competent to stand trial, and also that although [Appellant] reported a history of
mental issues, she knew the wrongfulness of her actions at the time of the offense, and,
therefore, a mental status defense is precluded per O.R.C. Section 2901.21.” May 9, 2025
Judgment Entry.
{¶7} On June 3, 2025, Appellant filed a motion, requesting a second competency
evaluation. Attorney Wolfe stated:
Appellant has indicated that he [sic] suffers from a variety of mental
health disorders, most notably she is concerned with her ADHD (attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder) which, by her account, is so severe that she is
unable to receive and interpret information regarding her case that is relayed to
her in such a fashion that she is able to effectively communicate with her
counsel. Counsel first requested an evaluation on October 22, 2024, however
[Appellant] was uncooperative, purportedly due to her severe ADHD, and a
report was not able to be completed. The report was re-requested on January
28, 2025. [Appellant] again was uncooperative, and because of this, the doctor
could not confirm that she suffered from a severe mental illness, although it
was opined that she likely has a personality disorder.
After these evaluations were complete, counsel met with [Appellant],
where she was still unable to process the information counsel was relaying,
which she said was due to the time it takes her to process due to her ADHD.
This is making it impossible for her to effectively communicate with counsel
and assist in her own defense.
June 3, 2025 Request for Second Competency Evaluation at the State’s
Expense at pp. 1-2, unpaginated.1
{¶8} Via Judgment Entry issued June 9, 2025, the trial court ordered Appellant
receive a second evaluation of her competency to stand trial. After receiving a report dated
1
The October 22, 2024, and January 28, 2025 dates refer to the dates on which the requests for the evaluations
were served.
July 17, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on August 6, 2025. The parties had no
objections to the report and the trial court accepted the findings therein. See August 6, 2025
Judgment Entry.
{¶9} Attorney Wolfe filed a motion for second evaluation of Appellant’s mental
condition at the time of the offense on September 11, 2025. Via Judgment Entry/Nunc Pro
Tunc filed September 22, 2025, the trial court ordered Appellant be examined by the Forensic
Evaluation Service Center to determine her sanity at the time of the offense. In a
correspondence dated September 29, 2025, Dr. Nichting advised the trial court Angela
Ledgerwood, Ph.D., Psychologist, attempted to evaluate Appellant that day, however,
Appellant refused to participate in the evaluation. Dr. Nichting noted Appellant advised Dr.
Ledgerwood she did not understand enough to participate and did not understand what was
going on, which Appellant attributed to her untreated ADHD.
{¶10} The matter proceeded to jury trial on January 20, 2026. The following evidence
was presented at trial:
{¶11} Detective Justin Woodyard with the Licking County Sheriff’s Department
testified he responded to 200 Parana Drive, Newton Township, Licking County, Ohio, on
August 10, 2024, after receiving a telephone call regarding an incident at the residence.
Detective Woodyard stated, at some point during the investigation, the Sheriff’s Department
received a flash drive with video from the home security system installed at the residence. The
flash drive was marked as State’s Exhibit No. 1, and was played for the jury. Detective
Woodyard described the events captured on the video. The video depicted the Victim seated
in a recliner with his legs extended onto the footrest. While the Victim’s attention is focused
on a ringing cell phone, Appellant, who had wandered into the kitchen, reaches for a knife.
The Victim and Appellant struggle over the knife. Appellant tells the Victim, “We’re going to
do this together.” After stabbing the Victim multiple times, Appellant fled the residence.
Detective Woodyard also identified two knives which were recovered at the scene. Both of
the knives had what he suspected to be blood on them.
{¶12} Licking County Sheriff’s Deputy Ryan Donahue was dispatched to 200 Parana
Drive on August 10, 2024. When he arrived at the scene, Deputy Donahue made contact with
Detective Peck to ascertain what was happening. Deputy Donahue activated his body
camera. The body camera video was marked as State’s Exhibit No. 2 and was played for the
jury. The video captured Deputy Donahue speaking with Appellant. When Appellant was
asked if she had used any drugs that day, she replied she had three or four days prior, but
denied using drugs that day. Appellant is heard saying, “I stabbed him quite a few times. I’m
not sure how many, but I stabbed him * * * And he died instantly.” Trial Transcript at pp.
133-134.
{¶13} Candace Elkins, Appellant’s mother, testified Appellant called her twice
between 9:00 a.m. and noon on August 10, 2024, asking Elkins to find her car keys and pick
her up at the Victim’s house. Appellant did not live with Elkins, but her car was parked at
Elkins’ house. Although divorced, Elkins and the Victim remained good friends. Elkins noted
the Victim was not in good health and could not walk or breathe well. In addition, the Victim
suffered from seizures. As a result, a video system was installed in the Victim’s home.
{¶14} Elkins drove to the Victim’s house to pick up Appellant. While on her way,
Elkins received a call from the Victim, but did not answer. Elkins pulled over and tried to
call back, but the Victim did not answer. When Elkins arrived, she walked to the front porch
and “just heard screaming, screaming, and screaming” coming from inside the house. Id. at
p. 145. Elkins stepped into the residence and saw Appellant. Elkins had called 9-1-1 when
she heard the screaming and was on the phone with a dispatcher as she entered the residence.
The 9-1-1 call was played for the jury.
{¶15} Appellant attempted to get into Elkins’ van and drive away. Elkins and
Appellant struggled over the keys, but Elkins was able to forcibly take the keys from her.
Elkins recalled she touched Appellant’s stomach during the tussle and had blood on her own
hands. Elkins realized Appellant had stabbed herself. When Elkins first arrived at the
Victim’s house, Appellant asked, “You wanted to know where he is, here he is.” Id. at p.
151. Appellant then dragged the Victim’s body out of the house.
{¶16} Mason Wilkins was working for the Newark Fire Department on August 10,
2024, when he was dispatched to the Victim’s residence. When he arrived, he observed “an
individual in hysterics standing in the driveway crying.” Id. at p. 161. The individual directed
him to the Victim, who “was prone face down on the small stairs with his head up towards
the door and his lower extremities on the cement surface.” Id. The Victim was unresponsive
and did not have a pulse. Wilkins recalled the Victim had numerous wounds and lacerations
to his chest and neck. The Victim was hooked up to a cardiac monitor, but he had no signs
of life. Medics called a Code 16, DOA, dead on arrival.
{¶17} Licking County Coroner Charles Lee, D.O., performed the autopsy of the
Victim on August 11, 2024. Dr. Lee explained the Victim suffered 16 stab wounds, 12 to the
chest and 4 to the neck. Dr. Lee indicated four of the wounds were very deep with one going
into the right side of the Victim’s heart, one into his left lung, one into the left side of his heart,
and one into his right lung. The wounds measured between 4 ¼ to 5 ½ inches deep. Dr. Lee
determined the Victim’s cause of death was internal hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds
to the chest and neck, and the manner of death was a homicide. The coroner noted the 2 stab
wounds which penetrated the Victim’s heart were not survivable. Dr. Lee added the Victim
would have died in less than 2 minutes.
{¶18} After hearing all the evidence and deliberating, the jury found Appellant guilty
of murder as charged in the Indictment. After excusing the jury, the trial court proceeded to
sentencing. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison with no opportunity for parole
for a minimum of 15 years. The trial court memorialized Appellant’s conviction and sentence
via Judgment Entry filed January 21, 2026.
{¶19} It is from her conviction and sentence Appellant appeals, raising as her sole
assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE ONE SECTION TEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION BY
FINDING HER GUILTY OF MURDER, AS THAT VERDICT WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS ALSO AGAINST
THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. (T. 116-124; R.
JUDGMENT ENTRY 1/21/26; EXH. 1).
{¶20} The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are
both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380,
paragraph two of the syllabus (1997). Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to
whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, while weight
of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief. Id. at 386-387. A finding a
conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence, however, necessarily includes
a finding the conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and will therefore be dispositive
of the issues of sufficiency of the evidence. State v. McCrary, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.).
{¶21} An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is
to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, paragraph two of the syllabus (1991).
{¶22} The term “manifest weight of the evidence” relates to persuasion. Eastley v.
Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. It concerns “the inclination of the greater amount of credible
evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.” (Emphasis
deleted.) State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), superseded by constitutional
amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 n.4 (1997);
State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26.
{¶23} In determining whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, an appellate court reviews the entire record, “weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts
in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice
that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at
387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). Sitting as the
“thirteenth juror,” the court of appeals considers whether the evidence should be believed and
may overturn a verdict if it disagrees with the trier of fact's conclusion. Id.
{¶24} When conducting a manifest weight review, the question is whether the jury
clearly lost its way in resolving conflicts, resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice, even if
the evidence is legally sufficient. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387; State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d
49, 67 (2001). Appellate courts have traditionally presumed the jury’s assessment is correct,
given its ability to observe witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and tone, all critical factors in
evaluating credibility. Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 21; Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10
Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984).
{¶25} A manifest-weight claim succeeds only in “the exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d at 387. To reverse a conviction on manifest-weight grounds, all three judges on
the appellate panel must concur. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 3(B)(3); Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko,
2007-Ohio-4918, ¶¶ 2-4, citing Thompkins, syllabus ¶ 4.
{¶26} Appellant was convicted of murder, in violation of R. C. 2903.02(A), which
states “[no] person shall purposely cause the death of another person.” Appellant contends
the evidence did not establish she acted with the requisite mental state of “purposely.” We
disagree.
{¶27} R.C. 2901.22(A) defines “purposely,” as follows:
A person acts purposely when it is the person's specific intention to
cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against
conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to
accomplish thereby, it is the offender's specific intention to engage in conduct
of that nature.
{¶28} “A person is presumed to intend the natural, reasonable and probable
consequences of his voluntary acts.” State v. Scales, 2024-Ohio-2171, ¶ 22 (8th Dist), citing
State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 554 (1995). “[I]ntent to kill ‘may be deduced from all the
surrounding circumstances, including the instrument used to produce death, its tendency to
destroy life if designed for that purpose, and the manner of inflicting a fatal wound.’” State v.
Peasley, 2026-Ohio-1946, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.), citing 5, quoting State v. Robinson, 161 Ohio St. 213,
paragraph five of the syllabus (1954). When a defendant “inflicts a wound with a deadly
weapon in a manner that appears to be calculated to destroy life or inflict great bodily harm[,]”
a jury may infer the defendant acted purposely. State v. Ivery, 2020-Ohio-3349, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.),
quoting State v. Shorter, 2012-Ohio-2701, ¶ 16 (7th Dist.). A deadly weapon is “any instrument,
device, or thing capable of inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted for use as a
weapon, or possessed, carried, or used as a weapon.” R.C. 2923.11(A). “A knife constitutes
a ‘deadly weapon’ if possessed, carried, or used as a weapon.” State v. Phelps, 2023-Ohio-2808,
¶ 10 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Horne, 2009-Ohio-841, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.), quoting R.C.
2923.11(A).
{¶29} We have watched the video from the home security camera which captured the
events of August 10, 2024. The Victim is seated in a recliner in the living room while
Appellant paces around. Appellant walks into the kitchen, retrieves a knife, and then returns
to the living room. The Victim takes the knife from Appellant and returns it to the kitchen.
The Victim tries to talk to Appellant, asking her what she wants him to tell the squad.
Appellant does not respond, but grabs a knife. The Victim again takes it out of her hands.
Appellant grabs for a knife for a third time, and the Victim attempts to restrain her. A struggle
ensues over the knife. The Victim asks Appellant, “What, you going to kill me?” Appellant
responds, “Yeap!”
{¶30} As the scuffle continues, the Victim and Appellant fall to the floor. Appellant
begins to stab the Victim as he begs for his life. Appellant repeatedly stabs the Victim,
ultimately killing him. Appellant stands, exits the kitchen, yelling, “I just killed f-ing Nick! I
just killed f-ing Nick!”
{¶31} We find the extent and severity of the Victim’s injuries and the manner in which
they were inflicted was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude Appellant acted purposely
to kill the Victim. State v. Ferguson, 2022-Ohio-1648, ¶ 58 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Lindsey,
2015-Ohio-2169, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Scudder, 71 Ohio St.3d 263, 274 (1994) (“the
number and nature of [the victim's] stab wounds clearly established [the defendant's] purpose
to kill”). We also find the jury did not clearly lose its way in determining Appellant purposely
caused the death of the Victim.
{¶32} Based upon the foregoing, we find Appellant’s conviction was not based upon
insufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶33} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶34} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
{¶35} Costs to Appellant.
By: Hoffman, J.
King, P.J. and
Gormley, J. concur.