State v. Conner

[Cite as State v. Conner, 2026-Ohio-3871.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115631 v. : QUMAURIE CONNER, : Defendant-Appellant. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 1, 2026 Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-696461-B Appearances: Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Adrienne E. Linnick, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Moran & Fisher, Attorneys at Law, LLC, Susan J. Moran, and Michael T. Fisher, for appellant. LISA B. FORBES, P.J.: Defendant-appellant Qumaurie Conner (“Conner”) appeals his convictions for involuntary manslaughter and related offenses stemming from his part in causing the death of Kentada Todd (“Todd”). Conner argues on appeal that the juvenile court abused its discretion in transferring Conner’s case to the general division. He also appeals from the journal entry imposing consecutive prison sentences.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History On October 17, 2023, Conner was named in an 11-count complaint in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, accusing Conner of committing numerous offenses including aggravated murder allegedly committed on or about October of 2023. At the time, Conner was 14 years old. A. Probable-Cause Hearing On January 19, 2024, the juvenile court held a probable-cause hearing. The State called numerous witnesses at the probable-cause hearing who testified as to the details of the alleged offenses. Defense counsel and the State stipulated to Conner’s date of birth (12/14/2008) and that he was 14 years old at the time of the offenses. Although Conner does not raise the juvenile court’s probable- cause finding on appeal, we discuss it below to provide context and relevant facts for the raised assignments of error. On behalf of the State, Detective Timothy Cramer (“Det. Cramer”) of the Cleveland Police Department testified that on October 9, 2023, he responded to a reported homicide of a female, Todd, that occurred at 12:37 a.m. at 3425 East 52nd 1 Two other juveniles who were bound over to the general division and convicted have also appealed: State v. Ayers-Moore, 2026-Ohio-3114 (8th Dist.), and State v. Davis, 2026-Ohio-3338 (8th Dist.). Street (“the House”), in Cleveland, Ohio. Upon arriving on the scene, Det. Cramer observed multiple shell castings in the street in front of the home as well as bullet holes on the exterior of the home. Det. Cramer and his partner conducted interviews of several occupants of the house. From these interviews, Det. Cramer learned that the occupants “heard gunfire, and they realized that that gunfire was . . . striking the house . . . .” Det. Cramer testified that “at some point [the occupants] realized that Ms. Todd had been struck by a bullet and that she was bleeding and then police were called.” Todd was in her bed when she was shot. Det. Cramer explained that surveillance video was available from two locations north of the house at issue. Det. Cramer played one of the surveillance videos in court. He testified that the video showed a silver Hyundai Sonata traveling south on East 52nd Street, past the House. The same car then “appear[ed] as though it turned around and came back” in front of the House, at which time “four people exit[ed] the vehicle and beg[an] firing guns towards [the] house.” One of the individuals was wearing a black hoodie with a distinctive white rectangular logo at the center of it and white shoes. Det. Cramer testified that the shooters got back in the car after firing multiple rounds and the car continued northbound. Det. Cramer explained that all of the individuals who exited the vehicle fired shots based on the “muzzle flash in the video coming from their arms that are extended,” as well as where the spent casing were found.  Det. Cramer testified that he shared the information he had gathered from video surveillance with the police department’s Realtime Crime analyst. Det. Cramer stated that they searched for the Hyundai Sonata through the Realtime Crime cameras in the city. Police determined it was a stolen vehicle. Det. Cramer described using Flock and Realtime Crime cameras to track the vehicle’s location both before and after the homicide, as well as during the homicide itself. Hours after the homicide, the vehicle was observed turning from Turney Avenue onto Tioga Avenue, in Cleveland. A few minutes later, Det. Cramer observed two younger, black males coming from Tioga Avenue and turning onto Turney Avenue on foot. The vehicle was later discovered abandoned on Tioga Avenue. The two males observed on foot in the surveillance footage were wearing the same outfits observed in the Flock-camera captures of the vehicle as well as the surveillance video from the shooting at the House. One of the males was wearing the black hoodie with the distinctive white rectangular logo and white and black shoes. Det. Cramer testified that Regional Transit Authority (“RTA”) footage then captured the two males getting on a bus and going to the city of Garfield Heights. The two males are seen exiting the bus in the proximity of an area where a crew of juveniles are known to “hang out” and “create[] problems in that area.” Det. Cramer explained that the Garfield Heights police “were familiar with a group of kids down there, including knowing names and things like that.” The Garfield Heights police were able to “come up with some identifications” including identifying Conner from the surveillance photos. On October 11, 2025, Garfield Heights police responded to an unrelated incident that led to the arrest of several juveniles, including Conner. When Conner was arrested he was “wearing the same shoes or shoes that looked similar to the shoes” that were observed on one of the young black males on the surveillance photo from Turney Avenue. Det. Cramer testified that he went to Conner’s parents’ address, where he spoke with his mother and grandfather, who both identified Conner as the individual wearing the black hoodie with the white rectangular logo in the surveillance photo of the males walking on Turney Avenue. After hearing the testimony from Det. Cramer, the juvenile court found that there was probable cause that Conner committed the offenses for which he was charged. Conner was referred to the court diagnostic clinic in preparation for an amenability hearing. Dr. Lynn Williams (“Dr. Williams”) conducted appellant’s psychological evaluation. B. Amenability Hearing and Evaluation Report On April 16, 2024, the juvenile court held Conner’s amenability hearing. The parties stipulated to the court diagnostic clinic’s evaluation report (“Evaluation”), but noted that the age reflected therein for Conner was incorrect. The parties agreed that Conner’s age at the time of the offense was 14 years and 10 months. Dr. Williams evaluated Conner’s relevant family history, developmental and social history, academic performance, employment history, medical history, mental health, substance use, criminal history, intellectual functioning, and mental status. Dr. Williams summarized her findings in three key transfer factors and found that Conner’s risk for violence was “high,” his sophistication maturity was “high,” and his treatment amenability was “middle.” Included in the Evaluation was a discussion of Conner’s history of engagement with the juvenile court system. The Evaluation stated that Conner has two prior adjudicated delinquency cases, both assaults that were misdemeanors of the first degree. Additionally, Conner had two juvenile court cases pending at the time of the Evaluation. The Evaluation stated that two valid court-order violations had been filed against Conner, one for an alleged fight and the other for removing his GPS monitor. The Evaluation noted that Conner reported that the GPS monitor fell off. The Evaluation further stated that “[p]robation and school records indicated that [Conner] engaged in a number of threatening behaviors to others.” Conner had “five out of school suspensions between October 3, 2022, to February 9, 2023. Two were for fighting.” The Evaluation described Conner’s history with special-education services and current mental-health diagnosis of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), oppositional-defiant disorder, and major-depressive disorder. However, the Evaluation stated that “based on the clinical interview and historical records, [Conner] does not meet criteria for Intellectual Developmental Disorder. His intelligence is in the average range . . . He has some mental health history but does not suffer severe psychiatric disturbance that would impair reality testing.” The Evaluation further noted that juvenile-detention center (“JDC”) teachers described Conner as an “excellent student” and that as of the date of the Evaluation, Conner had achieved a Level 4, the highest level in the JDC behavior-management program. Neither the State nor defense counsel called witnesses at the amenability hearing, but both made arguments before the juvenile court. C. Court Findings At the conclusion of the amenability hearing, the juvenile court announced its findings and relinquished jurisdiction to the general division court after considering the factors set forth in R.C. 2152.12. The court concluded that “[b]ased on the application of [R.C. 2152.12](D) and (E), the nature of these charges, the Court finds that this matter will be transferred into the Adult System for trial.” D. Felony Indictment and Plea Conner was transferred to the general felony division. On November 4, 2024, the grand jury indicted Conner on the same charges and specifications as those contained in the original delinquency complaint. On August 25, 2025, Conner appeared in court and entered pleas of guilty to an amended indictment: amended Count 1, involuntary manslaughter (with 3-year firearm specification); Count 3, improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation; Count 4, felonious assault (with 3-year firearm specification), amended to list names of all victims; Count 10, improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle; and Count 11, receiving stolen property. The remaining counts and specifications were nolled. Conner agreed to an agreed-recommended prison terms of 18 to 25 years, not including the Reagan Tokes tail, and that he would not be eligible for early release. The court sentenced Conner to a minimum of 20 years in prison, running several of the counts consecutively to each other, and imposing a Reagan Tokes tail. Conner appeals, raising the following two assignments of error: Assignment of Error 1: The juvenile court abused its discretion when it transferred Defendant’s case for criminal prosecution, without sufficient credible evidence of non-amenability, in violation of R.C. 2152.12(B); the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and art. I, § 16 of the Ohio Const. Assignment of Error 2: The trial court violated Defendant’s rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution [and] the Ohio Constitution, when it imposed a consecutive sentence which is not clearly and convincingly supported by the record. II. Law and Analysis A. Assignment of Error No. 1 – Amenability 1. Legal Standards Ohio’s juvenile system provides two types of transfer: discretionary and mandatory. State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 90 (2000). At issue here is a discretionary transfer.  In a discretionary-transfer proceeding, the juvenile court may transfer the child to adult court for prosecution if it finds (1) that the child was at least 14 years old at the time of the charged act, (2) there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the charged act, and (3) “[t]he child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.” R.C. 2152.12(B)(1), (2), and (3); see State v. Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-4276, ¶ 3, citing R.C. 2152.12(B) (“Discretionary transfer affords juvenile court judges the discretion to transfer to adult court certain juveniles who do not appear to be amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system or who appear to be a threat to public safety.”). Before making a discretionary-transfer decision, the juvenile court must order an “investigation into the child’s social history, education, family situation, and any other factor bearing on whether child is amenable to juvenile rehabilitation, including a mental health examination of the child by a public or private agency or a person qualified to make the examination.” R.C. 2152.12(C). In determining whether to exercise its discretion to transfer a child to adult court under R.C. 2152.12(B), the juvenile court must consider the statutory factors in R.C. 2152.12(D) in favor of transfer against the statutory factors in R.C. 2152.12(E) in opposition to transfer, and the court must indicate on the record the specific factors it weighed in making its determination. R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). Neither list of factors is exhaustive. Id. A juvenile court’s decision to exercise its discretion to transfer a juvenile to adult court must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Nicholas at ¶ 35. We also note that the juvenile court is not “‘required to individually analyze each and every possible avenue for juvenile rehabilitation and decide that [the juvenile] was not amenable to them.’” State v. Taylor, 2024-Ohio-5094, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.), quoting D.M. v. D.M., 2017-Ohio-8768, ¶ 50 (6th Dist.). This court reviews the juvenile court’s amenability determination for an abuse of discretion. In re M.P., 2010-Ohio-599, ¶ 14. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio- 3304, ¶ 35. An abuse of discretion “‘implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.’” W.A.F.P., Inc. v. Sky Fuel Inc., 2024-Ohio-3297, ¶ 13, (8th Dist.), quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d 217, 219 (1983). “In the context of an amenability determination, a juvenile court’s analytical error as to one factor of many is not, standing alone, necessarily an abuse of discretion where the error is not prejudicial and the court relies on other factors.” In re J.S., 2023- Ohio-2675, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Gregory, 2020-Ohio-5207, ¶ 2 (2d Dist.). In light of “‘the discretion afforded the juvenile court by the legislature in determining a juvenile’s amenability to the juvenile justice system,’” the juvenile court’s amenability determination cannot be reversed if “‘there is some rational and factual basis to support the trial court’s decision.’” State v. Nicholson, 2022-Ohio-2037, ¶ 206 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Crosby, 2019-Ohio-2217, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.). No one factor controls over any other. State v. Foster, 2023-Ohio-4308, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). 2. Trial Court’s Considerations and Findings Regarding Amenability Pertinent to this appeal, the juvenile court indicated at the amenability hearing that it considered the following R.C. 2152.12(D) factors in favor of transfer include: (1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psychological harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of the alleged act. (2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim due to the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of the physical or psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim. .. (4) The child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or as part of a gang or other organized criminal activity. (5) The child had a firearm on or about the child’s person or under the child’s control at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm. (6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adjudication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community control sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudication or conviction. (7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile system. (8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer.  (9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system. The juvenile court explained that it did not find any of the factors against transfer articulated in R.C. 2152.12(E) applied. The court determined that factors 1 and 2 weigh in favor of transfer. Specifically, pursuant to factor 1 the court stated on the record that the harm to the victim — death, “weighs heavily, heavily in favor of transfer.” Further, under factor 2, the harm was exacerbated by the vulnerability of the victim, specifically that she was “in her own bed asleep in her own house.” With regard to factor 4, that court considered whether the crime was committed “for hire or as part of a gang or other organized criminal activity.” Although the court did not make a finding that this factor weighed in favor of amenability, the court discussed the possibility that organized criminal activity was involved here because the “car was stolen, the house cased, people drove around, they came back, they all four got out of the car, then they left, then the car was found discarded six hours later.” The court found that factor 5 applied, specifically that the “juvenile displayed, brandished, indicated, or used a firearm.” Next, the court stated that factor 6 (whether at the time of the act charged, the juvenile was awaiting adjudication or disposition for delinquency, or was under a community-control sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquency) did not apply. The court noted that Conner had previously been placed on probation for two assault cases and “things weren’t working so well.” The court stated that Conner was “referred to a specialized docket program[, a]nd because there was a refusal, not necessarily clear to me who’s refusing[, the parent or juvenile], the probation was terminated, not because it was a successful termination . . . .” The court noted that the present case “occurred two or three months” after that termination. The court voiced its discomfort with the way that “case has moved through the system.” The court found that factor 7 applied, specifically that “prior sanctions” show that rehabilitation is not likely. The court stated that the Evaluation indicates a “high estimate for a risk of future violence” and noted Conner’s two misdemeanor assaults, “history of threatening others and fights in school,” “parent criminality,” “an unstable home environment,” and the present “fatal act of violence with a firearm.” The court stated that “[t]hese are major violations of basic rights of . . . societal norms and rules.” The court discussed factor 8, which considers whether the juvenile is “emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough” for transfer. Citing the Evaluation, specifically Conner’s “RSTI Sophistication and Maturity” score that is in the 88 percentile (high-offender range), the court explained that Conner “has some ability to regulate . . . [and] is aware of the wrongfulness of crimes and understands behavioral norms.” The court noted Conner’s frequent absences without leave and refusal to take medication. The court found that Conner “is displaying a higher level of sophistication and maturity and using these skills in a criminogenic manner.”  Finally, the court found that factor 9 applied, specifically that there “is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system.” The court cited two Eighth District Court of Appeals cases, including State v. Johnson, 2015- Ohio-96 (8th Dist.), and State v. Hennings, 2019-Ohio-4675 (8th Dist.), to support the proposition that severity of the crime “is an indication that rehabilitation is going to take a longer period of time.” The court also stated that the minimum sentence here would go well beyond Conner’s 21st birthday. With regard to the factors weighing against transfer, the court found that none of them applied. With respect to factor 7 (a child’s mental illness or intellectual disability), the court referenced the Evaluation, which stated that Conner “has some mental health history, but does not suffer severe psychiatric disturbance that would impair reality testing.” In its journal entry, the court summarized each of the findings it made. The juvenile court listed the R.C. 2152.12(D) factors it considered and made the following findings: The Court finds after a full investigation, including a mental examination of said child made by a duly qualified person, and after full consideration of the child’s prior juvenile record, family environment, school record, efforts previously made to treat and rehabilitate the child, including prior commitments to the Department of Youth Services, the nature and severity of the offenses herein, the age, physical, and mental condition of the victim as effected by the matter therein, and other matters of evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child herein is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and that the safety of the community may require that he be held beyond his twenty-first birthday.  B. Conner Challenges the Trial Court’s Weighing of the R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E) Factors Conner asserts with his first assignment of error that the juvenile court abused its discretion in binding him over to the general division when the record lacked sufficient evidence to support a finding of nonamenability. Specifically, Conner argues that “his young age, the context of his childhood traumas that led to his serious behavior, that he had not ever been committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Services before, his positive progress at the juvenile detention center, and the fact that he was receptive to mental health services,” are “credible and compelling evidence” that he was amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system. According to Conner, the juvenile court misapplied R.C. 2152.12(D)(2) by attributing “the victim’s placement in bed as an exacerbating physical vulnerability.” Conner does not dispute that the victim was sleeping at the time of the incident, or that the victim was shot in her bed at 12:37 a.m. Conner does not cite any cases to support his argument that the victim’s placement in bed, or more specifically, sleeping, cannot be considered a vulnerability under this factor. We are persuaded by the State’s argument that here, the victim was in a vulnerable “physical condition” that may exacerbate the harm suffered by the victim. The circumstances here are similar to a rape case where “courts of appeals have ‘concluded that sleeping is a “physical condition” that substantially impairs a victim’s ability to resist . . . in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c).’” State v. Miller, 2019-Ohio-4121, ¶ 37 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Stevens, 2016-Ohio-446, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.). Conner also appears to argue that the juvenile court improperly “failed to acknowledge the lack of . . . evidence” of “organized crime, gang activity, or “crime for hire” under factor 4. We disagree. Although the juvenile court considered the possibility of organized criminal activity because of concern for how the incident unfolded, the court explicitly made a finding that this factor did not apply. With regard to factor 7, Conner attempts to draw a parallel to an Eighth District case, State v. Carter, 2023-Ohio-4310 (8th Dist.), where we held that the juvenile court “acted unreasonably” in making its amenability determination because it “wrongly concluded that no further juvenile court services were available to [defendant], even though the court specifically found that he had never been committed to ODYS, which has care and treatment services for juveniles.” Id. at ¶ 21. The facts in Carter are distinguishable. There, this court held that the juvenile court’s nonamenability finding for robbery, theft, and having weapons while under disability, was based on a demonstrably false premise that there were no remaining juvenile court options to hold him accountable and restore and rehabilitate him, even though he had never before been committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Servies (“ODYS”), as well as the court’s mere “speculation that the victim suffered economic and psychological harm” despite a lack of “any evidence whatsoever” regarding the harm suffered by the victim. Id. at ¶ 21, 25. In Carter, the court highlighted that a juvenile’s amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile system “‘is one of the juvenile’s rehabilitative potential, and it is separate from the question of the services the state has to offer or the services a juvenile court judge perceives the state has to offer.’” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 23, quoting Nicholas, 2022- Ohio-4276, at ¶ 54. Here, the juvenile court did not conclude that there was “nothing left” for Conner in the juvenile justice system, rather that prior sanctions and Conner’s related circumstances show that rehabilitation is not likely in the juvenile system. Conner’s “high estimate for a risk of future violence,” coupled with his history of assaults, fights, and threatening others, as well as the present “fatal act of violence with a firearm,” indicated to the juvenile court that the juvenile system is not best suited for his rehabilitation. This finding is supported by the record. Additionally, Conner argues that the court abused its discretion when it found that he did not have a mental illness or intellectual disability (in considering factors weighing against transfer), “despite the repeated references that [he] refus[ed] to take his prescribed medications (Focalin for ADHD, and Melatonin for sleep).” When a similar issue came before our sister court, the First District held that the trial court did not err in not weighing “mental illness” in the juvenile’s favor, despite the juvenile’s diagnosis with ADHD, “conduct disorder,” “disruptive mood” disorder, and “unspecified anxiety disorder.” State v. Bates, 2024-Ohio-5831, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). The court explained that the doctor that conducted the juvenile’s psychological evaluation did “not opine that his emotional challenges rise to the level of a mental illness.” Id. The court there further explained that the “statute does not elaborate on what ‘mental illness’ means . . .” but pointed to definitions provided by the State, including R.C. 5101.60(N), which defines “mental illness” as a “substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life.” Id.; see also R.C. 5101.60(N), 5119.01(A)(14), and 5122.01(A). Here, the court considered Conner’s mental-health history, but declined to find that this factor weighed against transfer, referencing the Evaluation’s finding that while Conner “has some mental health history, [he] does not suffer severe psychiatric disturbance that would impair reality testing.” This finding is supported by the language defining mental illness as a “substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 5101.60(N); 5119.01(A)(14); 5122.01(A). Finally, Conner argues that the juvenile court “did not delve into the possible benefits of rehabilitation . . . but rather the court focused solely on the seriousness of the offenses” and that it treated the proceeding as a mandatory bindover as opposed to a discretionary bindover. A review of the amenability- hearing record and the court’s findings refutes Conner’s argument. Moreover, this and other courts have “repeatedly recognized that ‘the more serious the offense, the less amenable the juvenile will be to rehabilitation in the juvenile system.’” Johnson, 2015-Ohio-96, at ¶ 43 (8th Dist.), quoting West, 2006-Ohio-3518, at ¶ 24 (4th Dist.).  Our review of the record reveals that the trial court considered all of the relevant factors in favor of and against transfer. The juvenile court found that six out of the nine R.C. 2152.12(D) factors favoring transfer applied. The juvenile court also considered the R.C. 2152.12(E) factors against transfer, finding that none of them applied. Conner has not identified anything in the court’s findings that is unsupported by the record. Conner’s disagreement is with the way the trial court applied the facts in the record to the relevant R.C. 2152.12 factors and the weight given to the factors by the juvenile court. However, having found that the trial court weighed the R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E) factors, and made the necessary findings based on the record before it, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Conner was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system. Conner’s first assignment of error is overruled. C. Assignment of Error No. 2 — Consecutive Sentence In the second assignment of error, Conner claims that the trial court improperly imposed a consecutive sentence, which is clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. Conner’s sentence is not subject to appellate review pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), which provides, “A sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” The Supreme Court has held that “an agreed-upon sentence may not be [appealed] if (1) both the defendant and state agree to the sentence, (2) the trial court imposes the agreed sentence, and (3) the sentence is authorized by law.” State v. Underwood, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 16, citing R.C. 2953.08(D)(1); see also State v. Thompson, 2025 Ohio-4825, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.) (concluding that a jointly recommended sentence if imposed, is not reviewable on appeal). Our court has repeatedly held that “this limitation on a defendant’s ability to challenge a jointly recommended sentence on appeal applies to sentences imposed as a result of plea agreements involving an agreed specific term, plea agreements involving a jointly recommended sentencing range and plea agreements involving pleas to multiple offenses with a jointly recommended sentencing range.” State v. Vegil St. Valle, 2024-Ohio-1167, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Williams, 2020-Ohio-3802, ¶ 8-10 (8th Dist.). Moreover, this court and others have unequivocally stated that “[i]n the context of a jointly recommended sentence that includes nonmandatory sentences, a trial court is not required to make the consecutive sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) or include those in the sentencing entry.” State v. Coleman, 2022-Ohio-4013, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.); see also State v. Conners, 2016-Ohio- 3195, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.) (holding that consecutive sentence findings are unnecessary when a trial court imposes a jointly recommended sentence). When a court “imposes a jointly recommended sentence, which contemplated consecutive sentences, without making the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings, the sentence is nonetheless considered to be “authorized by law” and is not reviewable on appeal pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1).” Id. at ¶ 19.  Here, the trial court accepted the jointly recommended aggregate minimum term of 18 to 25 years. The court imposed a minimum term of 20 years, which is within the agreed-to range. In addition, the trial court advised Conner at the change-of-plea colloquy that the jointly recommended sentencing range did not include the maximum possible term under the Reagan Tokes Law sentencing structure. The trial court did not deviate from the jointly recommended sentence. Conner’s only point of disagreement is that the court did not impose a lower, non- consecutive, sentence within the agreed-upon range. This, however, is not a valid basis on which to overturn Conner’s sentence. We, nevertheless, note an error in the sentencing entry.2 Specifically, the sentencing journal entry does not adhere to the statutory methodology for calculation of Conner’s indefinite sentence under R.C. 2929.14 and 2929.144(B)(2). See Ayers-Moore, and Davis. See also State v. Jenkins, 2025-Ohio-2143, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.) (S.C. Gallagher, J., concurring in judgment only). The trial court imposed an aggregate stated minimum term of 20 years, and improperly imposed “maximum terms” independently calculated on each first- and second-degree felony of which Conner was convicted. That is, the sentencing journal entry provides: The court imposes a prison sentence at the Lorain Correctional Institution of 20 year(s). This is an agreed recommended sentence by the parties. In Count 1, Defendant [is] sentenced to 3 years on the gun specification, to run prior to and consecutive [to] the underlying 2 The trial court made the same error in the sentencing entries for Conner’s codefendants. Ayers-Moore, 2026-Ohio-3114 (8th Dist.), and Davis, 2026-Ohio-3338 (8th Dist.).  offense, to which he is sentenced to a minimum of 7 and maximum of 10.5 years, in count 3 the defendant is sentenced to a minimum of 5 year[s] and a maximum of 7.5 years, in count 4 the defendant is sentenced to 3 years on the gun specification, to run consecutive to the gun specification in count 1, and prior to and consecutive to the underlying offense, to which he is sentenced to a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of 7.5 years, 1 year on count 10, and 1 year on count 11. Counts 1, 4, 10, and 11 are to run consecutive to each other. The gun specification in Count 4 shall run consecutive, but the underlying sentence in count 4, shall run concurrent. However, where a defendant is convicted of multiple qualifying offenses, R.C. 2929.144 calls for the imposition of only one indefinite sentence on the most serious qualifying felony being sentenced. Consequently, the sentence imposed by the trial court is incorrect and not in compliance with the formula set forth in R.C. 2929.144. See Jenkins at ¶ 76. Nevertheless, because this sentencing error was not appealed, it remains as imposed. See Snyder v. Old World Classics, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-1875, ¶ 4 (Courts of appeal are limited to reviewing matters presented by the parties.); see State v. Sailor, 2021-Ohio-2277, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.); see also State v. Wilson, 2006- Ohio-2750, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). The second assignment of error challenging the sentence is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR