State v. Dearmond
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket2025-CA-79
JudgeHanseman
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Dearmond, 2026-Ohio-4599.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. No. 2025-CA-79
Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 24-CR-023
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
TYREN L. DEARMOND SR. : Court)
:
Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 20, 2026, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
LEWIS, P.J., concurs.
HUFFMAN, J., concurs in judgment only.
OPINION
CLARK C.A. No. 2025-CA-79
THOMAS W. KIDD, JR., Attorney for Appellant
JOHN M. LINTZ, Attorney for Appellee
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Tyren L. Dearmond, Sr. appeals from his conviction by a jury of felony murder
predicated on felonious assault. Dearmond claims that the trial court erred when it overruled
his motion to suppress and that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence and was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Dearmond also contends that the trial court
erred in failing to admit an exculpatory statement he made to law enforcement and erred in
refusing to suppress statements he made after invoking his right to counsel. For the following
reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} This case arose from the shooting and death of Duane Ellington. In the
afternoon hours of December 21, 2023, Dearmond was at a residence on West Euclid
Avenue in Springfield, Ohio, with a friend named Peterson. Dearmond was wearing orange
pants and shoes and an orange and blue jacket. Another friend named Upshaw arrived to
return Dearmond’s cellphone. While outside the residence, Upshaw gave Dearmond a bear
hug, and Dearmond stepped back and started to punch at Upshaw. Peterson attempted to
break the two apart. At the same time, Ellington was driving down Euclid Avenue with his
wife. Ellington knew the men and stopped the car to help Peterson break up the fight.
{¶ 3} Once Dearmond and Upshaw were separated, Peterson and Ellington walked
across the street. While standing on the sidewalk near Upshaw’s white jeep, Ellington was
struck in the head by a bullet. Right before Ellington was shot, his wife was seated in their
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parked vehicle and saw Dearmond waving a gun around. She also heard a woman scream
“Put it away! You know what happens when you do that!” Upon hearing a single gunshot,
Ellington’s wife ducked down in her car seat; when she sat back up, she saw Ellington lying
on the ground.
{¶ 4} After Ellington was shot, Peterson called 911 and reported to the operator that
Dearmond had shot Ellington, Dearmond stated, “I didn’t do this,” got into Upshaw’s jeep,
and drove away.
{¶ 5} Ellington died three days later. A coroner performed an autopsy and determined
that his cause of death was a single gunshot wound to the head. The coroner concluded
that the bullet had entered Ellington’s front left forehead and traveled backwards into his
skull. The coroner ruled the manner of death a homicide.
{¶ 6} On January 17, 2024, Dearmond was indicted for purposeful murder, felonious
assault, felony murder (based on the felonious assault), discharging a firearm on or near a
prohibited premises, and having weapons while under disability.1 Four of the indicted counts
also charged three-year firearm specifications.
{¶ 7} Dearmond was arrested and interviewed at the Springfield Police Department
on March 14, 2024. Prior to his interview, Detective Sullivan read Dearmond his Miranda
rights. Dearmond told Det. Sullivan that he did not want to talk about the case but that he
did have a statement to make. Thereafter, Dearmond signed the waiver of rights portion of
the Miranda rights form. Det. Sullivan then asked Dearmond if he wanted to talk about the
case at all, to which Dearmond stated “no” and that he wanted the detective to know that he
and his friends and family all had had a good relationship with Ellington. Thereafter,
1 Before the commencement of Dearmond’s trial, the State dismissed the having weapons
while under disability charge.
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Dearmond spoke with Det. Sullivan and his partner, Det. Jordan. Throughout his interview,
Dearmond refused to answer some questions while providing information to the detectives
regarding other subjects. Over the course of approximately an hour and a half conversation
with the detectives, Dearmond stated he would speak to the detectives later “once [he] got
a lawyer.”
{¶ 8} When asked if he wanted to tell his side of the story, Dearmond stated that “I
can’t,” but then offered “hopefully one day once I get a lawyer, then we can sit down and
talk.” Later, Det. Jordan asked if Dearmond felt he needed to have counsel before “getting
stuff off [his] chest”; Dearmond responded, “yes, sir.” Jordan asked if Dearmond would want
to share his side once he had counsel, and Dearmond replied “of course.” Dearmond
continued offering the detectives information and stated that, once he got an attorney, he
would talk to that person and then they would all then sit down to talk, and he would tell his
side of what happened.
{¶ 9} After Dearmond continued to offer some information, Det. Jordan asked
Dearmond if he felt he wanted to discuss it more, but again Dearmond replied by stating “I
can’t,” and “once I get an attorney,” and then I will talk “all the way, word for word.” Dearmond
continued to discuss information with the detectives on some subjects, while refusing to
provide information regarding the gun and certain things he did the day Ellington was shot.
He stated approximately 14 different times that he would speak to detectives later “once he
[got] a lawyer.” For example, when Det. Jordan asked if he had been standing on the porch
when the gun went off, Dearmond replied, “we can talk about all that later once I get a
lawyer.” Later, he said, “once I get a lawyer, I’ll have a chance to answer your questions”
and “I want to finish this conversation, but I want to do it the right way once I get a lawyer.”
{¶ 10} During his interview, Dearmond told the detectives that they needed to check
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the gun, investigate where it was located, and talk to the people who were outside when
Ellington was shot to learn that he had run over to Ellington to help him. Dearmond also
stated that what happened was not murder and repeatedly stated that he knew Ellington and
that Ellington was a good guy. Dearmond also told detectives numerous times that there
was “no way it happened the way it happened” and that the police report he read was not
accurate. Dearmond also stated that he “would never have hurt those three men."
{¶ 11} Dearmond filed a motion to suppress on July 11, 2024. In his motion, he sought
to suppress his statements to law enforcement, arguing that he had invoked his right to
counsel. The trial court overruled Dearmond’s motion, finding that Dearmond’s statements
were not sufficiently clear and unequivocal to invoke his right to counsel.
{¶ 12} A jury trial was held on September 30 and 31, 2025. The jury heard evidence
from eight witnesses presented by the State. Ellington’s wife and Peterson both testified as
eyewitnesses. The coroner testified regarding his findings and conclusions related to
Ellington’s death. A paramedic testified about assisting Ellington at the scene and
transporting him to the hospital. Detective Sullivan and two officers from the Springfield
Police Department testified regarding the photographs and evidence collected on Euclid
Avenue, including a black, loaded .22 semi-automatic pistol found lying on the ground. A
firearms expert testified that the .22 semi-automatic pistol was operable and explained its
safety features. Dearmond did not testify or present any witnesses.
{¶ 13} On October 2, 2025, the jury returned its verdicts. Dearmond was found not
guilty of purposeful murder but guilty of felonious assault, felony murder, and discharging a
firearm on or near a prohibited premises. The jury also found that, while committing those
offenses, Dearmond had a firearm on or about his person or under his control and either
displayed, brandished, indicated possession, or used it to facilitate the offenses.
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{¶ 14} The trial court sentenced Dearmond on October 14, 2025. Prior to sentencing,
the court merged the felonious assault and felony murder offenses, and the State elected to
proceed on felony murder. The court imposed a 15-year to life sentence on the felony murder
and a 10-year sentence on the discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited premises, to be
served concurrently. The trial court also imposed two three-year prison terms on the firearm
specifications, to run consecutively to one another and to Dearmond’s 15-year to life
sentence. Thus, Dearmond’s aggregate sentence was 21-years to life.
{¶ 15} Dearmond appeals, raising three assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred by denying Dearmond’s motion to suppress
his custodial interview after he invoked his right to counsel.
2. The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law and/or against
the manifest weight of the evidence to sustain Dearmond’s
convictions on counts two and three because the State failed to
prove the predicate intent required by the transferred intent
doctrine.
3. The trial court erred by excluding Dearmond’s statement that he
“would never have hurt those three men” as hearsay when Evid.R.
803(3) independently admitted it.
II. Dearmond’s statements were not a clear and unequivocal invocation of his
right to counsel.
{¶ 16} In his first assignment of error, Dearmond argues that the trial court erred when
it overruled his motion to suppress. Dearmond claims that he invoked his right to counsel.
{¶ 17} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
and fact.” State v. Weaver, 2025-Ohio-2256, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.). “When considering a motion to
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suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position
to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v.
Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial
court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. . . . Accepting
these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without
deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal
standard.” Id.
{¶ 18} It is unquestionable that, “[u]nder the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself. To
counteract the coercive pressure of custodial interrogations, police officers must warn a
suspect, prior to questioning, that he or she has a right to remain silent and a right to the
presence of an attorney.” State v. Hammett-Marette, 2019-Ohio-394, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), citing
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103-104 (2010), citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966).
{¶ 19} It is well-settled that if a suspect effectively waives his right to counsel and right
to remain silent after receiving Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to
question him. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-376 (1979). However, once a
suspect invokes his right to remain silent, police must scrupulously honor the request and
cease all questioning. State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 519 (2001), citing Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), citing Miranda. Police must also stop questioning a suspect
when he clearly and unambiguously invokes his right to counsel. Id., citing Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). The unambiguousness requirement applies equally to the
invocation of the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. Id. at 779.
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{¶ 20} The question of whether a suspect unambiguously and unequivocally
requested counsel is an “objective inquiry.” State v. Morris, 2026-Ohio-1519, ¶ 49, citing
Davis at 459. “[T]he test is not whether an officer could possibly consider [the suspect’s]
statement as evincing a desire for a lawyer. [Instead, it is] whether a reasonable officer,
under the totality of the circumstances, would have understood [the suspect’s] statement to
be an unambiguous and unequivocal request for a lawyer in that moment.” Id. at ¶ 60, citing
Davis at 459.
{¶ 21} “‘If a suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for
counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.’” State v. Hammett-Marette,
2019-Ohio-394, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting Davis at 461-62 and State v. Brown, 2003-Ohio-
5059, ¶ 18. “The officers also have no obligation to ask clarifying questions to ascertain if
the suspect is attempting to invoke his right to counsel.” Id., citing Davis at 461-462.
Additionally, “[i]f the statement is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable police officer
in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking
the right to counsel, the cessation of questioning is not required.” State v. Henness, 79 Ohio
St. 3d 53, 63 (1997).
{¶ 22} The statement “maybe I should talk to a lawyer” has been held to be insufficient
to invoke the right to counsel and require police to cease questioning. Davis at 462. The
question “don’t I supposed to have a lawyer present?” and the statement “ I think I need a
lawyer” have also been held to be unclear and too ambiguous to sufficiently invoke the right
to counsel. Brown at ¶ 19; Henness at 63. We have also previously held the statement “I
respect what you’re doing and everything. I’m not trying to get into any kind of trouble…and
if you’re trying, you know, to get me in trouble, I’m gonna talk to a lawyer. . .” to not be a
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clear and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel. State v. Hatten, 2010-Ohio-499,
¶ 58 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 23} Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed a situation in which a
defendant said “like I can’t talk to a lawyer?” after being told by an officer “anybody could”;
defendant then replied, “yeah cause that’s—we goin’ to do that because I don’t know what
you're talking about.” The Supreme Court held that the defendant had not clearly and
unequivocally invoked his right to counsel so as to require questioning of the suspect to stop.
State v. Morris, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1519, ¶ 54-55. The Supreme Court emphasized
that a statement which implies a future desire for a lawyer, rather than a present assertion
of a desire to speak with a lawyer, does not constitute an unambiguous and unequivocal
request for counsel to require all questioning of a suspect to stop. Id. at ¶ 57, 59. The Morris
Court explained, “[w]hen someone says that he is going to do something, that generally
means that he will do it in the future. So, even if it were absolutely clear that Morris used
“that” to refer to talking to a lawyer, he implied that he was going to do it at some point in the
future rather than presently. Thus, he may have meant that he was going to talk to a lawyer
in the future because he was not going to let them pin a shooting on him that he didn’t do.”
(Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 57.
{¶ 24} While Dearmond claims his various statements referring to counsel invoked
his right to counsel, we have reviewed Dearmond’s interview in its entirety and do not agree.
Dearmond’s statements to the detectives were similar to those in Morris and implied a future
desire to have counsel. Dearmond repeated approximately 14 times that he would speak to
detectives at a later time “once [he] had a lawyer.” Dearmond was clear with the detectives
early on that he would speak freely with them once he retained counsel and spoke with the
attorney. Dearmond specifically referred to the future in his statements to the detectives by
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stating he couldn’t presently talk about “that,” but that “hopefully one day once I get a lawyer,
then we can sit down to talk.” Dearmond also specified during the interview that once he got
an attorney, he would “talk to them, then we will sit down and I’ll tell my side.”
{¶ 25} Given Dearmond’s statements, which referred to having a lawyer in the future,
the trial court did not err in finding that Dearmond’s statements were not a clear and
unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. Therefore, the detectives did not violate
Dearmond’s constitutional right to counsel when they continued to question him regarding
the events of December 21, 2023. Dearmond’s first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Dearmond’s conviction for felony murder was based on sufficient evidence
and was not against the manifest weight.
{¶ 26} In his second assignment of error, Dearmond claims that there was insufficient
evidence supporting his conviction for felony murder predicated on felonious assault.
{¶ 27} “When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, [he] is arguing
that the State presented inadequate evidence on an element of the offense to sustain the
verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Matthews, 2018-Ohio-2424, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.), citing State v.
Hawn, 138 Ohio App.3d 449, 471 (2d Dist. 2000). “‘During a sufficiency review, the reviewing
court considers the evidence “in a light most favorable to the prosecution” “to determine
whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. McClain, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3934, ¶ 20,
quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded
by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 1997-Ohio-355,
¶ 49, fn. 4. “Because the question whether evidence is sufficient to support a verdict is a
question of law, an appellate court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de
novo.” Id., citing State v. Dent, 2020-Ohio-6670, ¶ 15. “The verdict will not be disturbed
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unless the appellate court finds that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion
reached by the trier-of-fact.” State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997), citing Jenks at
273.
{¶ 28} In contrast, “[a] weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability
of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is
more believable or persuasive.” State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), citing State
v. Hufnagle, 1996 WL 501470 (2d Dist. Sept. 6, 1996). When evaluating whether a
conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court must review
the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider witness
credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact
“‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387
(1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A judgment of
conviction should be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence only in
exceptional circumstances. Martin at 175.
{¶ 29} Dearmond challenges only the mens rea or the intent element of his conviction
for felony murder (with felonious assault as the predicate offense). Specifically, Dearmond
claims that there was no evidence presented at trial to show that he intended any harm to
Ellington. Additionally, Dearmond argues that, under the State’s theory of transferred intent,
there was also no evidence to indicate that he intended physical harm to Upshaw, and
therefore no intent transferred to Ellington, the unintended victim.
{¶ 30} The jury found Dearmond guilty of murder pursuant to R.C. 2903.02(B), also
known as felony murder. In order to convict a defendant of felony murder, the State must
prove the defendant caused the death of another “as a proximate result of committing or
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attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree that
is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2903.02(B).
{¶ 31} We have explained that, “[i]n 1998, the Ohio General Assembly added the
felony-murder provision to Ohio's murder statute.” State v. Scott, 2024-Ohio-5595, ¶ 12 (2d
Dist.). “The felony murder provision does not prohibit specific conduct. Instead, that section
prohibits the result of causing the death of another as a proximate result of committing an
offense of violence that is a first- or second-degree felony.” Id., quoting State v. Cook, 2010-
Ohio-6222, ¶ 49 (2d Dist.). “In other words, commission of another felony offense is a
necessary predicate to an R.C. 2903.02(B) offense, and the predicate felony must be a
proximate cause of the death R.C. 2903.02(B) prohibits.” Id., quoting Cook at ¶ 49. “The
only mental state required for conviction under R.C. 2903.02(B) is the mental state required
for the underlying felony offense.” Id., quoting State v. Flow, 2022-Ohio-4416, ¶ 78 (6th
Dist.), citing State v. Miller, 2002-Ohio-4931.
{¶ 32} In Miller, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether felony murder was
supported by evidence that established that the defendant had shot the victim knowingly,
when the underlying offense of violence charged was felonious assault. Miller at ¶ 20. The
Court explained that, “[i]f [a] defendant has knowingly caused physical harm to his wife by
firing the gun at her . . ., he is guilty of felonious assault. The fact that she died from her
injuries makes him guilty of felony murder, regardless of his purpose.” Id. at ¶ 33. “The
felony-murder statute imposes what is in essence strict liability. Though intent to commit the
predicate felony is required, intent to kill is not.” Scott at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Nolan, 2014-
Ohio-4800, ¶ 9.
{¶ 33} The jury found Dearmond guilty of felonious assault (the predicate offense to
felony murder here) pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). In most circumstances, felonious
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assault is a felony of the second degree. R.C. 2903.11(D)(1)(a). In order to establish that a
defendant committed felonious assault, the State must prove the defendant knowingly
caused or attempted to cause physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon. R.C.
2903.11(A)(2). The term “deadly weapon” means “any instrument, device, or thing capable
of inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed,
carried, or used as a weapon.” R.C. 2923.11(A); R.C. 2903.11(E)(1).
{¶ 34} “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware
that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain
nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). “A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is
aware that such circumstances probably exist.” Id.
{¶ 35} “The law has long recognized that intent, lying as it does within the privacy of
a person’s own thoughts, is not susceptible of objective proof. The law recognizes that intent
can be determined from the surrounding facts and circumstances, and persons are
presumed to have intended the natural, reasonable and probable consequences of their
voluntary acts.” State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 60 (1995). “‘Intent can never be proved
by the direct testimony of a third person and it need not be. It must be gathered from the
surrounding facts and circumstances . . . .’” Id., quoting State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 168
(1990), quoting State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27 (1936), paragraph four of the syllabus.
“[I]ntent [or acting knowingly] may be inferred in a felony-murder when the offense [of
felonious assault] and the manner of its commission would be likely to produce death.” Id.
{¶ 36} There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s conclusion that
Dearmond acted knowingly and committed felony murder with the underlying offense of
felonious assault. Ellington’s wife testified that she saw Dearmond fighting with Upshaw
when Ellington stopped their car to assist Peterson in breaking the two men apart.
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Thereafter, she saw Dearmond, who she described as wearing all orange clothing, waiving
a gun. Ellington’s wife identified Dearmond at trial as the man she saw wearing what she
described as an orange jump suit. She had heard the sound of one gun shot and, when she
looked across the street, she saw Ellington on the ground. She also saw Dearmond get into
a white jeep and drive away. The jury also heard testimony from Peterson that, immediately
after the gun shot, he called 911 and told the operator that Dearmond had shot Ellington.
{¶ 37} While neither Ellington’s wife nor Peterson (the only eyewitnesses at trial)
testified that they had seen Dearmond point the gun at Ellington, the jury could have
reasonably concluded that Dearmond pointed the gun at Ellington. “A reasonable jury can
convict a defendant of felonious assault if the defendant knowingly pointed a gun that
qualifies as a ‘deadly weapon’ at the victim and either fired or attempted to fire in the victim's
direction.” State v. Peters, 2023-Ohio-4362, ¶ 13, citing State v. Brooks, 44 Ohio St.3d 185,
192 (1989). Additionally, “[t]he shooting of a gun in a place where there is a risk of injury to
one or more persons supports the inference that [a defendant] acted knowingly.” State v.
Gregory, 90 Ohio App.3d 124, 131 (12th Dist. 1993), citing State v. Cartellone, 3 Ohio
App.3d 145, 148 (8th Dist. 1981) and State v. Green, 58 Ohio St.3d 239 (1991); See also
State v. Phillips, 75 Ohio App. 3d 785 (2d Dist.) (defendant’s intent to cause physical harm
could be inferred from his having shot a gun randomly in the direction of other individuals);
State v. Hibbard, 2003-Ohio-5104 (12th Dist.) (discharging a firearm in a swinging arc motion
in the victim’s direction as the victim was running supported felonious assault conviction).
{¶ 38} Evidence from the coroner established that the bullet’s path was from an
undeterminable distance away from Ellington and that the bullet struck him on his front left
forehead and traveled straight back into his skull. Fragments from the bullet were removed
from Ellington’s brain. Additionally, Peterson testified that he had been standing next to
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Ellington facing in the direction of Dearmond, who was across the street. From Peterson’s
testimony, the entry wound on Ellington’s forehead, and the bullet fragments recovered
during his autopsy, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Dearmond, who was
standing across the street from Ellington and was described as having a gun, pointed it
toward where Ellington was standing and fired it.
{¶ 39} The jury also heard evidence from an expert witness that the gun had been
loaded and operable and that it would not have fired unless its trigger was squeezed. White
testified that he had examined the gun and found it to have multiple safety features which
were all in working order. One of the safety features was on the gun’s trigger. Considering
all of the safety features, White testified that the gun would not have fired unless the safety
features had been moved to their respective off settings, and then the trigger was squeezed.
In our view, these facts, if believed, supported the jury’s determination that Dearmond had
acted with knowing intent. Waiving a loaded, operable gun, with its safety features off and a
finger on the trigger on a residential street was knowing conduct which was probable to
cause serious physical harm or death to another person who was in the vicinity.
{¶ 40} Dearmond argues that under the transferred intent theory, there was
insufficient evidence of his intent to cause harm to Upshaw, and therefore, no intent to
transfer to Ellington. Under the well-established doctrine of transferred intent, “an offender
who intentionally acts to harm someone but ends up accidentally harming another is
criminally liable as if the offender had intended to harm the actual victim.” In re T.K., 2006-
Ohio-3056, ¶ 15. However, the jury could have disregarded the doctrine of transferred intent
under the facts and circumstances of this case, because, as we previously explained, there
was sufficient evidence that Dearmond had acted knowingly. Additionally, the trial court’s
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jury instructions did not require consideration of transferred intent. We will not speculate as
to whether the jury applied the doctrine of transferred intent in its deliberations.
{¶ 41} Dearmond’s arguments that his conviction was against the manifest weight of
the evidence was also based on the transferred intent doctrine. He contends that Peterson
testified that Dearmond and Upshaw did not have “bad blood” and were long-time friends.
Dearmond also focuses on the fact that no witness saw him point the gun or shoot at Upshaw
or Ellington. However, an appellate court “must defer to the fact-finder's witness-credibility
determinations” and may not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact. State v. Reillo,
Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 38; Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21.
{¶ 42} Additionally, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimony are matters for the trier of fact to resolve. State v. Cantrell, 2026-Ohio-1675, ¶ 38,
citing State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d
230 (1967). This is because “the factfinder . . . has the opportunity to see and hear the
witnesses [and] . . . [t]he decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of
particular witnesses is within the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and
heard the witness.” Id., citing State v. Lawson, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (2d Dist. Aug. 22, 1997).
{¶ 43} The record does not support a conclusion that the jury lost its way in arriving
at its verdict, and therefore its guilty verdict did not create a manifest miscarriage of justice.
Dearmonds conviction for felony murder was not against the manifest weight of the evidence
or based on insufficient evidence. Dearmond’s second assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Dearmond’s statement “I would never have hurt those three men” was
properly excluded as hearsay.
{¶ 44} In his third assignment of error, Dearmond claims that the trial court erred by
excluding his statement “I would never have hurt those three men” as hearsay during the
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trial. Dearmond contends that the statement was admissible under Evid.R. 803(3) as a then
existing state of mind. The State argues that Dearmond has waived all but plain error
because he failed to object or raise this issue with the trial court during the trial. We agree
with the State.
{¶ 45} Generally, “the admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173 (1987), paragraph two
of the syllabus. Appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard of review when
reviewing a trial court’s decision on the admission or exclusion of evidence. State v. Morris,
2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 22, 23. An abuse of discretion is defined as an unreasonable, arbitrary,
or unconscionable decision. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶ 46} The record indicates that the trial court excluded the statement based on
Dearmond’s not being a party opponent under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(a); Dearmond did to object
or raise an argument that the then existing state of mind exception to the hearsay rule
applied. Therefore, Dearmond waived all but plain error with respect to this evidentiary
ruling. Wortham v. Dayton, 2023-Ohio-1767, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.) (“Evidentiary rulings that are not
objected to at trial are waived for purposes of appeal unless the appellant demonstrates
plain error.”). Appellate courts have discretion to correct “[p]lain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights” notwithstanding an appellant’s failure to timely raise those errors in the
trial court. Crim.R. 52(B). To prevail on a claim that the trial court committed plain error, an
appellant must demonstrate that an error occurred, that such error constitutes an obvious
defect in the trial proceedings, and that the error affected the outcome of the trial. See, e.g.,
State v. Gordon, 2018-Ohio-259, ¶ 23.
{¶ 47} One exception to the hearsay rule is a “statement of the declarant's then
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive,
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design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed . . . .” Evid.R. 803(3). Under Evid.R. 803(3),
“the testimony sought to be introduced must point towards the future rather than the past.”
State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 21 (1987); State v. Leonard, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 108,
citing Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 105-106 (1933) (hearsay statements that relate
past events are not admissible under the state-of-mind exception) and Weissenberger, Ohio
Evidence (2004) 463, Section 803.30 (“Where the statement does not pertain to a ‘then
existing’ condition, it must be viewed as a narrative account of a past event formulated after
time for reflection, and it is not admissible under Rule 803[3].”).
{¶ 48} Here, Dearmond’s statement “I would never have hurt those three men” did
not point toward the future; it related to his state of mind on December 21, 2023, and
therefore his state of mind in the past. Therefore, the statement was not admissible as a
hearsay exception under Evid.R. 803(3).
{¶ 49} Regardless, the statement was contained in State’s Exhibit 60, an audio and
video recording of a portion of Dearmond’s interview with detectives. The jury watched and
listened to the video during Detective Sullivan’s direct examination. In the recording, it is
audible that Dearmond stated, “I would never have hurt those three men.” While the trial
court prohibited eliciting this statement from Detective Sullivan’s testimony during the trial,
the jury received Dearmond’s statement in the form of State’s Exhibit 60. As a result, the
record does not demonstrate plain error. Dearmond’s third assignment of error is overruled.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 50} Having overruled Dearmond’s three assignments of error, the judgment is
affirmed.
.............
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LEWIS, P.J., concurs.
HUFFMAN, J., concurs in judgment only.
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