State v. Khalif
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket23AP-274
JudgeDingus
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Khalif, 2026-Ohio-4551.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State of Ohio, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 23AP-274
(C.P.C. No. 21CR-2682)
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Mahad M. Khalif, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on November 17, 2026
On brief: [Shayla D. Favor], Prosecuting Attorney, and
Michael A. Walsh, for appellee.
On brief: Dennis C. Belli, for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
ON REMAND from the Supreme Court of Ohio
DINGUS, J.
{¶ 1} This matter is before this court on remand from the Supreme Court of Ohio’s
decision in State v. Khalif, 2026-Ohio-2689 (“Khalif II”), which affirmed in part, and
reversed in part, this court’s judgment in State v. Khalif, 2024-Ohio-2239 (10th Dist.)
(“Khalif I”). As instructed by the Supreme Court, this court must now consider “Khalif’s
assignment of error regarding whether his felony conviction was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.” Khalif II at ¶ 29.
{¶ 2} Before directly addressing this issue, we first provide some procedural
background. Khalif was charged and convicted of discharge of a firearm on or near
prohibited premises, a violation of R.C. 2923.162, a third-degree felony, with an attached
three-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A). Pursuant to
R.C. 2923.162(C)(2), a violation involving the discharge of a firearm upon or over a public
No. 23AP-274 2
road or highway is a third-degree felony if it created a substantial risk of physical harm to
any person or caused serious physical harm to property. This additional element elevates
a violation of this statute from a first-degree misdemeanor to a third-degree felony. Khalif
II at ¶ 2. And the three-year firearm specification contained in R.C. 2941.145(A) attaches
only to a felony conviction. Khalif I at ¶ 37, citing R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a); State v. Canady,
2019-Ohio-106, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). The indictment specifically stated that Khalif “created a
substantial risk of physical harm to any person or caused serious physical harm to
property.” (Indictment at 1.) However, the verdict form provided to the jury did not include
either the degree of the offense or the language related to an aggravating element. Instead,
the jury verdict form stated in its entirety “[w]e, the Jury, being duly impaneled and sworn
in this case, find the Defendant, Mahad M. Khalif, Guilty of Discharge Firearm On/Near
Prohibited Premise, as charged in Count Two of the Indictment.” (Emphasis omitted.)
(Feb. 27, 2023, Verdict.)
{¶ 3} In Khalif’s appeal, his assigned errors included challenges to the verdict form
and the absence of a no-duty-to-retreat jury instruction, as well as a contention that his
conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence (his third assignment of error).
Khalif I at ¶ 18. This court rejected Khalif’s manifest-weight contention and his challenge
to the jury instructions. Id. at ¶ 54, 62. In reaching this conclusion, this court noted that
“although Khalif testified at trial he feared for his safety when he stood in the roadway and
fired his weapon, the three law enforcement officers all testified Khalif never mentioned
fearing for his safety during their investigation and instead indicated he fired his weapon
because he believed he was allowed to since the vehicle had been stolen.” Id. at ¶ 61.
However, as to his verdict form challenge, this court found that “because the jury verdict
form here did not contain either the degree of the offense or the presence of the aggravating
element, the jury verdict form could only constitute a finding of guilty of the least degree of
the offense charged.” Khalif I at ¶ 37. Therefore, this court concluded that “the trial court
erred in convicting and sentencing Khalif of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited
premises as a third-degree felony and in imposing the accompanying three-year firearm
specification.” Id. This court accordingly remanded the matter to the trial court with
instructions to enter a conviction of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises
as a first-degree misdemeanor. Id. at ¶ 81.
No. 23AP-274 3
{¶ 4} In Khalif II, the Supreme Court affirmed this court’s judgment that the trial
court did not err in not instructing the jury that Khalif had no duty to retreat. Khalif II at
¶ 4. However, the Supreme Court also held that although the verdict form did not satisfy
the requirements of R.C. 2945.75(A)(2), Khalif did not timely object to the form, and he did
not demonstrate plain error. Id. at ¶ 4. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed this court’s
judgment as to the verdict form issue and remanded the matter to consider, again, Khalif’s
manifest-weight challenge presented in his third assignment of error. Id. at ¶ 4, 29.
{¶ 5} Because this court in Khalif I considered Khalif’s manifest-weight challenge
only in relation to the first-degree misdemeanor offense, our analysis did not address either
the aggravating element or the accompanying firearm specification. In support of his third
assignment of error, Khalif argued that the jury clearly lost its way by rejecting his self-
defense claim. Specifically, he asserted that “his testimony demonstrates he acted in self-
defense and the state did not convincingly prove otherwise.” Khalif I at ¶ 60. Khalif did
not argue, however, that the jury lost its way in finding that the state proved all the elements
of the charged offense, including the aggravating element, or the accompanying firearm
specification. After reviewing the entire record, we rejected Khalif’s contention that the jury
clearly lost its way in concluding that the state proved that he did not act in self-defense
when he fired his weapon. Id. at ¶ 62. The Supreme Court’s decision in Khalif II, reversing
this court’s judgment as to the verdict form issue, requires us to consider Khalif’s manifest-
weight challenge in relation to his conviction of the third-degree felony level of the offense.
But, given the limited scope of Khalif’s argument, no additional analysis is necessary, nor
does it alter our conclusion. Whether the manifest weight of the evidence supports the
jury’s rejection of Khalif’s affirmative defense of self-defense presents a different question
from whether the manifest weight of the evidence supports the elements of the charged
offense and the accompanying firearm specification. And because Khalif’s manifest-weight
argument does not challenge the latter, we will not address it. Therefore, even when we
review Khalif’s manifest-weight challenge in the context of his conviction as a third-degree
felony with the accompanying firearm specification, our analysis and conclusion remain
the same as in Khalif I: the jury did not lose its way by rejecting Khalif’s version of events
and concluding that the state proved that he did not act in self-defense when he fired his
weapon in the direction of the vehicle.
No. 23AP-274 4
{¶ 6} For these reasons, we again overrule Khalif’s third assignment of error.
Based on this determination, and in view of the Supreme Court’s decision in Khalif II, we
affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
BOGGS, P.J., and DORRIAN, J., concur.
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