State v. Jouett

[Cite as State v. Jouett, 2026-Ohio-4209.] STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA ) STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 2025CA0078-M Appellee v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE DAVID M. JOUETT COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 2025CR0206 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: October 26, 2026 FLAGG LANZINGER, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant David Jouett appeals from the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms. I. {¶2} In February 2025, police conducted a welfare check on a resident (“the Resident”) of a home. In so doing, police discovered Jouett trespassing inside the premises. He was believed to be under the influence of drugs. A glass pipe containing methamphetamine residue and a small amount of methamphetamine were discovered on a table in an upstairs bedroom; prior to their discovery, Jouett had retrieved his shoes and coat from that area of that bedroom. {¶3} In April 2025, an indictment was filed charging Jouett with one count of aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the fifth degree. Jouett underwent a competency evaluation, and, following a hearing, the trial court found him to be competent.  2 {¶4} The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found Jouett guilty of the charge. The trial court sentenced Jouett to a prison term of six months to be served in the county jail. The sentence was to be served consecutively to a sentence in another case. {¶5} Jouett has appealed, raising three assignments of error for our review. Some of the assignments of error will be addressed out of sequence to facilitate our review. II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II THE JURY’S GUILTY VERDICT ON COUNT 1, POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE, WAS NOT SUPPORT BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. {¶6} Jouett argues in his second assignment of error that the finding of guilt is not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, Jouett asserts that the record does not support the conclusion that the methamphetamine found in the Resident’s home was Jouett’s. {¶7} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 2009-Ohio-6955, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency analysis, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). “In other words, an appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The trier of fact is entitled to rely on direct, as well as circumstantial evidence. See id. “The court does not consider whether  3 the State met its burden to prove the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. McClain, 2026-Ohio-3934, ¶ 1. {¶8} Jouett was found guilty of violating R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a). R.C. 2925.11(A) states that “[n]o person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.” When the drug involved is a schedule I or II drug, with certain exceptions not relevant here, the offense is aggravated possession of drugs. R.C. 2925.11(C)(1). Methamphetamine is a schedule II drug. See Adm.Code 4729:9-1-02(C)(2). “‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.” R.C. 2925.01(K). This Court has repeatedly held that a person may knowingly possess a substance or object through either actual or constructive possession. Constructive possession exists when an individual knowingly exercises dominion and control over an object, even though that object may not be within his immediate physical possession. Additionally, [p]ossession of a drug includes possessing individually, or jointly with another person. Joint possession exists when two or more persons together have the ability to control an object, exclusive of others. State v. McConnell, 2025-Ohio-4358, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Beauford, 2023-Ohio-3782, ¶ 42 (9th Dist.). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.” R.C. 2901.22(B).  4 {¶9} The evidence from the trial can be summarized as follows. The Resident, who rented a home on Bishop Court, was scheduled to meet with police the morning of February 26, 2025. However, when the Resident arrived for the meeting under the influence, he was asked to leave. After that, police began receiving messages and missed calls from the Resident indicating that he was “going to do something drastic” soon. At that point, the detective involved spoke to Sergeant Derek Crooks with the Medina Police Department and asked him to do a welfare check at the residence. {¶10} Sergeant Crooks arrived at the house around 4:00 p.m. The Resident invited Sergeant Crooks inside and Sergeant Crooks heard footsteps upstairs. He asked who was upstairs and the Resident told Sergeant Crooks that it was David. Sergeant Crooks then heard what he thought was a window opening. Sergeant Crooks became concerned someone was escaping out the window and went outside to investigate. When Sergeant Crooks did not locate anyone, he went back inside and proceeded upstairs with the Resident. Someone came out of the bathroom, whom Sergeant Crooks recognized as Jouett due to prior interactions. Sergeant Crooks was aware that Jouett had trespass paperwork filed against him by the landlord and that he was not allowed to be in the house. Sergeant Crooks informed Jouett of the same and Jouett went into the room next to the bathroom to get his shoes and a coat. The items were located near a chair and table in the room. They all then headed downstairs until another officer arrived and Jouett was placed under arrest for trespassing. {¶11} While they were downstairs waiting for the officer to arrive, Sergeant Crooks noticed that Jouett was having a lot of involuntary twitching and facial movements that Sergeant Crooks associated with methamphetamine use. Sergeant Crooks testified that the general signs of methamphetamine use would be sweating, involuntary twitching, random movements, jerking, and  5 fast-paced talking. Sergeant Crooks asked Jouett how much meth he had done and Jouett responded something like, “I did a little bit earlier[.]” However, Sergeant Crooks believed that Jouett had used much more recently than earlier in the day based on Jouett’s behavior. Jouett claimed to have just gotten to the residence. No drugs were found on Jouett’s person. {¶12} After Jouett was arrested, the Resident wanted Sergeant Crooks to check the upstairs bathroom to make sure there was nothing illegal there since Jouett had been in there. As Sergeant Crooks was checking the bathroom, the Resident peered into the room next door and noticed something. The two went into the room, and discovered on the table, near where Jouett’s shoes and coat had been, a glass smoking device commonly used for methamphetamine, a powdered substance that appeared to be methamphetamine, and a rolled-up counterfeit hundred- dollar bill. Laboratory testing would subsequently confirm the presence of methamphetamine on the pipe and in the powder. No fingerprint testing was done as Sergeant Crooks stated it was not common practice to do so when he knew the individuals involved in the suspected crime. {¶13} The Resident also testified at trial. He admitted to using methamphetamine that day and stated that Jouett was using it as well. The Resident got the methamphetamine from an acquaintance. He further testified that both he and Jouett were using the methamphetamine that was found upstairs. The Resident indicated that the room was the guest bedroom and Sergeant Crooks believed that the room was used by many people. However, the Resident admitted that he had some of his own items in that room. The Resident pleaded guilty to aggravated possession of drugs for the methamphetamine that was found in his house. The Resident did not receive anything in exchange for his testimony.  6 {¶14} Portions of Sergeant Crooks’ body camera video were also played for the jury and admitted into evidence along with video of Jouett in the backseat of the cruiser. The footage that was admitted supports the testimony of Sergeant Crooks. {¶15} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we cannot conclude that Jouett has demonstrated that his conviction is based upon insufficient evidence. There was evidence that Jouett had used methamphetamine, and that he had done so recently. There was also specific testimony that Jouett had used some of the very methamphetamine that is the subject of this case and that was found in the upstairs room from where Jouett retrieved his coat and shoes. While it is true that the methamphetamine was not found on Jouett, and that other people utilized the room where the drugs were found, that does not negate the evidence that supports the elements of the crime. The State presented evidence from which it could be concluded that Jouett constructively and jointly possessed the drugs found in the upstairs bedroom of the Resident. See McConnell, 2025-Ohio-4358, at ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), quoting Beauford, 2023-Ohio-3782, at ¶ 42 (9th Dist.). {¶16} Jouett’s second assignment of error is overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I MR. JOUETT’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE[.] {¶17} Jouett argues in his first assignment of error that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In particular, Jouett asserts that there was no competent, credible evidence that Jouett knowingly possessed the methamphetamine found in the Resident’s house. {¶18} When considering a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court is required to consider the entire record, “weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier  7 of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist. 1986). “A reversal on this basis is reserved for the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Croghan, 2019-Ohio-3970, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.). “This Court will not overturn a verdict on a manifest weight challenge simply because the jury chose to believe the State’s version of the events.” State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-196, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.). {¶19} Jouett’s argument largely appears to sound in sufficiency, an argument which is outside the scope of his stated assignment of error. To the extent that Jouett’s argument can be read as challenging the weight of the evidence, he has failed to demonstrate that the jury lost its way in finding him guilty. Otten at 340. The weight of the evidence supports that Jouett was using the methamphetamine that was found in the upstairs guest room. Prior to the drugs being discovered, Jouett retrieved his shoes and coat from the same area of that room. Accordingly, the weight of the evidence also supports that Jouett knowingly possessed the methamphetamine. The fact that there was no DNA or fingerprint testing done does not change that conclusion. {¶20} Jouett’s first assignment of error is overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES[.] {¶21} Jouett argues in his third assignment of error that the trial court erred in running the sentence in this case consecutively to the sentence in another case. Jouett does not appear to dispute that the trial court made the relevant findings required by the statute. Instead, Jouett asserts that the record does not support the finding that the trial court made under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)- (c). As Jouett has limited his argument to this issue, this Court will likewise limit its analysis.  8 {¶22} “The appellate-review statute, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), provides the sole method for reviewing consecutive sentences and requires an appellate court to review the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings. The appellate court may modify the consecutive sentences only if the record clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings or if the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. The appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment based on subjective disagreement with the trial court.” (Emphasis in original. Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Polizzi, 2026-Ohio-2588, ¶ 25. {¶23} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides: If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following: (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. {¶24} Here, the trial court found R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) to be applicable; that is clear both from the sentencing hearing, and the sentencing entry, which specifically references R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a). {¶25} At the time of the sentencing hearing, in October 2025, Jouett was serving a sentence in the county jail for another case involving nonsupport. The record in the instant case  9 demonstrates that Jouett was sentenced in the nonsupport case in June 2025, that the sentence was for a year, and that it was set to expire in April 2026. Initially, the trial court was considering imposing community control consecutive to Jouett’s other nonsupport conviction. However, Jouett expressed no interest in being subject to community control or its requirements. From the foregoing, the trial court inferred that Jouett had no interest in rehabilitation. The trial court informed Jouett that it was sentencing him to six months in prison, to be served in jail, and it would not be imposing the sentence concurrently to the sentence in Jouett’s nonsupport case. The trial court noted that, if it did so: There’s no lesson learned. There’s no punishment invoked. There’s no opportunity to rehabilitate if we gave you concurrent time. It would be a nothing event, this crime, and this is a serious crime in that you’re using this awful drug that’s destroying yourself, hurting society, hurting your family, hurting the community[.] Additionally, the trial court observed that Jouett had “a lot of drug and alcohol abuse[.]” {¶26} Jouett has not demonstrated that the record clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court’s finding that Jouett “committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing[.]” See R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a); Polizzi, 2026-Ohio- 2588, at ¶ 25. While the record is not a picture of perfect clarity with respect to the precise details of Jouett’s nonsupport case, it certainly supports that Jouett committed this crime in February 2025, while he was awaiting trial in the nonsupport case. Jouett appears to also argue that, even if the record supports that Jouett committed this offense while awaiting trial, the nature of the other case, i.e. nonsupport of dependents, does not warrant the imposition of consecutive sentences. Jouett cites no law to support his conclusory allegation, nor does this Court read anything in the statute authorizing this Court to consider the same in this context. {¶27} Jouett has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences in this case. Jouett’s third assignment of error is overruled.  10 III. {¶28} Jouett’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant. JILL FLAGG LANZINGER FOR THE COURT STEVENSON, J. MANNING, J. CONCUR.  11 APPEARANCES: BENJAMIN R. SORBER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and STEFANIE H. ZARANEC, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.