State v. McGreal

[Cite as State v. McGreal, 2026-Ohio-4320.] IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT STARK COUNTY, OHIO STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025 CA 00144 Plaintiff-Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2025 CR 1440 VINCENT MCGREAL Judgment: Affirmed in part; Remanded in Defendant-Appellant part Date of Judgment Entry: October 28, 2026 BEFORE: Andrew J. King, Robert G. Montgomery, and Kevin W. Popham, Judges APPEARANCES: Kyle Stone, & Christopher A. Piekarski, for Plaintiff-Appellee; George Urban, for Defendant-Appellant OPINION Popham, J., {¶1} Appellant Vincent McGreal appeals his conviction and sentence after a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas for Stark County, Ohio. For the following reasons we affirm. Facts and Procedural History {¶2} On July 23, 2025, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted McGreal on seven counts: Count 1, possession of cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(4)(e), a first- degree felony; Count 2, trafficking in cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)/(C)(4)(f), a first-degree felony; Count 3, possession of a fentanyl-related compound, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(11)(a), a first-degree felony; Count 4, trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)/(C)(9)(f), a first-degree felony; Count 5, possession of heroin, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(6)(d), a second-degree felony; Count 6, trafficking in heroin, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)/(C)(6)(e), a second-degree felony; and Count 7, aggravated possession of drugs, methamphetamine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(1)(b), a third-degree felony. {¶3} On September 23, 2025, a jury trial was held, during which the following evidence was presented. {¶4} On May 13, 2025, Officer Daniel Szansizlo of the Canton Police Department was working the day shift when he received a dispatch regarding an arrest warrant for McGreal. Officer Szansizlo, along with two additional officers, responded to a residence where McGreal was believed to be located. Although Szansizlo was equipped with a body camera, he did not activate it until later in the encounter. Body-camera footage from Officer Little was admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 2. {¶5} After officers were unable to make contact with anyone at the front door, they entered the residence through the back door. Officers encountered B.R. inside the residence and asked him to leave while they searched for McGreal. Officers proceeded to clear the residence but did not immediately locate him. Believing McGreal might be hiding in a bedroom, officers continued their search. {¶6} Officer Szansizlo kicked open the bedroom door and discovered that the closet inside the room was locked. He believed McGreal was inside the closet. Officers could not determine whether the closet door was locked from the inside or outside. They pried open the closet door and found McGreal inside. Officers ordered him out of the closet, handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest. {¶7} A search incident to arrest revealed no drugs on McGreal's person. McGreal complained of leg pain and was transported to Aultman Hospital, where Officer Szansizlo later spoke with him. During that conversation, McGreal stated that he intended to remain in the closet until police either located him or left the scene. {¶8} Officer Camden Sens, who is typically assigned to cases involving drugs and drug trafficking, testified regarding items discovered at the residence. A digital scale was located immediately across from the closet opening. Officer Sens explained that digital scales are commonly used in drug trafficking to weigh substances for sale or personal use. Although officers initially observed one digital scale in plain view in the closet, they ultimately recovered three digital scales. {¶9} Officers also recovered items used to ingest drugs, including a pipe, from inside the closet. Based upon these observations, officers applied for and obtained a search warrant. {¶10} A subsequent search of the residence revealed additional items associated with drug use or trafficking. A cellphone and a black backpack were located on a mattress in the bedroom where McGreal had been found. Detective Sens later applied for, and was granted, a search warrant for the contents of the cell phone. In executing that search warrant, the detective determined that McGreal was the "subscriber of the phone" because several text messages found within it addressed the owner of the phone/number as "Vin," which is a nickname for "Vincent.” Detective Sens also found several "photos of interest" stored in the phone, including a photo of a "dark brown substance" (i.e., suspected heroin) resting on top of a digital scale. The digital scale in the photo, and the scale’s "buttons" matched one of the digital scales seized from McGreal's bedroom/closet. The dark brown substance seen in the photo also "looked very similar" to one of the illicit substances seized from McGreal's bedroom. Detective Sens also discovered that McGreal, as the user of the cell phone, had made several "pings" to the 18th Street address while communicating with others, signifying that he was at that house. Based on his training and experience, Detective Sens testified that someone might "ping" their location to another person over the phone so, "if someone were interested in buying [narcotics], they would know exactly where to go." {¶11} Inside the black backpack, officers discovered a pink, smiley-face bag containing multiple substances suspected to be crack cocaine, marijuana, black tar heroin, and fentanyl. Officer Sens testified that the quantity of suspected drugs indicated that they were intended for sale rather than personal use. Officers also recovered two additional digital scales. {¶12} Officers discovered a ledger containing names and telephone numbers. No handwriting analysis was performed on the ledger. Officers also recovered medical discharge paperwork belonging to McGreal from the closet where he had been hiding. Officers did not locate other items in the bedroom or closet bearing McGreal's name or address. Men's clothing was present in the bedroom, but officers did not determine the size of the clothing. {¶13} Officers also discovered packaging and accessories for two firearms in the closet. No investigation was conducted to determine ownership of the firearms. {¶14} B.R. had his own separate bedroom in the house, which was also searched. No drugs or drug paraphernalia was found in B.R.’s bedroom. {¶15} Alexis Kimble, a forensic scientist with the crime laboratory, testified that she works in the chemistry unit analyzing controlled substances. The laboratory also includes sections that analyze firearms and fingerprints. Kimble tested residue from the digital scales and determined that the scales contained cocaine, methamphetamine, and THC. A silicone container submitted for testing contained 1.21 grams of cocaine. Kimble also tested and analyzed additional substances recovered from the residence and confirmed the presence and amounts of various controlled substances. {¶16} McGreal did not testify or present evidence. Verdict and Sentence {¶17} The jury found McGreal guilty of all seven counts. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate indefinite prison term of a minimum of 10 to a potential maximum sentence of 15 years. Assignments of Error {¶18} McGreal raises two assignments of error for our consideration: {¶19} "I. MCGREAL'S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE." {¶20} "II. MCGREAL WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO MAKE ANY OBJECTIONS AT TRIAL AND DECLINED TO CROSS-EXAMINE A KEY WITNESS." I. {¶21} In his first assignment of error, McGreal specifically argues that, because no drugs were found on him, no testimony established that the room belonged to him, and other individuals were present in the house, the State failed to prove that he constructively possessed the controlled substances found in the backpack, bedroom, and closet.  Manifest Weight of the Evidence {¶22} A manifest-weight challenge concerns the persuasive force of the evidence. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. In reviewing such a challenge, an appellate court acts as a “thirteenth juror,” independently reviewing the record, weighing the evidence and reasonable inferences, considering witness credibility, and determining whether the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio- 3800, ¶ 17; State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). Reversal on manifest-weight grounds is reserved for the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against conviction. Thompkins at 387. {¶23} Because the jury personally observes the witnesses, an appellate court affords substantial deference to the jury’s credibility determinations. Eastley at ¶ 21; Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). As the Supreme Court of Ohio explained, an appellate court’s role as a thirteenth juror does not permit it to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder merely because it might have reached a different conclusion. State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26, See also State v. Reillo, 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 3. A conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the jury believed the State’s evidence over the defense’s theory. When the evidence permits competing reasonable interpretations, the jury’s resolution of those conflicts is entitled to deference. Moreover, when the evidence permits competing reasonable interpretations, an appellate court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment. State v. Reillo, 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 28. {¶24} In addition, the Ohio Constitution requires the unanimous concurrence of all three appellate judges before a conviction may be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence. Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(3); Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶¶ 2-4. Analysis {¶25} McGreal does not dispute that controlled substances were recovered from the residence, including the backpack and closet. Nor does he dispute that officers found him hiding inside the closet when they entered the bedroom. Instead, McGreal argues that the State failed to establish that he knowingly possessed the controlled substances because no drugs were found on his person, no witness testified that the bedroom belonged to him, and other individuals had access to the residence. {¶26} R.C. 2901.22(B) provides the definition of knowingly: A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact. {¶27} Whether a person acts knowingly can only be determined, absent a defendant's admission, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself. State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 38 (1978), citing State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27 (1936); State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 139 (1992); State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563 (1st Dist. 2001).  {¶28} R.C. 2925.01(K) defines possession as having control over a thing or substance, although possession may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found. R.C. 2901.21(D)(1) provides that possession is a voluntary act when the possessor knowingly procures or receives the thing possessed or is aware of the possessor's control of the thing possessed for sufficient time to have ended possession. {¶29} Possession may be actual or constructive. State v. Butler, 42 Ohio St.3d 174, 176 (1989); State v. Haynes, 25 Ohio St.2d 264, 267 (1971); State v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87 (1982), syllabus. To establish constructive possession, the evidence must prove that the defendant was able to exercise dominion and control over the contraband. State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 332 (1976). Dominion and control may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone. State v. Trembly, 137 Ohio App.3d 134 (8th Dist. 2000). Circumstantial evidence that the defendant was located in very close proximity to the contraband may support a finding of constructive possession. State v. Butler, supra; State v. Barr, 86 Ohio App.3d 227, 235 (8th Dist. 1993); State v. Morales, 2005-Ohio-4714, ¶ 50 (5th Dist.); State v. Moses, 2004-Ohio-4943, ¶ 9 (5th Dist.). {¶30} Ownership of the contraband need not be established in order to find constructive possession. State v. Smith, 2002-Ohio-3034, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Mann, 93 Ohio App.3d 301, 308 (8th Dist. 1994). Furthermore, possession may be individual or joint. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d at 332. Multiple individuals may constructively possess the same item simultaneously. State v. Pitts, 2000-Ohio-1986 (4th Dist.). {¶31} Here, the evidence connecting McGreal to the bedroom was not based solely upon his presence in the residence or his proximity to the drugs. The State introduced McGreal's own statements concerning the bedroom and his belongings. When Officer Szaniszlo later spoke with McGreal at the hospital, he asked McGreal “It’s your house, right? You stay there? McGreal responded, "Yeah, I guess I stay there, yeah." (State’s Exh. 2 at 03:40). Szaniszlo then asked, "Well, it's your room, right?" and McGreal nodded affirmatively. When Szaniszlo explained that officers had to break down the bedroom door, McGreal responded, "I hope my stuff doesn't get taken." (State’s Exh. 2 at 3:50)(emphasis added). When asked, McGreal denies paying any rent; rather, he claims they just let him stay there sometimes. (Id. at 03:59-04:05). He also admits that he has been staying there "not too long, a month or two." (Id.) McGreal then told the officer, "[t]hat's not all [his] stuff ' in there and "[t]hat's not [his] room"; although he still admits "[he] sleep[s] in it sometimes." (1Tr. at 148; State’s Exh. 2 at 04:05). {¶32} These statements were significant because they provided evidence of McGreal's continuing relationship with the particular bedroom in which the contraband was discovered. McGreal did not merely acknowledge that he had been present somewhere in the residence. He agreed that he was staying in the bedroom, stated that he had been staying there for one to two months, and referred to belongings in the room as "my stuff." From these statements, the jury could reasonably infer that McGreal exercised control over the bedroom and its contents. {¶33} The physical evidence corroborated that inference. Officers found McGreal hiding inside the closet in that bedroom. Inside the same closet, officers found McGreal's medical discharge paperwork. Officers also found drug-ingestion paraphernalia, including a pipe, inside the closet. A digital scale was located immediately across from the closet opening, and officers ultimately recovered three digital scales. Forensic testing established that residue on the scales included cocaine, methamphetamine, and THC. Additional controlled substances were recovered from a backpack located on a mattress in the bedroom. {¶34} The State also presented evidence connecting McGreal to the residence through a cellphone containing messages addressed to "Vin," and Detective Sens testified that McGreal, as the user of the cellphone, had made several "pings" to the 18th Street address while communicating with others, signifying that he was at the residence. Officers also located a photograph of a digital scale containing a brown substance on the scale. {¶35} The jury was entitled to consider this evidence collectively rather than in isolation. McGreal's own statements established his connection to the bedroom; his presence inside the closet demonstrated his physical connection to that particular location; his personal medical paperwork was found inside the closet; and drug-related items and controlled substances were found in and around the same bedroom. The evidence therefore permitted the jury to infer not merely that McGreal was present where drugs were found, but that he knew of and exercised control over the area in which the drugs and drug-related items were located. {¶36} McGreal emphasizes that no drugs were found on his person and that other individuals were present in the residence. Those circumstances are relevant to the weight of the evidence, but they do not preclude a finding of constructive possession. The State was not required to establish that McGreal exercised exclusive control over the contraband. Possession may be joint, and multiple individuals may constructively possess the same contraband. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d at 332. Thus, evidence that another person may also have had access to the residence does not negate evidence that McGreal himself exercised dominion and control over the contraband.  {¶37} Nor does the absence of testimony from another witness expressly identifying the bedroom as McGreal's room render the State's evidence against him unpersuasive. McGreal himself acknowledged that the bedroom was his and that he had been staying there for one to two months. The jury was entitled to consider those statements as evidence of his relationship to the bedroom and the items located there. {¶38} Circumstantial evidence is defined as "'testimony not based on actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of other facts from which deductions are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought to be proved.'" State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 150 (1988), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979). "Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value." State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102, 1997-Ohio-355, 684 N.E.2d 668, at n.4 (1997). "'[C]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if that evidence would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. McKnight, 2005-Ohio-6046, ¶ 75, quoting State v. Heinish, 50 Ohio St.3d 231, 238 (1990). {¶39} Upon reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and considering the credibility of the witnesses, we cannot conclude that the jury clearly lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice. This is not a case in which constructive possession rests solely upon McGreal's presence in a residence or his proximity to contraband. {¶40} The evidence included McGreal's own acknowledgment of his relationship to the bedroom, his statement that he had been staying there for one to two months, and his reference to belongings in the room as "my stuff." That evidence was corroborated by the location of his personal paperwork, his presence inside the closet, and the drug-related items and controlled substances recovered from the bedroom and closet. {¶41} McGreal is certainly free to argue that he did not know the controlled substances were present or that another person exercised control over them. But the existence of evidence from which the jury could have reached a different conclusion does not establish that the jury lost its way. The jury observed the witnesses subject to cross-examination, reviewed the photographs taken during execution of the search warrant, and viewed the body- camera footage. On this record, we cannot say that the jury disregarded compelling evidence weighing against conviction or that the evidence weighs heavily against McGreal's convictions. {¶42} Accordingly, McGreal's convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and his first assignment of error is overruled. II. {¶43} In his second assignment of error, McGreal argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to object during trial and failed to cross- examine the forensic scientist who identified the nature and the quantity of the controlled substances recovered from the residence. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel {¶44} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). First, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. Id. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential, and a reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and constituted sound trial strategy. Id. {¶45} Second, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.; see also State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio- 2993, ¶¶ 28-29 (5th Dist.). Failure to Object {¶46} McGreal first argues that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to make objections during trial. McGreal, however, does not identify a particular piece of evidence to which counsel should have objected, the legal basis for such an objection, or why the objection would have been sustained. Nor does he identify any specific evidence that, if excluded, would have materially affected the outcome of the trial. {¶47} App.R. 12(A)(2) authorizes this Court to disregard an assignment of error when "the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is based . . . as required under App.R. 16(A)." Courie v. ALCOA, 2005-Ohio-3483, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting former App.R. 12(B)(2); see also Smith v. Akron Appeals Bd. of Dept. of Public Health, 2003-Ohio-93, ¶¶ 26-27 (9th Dist.); State v. Roman-Navarre, 2025-Ohio-3156, ¶ 89 (5th Dist.). Although those cases concern an appellant's failure to identify the alleged error on appeal, the same basic problem exists here. McGreal has not identified what objection competent counsel should have made or demonstrated that the trial court would have sustained such an objection.  {¶48} More importantly, McGreal has not demonstrated prejudice. Even assuming counsel should have made additional objections, McGreal does not identify any evidence that would have been excluded as a result or explain how its exclusion would have created a reasonable probability of a different verdict. His claim therefore rests on speculation concerning what might have occurred had counsel objected. Speculation is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Montgomery, 2016-Ohio-5487, ¶ 104; State v. Short, 2011-Ohio-3641, ¶ 119. {¶49} Accordingly, McGreal has failed to establish either deficient performance or resulting prejudice based upon counsel's failure to make unspecified objections during trial. Failure to Cross-Examine the Forensic Scientist {¶50} McGreal also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine the forensic scientist who tested the substances recovered from the residence. McGreal does not identify, however, any particular deficiency in the forensic scientist's testimony or identify any evidence that cross-examination would have elicited that would have undermined the State's case. {¶51} The record reflects McGreal’s defense centered on constructive possession. His argument was that the State failed to establish that he knowingly possessed the controlled substances because no drugs were found on his person, other individuals had access to the residence, and the State did not establish that he controlled the bedroom where the drugs were found. The identity of the substances, although necessary to establish the charged offenses, was not the principal factual dispute identified by the defense. {¶52} Counsel's decision concerning the scope and manner of cross-examination is generally a matter of trial strategy. State v. Hoffner, 2004-Ohio-3430, ¶ 45; State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 339 (2000). An appellate court will not second-guess counsel's reasonable tactical decisions merely because another strategy might have been employed. Moreover, debatable trial tactics do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Hoffner at ¶ 45. {¶53} Here, McGreal does not explain what additional cross-examination would have established. He does not identify an inconsistency in the forensic scientist's testimony, challenge the testing procedures, dispute the chain of custody, identify a deficiency in the laboratory analysis, or explain how further questioning could have undermined the State's evidence that the substances recovered from the residence were controlled substances. Without such a showing, we cannot conclude that counsel's decision not to cross-examine the forensic scientist fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. {¶54} Nor has McGreal established prejudice. The mere possibility that additional questioning might have elicited testimony favorable to the defense is insufficient. Montgomery, 2016-Ohio-5487, ¶ 104; Short, 2011-Ohio-3641, ¶ 119. McGreal must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had counsel cross- examined the witness. He has not done so. {¶55} Indeed, the principal issue at trial was not whether the substances recovered from the residence were controlled substances. The evidence establishing the nature of the substances supported the State's proof of the underlying offenses, while the disputed issue concerning McGreal's guilt was whether he knowingly possessed those substances. As discussed in our resolution of McGreal's first assignment of error, the State presented evidence connecting McGreal to the bedroom and closet where the contraband and drug-related items were discovered, including McGreal's own statements concerning the bedroom and his belongings, his presence inside the closet, and the discovery of his personal paperwork and drug-related items in that area. {¶56} On this record, McGreal has not demonstrated that counsel's failure to cross- examine the forensic scientist constituted deficient performance or that further cross- examination would have created a reasonable probability of a different result. {¶57} Accordingly, McGreal’s second assignment of error is overruled. Nunc Pro Tunc Correction {¶58} We note an error in the trial court's October 9, 2025, Sentencing Entry that was not raised by either party. {¶59} The record reflects that McGreal was convicted following a jury trial. The October 9, 2025, Sentencing Entry, however, states that McGreal entered pleas of guilty to the charges. Because the sentencing entry does not accurately reflect the manner in which McGreal was convicted, we remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the October 9, 2025, Sentencing Entry to reflect that McGreal was found guilty following a jury trial.  {¶60} For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas for Stark County, Ohio is affirmed. However, this case is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the October 9, 2025, Sentencing Entry to reflect that McGreal was found guilty following a jury trial. {¶61} Costs are to be paid by appellant Vincent McGreal. By: Popham, P. J., King, J. and Montgomery, J., concur