Full Opinion

[Cite as State v. Kinder, 2026-Ohio-4605.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 30818 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 03647 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas DEWAYNE THOMAS KINDER, JR. : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION ........... Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 20, 2026, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24. Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket. For the court, MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE HUFFMAN, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30818 DEWAYNE THOMAS KINDER, JR., Appellant, Pro Se MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee TUCKER, J. {¶ 1} Dewayne Thomas Kinder, Jr., appeals from a series of judgments entered by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas denying his petition for postconviction relief as well as his successive petitions for postconviction relief. The court also denied a motion to compel. For the following reasons, we affirm. I. Factual and Procedural History {¶ 2} In January 2023, Kinder was indicted on one count of trespass in a habitation and one count of attempted trespass in a habitation. After counsel was appointed, Kinder filed a not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) plea and a request for a mental evaluation. The NGRI plea was subsequently withdrawn. In January of 2024, Kinder filed a motion for intervention in lieu of conviction, which was denied. In February 2024, he entered a guilty plea to both indicted charges. The trial court imposed a term of community control sanctions not to exceed five years. No appeal was taken. {¶ 3} On June 9, 2025, Kinder filed a pro se motion requesting the trial court to waive fines, court costs, and restitution. The trial court overruled the motion noting that Kinder had not been fined and no restitution had been ordered. The court further found that Kinder had not shown he was incapable of paying the court costs of $745.17. Kinder filed a supplemental motion regarding the court costs. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order 2 waiving all but that portion of the court costs which were “non-waivable.” On July 31, 2025, the trial court entered a notice of termination of community control. {¶ 4} On August 15, 2025, Kinder, acting pro se, filed a motion to vacate his conviction or for a new trial. The trial court treated the motion to vacate his conviction as a petition for postconviction relief and denied it as untimely. The trial court further found that the provisions of Crim.R. 33 governing motions for a new trial were inapplicable because Kinder had pleaded guilty to the indicted offenses. Thereafter, Kinder filed a pro se motion to dismiss, suppress, and strike, which the trial court overruled as an untimely successive petition for postconviction relief. Kinder also filed a motion to compel discovery, which the trial court overruled. On December 5, 2025, Kinder filed a motion to vacate the conviction, a “writ of error coram nobis,” and a motion for a “Franks hearing.” In December 2025, the trial court found the motions to be in the nature of a petition for postconviction relief and overruled them as successive and untimely. {¶ 5} Kinder appeals. II. Postconviction Relief {¶ 6} Kinder raises the following as his second, third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error: APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID WHERE PRIOR COUNSEL ENTERED AN UNAUTHORIZED NGRI PLEA WITHOUT APPELLANT’S CONSENT, IMPLICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL AUTONOMY RIGHTS RECOGNIZED IN MCCOY V. LOUISIANA; THE PLEA ACCEPTANCE ORDER AND THE WRITTEN PLEA FORM ARE FACIALLY INCONSISTENT; AND THE PLEA TERMS WERE NEVER DOCUMENTED 3 IN THE RECORD AS REQUIRED BY OHIO CRIM.R. 11(C)(2). APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL ENTERED AN UNAUTHORIZED PLEA, WITHHELD DISCOVERY FROM APPELLANT, IMPROPERLY INFLUENCED APPELLANT TO ENTER A GULTY PLEA, AND CONSTRUCTIVELY ABANDONED APPELLANT WHILE REMAINING COUNSEL OF RECORD. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING IMPROPER POST-SENTENCING MODIFICATIONS BY ADDING FORM 10G AND FORM 10A ENHANCEMENTS SIXTEEN DAYS AFTER SENTENCING WITHOUT NOTICE OR HEARING, AND BY RE-IMPOSING ENHANCED ALTERNATIVE SENTENCES ON JULY 2, 2024, WITHOUT A NEW VIOLATION OR REVOCATION HEARING. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR FRANKS HEARING WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE APPELLANT SUBMITTED A SWORN AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHING A SUBSTANTIAL PRELIMINARY SHOWING THAT THE WARRANT AFFIDAVIT CONTAINED MATERIAL FALSEHOODS AND OMISSIONS. {¶ 7} At the outset, we note that, with the exception of the motion for a new trial and the motion to compel, the trial court treated all of Kinder’s motions as petitions for 4 postconviction relief.1 {¶ 8} Kinder does not contest the trial court’s classification of his motions as petitions for postconviction relief, and indeed, he refers to his various pleadings as such. We agree with the trial court’s treatment of Kinder’s pleadings. It is well-established that “irregular ‘no name’ motions must be categorized by a court in order for the court to know the criteria by which the motion should be judged.” State v. Bush, 2002-Ohio-3993, ¶ 10. Further, it is also appropriate for a trial court to recast motions that are named and presented under a specific rule if that rule has no application to the judgment at issue. State v. Schlee, 2008-Ohio-545, ¶ 12. {¶ 9} While Kinder’s August 15, 2025, motion was styled, in part, as a motion to vacate, this court has held that such pleadings are properly considered as petitions for postconviction relief. State v. Clark, 2017-Ohio-120, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). Further, his additional motions were filed subsequent to his conviction, claimed a denial of rights, and sought to render the judgment of conviction void. Thus, they were all properly recast as petitions for postconviction relief. {¶ 10} “Postconviction relief is a means by which the petitioner may present constitutional issues to the court that would otherwise be impossible to review because the evidence supporting those issues is not contained in the record of the petitioner's criminal conviction.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Monroe, 2015-Ohio-844, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.). “Postconviction relief is a remedy sought by a defendant who has either been tried and found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, or who has pled guilty and has been convicted.” State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 283 (1999). 1 The trial court overruled the motion for a new trial finding that, because Kinder had entered a guilty plea, a Crim.R. 33 motion seeking a new trial was impossible. Kinder does not contest this portion of the trial court’s judgment. 5 {¶ 11} R.C. 2953.21, the statute that governs postconviction relief, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (A)(1)(a) A person in any of the following categories may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other appropriate relief: (i) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense or adjudicated a delinquent child and who claims that there was such a denial or infringement of the person's rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States; ... (b) A petitioner under division (A)(1)(a) of this section may file a supporting affidavit and other documentary evidence in support of the claim for relief. ... (2)(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication . . . . If no appeal is taken, except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, the petition shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the expiration of the time for filing the appeal. {¶ 12} Furthermore, R.C. 2953.23, the statute that governs second or successive petitions, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 6 (A) Whether a hearing is or is not held on a petition filed pursuant to section 2953.21 of the Revised Code, a court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in division (A) of that section or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless division (A)(1) or (2) of this section applies: (1) Both of the following apply: (a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner's situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right. (b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner eligible for the death sentence. {¶ 13} Kinder did not file a direct appeal from his conviction. Therefore, to be timely, he was required to file his petition for postconviction relief “no later than three hundred sixty- five days after the expiration of the time for filing the appeal.” R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a). The expiration of the time for filing his appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence was 7 March 22, 2024. He filed his first petition for postconviction relief on August 8, 2025. Thus, the petition, on its face, was untimely. {¶ 14} “A trial court has jurisdiction, and may consider an untimely petition, if a petitioner ‘shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief.’” State v. Blankenship, 2026-Ohio-3651, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.), citing R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). “‘A petitioner may make the required showing . . . by demonstrating that he was previously unaware of the evidence on which the petition relies and could not have discovered it by exercising reasonable diligence.’” Id., quoting State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-134, ¶ 18. “In Johnson, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that ‘unavoidably prevented’ means ‘not “merely prevented,”’ and ‘a petitioner filing an untimely postconviction petition must show that any delay in discovering the facts undergirding the petition was “incapable of being avoided or evaded.”’" Id., quoting Johnson at ¶ 24, quoting Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003). {¶ 15} Here, Kinder does not claim that he was unavoidably prevented from filing any of the petitions in a timely manner. Indeed, his own pleadings demonstrate that he was aware of the issues raised in his petitions prior to the expiration of the time to file a direct appeal. {¶ 16} Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the initial petition as untimely. Likewise, because “R.C. 2953.23(A) precludes trial courts from entertaining successive petitions for postconviction relief unless one of the exceptions in the statute applies,” the trial court did not err in denying the subsequent petitions as successive and untimely. State v. Weber, 2020-Ohio-4851, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). {¶ 17} Accordingly, the second, third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error are overruled. 8 III. Motion to Compel {¶ 18} Kinder’s first assignment of error states as follows: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY WHERE THE STATE WITHHELD MATERIAL EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF BRADY V. MARYLAND AND OHIO CRIM.R. 16. {¶ 19} In December of 2025, Kinder filed a motion to compel the State to produce discovery. The motion contends he did not receive exculpatory discovery in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). {¶ 20} In Brady, the United States Supreme Court stated, “We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. In order to establish a Brady violation, “the petitioner must demonstrate three elements: first, the prosecution failed to disclose evidence upon request; second, that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and third, that the evidence was material.” State v. Aldridge, 120 Ohio App.3d 122, 145 (2d Dist. 1997). A Brady violation could support a petition for postconviction relief. {¶ 21} We first note that “[w]ithout state action, the panoply of constitutional protections generally does not apply.” State v. O.E.P.-T., 2023-Ohio-2035, ¶ 79 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Fornshell, 2021-Ohio-674, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), citing Bouquett v. St. Elizabeth Corp., 43 Ohio St.3d 50, 53 (1989) (appellee required to show state action to “warrant the constitutional protection of due process”). Here, throughout his numerous pleadings, Kinder admits that the State provided discovery to his appointed counsel. However, Kinder asserts 9 that his attorney did not share the discovery with him. If accurate, this assertion is troubling, but not a Brady violation. Nevertheless, in other pleadings, Kinder acknowledges he had the opportunity to review the discovery the State provided. Given this, it is impossible for us to find a Brady violation. {¶ 22} We conclude the trial court did not err by overruling the motion to compel. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled. IV. Mootness {¶ 23} The fifth assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THIS MATTER MOOT WHERE ACTIVE COLLECTION PROCEEDINGS OF $1,714.34 WERE INITIATED AFTER TERMINATION OF COMMUNITY CONTROL, CONSTITUTING ONGOING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONVICTION. {¶ 24} Kinder claims that the trial court erred by stating that his August 5, 2025, motion to vacate and for a new trial were moot. In support, he claims the amount he owes in court costs has been referred to collection, making the action ongoing, and, thus, not moot. {¶ 25} We find this argument without merit. The trial court’s decision denying the motion to vacate and for a new trial was based upon the court’s finding that the petition was untimely and that the provisions of Crim.R. 33 for a new trial were inapplicable to this case. While the court did say that the matter was “essentially moot,” it did not base its decision on that ground. Therefore, the fifth assignment of error is overruled. 10 X. Conclusion {¶ 26} Having overruled all of Kinder’s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. ............. HUFFMAN, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. 11