State v. Kinder
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket30818
JudgeTucker
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Kinder, 2026-Ohio-4605.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. No. 30818
Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 03647
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
DEWAYNE THOMAS KINDER, JR. : Court)
:
Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 20, 2026, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE
HUFFMAN, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.
OPINION
MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30818
DEWAYNE THOMAS KINDER, JR., Appellant, Pro Se
MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Dewayne Thomas Kinder, Jr., appeals from a series of judgments entered by
the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas denying his petition for postconviction relief
as well as his successive petitions for postconviction relief. The court also denied a motion
to compel. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In January 2023, Kinder was indicted on one count of trespass in a habitation
and one count of attempted trespass in a habitation. After counsel was appointed, Kinder
filed a not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) plea and a request for a mental evaluation.
The NGRI plea was subsequently withdrawn. In January of 2024, Kinder filed a motion for
intervention in lieu of conviction, which was denied. In February 2024, he entered a guilty
plea to both indicted charges. The trial court imposed a term of community control sanctions
not to exceed five years. No appeal was taken.
{¶ 3} On June 9, 2025, Kinder filed a pro se motion requesting the trial court to waive
fines, court costs, and restitution. The trial court overruled the motion noting that Kinder had
not been fined and no restitution had been ordered. The court further found that Kinder had
not shown he was incapable of paying the court costs of $745.17. Kinder filed a
supplemental motion regarding the court costs. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order
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waiving all but that portion of the court costs which were “non-waivable.” On July 31, 2025,
the trial court entered a notice of termination of community control.
{¶ 4} On August 15, 2025, Kinder, acting pro se, filed a motion to vacate his
conviction or for a new trial. The trial court treated the motion to vacate his conviction as a
petition for postconviction relief and denied it as untimely. The trial court further found that
the provisions of Crim.R. 33 governing motions for a new trial were inapplicable because
Kinder had pleaded guilty to the indicted offenses. Thereafter, Kinder filed a pro se motion
to dismiss, suppress, and strike, which the trial court overruled as an untimely successive
petition for postconviction relief. Kinder also filed a motion to compel discovery, which the
trial court overruled. On December 5, 2025, Kinder filed a motion to vacate the conviction, a
“writ of error coram nobis,” and a motion for a “Franks hearing.” In December 2025, the trial
court found the motions to be in the nature of a petition for postconviction relief and overruled
them as successive and untimely.
{¶ 5} Kinder appeals.
II. Postconviction Relief
{¶ 6} Kinder raises the following as his second, third, fourth, and sixth assignments
of error:
APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID WHERE
PRIOR COUNSEL ENTERED AN UNAUTHORIZED NGRI PLEA WITHOUT
APPELLANT’S CONSENT, IMPLICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL
AUTONOMY RIGHTS RECOGNIZED IN MCCOY V. LOUISIANA; THE PLEA
ACCEPTANCE ORDER AND THE WRITTEN PLEA FORM ARE FACIALLY
INCONSISTENT; AND THE PLEA TERMS WERE NEVER DOCUMENTED
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IN THE RECORD AS REQUIRED BY OHIO CRIM.R. 11(C)(2).
APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
WHERE COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL ENTERED AN UNAUTHORIZED
PLEA, WITHHELD DISCOVERY FROM APPELLANT, IMPROPERLY
INFLUENCED APPELLANT TO ENTER A GULTY PLEA, AND
CONSTRUCTIVELY ABANDONED APPELLANT WHILE REMAINING
COUNSEL OF RECORD.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING IMPROPER POST-SENTENCING
MODIFICATIONS BY ADDING FORM 10G AND FORM 10A
ENHANCEMENTS SIXTEEN DAYS AFTER SENTENCING WITHOUT
NOTICE OR HEARING, AND BY RE-IMPOSING ENHANCED ALTERNATIVE
SENTENCES ON JULY 2, 2024, WITHOUT A NEW VIOLATION OR
REVOCATION HEARING.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR FRANKS HEARING WITHOUT AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE APPELLANT SUBMITTED A SWORN
AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHING A SUBSTANTIAL PRELIMINARY SHOWING
THAT THE WARRANT AFFIDAVIT CONTAINED MATERIAL FALSEHOODS
AND OMISSIONS.
{¶ 7} At the outset, we note that, with the exception of the motion for a new trial and
the motion to compel, the trial court treated all of Kinder’s motions as petitions for
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postconviction relief.1
{¶ 8} Kinder does not contest the trial court’s classification of his motions as petitions
for postconviction relief, and indeed, he refers to his various pleadings as such. We agree
with the trial court’s treatment of Kinder’s pleadings. It is well-established that “irregular ‘no
name’ motions must be categorized by a court in order for the court to know the criteria by
which the motion should be judged.” State v. Bush, 2002-Ohio-3993, ¶ 10. Further, it is also
appropriate for a trial court to recast motions that are named and presented under a specific
rule if that rule has no application to the judgment at issue. State v. Schlee, 2008-Ohio-545,
¶ 12.
{¶ 9} While Kinder’s August 15, 2025, motion was styled, in part, as a motion to
vacate, this court has held that such pleadings are properly considered as petitions for
postconviction relief. State v. Clark, 2017-Ohio-120, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). Further, his additional
motions were filed subsequent to his conviction, claimed a denial of rights, and sought to
render the judgment of conviction void. Thus, they were all properly recast as petitions for
postconviction relief.
{¶ 10} “Postconviction relief is a means by which the petitioner may present
constitutional issues to the court that would otherwise be impossible to review because the
evidence supporting those issues is not contained in the record of the petitioner's criminal
conviction.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Monroe, 2015-Ohio-844, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.).
“Postconviction relief is a remedy sought by a defendant who has either been tried and found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, or who has pled guilty and has been convicted.” State v.
Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 283 (1999).
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The trial court overruled the motion for a new trial finding that, because Kinder had entered
a guilty plea, a Crim.R. 33 motion seeking a new trial was impossible. Kinder does not
contest this portion of the trial court’s judgment.
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{¶ 11} R.C. 2953.21, the statute that governs postconviction relief, provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
(A)(1)(a) A person in any of the following categories may file a petition in the
court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and
asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant
other appropriate relief:
(i) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense or adjudicated a
delinquent child and who claims that there was such a denial or infringement
of the person's rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the
Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States;
...
(b) A petitioner under division (A)(1)(a) of this section may file a supporting
affidavit and other documentary evidence in support of the claim for relief.
...
(2)(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code,
a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be filed no
later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial
transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of
conviction or adjudication . . . . If no appeal is taken, except as otherwise
provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, the petition shall be filed no
later than three hundred sixty-five days after the expiration of the time for filing
the appeal.
{¶ 12} Furthermore, R.C. 2953.23, the statute that governs second or successive
petitions, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
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(A) Whether a hearing is or is not held on a petition filed pursuant to section
2953.21 of the Revised Code, a court may not entertain a petition filed after
the expiration of the period prescribed in division (A) of that section or a second
petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless
division (A)(1) or (2) of this section applies:
(1) Both of the following apply:
(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented
from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the
claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of
section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the
United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that
applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner's situation, and the petition
asserts a claim based on that right.
(b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the
petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted or, if the
claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for constitutional error at the
sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner
eligible for the death sentence.
{¶ 13} Kinder did not file a direct appeal from his conviction. Therefore, to be timely,
he was required to file his petition for postconviction relief “no later than three hundred sixty-
five days after the expiration of the time for filing the appeal.” R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a). The
expiration of the time for filing his appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence was
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March 22, 2024. He filed his first petition for postconviction relief on August 8, 2025. Thus,
the petition, on its face, was untimely.
{¶ 14} “A trial court has jurisdiction, and may consider an untimely petition, if a
petitioner ‘shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts
upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief.’” State v. Blankenship,
2026-Ohio-3651, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.), citing R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). “‘A petitioner may make the
required showing . . . by demonstrating that he was previously unaware of the evidence on
which the petition relies and could not have discovered it by exercising reasonable
diligence.’” Id., quoting State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-134, ¶ 18. “In Johnson, the Ohio
Supreme Court explained that ‘unavoidably prevented’ means ‘not “merely prevented,”’ and
‘a petitioner filing an untimely postconviction petition must show that any delay in discovering
the facts undergirding the petition was “incapable of being avoided or evaded.”’" Id., quoting
Johnson at ¶ 24, quoting Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003).
{¶ 15} Here, Kinder does not claim that he was unavoidably prevented from filing any
of the petitions in a timely manner. Indeed, his own pleadings demonstrate that he was
aware of the issues raised in his petitions prior to the expiration of the time to file a direct
appeal.
{¶ 16} Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the initial petition as
untimely. Likewise, because “R.C. 2953.23(A) precludes trial courts from entertaining
successive petitions for postconviction relief unless one of the exceptions in the statute
applies,” the trial court did not err in denying the subsequent petitions as successive and
untimely. State v. Weber, 2020-Ohio-4851, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 17} Accordingly, the second, third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error are
overruled.
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III. Motion to Compel
{¶ 18} Kinder’s first assignment of error states as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
COMPEL DISCOVERY WHERE THE STATE WITHHELD MATERIAL
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF BRADY V. MARYLAND AND
OHIO CRIM.R. 16.
{¶ 19} In December of 2025, Kinder filed a motion to compel the State to produce
discovery. The motion contends he did not receive exculpatory discovery in violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
{¶ 20} In Brady, the United States Supreme Court stated, “We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. In order to establish a Brady violation,
“the petitioner must demonstrate three elements: first, the prosecution failed to disclose
evidence upon request; second, that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and third,
that the evidence was material.” State v. Aldridge, 120 Ohio App.3d 122, 145 (2d Dist. 1997).
A Brady violation could support a petition for postconviction relief.
{¶ 21} We first note that “[w]ithout state action, the panoply of constitutional
protections generally does not apply.” State v. O.E.P.-T., 2023-Ohio-2035, ¶ 79 (10th Dist.),
quoting State v. Fornshell, 2021-Ohio-674, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), citing Bouquett v. St. Elizabeth
Corp., 43 Ohio St.3d 50, 53 (1989) (appellee required to show state action to “warrant the
constitutional protection of due process”). Here, throughout his numerous pleadings, Kinder
admits that the State provided discovery to his appointed counsel. However, Kinder asserts
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that his attorney did not share the discovery with him. If accurate, this assertion is troubling,
but not a Brady violation. Nevertheless, in other pleadings, Kinder acknowledges he had the
opportunity to review the discovery the State provided. Given this, it is impossible for us to
find a Brady violation.
{¶ 22} We conclude the trial court did not err by overruling the motion to compel.
Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Mootness
{¶ 23} The fifth assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THIS MATTER MOOT WHERE
ACTIVE COLLECTION PROCEEDINGS OF $1,714.34 WERE INITIATED
AFTER TERMINATION OF COMMUNITY CONTROL, CONSTITUTING
ONGOING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONVICTION.
{¶ 24} Kinder claims that the trial court erred by stating that his August 5, 2025,
motion to vacate and for a new trial were moot. In support, he claims the amount he owes
in court costs has been referred to collection, making the action ongoing, and, thus, not
moot.
{¶ 25} We find this argument without merit. The trial court’s decision denying the
motion to vacate and for a new trial was based upon the court’s finding that the petition was
untimely and that the provisions of Crim.R. 33 for a new trial were inapplicable to this case.
While the court did say that the matter was “essentially moot,” it did not base its decision on
that ground. Therefore, the fifth assignment of error is overruled.
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X. Conclusion
{¶ 26} Having overruled all of Kinder’s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
.............
HUFFMAN, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.
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