State v. Terry
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket116163
JudgeS. Gallagher
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Terry, 2026-Ohio-4581.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 116163
v. :
CHRISTOPHER TERRY, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 19, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-24-696170-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Jeffrey Schnatter and Alyssa Teetzel,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Marein & Bradley, LLC, and John T. Martin, for
appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
Christopher Terry appeals his convictions for involuntary
manslaughter, failure to stop after an accident, and tampering with evidence
entered after a jury trial, and the ensuing, non-life, indefinite prison sentence of
nine to twelve years. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Terry lost control of his vehicle while driving nearly 100 miles per
hour over the posted speed limit in a residential neighborhood, crashing into an
apartment building. Terry fled the scene. The crash severed the building’s natural
gas line, flooding the basement with inflammable gas. Not long after the crash, the
building exploded causing serious injury to the victim, who ultimately died as a
result of carbon monoxide suffocation from the fire erupting from the explosion. At
least two others escaped before the explosion. Shortly after the fatal collision, Terry
contacted the police department claiming he was carjacked and the vehicle was
stolen before the crash. The problem with that story was police investigators
recovered Terry’s DNA from the deployed air bags in the wrecked vehicle, which
would occur if he was driving it at the time of the collision.
Terry’s appellate arguments are limited. In the first three
assignments of error, he claims that his convictions for involuntary manslaughter
and tampering with evidence are invalid because there are more specific, less severe
offenses available, and in the alternative, his trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to timely challenge those charges. Under this general theory, Terry claims that the
first-degree felony offense of involuntary manslaughter is not cognizable and a
violation of his federal constitutional rights because the State could have also
charged him with a third-degree aggravated vehicular homicide, which shares
similar elements as involuntary manslaughter. Likewise, he claims that falsification,
and not tampering with evidence, would have been the more appropriate charge
related to his misconduct. In the fourth assignment of error, Terry claims the trial
court erred by imposing consecutive sentences without making the findings
required under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). None of Terry’s arguments have merit.
For the first assignment of error, Terry gives this panel “two choices:
Either hold that [the conviction for involuntary manslaughter] runs afoul of the
General Assembly’s intent or hold that the prosecution’s manner of charging [that
count] violated Equal Protection and Due Process” because “[e]qual protection is
violated when a statutory scheme is such that two different applications of criminal
law can prescribe [sic] different penalties while still requiring the State to prove
identical elements.” See State v. Wilson, 58 Ohio St.2d 52, 55 (1979). According to
Terry, the involuntary-manslaughter charge is not cognizable under Ohio law
because “[e]vidence that a defendant caused the death of a person through reckless
driving supports a conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide as well as for the
lesser offense of vehicular assault[,]” both of which are less severe than the first-
degree involuntary-manslaughter offense. Terry’s constitutional argument rests on
his presumption that involuntary manslaughter under R.C. 2903.04(A) and
aggravated vehicular homicide under R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a) share identical
elements, and that overlap necessarily violates his federal constitutional rights.
Terry’s reliance on Wilson, in attempting to claim a due process or
equal protection violation under the federal constitution, is misplaced. It is true that
the court in Wilson held that “if the statutes prohibit identical activity, require
identical proof, and yet impose different penalties, then sentencing a person under
the statute with the higher penalty violates the Equal Protection Clause” of the
United States Constitution. Id. at 55-56. That unsupported conclusion, however,
was short lived.
Within months of Wilson’s release, the Supreme Court of the United
States concluded that charging offenders with one crime when another proscribes
identical conduct with a different sentencing scheme is constitutionally permissible
because “[t]here is no appreciable difference between the discretion a prosecutor
exercises when deciding whether to charge under one of two statutes with different
elements and the discretion he exercises when choosing one of two statutes with
identical elements.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979). It was
further concluded that “[j]ust as a defendant has no constitutional right to elect
which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the basis of his indictment and
prosecution, neither is he entitled to choose the penalty scheme under which he will
be sentenced.” Id. Accordingly, criminal statutes with identical elements but
differing penalty schemes do not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses
of the federal constitution. It is well within the prosecutor’s discretion to choose
between different criminal schemes in seeking indictments.1
“It has long been settled that the Supremacy Clause binds state courts
to decisions of the United States Supreme Court on questions of federal statutory
1 Terry has not advanced any assignment of error challenging the prosecutor’s
discretion to amend the indictment.
and constitutional law.” State v. Burnett, 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 424 (2001). Terry has
not addressed the controlling precedent on the federal constitutional question. And
beyond that, Terry is unable to produce any authority in the nearly 50 years since
Wilson was released, in which a conviction has been ultimately overturned based on
Wilson. See State v. Ballard, 2016-Ohio-364, ¶ 14-15 (1st Dist.) (collecting cases).
Instead of addressing the binding precedent, Terry argues that the
Ohio Supreme Court left Wilson as controlling authority in Ohio when it
distinguished it in State v. Klembus, 2016-Ohio-1092, a problematic assertion in
light of the Supremacy Clause. In Klembus, the offender challenged enhancements
to his offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OVI”), claiming that the
enhancements were identical because a third-degree OVI offense required proof of
an OVI conviction and five OVI convictions in the last 20 years, while a fourth-
degree OVI offense only required proof of the five OVI convictions in the last 20
years. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected application of Wilson in that case because
sentencing enhancements are not crimes, the issue in Wilson. Id. at ¶ 17. In other
words, the validity of Wilson was not before the Ohio Supreme Court because the
Wilson analysis was not implicated by the particular facts of the case.
Wilson’s conclusion is entirely based on a state court’s interpretation
of federal constitutional rights. The Supremacy Clause precludes this court from
applying state-court precedent at odds with that issued by the Supreme Court of the
United States on the constitutional question. Burnett at 422, quoting U.S. Const.,
art. VI, cl. 2 (“‘This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’”). We cannot ignore that binding
precedent, and Terry has not presented any Ohio-specific constitutional arguments.
Even if the elements of R.C. 2903.04(A), involuntary manslaughter, are identical to
aggravated vehicular homicide under R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a), which we assume
without deciding solely for the purpose of this discussion, that is not a constitutional
violation under the federal law. See Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114.
As it pertains to Ohio law, Terry claims that involuntary manslaughter
under R.C. 2903.04(A) is not coextensive with aggravated vehicular manslaughter
under R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a), under a test meant to determine whether a more
specific criminal statute should be applied over a more generalized statute under
R.C. 1.51. See State v. Chippendale, 52 Ohio St.3d 118, 122 (1990). R.C. 1.51 provides
that “[i]f a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be
construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both.” It is only “[i]f the conflict
between the provisions is irreconcilable,” that “the special or local provision prevails
as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later
adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.” Id. In
Chippendale, the Ohio Supreme Court unambiguously held that because the
legislature removed language to amend the involuntary manslaughter statute to
exclude the vehicular-related crimes from the draft form of the statute, “the
legislature clearly intended ‘* * * to permit a charge of manslaughter against persons
involved in vehicular fatalities despite the more specific provisions for aggravated
vehicular and vehicular homicide.’” Id., quoting State v. Davis, 13 Ohio App.3d 265
(2d Dist. 1983). Under R.C. 1.51, that demonstrates the legislature’s “manifest
intent” that the general provision could prevail. Id.
Terry’s discussion of Chippendale is limited, and he offers no
arguments that any subsequent change in statutory enactment would lead to a
different conclusion. Instead, Terry claims he should prevail because “what the
prosecution has done in this case goes well beyond anything permitted by
Chippendale,” or in the alternative, this panel should overrule the Ohio Supreme
Court. The former argument goes no deeper than that statement, and there is no
explanation provided to distinguish Chippendale. We decline to address Terry’s
conclusory statement and, therefore, need not weigh in on the interplay between the
two statutes at issue. In order to accept Terry’s argument on this point, this panel
would have to find and analyze case authority of our own volition. The parties, not
an appellate court, bear the burden of advancing and supporting an argument with
citations to legal authority and facts in the record. State v. Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-
4034, ¶ 19, citing State v. Bodyke, 2010-Ohio-2424, ¶ 78 (O’Donnell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). As to his latter point, it is axiomatic that an
intermediate court lacks authority to overrule a superior court.
The first assignment of error is overruled.
In the second assignment of error, Terry argues that if the first
assignment of error is resolved under the plain-error standard, his trial counsel
should be deemed to have rendered ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the
involuntary-manslaughter charge. Because that argument is limited to addressing
a conclusion this panel has not reached, the second assignment of error is moot and
need not be considered. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c) (“Unless an assignment of error is
made moot by a ruling on another assignment of error, decide each assignment of
error and give reasons in writing for its decision.”).
In the third assignment of error, Terry claims that he “cannot be
convicted of the general offense of tampering with evidence in [Count 3], when there
is a more specific offense available, to wit: falsification.” Importantly, Terry has
conceded that his conviction for tampering with evidence is based on sufficient
evidence, demonstrating that the State presented evidence establishing each
element of the tampering offense. Terry further provides no authority or analysis to
support his claim. See App.R. 16(A)(7). His sole claim is that a charge of falsification
would be more specific to his criminal conduct than the tampering-with-evidence
conviction that is supported by sufficient evidence. As mentioned earlier, it is not
this court’s responsibility to present arguments on behalf of a party. Quarterman
at ¶ 19, citing Bodyke at ¶ 78. It cannot be concluded, based on the limited argument
presented, that the two charges are irreconcilable under R.C. 1.51 or that the
exception to that rule does not apply. The third assignment of error is overruled
solely based on the cursory, unsupported argument presented for review.
In the fourth, and final, assignment of error, Terry claims the trial
court failed to make the consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
because the trial court did not expressly use the statutory language in announcing
the findings at the sentencing hearing, which were later clarified in the final entry of
conviction:
The court imposes prison terms consecutively finding that
consecutive service of the prison term is necessary to protect the public
from future crime or to punish the defendant; that the consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of defendant’s
conduct and to the danger defendant poses to the public; and that, the
defendant committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
defendant was awaiting trial or sentencing or was under a community
control or was under post-release control for a prior offense, or at least
two of the multiple offenses were committed in this case as part of one
or more course of conduct, and the harm caused by said multiple
offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of
the offenses committed . . . adequately reflects the seriousness of
defendant’s conduct, or defendant’s history of criminal conduct
demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the
public from future crime by the defendant.
It must be acknowledged that “[a] court of record speaks only through its journal
and not by oral pronouncement or mere written minute or memorandum.” State v.
Leegrand, 2022-Ohio-3623, ¶ 8, citing Schenley v. Kauth, 160 Ohio St. 109 (1953),
paragraph one of the syllabus. The written findings in the final entry of conviction,
therefore, must be considered.
The trial court’s memorialized findings align with the statutory
requirements established in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Under that subsection, a trial court
has discretionary authority to “impose consecutive sentences for multiple offenses
if it finds that doing so is necessary to protect the public or to punish the offender[,]”
“that the sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s
conduct and the danger the offender poses to the public[,]” and one of three findings
are made that “[t]he offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the
offender[,]” that two of the offenses “were committed as part of one or more courses
of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so
committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses
committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct[,]” or “[t]he offender’s history of criminal
conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public
from future crime by the offender.” State v. Polizzi, 2026-Ohio-2588, ¶ 14; R.C.
2929.14(C)(4).
Terry has not claimed that the final entry of conviction differs with
the oral pronouncement to a reversible extent. In fact, Terry has not addressed the
written findings altogether. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Because the findings adhere to the
statutory requirements, the final assignment of error, solely claiming that the R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) findings were not made, is overruled. The record demonstrates that
the trial court made the required findings before imposing consecutive sentences.
Terry’s convictions are affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR