State v. El

[Cite as State v. El, 2026-Ohio-4489.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 116326 v. : ALQAADIR EL, : Defendant-Appellant. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 12, 2026 Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-25-706317-A Appearances: Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christopher Woodworth, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Dunham Law, LLC and Michael P. Dunham, for appellant. DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.: Defendant-appellant Alqaadir El appeals his convictions after pleading no contest to charges of having weapons while under disability and carrying a concealed weapon. El challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized and statements he made during an encounter with police. He further contends that his conviction for having weapons while under disability violated his right to keep and bear arms under U.S. Const., amends. II and XIV, as well as Ohio Const., art. I, § 4. Finally, El argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise such constitutional challenges. Finding no merit to the appeal, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. I. Facts and Procedural History On October 22, 2025, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned a two- count indictment charging El with having weapons while under disability, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), and carrying concealed weapons, a felony of the fourth degree in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2). Each count contained a forfeiture specification pertaining to a SCCY 9 mm handgun. Pursuant to the indictment and bill of particulars, the charge of having weapons while under disability was predicated upon El’s conviction for trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03 in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-09-522488-A. The indictment stemmed from El’s encounter with several Cleveland police officers beginning at approximately 11:55 p.m. on October 12, 2025, an interaction thoroughly explored in the course of the suppression hearing discussed below. On January 16, 2026, following discovery and initial pretrials, El filed a motion to suppress all evidence concerning the October 12 encounter. Specifically, he sought to preclude the State from introducing any statements, items, or other evidence obtained during El’s interaction with police, including his admission that there was a firearm in the vehicle he was driving “and officer observations following that admission.” The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on February 27, 2026. The State called a single witness, Cleveland Police Officer Jonathon Selleny, and introduced two exhibits consisting of body-camera footage from Officer Selleny and from his partner, Officer Anthony Krokos. Officer Selleny testified that late at night on October 12, 2025, he and his partner were patrolling the area of East 22nd Street and Cedar Avenue near “[t]he old juvenile detention facility that they’re in the process of demolishing.” (Tr. 17.)1 He described the area as a “hotspot for the city” known to police, including him personally, as an area subject to frequent calls for homicides, shootings, aggravated robberies, and other criminal activity. (Tr. 16-17.) Officer Selleny testified that while patrolling the area, he observed a Kia SUV “backed into a very dark, almost unlit, basically dead end alley.” (Tr. 18.) He viewed the vehicle’s make as significant because he and other police officers had “been dealing with a rash of Kia thefts specifically for a number of years.” (Tr. 18.) He testified that he “personally [had] recovered numerous stolen vehicles, including Kias, in and around that area.” (Tr. 18.) Officer Selleny and his partner pulled into the alley to make contact with the vehicle’s operator. Two additional officers in another patrol car had pulled 1 Officer Selleny referred to “22nd and Cedar,” but this court may take judicial notice of Google Maps to determine locations and distances. State v. McGrath, 2025-Ohio-2600, ¶ 32, fn. 4 (8th Dist.); State v. Bradford, 2018-Ohio-1417, ¶ 71 (8th Dist.); Mitchell v. TVA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56527, *2-3, fn. 1 (E.D.Tenn. Apr. 30, 2015). in behind El’s vehicle. (Tr. 36.) Officer Selleny testified that he wanted to determine whether the car was stolen and why it was parked there, because it is “not typically a place that people park or have any reason to necessarily be hanging out that late at night.” (Tr. 20.) He further testified to his recollection that neither police emergency lights nor any police siren had been activated either before or during the encounter with El. (Tr. 48.) Body-camera footage and testimony indicated that as they approached the car, El appeared to be exiting or outside the driver’s side door of the vehicle, which was open. (Tr. 35.) Officer Selleny directed him to step away from the car and move to the front of the vehicle. He testified that this was based on the lighting, the location, and the fact that he had not “identified who I’m dealing with.” (Tr. 27.) He testified that asking El to move to the front of his vehicle “was a safety request.” (Tr. 27.) He asked El for his identification, which El provided, and which was then turned over to Officer Krokos. Officer Selleny testified that when El was asked why he was there, he stated he was “working armed security.” (Tr. 20.) Body-camera footage indicated that in response to being asked why he was there, El simply said he was “doing security here.” Body-camera footage further indicated that Officer Selleny stated that the only reason they were having a conversation was because there had been “a lot of stolen cars over here, and this is a Kia.” Officer Selleny then asked El, “Got any guns or anything with you or nothing?” El replied, “I mean, well, yeah, I’m an armed security officer,” and appeared to gesture towards the vehicle with his right hand. Officer Selleny then asked, “Do you have a gun on you physically right now?” El responded that he did not. Officer Selleny asked El to keep his hands visible, but no pat-down ensued. Officer Selleny testified, and body-camera footage confirmed, that El remained standing outside of his vehicle, and was not handcuffed, while the officers ran a search on El’s identification. The ID search indicated potential outstanding warrants. Officer Selleny also testified, consistent with body-camera footage, that El had indicated he was working for “R-CAP Security,” which in Officer Selleny’s experience was “known to employ felons that are in possession of firearms.” (Tr. 39.) This, combined with El’s statement that he was working armed security, prompted Officer Selleny to conduct an Ohio Law Enforcement Gateway (“OHLEG”) search for any criminal or driving history. Body-camera footage indicated that Officer Selleny returned to his cruiser to continue searching records. According to Officer Selleny, the OHLEG search returned results indicating that El had prior felony drug convictions, including felony cocaine possession, felony drug trafficking, and a conviction for having weapons while under disability. These results led him to believe that El “was unable to legally possess a firearm.” (Tr. 23.) Officer Krokos had followed Officer Selleny to the police cruiser. Body- camera footage indicates that Officer Selleny asked Officer Krokos to confirm that the firearm was in the vehicle. Officer Krokos returned to speak briefly with El. The body-camera footage indicates that he asked El, “You say the firearm’s in the vehicle?” El responded, “Huh?” and Officer Krokos then asked, “You said your gun’s in the car?” El pointed to the vehicle and responded, “Yeah.” After Officer Krokos returned to the police cruiser and informed Officer Selleny of the gun’s location, Officer Selleny returned to El’s vehicle. He testified that at that time, El was being detained because he was in the process of being arrested. He testified that El was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). According to Officer Selleny’s testimony, he learned that the “firearm was under the driver’s seat and it was his girlfriend’s gun allegedly.” (Tr. 24.) According to the body-camera footage, at least a portion of this conversation occurred before El was read his Miranda rights. Officer Selleny exited his police cruiser, approached El, and said, “The gun in the car is yours, right?” When El responded, “Huh?” Officer Selleny repeated the question. It was at that point that El indicated the gun was actually his girlfriend’s. Officer Selleny then asked him to place his hands behind his back and, as El was being handcuffed, informed him that he was being arrested because he was not legally permitted to be in possession of a handgun because of his previous convictions. Officer Brittany Stacho, one of two additional Cleveland police officers at the scene, then read El his Miranda rights. (Tr. 37-38.) The body-camera footage reflects that at the moment Officer Stacho finished providing El with his Miranda advisements, Officer Selleny — while shining a flashlight in the driver’s side window — asked him, “Where’s the gun in the car?” El responded that it was “under the seat.” Officer Selleny recovered the firearm, with a bullet in the chamber, from under the driver’s seat. He further explained to the trial court that because they could not leave the vehicle unattended, police policy was “to inventory the vehicle . . . and then the vehicle gets towed.” (Tr. 24.) On cross-examination, Officer Selleny conceded that he began asking El about the firearm before El was notified of his Miranda rights. He further conceded that he was not sure whether El responded in the affirmative, or at all, when Officer Stacho asked El if he understood those rights. He further clarified that it was Officer Stacho and her partner, Officer Whitner, who had first observed the Kia vehicle and that the officers “had discussed how to approach the situation from a safety standpoint for everybody involved.” (Tr. 42.) He further conceded that El was calm, cooperative, and honest with police throughout the encounter. The State rested subject to the admission of exhibits (the two body- camera videos), which were admitted without objection. The defense rested without calling witnesses. Following brief closing arguments, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On March 5, 2026, it issued its opinion. The trial court found Officer Selleny’s testimony credible, characterized the encounter as consensual, and denied El’s motion to suppress. On March 18, 2026, El pleaded no contest to the charges in the indictment. The trial court found El guilty and sentenced him to five years of community control. This timely appeal followed. II. Assignments of Error El presents three assignments of error for our review: Assignment of Error 1: The trial court erred in denying Mr. El’s motion to suppress in violation of his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, coercive custodial interrogation, self-incrimination, and due process of law under the US Constitution. Amend. IV, US Con. Amend. V, US Con. Amend. XIV, and, Ohio Con. Art. I. Tr. Passim. Assignment of Error 2: The trial court erred in finding Mr. El guilty on a no contest plea because the indictment, bill of particulars, and, statement of facts show that the charges violate both on its face and as applied the right to keep and bear arms under US Con. Amend. II, US Con. Amend. XIV, and, Ohio Con. Art. I. Tr. Passim. Assignment of Error 3: Mr. El was denied effective assistance of counsel under US Con. Amend VI, US Con. Amend XIV, and, Ohio Con. Art. I. Tr. Passim. Finding no merit to any of El’s assignments of error, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. III. Analysis A. First Assignment of Error In his first assignment of error, El contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. “An appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Byrd, 2022-Ohio-4635, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. This court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Byrd at ¶ 14, citing State v. Preztak, 2009-Ohio-621, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.); State v. Taylor, 2026-Ohio-1041, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). This court will then “independently determine, as a matter of law, whether the applicable legal standard has been satisfied.” State v. Moore, 2014-Ohio-2979, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 2014-Ohio-496 (8th Dist.). The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” and is enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution contains language almost identical to the Fourth Amendment. It generally affords Ohioans the same protections against unreasonable searches and seizures in felony cases. State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 245 (1997) (holding “that Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution affords protections that are coextensive with those provided by the Fourth Amendment”).2 “‘Evidence obtained by the State in violation of these constitutional provisions must be suppressed from use by the State in its criminal prosecution of the person from whom it was seized.’” State v. Taylor, 2026-Ohio- 1041, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Baker, 2007-Ohio-5450, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). 2 The Ohio Supreme Court has found that the Ohio Constitution provides more robust protections than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in certain contexts, but none that are relevant here. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 2015-Ohio-2438 (holding that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment against searches and seizures made by law enforcement personnel who lack authority to make an arrest); State v. Brown, 2003-Ohio-3931 (holding that Ohio Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment against warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors).  1. Classifying the Police Encounter Interactions between police and individuals can fall into three distinct categories: 1) a consensual encounter, 2) a brief investigatory stop or detention, or 3) an arrest. State v. Parrish, 2023-Ohio-3356, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Thomas, 2011-Ohio-1292, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). See also State v. Millerton, 2015-Ohio-34, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 2010-Ohio-2854, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.). The trial court characterized the officers’ interaction with El as a consensual encounter. The analysis will begin with the officers’ decision to approach El’s stopped vehicle. This court has explained: In a consensual encounter, police practices such as approaching a person in a public place, engaging the person in conversation, requesting information, examining one’s identification, and requesting to search a person’s belongings are permissible, and Fourth Amendment guarantees are not implicated in such encounters. State v. Hicks, 2023-Ohio-4126, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Jackson, 2022- Ohio-187, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.). “These encounters remain consensual as long as the police officer, by physical force or show of authority, has not restrained the person’s liberty such that a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away.” Id., citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16 (1968) (“[N]ot all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”).  Accordingly, “when a police officer merely approaches and questions persons seated within parked vehicles, a consensual encounter occurs that does not constitute a seizure so as to require reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts.” State v. Franklin, 2014-Ohio-1422, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). Here, as in Franklin, the officers “did not pull over appellant, nor did they activate their overhead lights when they stopped their patrol vehicle.” Franklin at ¶ 15. There was nothing indicating that officers had ordered El to step out of his vehicle. The body- camera footage reflects that he was already outside the automobile as Officer Selleny and his partner approached him. State v. Robinson, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4023 (12th Dist. Sept. 8, 1997), is also instructive. In that case, the Twelfth District held that there was no seizure at the time an officer approached the defendant’s vehicle and made inquiries. It was shortly after midnight, and the vehicle was parked in the lot of a restaurant that had by that time closed for business. The Robinson Court found that the initial contact was a consensual encounter, not a stop or seizure implicating Fourth Amendment rights and requiring reasonable suspicion. The facts here, at least as to the officers’ initial approach, are similar to those in Robinson. It was nearly midnight. El was parked in an alley. Indeed, the alley was not adjacent to a business that had simply closed for the evening, as in Robinson, but to the permanently closed juvenile detention center. Officer Selleny approached the vehicle and first asked, “What’s up, man? You chillin’?”  In this case, however, our independent review of the body-camera footage suggests that even if the interaction began as consensual, it quickly ceased being so. Immediately following his greeting, while observing El near the driver’s side door of the vehicle, Officer Selleny took on a commanding tone. He twice told El to “step away from the car.” He then directed El to “step to the front” of the car. Officer Selleny testified that this was “a safety request” based upon the location, the poor lighting conditions, and his personal experiences involving firearm-related crime in the area and stolen Kia vehicles. (Tr. 27.) Even crediting Officer Selleny’s testimony that his commands were driven by concerns for officer safety, however, they were precisely that — commands. And the repeated commands were issued in an authoritative tone that left little doubt that compliance was required. This constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Hurtt, 2018- Ohio-1263, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.) (holding that directive “to step to the front of the vehicle, for officer safety . . . constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment”). The Hurtt Court distinguished the facts in that case from State v. Blankenship, 2014-Ohio-3600 (4th Dist.), in which “the trial court found that the officer phrased his statement as a request.” (Emphasis added.) Hurtt at ¶ 23. The Hurtt Court deferred to the trial court’s conclusion, based on the trial court’s observation of the officer’s testimony, that the officer “phrased his statement to Hurtt directing him to get out of the vehicle and move to the front of the vehicle as an order.” Id. at ¶ 24.  In the present case, even though the trial court found Officer Selleny’s testimony credible and characterized the interaction as “a consensual encounter,” it did not directly address Officer Selleny’s twice-repeated command that El step away from the car or his command that El move to the front of the vehicle. Furthermore, unlike the Fourth District when it decided Blankenship and Hurtt, the body-camera footage is available for review. Despite any deference to the trial court’s factual findings in a suppression hearing, particularly as to credibility, this court may independently review body-camera footage. See, e.g., Cleveland v. McClairn, 2026- Ohio-3641, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). “[T]he test for existence of a ‘show of authority’ is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person.” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991). Officer Selleny’s directive was not a request, but an order. Moreover, Officer Selleny testified that there were four officers on scene, in two vehicles, and that they coordinated their approach. The body-camera footage suggests that El’s vehicle was boxed in by the two police patrol cars, with one patrol car in front and the other behind. Even if the encounter began as consensual, it quickly became an investigative detention. Therefore, the focus now shifts to reasonable suspicion. 2. Reasonable Suspicion for the Investigative Detention Fourth Amendment protections “extend to brief investigative stops that fall short of traditional arrests.” State v. Hairston, 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 9, citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). “An officer may conduct such a stop, i.e., a Terry stop, when he or she ‘has a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal behavior has occurred or is imminent.’” State v. Shabazz, 2026-Ohio-3630, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), quoting Hairston at ¶ 9, citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. “Reasonable suspicion is a standard less demanding than one for probable cause in quantity and content, as well as reliability.” State v. Hallowell, 2026-Ohio-1036, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Muldrow, 2016-Ohio-4774, ¶ 24 (10th Dist.), citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). See also Hairston at ¶ 10 (“The reasonable-suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable- cause standard used when analyzing an arrest.”). “To justify a stop based on reasonable suspicion, the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (Cleaned up.) Shabazz at ¶ 29. See also McClairn at ¶ 10, citing State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.3d 58, 60 (1990). “The determination whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop must be based on the totality of circumstances ‘viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.’” Hairston at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991). See also McClairn, 2026-Ohio-3641, at ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). Furthermore, “[a]n assessment of the totality of the circumstances ‘does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.’” Hairston at ¶ 10, quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). An appellate court must “consider the cumulative facts ‘not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.’” Hairston at ¶ 10, quoting Cortez at 418. Accordingly, it is erroneous to “focus[] on individual factors in isolation rather than on the totality of the circumstances.” Hairston, 2019-Ohio- 1622, at ¶ 15, citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. “The reasonable-suspicion determination must be ‘based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.’” (Emphasis in original.) Hairston at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 19. When the totality of the circumstances are considered, the investigatory detention of El was supported by reasonable suspicion. Officer Selleny testified, and body-camera footage confirmed, that it was nearly midnight when officers approached El’s vehicle. That vehicle, a Kia, was not parked in a lot or on the street, but in a dark, dead-end alley. It was not parked near a home or business, but rather adjacent to the fenced-off, decommissioned juvenile detention center. In other words, it was “not typically a place that people park or have any reason to necessarily be hanging out that late at night.” (Tr. 20.) Officer Selleny testified to his own personal experience of “dealing with a rash of Kia thefts.” (Tr. 18.) He testified that he “personally [had] recovered numerous stolen vehicles, including Kias, in and around” the area where El was parked. (Tr. 18.) The trial court found Officer Selleny’s testimony credible.  Moreover, Officer Selleny’s explanation was not a post hoc justification raised for the first time at the suppression hearing. On the body-camera footage, Officer Selleny can clearly be heard telling El, “So the only reason why we’re even having these conversations right now is that there’s a lot of stolen cars over here, and this is a Kia.” See, e.g., State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 292 (1980) (finding reasonable suspicion and noting, inter alia, that officer “explained to appellant that he had stopped him due to the fact that there had been much theft and criminal damage in the parking lot lately”). “An officer’s experience with criminal activity in an area and an area’s reputation for criminal activity are factors” the Ohio Supreme Court has “found relevant to the reasonable-suspicion analysis.” Hairston, 2019-Ohio-1622, at ¶ 12, citing Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d at 88, and State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 179 (1988). Officer Selleny was “‘not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of [the] location in determining whether the circumstances [were] sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.’” Hairston at ¶ 15, quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). See also Shabazz, 2026-Ohio-3630, at ¶ 33 (8th Dist.) (holding that even where officer “did not observe any overt criminal behavior,” factors including officer’s knowledge of prior criminal activity at location could “combine[] to create reasonable suspicion of drug activity”). Even the time of night — for example, the fact that it was “after dark” — is “another circumstance” the Ohio Supreme Court has “found to be of some significance in the reasonable- suspicion analysis.” Hairston at ¶ 12, citing Bobo at 179.  In Freeman, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the “specific and articulable facts supporting” reasonable suspicion included: (1) the location of the investigation being a high crime area; (2) the officer being quite aware of recent criminal activity in the motel parking lot in which appellant was parked; (3) the time of night being 3:00 a.m.; and (4) the appellant sitting alone in the car at the rear of the building for approximately 20 minutes with the engine turned off. Freeman at 295. Under such circumstances, “the officer was only performing his police duties in a conscientious manner,” and “[i]t is contra to the very nature of the duty of an officer to patrol in a high crime area and to be oblivious to such aforementioned facts.” Id. In the present case, considering the totality of the circumstances as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable police officer, the cumulative facts rose to the level of reasonable suspicion. Officer Selleny testified to his personal knowledge that this was a high-crime area and that Kias were commonly stolen. It was very late at night. The vehicle was backed into a dead-end alley. This justified commencing an investigatory detention. Indeed, Officer Selleny’s unrebutted testimony, which the trial court found credible, is bolstered by the explanation El himself provided for his presence. Assuming El was being truthful with the officers, this precise location — immediately adjacent to a fenced-off, decommissioned public building — was so prone to mischief that R-CAP was contracted to provide late-night armed security there. It would be illogical to conclude that patrol officers lacked reasonable suspicion to investigate when they observed, at nearly midnight, an unmarked vehicle of a type typically stolen parked in exactly that spot. 3. Firearm Questions Prior to Miranda Advisements The investigatory detention began in earnest when Officer Selleny asked El what he was doing. El responded that he was “doing security here.” He then asked El for identification. No Terry pat-down occurred at this juncture, and El was not handcuffed. It does not appear that any officer drew his or her firearm. Officer Selleny did, however, briefly ask El whether he had a gun on him, to which El responded, “I mean, well, yeah, I’m an armed security officer.” These questions occurred before El was read his rights under Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court established procedural safeguards for securing the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the privilege against self- incrimination applies to a witness in a state proceeding. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). “A similar privilege is recognized in Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.” Cleveland v. Oles, 2017-Ohio-5834, ¶ 8. Miranda warnings are designed to protect a suspect from coercive pressure during a custodial interrogation. Miranda at 444. “A custodial interrogation is ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’” Oles at ¶ 9, quoting Miranda at 444. “If a suspect provides responses while in custody without having first been informed of his or her Miranda rights, the responses may not be admitted at trial as evidence of guilt.” Oles at ¶ 9, citing Miranda at 479. Here, assuming that El was not free to leave, the scenario was akin to a traffic stop. “But ‘not free to leave’ and ‘in custody’ are distinct concepts.” Oles at ¶ 30. “For purposes of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the test is not whether the individual feels free to leave but whether the situation ‘exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.’” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 437. “The relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood himself or herself to be in custody.” Oles at ¶ 33. Here, the totality of the circumstances indicates that El was not in custody when Officer Selleny asked whether he had a gun. While Officer Selleny had ordered El to move to the front of his car, he was not subject to a pat-down or other search. He was not handcuffed. He was not told that he was under arrest. He was not told that his vehicle was about to be searched. The officers had not activated their emergency lights. Nor was El placed in a police cruiser. “During a brief investigatory stop, without placing the suspect in custody or under arrest, an officer is entitled to ask questions to confirm his suspicions that criminal activity occurred.” Millerton, 2015-Ohio-34, at ¶ 23 (2d Dist.). For example, “an officer can ask for identification or sufficient information to write a citation or to run a background check for outstanding warrants, often called a ‘field investigation.’” Id., citing State v. Wortham, 145 Ohio App.3d 126, 131 (2d Dist. 2001). Moreover, “it is permissible for a police officer to ask someone stopped for a traffic violation if he is armed, even absent a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and presents a danger to the officer or others.” State v. Brown, 2012-Ohio-5532, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Lenoir, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2494 (2d Dist. June 6, 1997). “Although any search for weapons must be based on reasonable, articulable suspicion that a weapon is present, ‘a simple inquiry as to whether the person stopped has a weapon is not a search or a seizure.’” Brown at ¶ 11, quoting Lenoir at *7. “[O]fficers have a legitimate concern for their safety when conducting traffic stops.” Brown at ¶ 11. Here, the simple inquiry into whether El had a weapon was not a search or seizure. Indeed, this is not a case where Officer Selleny (or any other officer on scene) had initiated a Terry pat-down, and El was not yet handcuffed. The body-camera footage reflects that he was wearing a zippered top that not only fully covered his waistband but extended to approximately mid-thigh. Officer Selleny testified that in the interest of officer safety, he asked whether El had any weapons. Even though this question preceded any Miranda warnings, it did not violate El’s Fifth Amendment rights. Even putting aside officer safety, El was not in police custody at this point. “As occurred in this case, the detainee’s response to such a question may provide the reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is armed.” Brown at ¶ 12. Here, El responded “yeah” to whether he had a weapon, affirmatively stated that he was an “armed security officer,” and appeared to gesture towards the vehicle. Officer Krokos later asked El whether his firearm was in the vehicle, to which he responded, “Yeah.” After running El’s information through OHLEG, Officer Selleny asked El whether the gun in the vehicle was his. These inquiries into the location of the gun and ownership of the gun were likewise posed before El was formally arrested; El was not subjected to a custodial interrogation when Officer Krokos and Officer Selleny asked him those questions. Reiterating again, El was standing outside the vehicle. He was not handcuffed. He was not placed in a police cruiser. He had not been subjected to a pat-down. He was not told that he or his vehicle would be searched. This was, again, the functional equivalent of a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion.3 “[A]n ordinary traffic stop is analogous to a Terry stop rather than a formal arrest, and ‘persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda.’” Boone at ¶ 37, quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). “The custody inquiry is objective,” and “Miranda attaches only when ‘freedom of action is curtailed to a “degree associated with formal arrest.”’” Boone at ¶ 38, quoting Berkemer at 440, quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). 3 “There are two types of valid traffic stops: (1) where police have probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring and (2) where police have reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred.” State v. McMillon, 2019-Ohio- 2716, ¶ 11 (7th Dist.), citing inter alia, Terry, 392 U.S. 1. See also State v. Boone, 2026- Ohio-3900, ¶ 43 (7th Dist.).  Roadside questioning is noncustodial where “(1) the intrusion is minimal, (2) the questioning and detention are brief, and (3) the interaction is nonthreatening or nonintimidating.” Oles, 2017-Ohio-5834, at ¶ 24. Applying those factors here, the questioning of El prior to his formal arrest, including officer inquiries into whether the firearm was in the vehicle and ownership of the firearm, was noncustodial. First, the officers approached El’s vehicle but did not activate their lights or sirens. They did not conduct a pat-down of El or handcuff him. They did not indicate that they wanted to search him or his vehicle. The intrusion was therefore minimal. See Oles at ¶ 26. Second, the questioning and detention were brief. Indeed, the entire interaction preceding El’s arrest occurred in fewer than six minutes. In the body- camera footage, Officer Selleny exits his police cruiser at approximately the 28- second mark. He arrests El at approximately the four-minute and 23-second mark. In other words, the prearrest encounter lasted just under four minutes. Officer Selleny spent most of that time performing database searches. His partner’s body- camera footage indicates that during that time El casually conversed with other officers concerning the nature of his security work, explaining, for example, that the site was prone to trespass by urban explorers’ intent on recording videos for YouTube. Third, and finally, the interaction was nonthreatening and nonintimidating. As in Oles, El “was not handcuffed” and “[t]here is no indication that the questioning was overly repetitive or that [El] objected to any of the [officer’s] requests or questions.” Id. at ¶ 28. “This differs from the kind of interrogation — designed to pressure a suspect to confess to illegal conduct — that was of particular concern to the Supreme Court in Miranda.” Id. Indeed, unlike Oles, El was not questioned while sitting in a police patrol car. Moreover, even if Officer Selleny’s question as to ownership of the firearm was designed to elicit an incriminating admission from El, this does not change the outcome of our analysis. Boone, 2026-Ohio-3900 (7th Dist.), concerned a traffic stop for slow speed and marked lane violations. The officer advised Boone of the reason for the stop, requested Boone’s license and insurance, asked where Boone was coming from, and also asked whether he had been drinking. The officer conceded in his testimony “that he already suspected impairment and viewed the questions as part of his OVI investigation.” Boone at ¶ 40. The Seventh District concluded that this “does not create custody, because the officer’s unarticulated plan is irrelevant to the objective inquiry. . . . [Boone] was not arrested until after the field sobriety tests,” and his “pre-arrest statements [were] therefore admissible.” Id., citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441-442. See also State v. Montgomery, 2022- Ohio-4030, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.) (“As clearly established in Berkemer, an officer’s unarticulated intent to arrest an offender has no bearing on whether a suspect was in custody.”). El was then unequivocally placed under arrest, handcuffed, and read his Miranda rights. His answer to whether he understood those rights was inaudible, but Officer Selleny’s sole additional question concerned the location of the firearm in the vehicle, which Officer Selleny asked while shining a flashlight into the driver’s side window. El responded that the gun was und