State v. Boykin

[Cite as State v. Boykin, 2026-Ohio-4432.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PORTAGE COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-P-0082 Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas RAUSHANAH T. BOYKIN, Trial Court No. 2023 CR 01175 Defendant-Appellant. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Decided: November 9, 2026 Judgment: Affirmed Connie J. Lewandowski, Portage County Prosecutor, and Vincent V. Vigluicci, Assistant Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). Eric R. Fink, 11 South River Street, Kent, OH 44240 (For Defendant-Appellant). ROBERT J. PATTON, J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Raushanah T. Boykin (“Boykin”), appeals the judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas sentencing her to a 14-month prison term following a jury trial where she was convicted of two counts of assault of a law enforcement officer. {¶2} On appeal, Boykin argues that her conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence, that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Crim.R. 12.2 notice of self-defense. {¶3} Upon review, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found the elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury’s verdict did not create a manifest miscarriage of justice as to require a new trial. Even assuming trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to file an appropriate notice of self-defense pursuant to Crim.R. 12.2, Boykin cannot demonstrate prejudice. Viewing the evidence most favorably to her, Boykin was not entitled to a self-defense instruction as a matter of law as the uncontroverted evidence presented at trial established that Boykin caused the physical altercation. {¶4} Accordingly, the judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Substantive and Procedural Facts {¶5} A Portage County Grand Jury indicted Boykin on two counts of assault of a law enforcement officer, fourth-degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2903.13. Boykin pleaded not guilty to the charges and proceeded to a trial by jury. The following testimony was presented at trial. {¶6} Toni Olsen (“Olsen”) was the property manager for Shady Lake Apartments (“Shady Lake”) in the City of Streetsboro. Olsen explained that during her experience with Shady Lake, tenants were required to pay rent on the first day of each month. If, however, a tenant failed to pay by the fifth day of the month, she would tape a three-day notice on the door of the respective unit to begin the process of evicting the tenant. If rent remained unpaid after the three-day notice period, an action would be filed against that tenant in court. {¶7} Beginning in March 2023, Boykin’s sister, Rajah Boykin (“Rajah”), leased Shady Lake apartment E-205 with her boyfriend, Horatio Hullett (“Hullett”), and agreed to PAGE 2 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082 pay $1,230 per month in rent. In August 2023, Rajah and Hullett failed to pay the rent, so Olsen taped a three-day notice to the door in accordance with Shady Lake policy. {¶8} At the end of the three-day period, because Rajah and Hullett continued to occupy the premises without having paid the rent, Shady Lake apartments filed an eviction action against them. After successfully obtaining a writ of restitution in court, Portage County Sheriff’s deputies arrived on scene to move the occupants out on October 18, 2023. No one opened the door for police, and a master key had to be used for entry. Upon entering, Hullett vacated the premises with two young children, but Rajah refused to exit. Instead, Rajah was upset and began verbally arguing with the officers. {¶9} Siera Hahn (“Hahn”) was employed with Shady Lake on the date of the incident and was training to become a property manager. Hahn testified that Boykin also lived at Shady Lake in a different building with her mother. A few minutes into arguing with the officers, Hahn testified that Boykin arrived and was calm, quiet, and acting like a normal sister coming to see what was going on. Hahn stated that Boykin’s presence did not bring any indication that things would soon escalate. {¶10} Eventually, Hahn testified that both sisters exited the apartment. However, Boykin wanted to go back inside to get a pair of shoes for Rajah. Hahn testified that Deputy Seth Slabaugh (“Deputy Slabaugh”) was blocking the doorway refusing to permit Boykin back inside, and in response, Hahn stated that Boykin raised her elbow and punched Deputy Slabaugh on the right side of his face with a closed fist. Hahn testified that Deputy Slabaugh took Boykin to the ground and was punching her while Boykin kicked at him. Hahn hid in a nearby closet during the altercation and did not believe Boykin acted in self-defense. PAGE 3 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082  {¶11} Olsen was present when law enforcement arrived, but she did not enter the apartment. Although Olsen testified that she heard yelling, prompting her to move away from the area and hide in a closet, Olsen was not close enough to see or hear what was happening.1 Olsen remained unaware of the situation or who the aggressor was. {¶12} Kenneth Seeley (“Seeley”) was the maintenance supervisor at Shady Lake. Seeley was present during the move out as he was tasked with changing the locks on the apartment once the occupants were removed. Seeley testified that the women were screaming swear words at the officers on scene, and he saw the female resident of E- 205 draw back, hit one of the officers, and run back inside the apartment. Seeley testified that the other female jumped on the officer’s back from behind and began punching him. Seeley was unable to identify either of the women on scene by name and used the names “Raushanah,” “Rajah,” and “Jaylenne2” interchangeably, and sometimes referred to the women as “the younger sister” and “the older sister.3” {¶13} Deputy Slabaugh testified he was training on the date of the incident, and Deputy Mark Bacon (“Deputy Bacon”) was his field officer. Deputy Slabaugh, assisting with the eviction, testified that when Rajah and Boykin exited the apartment, he stood in the doorway preventing them from going back inside. Body camera footage was played depicting Boykin attempting re-entry for a pair of shoes. Deputy Slabaugh testified that he put his hands on Boykin’s shoulders to prevent her reentry, and Deputy Slabaugh then 1. Olsen had previously provided a written statement to law enforcement that she saw Boykin hit one of the law enforcement officers on scene. However, she admitted at trial that she did not actually see this happen, and “[t]hat’s why [she] changed it.” 2. There is no such person named “Jaylenne” as relevant to this case. It is unclear from the record who the witness was referring to or otherwise believed “Jaylenne” to be. The parties at trial were unsure whether “Jaylenne” referred to a male or female, and the witness could not provide any meaningful clarification. 3. Despite referring to them as such, the witness articulated that he was unaware which sister was older and younger. The witness also claimed that, due to the passage of time, he could not tell which sister was sitting at the defense table in the courtroom. PAGE 4 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082 testified that Boykin punched the left side of his face two or three times landing in the temple area. {¶14} Deputy Slabaugh testified that he shoved Boykin away, causing her to fall to the ground. Immediately, Deputy Slabaugh attempted to apprehend Boykin on the ground. Boykin was not compliant, was kicking at Deputy Slabaugh, and was otherwise resisting arrest. Deputy Slabaugh admitted he “struck [Boykin] multiple times in the face as to try to get compliance from her.” Deputy Slabaugh was holding his metal handcuffs in his hands as he was striking Boykin in the face. {¶15} Boykin continued kicking and screaming before Rajah interjected to separate the two. Deputy Slabaugh testified that he was kicked in the groin during the melee. Officers then attempted to arrest Boykin, but she once again became non- compliant, prompting Deputy Bacon to tase her. Boykin was then apprehended and taken to University Hospitals for medical clearance and the removal of taser probes. {¶16} At the hospital, Boykin got into her purse and began using her cellphone. Deputy Slabaugh informed Boykin that she was under arrest, not permitted to use her phone at that time, and needed to give him the device. Deputy Slabaugh testified that this was standard policy for officer safety. Boykin ignored the command and continued using her phone. While attempting to grab the phone out of Boykin’s hand, Deputy Slabaugh accidentally knocked over Boykin’s purse. Deputy Slabaugh, after grabbing the phone, turned his back to Boykin to pick up the purse, and Boykin kicked Deputy Slabaugh from behind. Deputy Bacon, who was also present at the hospital, shouted at Boykin that “you just kicked him again, that’s another charge.” On the video footage, Boykin can be heard laughing in response. PAGE 5 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082  {¶17} At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Boykin guilty on both counts of assault on a law enforcement officer. Following a presentence investigation, the trial court imposed a 14-month prison term. The Appeal {¶18} Boykin timely appeals and raises three assignments of error for review: [1.] Ms. Boykin’s convictions for assault are not supported by sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. [2.] Ms. Boykin’s conviction[s] for assault are against the manifest weight of the evidence. [3.] Trial counsel prejudiced Ms. Boykin by failing to properly assert a claim of self-defense according to Crim.R. 12.2. {¶19} As each of Boykin’s three assignments of error rely, in part, on self-defense, Boykin’s three assignments of error will be addressed together. In her first assignment of error, Boykin argues that the State failed to prove she “knowingly” attempted to cause physical harm to Deputy Slabaugh as the assaults could not have actually caused Deputy Slabaugh harm and the record better supports her self-defense contention. She further asserts that the second assault, occurring at the hospital, was “physically impossible.” {¶20} In her second assignment of error, Boykin contends that her convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence as the witnesses had differing accounts of the events, and the police body camera did not show Boykin throw the first punch. {¶21} In her third assignment of error, Boykin argues that she was denied effective assistance of counsel as her trial counsel failed to file a notice of self-defense pursuant to Crim.R. 12.2. We disagree with each of these propositions. PAGE 6 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082  Manifest Weight and Sufficiency {¶22} On appeal, where an appellant challenges both the sufficiency and the manifest weight of the State’s evidence, the appellate court need only address the manifest weight argument. State v. Dykes, 2023-Ohio-4378, ¶ 6 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Masters, 2020-Ohio-864, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.). The determination that a verdict is not against the manifest weight necessarily includes a finding that the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. Id. {¶23} “[W]eight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief.” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 24. “‘The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). {¶24} “The choice between credible witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of fact and an appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123 (1986), citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77 (1984); Henkle v. Salem Mfg. Co., 39 Ohio St. 547 (1883); accord State v. Huertas-Alicia, 2024-Ohio-2214, ¶ 51 (11th Dist.). In other words, “[a]ppellate courts ‘should not reverse a decision simply because it holds a different opinion concerning the credibility of the witnesses and evidence submitted before the trial court….’” Stiles v. Bugno, 2024-Ohio-1262, ¶ 82 (7th Dist.), quoting Seasons Coal Co. at 81. “It is well established that the jury is in the best PAGE 7 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082 position to weigh the evidence placed before it.” State v. Dubois, 2024-Ohio-6115, ¶ 77 (11th Dist.). {¶25} “‘When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “‘thirteenth juror’” and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.’” Id. ¶ 68, quoting Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). However, this court may only sit as the thirteenth juror “when evidence contradicts a fact-finder’s findings . . . or when a witness’s testimony is so inconsistent as to material facts, so impeached, or so fantastical as to make it patently unbelievable.” State v. Reillo, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 3, citing State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26. Therefore, “‘[t]he discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel {¶26} “To obtain a reversal of a conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceeding.” State v. Madrigal, 2000-Ohio-448, ¶ 49, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). Self-Defense {¶27} Crim.R. 12.2 provides in part, “[w]henever a defendant in a criminal case proposes to offer evidence or argue self-defense . . . the defendant shall, not less than PAGE 8 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082 thirty days before trial in a felony case . . . give notice in writing of such intent . . . If the defendant fails to file such written notice, the court may exclude evidence offered by the defendant related to the defense, unless the court determines that in the interest of justice such evidence should be admitted.” {¶28} R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) states that “[a] person is allowed to act in self-defense . . . If, at the trial of a person who is accused of an offense that involved the person’s use of force against another, there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused person used the force in self-defense . . . the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense.” {¶29} “Self-defense is an affirmative defense.” State v. Wood, 1996 WL 649132, *6 (11th Dist. June 21, 1996). “Self-defense seeks to relieve the defendant from culpability rather than to negate an element of the offense charged.” State v. Petway, 2020-Ohio- 3848, ¶ 46 (11th Dist.). {¶30} In the context of private citizens using force against law enforcement officers, the Supreme Court of Ohio has modified the generalized statutory standard. “In the absence of excessive or unnecessary force by an arresting officer, a private citizen may not use force to resist arrest by one he knows, or has good reason to believe, is an authorized police officer engaged in the performance of his duties, whether or not the arrest is illegal under the circumstances.” State v. Newsome, 2005-Ohio-3775, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.), quoting Columbus v. Fraley, 41 Ohio St.2d 173, 180 (1975). {¶31} Where the evidence demonstrates a defendant is entitled to a self-defense jury instruction, trial counsel is prejudicially ineffective in failing to request that instruction. State v. Wilson, 2024-Ohio-776, ¶ 29. Failing to preserve a defense that would insulate a PAGE 9 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082 criminal defendant from liability is an omission that could not be considered a trial tactic. State v. Smith, 2025-Ohio-311, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Kole, 2001-Ohio-191, ¶ 17. Thus, in this context, the prejudice prong is governed by an analysis of whether Boykin was legally entitled to a self-defense instruction on the facts presented had her counsel filed the appropriate notice. {¶32} To be entitled to a self-defense instruction, there must be “evidence presented that tends to support that the accused person used the force in self-defense.” State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 20, quoting R.C. 2901.05(B)(1). Whether a defendant has met the burden of production is subject to a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard of review. Id. at ¶ 26. Therefore, “if the defendant’s evidence and any reasonable inferences about that evidence would allow a rational trier of fact to find all the elements of a self-defense claim when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, then the defendant has satisfied the burden.” Id. at ¶ 25; see State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded on other grounds, State v. Brinkman, 2026-Ohio-3190 (“The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the [defendant], any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the [defense] proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”) {¶33} The Supreme Court of Ohio has articulated that a self-defense claim is comprised of three elements: (1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide belief that he [or she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his [or her] only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force; and PAGE 10 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082  (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. Messenger at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Barnes, 2002-Ohio-68, ¶ 11. {¶34} Here, Boykin’s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Boykin claims that she did not act “knowingly” and that several witnesses failed to identify her at trial. This inconsistent position necessarily fails. “[A] defendant claiming self-defense concedes he had the purpose to commit the act.” State v. Krug, 2009-Ohio- 3815, ¶ 104 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Barnd, 85 Ohio App.3d 254, 260 (3d Dist. 1993). Boykin acted “knowingly” as “it is understood that punching, hitting, stomping, and kicking will ‘probably cause [serious physical harm] or will probably be of [that] nature.’” (Bracketed text in original.) State v. Stafford, 2025-Ohio-5773, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.), quoting R.C. 2901.22(B); accord State v. Hadlock, 2021-Ohio-3176, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Pigg, 2013-Ohio-4722, ¶ 33 (2d Dist.) (“‘punching someone’ is sufficient to establish the element of ‘knowingly’ for purposes of the assault statutes.”) {¶35} While the testimony of the Shady Lake employees contained some inconsistencies, “a defendant is not entitled to a reversal on manifest weight grounds merely because inconsistent evidence was offered at trial.” State v. Teagarden, 2008- Ohio-6986, ¶ 112 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Campbell, 2008-Ohio-4831, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.). Under a manifest-weight standard, “the sole testimony of the victim can support a conviction.” State v. Waskelis, 2012-Ohio-3030, ¶ 46 (11th Dist.), citing In re N.Z., 2011- Ohio-6845, ¶ 79 (11th Dist.). {¶36} With respect to Boykin’s argument that it was “physically impossible” for her to kick Deputy Slabaugh from behind, the video evidence belies her claim. While Deputy Slabaugh was standing face-to-face with Boykin while attempting to grab her phone, he PAGE 11 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082 turned his back to her when picking her purse up from the floor. At the time of that second assault, Boykin was facing toward Deputy Slabaugh as he was faced away from her. While the video does not show Boykin’s conduct, it is clear from Deputy Bacon’s prompt and contemporaneous statement “you just kicked him again, that’s another charge.” Therefore, the jury’s conclusion in this case does not amount to a manifest injustice warranting a new trial. {¶37} “[T]he officers’ body cameras carry great weight.” Cleveland v. King, 2025- Ohio-3067, ¶ 84 (8th Dist.), appeal not accepted, 2025-Ohio-5078. We recognize that “the jury is in the best position to weigh the evidence placed before it.” Dubois, 2024- Ohio-6115, at ¶ 77 (11th Dist.). Like the jury, this court viewed the body camera footage and observed Boykin’s conduct. Taken alongside Deputy Slabaugh’s testimony, we agree with the jury’s resolution of any conflicting accounts. This is not the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, at ¶ 25, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175. As Boykin’s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence, they are necessarily supported by sufficient evidence. Dykes, 2023-Ohio-4378, at ¶ 6 (11th Dist.), quoting Masters, 2020-Ohio-864, at ¶ 17 (11th Dist.). {¶38} With respect to Boykin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, resting on the premise that Deputy Slabaugh used excessive force, chronology of the events is critical. Boykin’s argument ignores the entirety of the preceding events. After Boykin and Rajah finally exited the apartment, Boykin attempted to push her way back inside. Hahn testified that after Deputy Slabaugh denied reentry, Boykin raised her elbow and punched Deputy Slabaugh in the face. Indeed, the body camera footage showed Boykin raise her PAGE 12 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082 elbow. Deputy Slabaugh testified that he was punched in the face. Following the punch, Boykin was taken to the ground where she began kicking Deputy Slabaugh, who was attempting to arrest her. Deputy Slabaugh testified that while Boykin was kicking him, she had kicked him in the groin. {¶39} Only after Boykin engaged in this conduct did Deputy Slabaugh strike Boykin in the face, attempting to gain her compliance. Furthermore, Deputy Slabaugh already had his handcuffs in his hand as he was trying to arrest Rajah. Boykin’s conduct distracted from that goal, leading to her own arrest instead of Rajah’s. Therefore, it was Boykin’s own conduct that prompted the force she complains of. Force used by an officer in response to being assaulted does not retroactively create a defendant’s right to claim self-defense with respect to the assault that prompted such force. See State v. Ferrell, 2020-Ohio-6879, ¶ 30 (10th Dist.) (holding that finding oneself “outmatched” after creating an altercation does not restore one’s right to assert self-defense “for a situation [s]he created”); accord State v. Staley, 2021-Ohio-3086, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.) (“where a defendant’s resistance precipitates an officer’s use of force, the defendant cannot successfully assert the defense of excessive force”). {¶40} Thus, the uncontroverted evidence at trial established that Boykin was “at fault in creating the situation leading to the affray.” Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, at ¶ 14, quoting Barnes, 2002-Ohio-68, at ¶ 11. As Boykin was at fault, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to her, she was not entitled to a self-defense instruction even if her counsel had filed a Crim.R. 12.2 notice. Accordingly, Boykin cannot demonstrate prejudice. {¶41} Accordingly, Boykin’s three assignments of error are without merit. PAGE 13 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082  Conclusion {¶42} “[P]otentially violent conflicts [are to] be resolved, not in the streets, but in the courts.” Fraley, 41 Ohio St.2d at 180. For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. MATT LYNCH, P.J., SCOTT LYNCH, J., concur. PAGE 14 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082  JUDGMENT ENTRY For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant. JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH, concurs THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. PAGE 15 OF 15 Case No. 2025-P-0082