State v. Calhoun

[Cite as State v. Calhoun, 2026-Ohio-3981.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 2025-CA-37 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 23-CR-089 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas WILLIAM H. CALHOUN : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION ........... Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on October 9, 2026, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24. Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket. For the court, MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.  OPINION CLARK C.A. No. 2025-CA-37 KIMBERLY KENDALL CORRAL, Attorney for Appellant JOHN M. LINTZ, Attorney for Appellee HUFFMAN, J. {¶ 1} William H. Calhoun appeals from a judgment entry of conviction on one count of aggravated murder, two counts of murder, two counts of felonious assault, one count of attempted murder, and one count of improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation, all with firearm specifications, as well as one count each of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises and having weapons while under disability. For the following reasons, the judgment of the Clark County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} Calhoun, who is also known as O.Z., was indicted on the above nine counts and specifications on February 13, 2023. The events giving rise to the charges began in November 2022 when Calhoun shot Janiel Portman, who is also known as Pinhead, at the Wayside Tavern in Springfield. Portman did not cooperate with law enforcement, and Calhoun was not charged. {¶ 3} On February 4, 2023, Calhoun returned to the Wayside Tavern in a Chevy Silverado around 6:00 p.m., and he remained there for six hours. When he left the bar, he was followed by a dark sedan occupied by three men, including Portman and Tyson DeArmond (“Tyson”). Multiple shots were fired from the sedan at Calhoun, and he returned fire. Calhoun eventually lost control of his Silverado, crashed, and fled on foot. Calhoun’s wife, Michael, picked him up after the crash, and the two went to another bar for a short time. Portman and Tyson were apprehended. Tyson’s driver’s license reflected a Liberty Street 2 address, and police learned that the dark sedan occupied by Portman and Tyson belonged to Racquel Fowler, who resided at the same Liberty Street location. {¶ 4} Around 1:30 a.m. on February 5, 2023, Calhoun and his wife received a phone call from Jermaine Fleming, an inmate at the Southeast Correctional Institution. While on the recorded call, they learned that Tyson had been arrested and that Portman was in the hospital. At the end of the call, Calhoun stated, “The update is: I’m going to Racquel’s house and opening her door up.” {¶ 5} Twenty minutes after the call, Calhoun proceeded to Fowler’s home on Liberty Street, where Nakesha DeArmond (Nakesha), Briana DeArmond (Briana), and Christian DeArmond (Christian) were present to celebrate Fowler’s birthday. Calhoun rang the doorbell, and Briana opened the door. Calhoun opened fire inside the home, and then he went outside and shot into the house before fleeing. A 911 call was made from the residence, and when police responded, Calhoun was identified by witnesses as the shooter. Fowler died at the scene, having been shot three times. Christian was also shot but survived. {¶ 6} Calhoun was initially assigned appointed counsel but then retained Attorney R. Over the next several months, the parties filed multiple motions. Relevant to Calhoun’s appeal, on May 24, 2023, the State filed a “suggestion of conflict,” noting that Attorney R. also represented Portman, who had been charged with obstructing official business for fleeing from the police. Calhoun also retained Attorney L. for the limited purpose of advising him about any potential plea offers. On July 7, 2023, a hearing was held on the suggestion of conflict. Calhoun filed a signed waiver of conflict on July 17, 2023, which the court accepted. {¶ 7} On May 19, 2025, at the start of the lengthy jury trial on this matter, the State identified another potential conflict after learning that Attorney R. also represented Christian 3 in an unrelated matter. Calhoun indicated that he was aware of the representation and that he waived any potential conflict, and the court accepted the waiver. {¶ 8} Seventeen witnesses testified for the State, three did so for Calhoun, and the trial court admitted nearly 300 exhibits. The jury found Calhoun guilty of all charges and specifications. On May 25, 2025, he filed a motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, which the trial court overruled. Calhoun was sentenced to an aggregate term of life without parole. He timely appealed. Assignments of Error and Analysis I. Potential Conflicts of Interest {¶ 9} In his first assignment of error, Calhoun argues that the trial court failed to inquire into the nature and extent of potential conflicts of interest arising out of defense counsel’s representation of Portman and Christian. As to Portman, Calhoun argues that the court instructed him to sign the waiver “prior to even hearing the details of the conflict.” He directs our attention to the following trial court statement discussing Attorney L.’s representation: “I think that’s one of the reasons they brought [Attorney L.] in.” According to Calhoun, the identity of “they” was never resolved, “but it was clearly not [Calhoun] as the Court was speaking to [Calhoun].” {¶ 10} Calhoun argues that it is “alarming” that at the hearing Attorney L. requested a sidebar out of Calhoun’s earshot in which Attorney L. stated that he intended to remain on the case. He notes that Attorney L.’s appearance was not mentioned again on the record and that Attorney L.’s name did not appear on any subsequent transcripts. {¶ 11} Calhoun argues that when the State advised the court that the potential conflict with Portman arose from the same matter involving Calhoun, Attorney R. indicated that he represented Portman in “another matter in some other capacity.” Calhoun asserts that 4 Attorney R. stated he was “not adverse” to either client when the issue was instead whether Calhoun’s and Portman’s interests were contrary to each other. Calhoun contends that Attorney R. relied on information derived from his representation of Portman at the hearing, such that further inquiry was required. According to Calhoun, there “is nothing in the record to indicate whether Portman executed a conflict waiver.” Regarding Christian, Calhoun notes that he (Calhoun) initially indicated that he did not want to waive the conflict in response to a question by the court, but that the court “rejected” this answer and again inquired if he wanted to waive the conflict. Calhoun argues that both potential conflicts existed throughout his trial and sentencing. He claims that the trial court failed to inquire as to whom Attorney R. had initially represented and whether Attorney R.’s other clients had executed waivers. Calhoun asserts that the court’s entry “avoids making any finding as to whether there [was] a conflict or whether it [was] waivable.” According to Calhoun, that Portman and Christian did not testify is not dispositive, and the case “must be remanded.” {¶ 12} Calhoun asserts that the record “is entirely void of what facts, law, logic or ethical rules would permit an attorney to be conflict free to offer trial counsel to a defendant in a case where a conflict ethically prohibits that same attorney from counseling as to whether to waive his trial rights to enter a plea.” According to Calhoun, “that [Attorney R.] was conflicted out of plea negotiations is dispositive.” {¶ 13} Calhoun further argues that a “discussion on the record is insufficient if it does not determine the nature of the conflict and its effect.” He asserts that he was informed of only potential conflicts but the “effect of an actual conflict [was] never explained” to him. Calhoun claims that the court’s questioning of him “constitutes neither an admonition of the possible ramifications of conflict nor is it a valid waiver of [his] Sixth Amendment right to conflict free counsel.” Calhoun argues that while he signed a waiver as to Portman, no 5 waiver was signed as to Christian, “and the oral record is ambiguous.” He argues that an abuse of discretion is demonstrated. {¶ 14} Finally, Calhoun argues that actual prejudice occurred. He directs our attention to the bill of particulars, which stated that on February 4, 2023, suspects believed to be Portman and Tyson fired at Calhoun’s vehicle, and that on February 5, 2023, Calhoun attempted to murder Christian. Calhoun contends that the bill of particulars put Attorney R. on notice that Portman was an alleged “suspect” in Calhoun’s case and that Christian was an alleged victim in Calhoun’s case. Calhoun notes that on June 2, 2023, Attorney R. filed a motion to suppress in which an issue was Portman not identifying Calhoun as his assailant at the Wayside Tavern. According to Calhoun, any alleged “harm is not speculative,” because the State’s case-in-chief adduced police testimony identifying Calhoun as Portman’s assailant, which required Attorney R. to call Portman to impeach this evidence, something Attorney R. himself had stated would require disqualification. Calhoun notes that bullet casings found in Fowler’s car (occupied by Portman) matched those found at the scene where gunfire was exchanged between Calhoun’s and Fowler’s vehicles. {¶ 15} Calhoun further states that on April 26, 2023, Attorney R. filed a motion to compel medical and police records related to Christian, and that the motion was never addressed. In the motion, Attorney R. argued that records pertaining to Christian’s injuries were “a crucial part of the Defense,” necessary to adequately prepare for trial, as well as “Brady material.” Calhoun claims that, despite that assertion, after accepting representation of Christian, Attorney R. “ceased all pursuit of these materials which he perceived to be Brady.” Calhoun argues that the “importance of Christian’s testimony to the defense strategy is obvious and apparent but the defense was not in a position to call [Christian] due to his actual conflict.” 6  {¶ 16} “Although fundamental, the right to counsel is not absolute.” State v. Hackney, 2021-Ohio-2064, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Ross, 2018-Ohio-3524, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.). “A defendant has no right to an attorney with a conflict of interest.” Id., citing Ross at ¶ 6. “An actual conflict or even ‘“a showing of a serious potential for conflict”’ will justify a trial court’s removal of a defendant’s counsel of choice.” Id., quoting Ross at ¶ 6, quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988). “This is because trial courts have an ‘“independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.”’” Id., quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006), quoting Wheat at 160. {¶ 17} Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 governs conflicts of interest involving current clients and states: (a) A lawyer’s acceptance or continuation of representation of a client creates a conflict of interest if either of the following applies: (1) the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another current client; (2) there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action for that client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by the lawyer’s own personal interests. (b) A lawyer shall not accept or continue the representation of a client if a conflict of interest would be created pursuant to division (a) of this rule, unless all of the following apply: 7  (1) the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each client; (2) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing; (3) the representation is not precluded by division (c) of this rule. (c) Even if each affected client consents, the lawyer shall not accept or continue the representation if either of the following applies: (1) the representation is prohibited by law; (2) the representation would involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same proceeding. {¶ 18} Comment 38 of the rule states: “Division (c)(2) does not address all nonconsentable conflicts. Some conflicts are nonconsentable because a lawyer cannot represent both clients completely and diligently or both clients cannot give informed consent.” {¶ 19} A conflict of interest “‘involves circumstances in which regard for one duty tends to lead to disregard of another duty, such as when there is representation of multiple clients with incompatible interests.’” State v. Dyer III, 2024-Ohio-3421, ¶ 40 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Hathaway, 2015-Ohio-5488, ¶ 14, citing State v. Gillard, 64 Ohio St.3d 304, 552-553 (1992). “‘A possible conflict of interest exists where the interests of the defendant may diverge at some point, so as to place the attorney under inconsistent duties, but an actual conflict of interest is shown where during the course of the representation the defendants’ interests do diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action.’” (Emphasis in original.) Id., quoting State v. Seals, 2005-Ohio-4837, ¶ 16 8 (2d Dist.), citing Gillard at 552-553. “‘In order to demonstrate an actual conflict of interest based upon what an attorney has failed to do, a defendant must demonstrate that [some] plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic that has sufficient substance to be at least viable might have been pursued but was not undertaken due to the attorney’s conflicting loyalties or interests.’” Id., quoting Hathaway at ¶ 14, citing Gillard at 553. {¶ 20} “‘An attorney representing multiple defendants in criminal proceedings is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop during the course of the trial.’” Dyer III at ¶ 39, quoting Seals at ¶ 14. “‘Where a trial court knows or reasonably should know of an attorney’s possible conflict of interest in the representation of a person charged with a crime, the trial court has an affirmative duty to inquire whether a conflict of interest actually exists.’” State v. McClure, 2015-Ohio-5203, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.), quoting Gillard at 311. {¶ 21} “Trial courts enjoy broad discretion when considering motions to disqualify counsel.” In re E.M.J., 2017-Ohio-1090, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.), citing Phillips v. Haidet, 119 Ohio App.3d 322, 324 (3d Dist. 1997). “‘We review a trial court’s determination regarding a motion to disqualify counsel for an abuse of discretion.’” Id., quoting Avon Lake Mun. Utils. Dept. v. Pfizenmayer, 2008-Ohio-344, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 34, citing State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980). Most instances of abuse of discretion occur when a trial court makes a decision that is unreasonable. State v. Gilbreath, 2022-Ohio-3759, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.), citing AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). “‘A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.’” Id., quoting AAAA Ents. “‘Absent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in making 9 the ruling, its decision must be affirmed.’” State v. Ogletree, 2014-Ohio-3431, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992). 1. Portman {¶ 22} At the start of the thorough hearing regarding the alleged conflict in Attorney R.’s representation of Calhoun and Portman, the court initially asked Attorney L. to explain his role in the matter. Attorney L. stated that he had been retained by Calhoun “to represent him with any potential offers that would be made by the Prosecution in this case and to advise him of any conflict of interest that may be present. That’s the scope of my responsibilities at this time.” {¶ 23} After reviewing Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 (a), the court indicated that “there are ways to get around those conflicts of interest in a matter such as this, that a client could sign a waiver of any potential conflict.” The court stated, “If we would proceed in this matter, I would require Mr. Calhoun to sign a waiver of conflict that would be on record.” The court then read Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(c) to Calhoun and advised him as follows: So, Mr. Calhoun, the concern the Court has and what we want to make sure doesn’t happen is that you never feel like you’re getting the raw end of the deal. I want you, with your representation, to feel like you had every opportunity to present your case, to be heard in your case without any potential conflicts; and I’m going to let the State speak to why they believe there may be a potential conflict. I’m going to give [Attorney R.] an opportunity to speak to why he doesn’t believe there’s conflict, or if he does believe there’s a conflict, why it’s waivable. And then I want to address you and see if you still, after hearing from the State and hearing from your attorney, if you still want [Attorney R.] to represent you. And I think that’s one of the reasons they 10  brought [Attorney L.] in; and again I’m going to let your attorney speak to this, but that [Attorney L.] then could represent you to make sure that if there was some type of an offer made that would put [Attorney R.] in a conflict, that your interest is still being represented. But I want you to be confident in that; and in doing so, I want you to sign a document waiving that; and even with all of that, the Court’s going to have to make a determination of whether or not I believe that there’s a conflict pursuant to [Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(c)] of this that would make it so that [Attorney R.] could not represent you. {¶ 24} Prosecutor S. then advised the court that the State believed that Portman and Tyson shot at Calhoun, and Prosecutor S. was concerned about Attorney R.’s representation of Portman, a potential witness for the State. She stated that negotiations between Attorney R. and each client “would clearly be adverse between the clients,” and if the State called Portman, Attorney R. would not be able to cross-examine him “to any effect.” The prosecutor stated that there was a “substantial risk that the attorney’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out [an] appropriate course of action for each client could be impaired.” The prosecutor noted that independent counsel had to be hired for the purpose of negotiating any plea offers, and she indicated that she did not believe such a conflict was waivable, even with informed consent. Prosecutor S. urged the court to disqualify Attorney R. based on the adverse interests of Calhoun and Portman. The court noted that Portman’s case was being handled in a separate courtroom. {¶ 25} Attorney L. then asked to approach the bench. He stated that he had spoken to the prosecutor two weeks earlier and “no offer ha[d] been made by the State.” Prosecutor H. then advised the court that Attorney L. had just entered his appearance and that the State 11 “wasn’t going to make an offer to someone that wasn’t even representing the client.” He indicated that he had “had discussions” with Attorney R. before Attorney L. became involved. Prosecutor H. stated, “I don’t think that [Attorney L.] can be a straw man for [Attorney R.].” {¶ 26} Attorney L. then told the court: “Your Honor, my client ha[s] independent counsel. It’s directly affecting this case completely. I plan on staying on this case. I am expecting an offer so that I can convey that to my client as an independent [counsel]. I don’t believe [Attorney R.’s] right now able to do that . . . .” The court asked Attorney L. if his entry of appearance had put him “immediately in the same boat as [Attorney R.],” and Attorney L. reiterated that he had been independently retained. Attorney R. advised the court that there “was discussion that there may be an offer coming and I can’t receive it and it was based on that limited conversation, but then [Attorney L.] came into the picture.” The sidebar concluded. {¶ 27} Attorney R. indicated that if Portman were to testify, he could not represent Calhoun and that if Calhoun were to testify against Portman, he could not represent Portman. Attorney R. stated, “[T]hose boundaries are clear.” He advised, “I am not aware of any requests or realistic potential to have any of my clients testify against any of my other clients.” Attorney R. stated that he had received suggestions from the Ethics Committee of the Ohio Supreme Court, and that because there was only a “theoretical possibility” of conflict in terms of testimony, “that would not be enough to disqualify a lawyer from representation, particularly when they have independent counsel to advise them on what their possibilities are.” He argued that there “were safeguards in place with independent counsel.” {¶ 28} Attorney R. stated that the “idea that counsel for the State has not approached [Attorney L.] with any realistic offers for Mr. Calhoun to consider would just demonstrate the 12 theoretical nature of this and not really something that actually exists as far as a conflict.” He read aloud a waiver that he drafted and stated that he went over it with Calhoun. Attorney R. indicated that if “there would be a change of heart of Mr. Calhoun or an offer that’s made that he really just can’t refuse, then I will willingly withdraw and then notify the Court of a clear conflict; but right now we’re at a theoretical stage where the State is simply throwing out a possibility that something may or may not exist . . . .” {¶ 29} In response to a question by the court, Attorney R. stated that if Portman were subpoenaed to testify in Calhoun’s trial, “another hearing needs to be had concerning whether or not it’s realistic that he would be testifying and under what terms; and I don’t think I would be invited to that hearing . . . .” He opined that “the Court has enough notice to know if that date is coming and be able to respond to it.” Attorney R. indicated that he was “not aware of any offer specific or even in general to Mr. Portman,” and that he was able to represent Calhoun to his fullest ability. He stated that if the State made an offer to Attorney L., he did not need to be informed of it, “and [if] there’s negotiations to be worked out, then I will willingly withdraw from the case or not be involved in those discussions, and I don’t think I could represent Mr. Portman at that point either.” {¶ 30} Attorney L. stated that he was awaiting an offer and an opportunity to discuss it with Calhoun and consider any defenses he may have. He indicated that he would represent Calhoun “completely if an offer is made that he accepts” and that he would then “be doing the plea hearing and disposition.” {¶ 31} In response to questions from the court, Calhoun indicated that he understood the proceedings and the basis of the potential conflict and that he wanted Attorney R. to represent him. He further expressed confidence in Attorney L.’s ability to represent him as Attorney L. indicated. 13  {¶ 32} Prosecutor S. then referred the court to Note 38 under Prof.Cond.R. 1.7. She advised that “the State has made overtures with respect to what kind of offer we would be willing to make, but the fact that we cannot make a firm offer is part and parcel of the problem here.” She asked, “[H]ow is [Attorney R.] to go over with Mr. Calhoun Mr. Portman’s role in this incident?” She emphasized that “the facts and circumstances surrounding this case include things done by Mr. Portman.” She indicated that even if Portman did not testify in Calhoun’s case, other witnesses would testify to those facts and circumstances. She described Portman as a “key player in those circumstances.” {¶ 33} Attorney R. responded that Portman had been charged only with obstruction for fleeing from the police and that his and Calhoun’s interests were not adverse “to this point.” The court asked Calhoun to “execute that waiver so that I can also have that to consider in this matter, that you did in fact have presented to you in open court a waiver of any potential disqualification, sir." Calhoun executed the waiver which stated: Circumstances exist that may disqualify [Attorney R.] from representing you in this matter. You may/may not have information pertaining to another case in which [Attorney R.] represents the Defendant. The undersigned Defendant believes that despite the conflict that may/may not exist, [Attorney R.] will represent him fairly and to the best of his ability. The undersigned Defendant acknowledges that he has had adequate time to discuss this matter with [Attorney R.] and separate counsel of the potential conflict. The undersigned hereby waives any potential conflict pertaining to the representation of [Attorney R.], pursuant to Ohio Rules of Professional 14  Conduct 1.7. The undersigned wishes to continue the representation of [Attorney R.] in this matter. This waiver is in no way solicited by [Attorney R.]. {¶ 34} The court’s written decision on the issue states: The Court gives great deference to an individual defendant who has chosen, and hired his own attorney to represent him. In addition, it is clear that the defendant has been advised of the potential conflict and has executed a waiver pursuant to Ohio Rules of Professional [Conduct] 1.7. While this Court is not making an ultimate decision as to the ethical obligations of defense counsel, the Court believes as far as the “suggestion of conflict” that the defendant may proceed with current counsel under the current set of facts. These facts and obligations could change at any time but the Court is not going to guess at what those changes may be before they happen. Therefore at this time the Court believes that the Defendant may proceed with current counsel. {¶ 35} Our complete review of the hearing record reflects that Calhoun’s brief vastly mischaracterizes the record. The transcript demonstrates that the trial court, as it expressly indicated it would, sufficiently inquired of the State, Attorney R., and Calhoun regarding the nature of any possible conflict of interest arising from Attorney R.’s representation of Portman. While Calhoun inaccurately suggests that the court instructed him to execute the waiver prior to any inquiry, the court merely advised him that he “could” execute a waiver “if we would proceed in this matter” after the court heard from the parties and reached its own conclusion on the issue. At the start of the colloquy, the record reflects that the court’s reference to “they” in “they having brought in Attorney L.” referred to Attorney R. and Calhoun, to further protect Calhoun’s interest in conflict-free representation. 15  {¶ 36} Calhoun does not state the basis for his “alarm” regarding the sidebar requested by Attorney L. That Attorney L. failed to appear again in the record is consistent with his indication that the scope of his representation was limited to advising Calhoun regarding any plea offers. {¶ 37} Calhoun also does not identify the information upon which Attorney R. allegedly relied that was “derived” from his representation of Portman. Because Portman’s matter was set in a separate courtroom, there would have been no reason for Portman to execute a waiver of conflict in Calhoun’s case. While Calhoun argues that the fact that Attorney R. “was conflicted out of plea negotiations is dispositive” of an actual conflict, Attorney R. and Attorney L. repeatedly advised the court that Attorney L. was retained as a safeguard. {¶ 38} Regarding Calhoun’s position that Attorney R. had been required to call Portman based on police testimony identifying Calhoun as Portman’s assailant at the Wayside Tavern incident, a showing of an actual conflict is not demonstrated. Attorney R. was in the best position to determine the existence of a conflict, and he denied any realistic potential that Portman would testify. Portman was also not charged in the shooting that transpired between Fowler’s vehicle and Calhoun’s vehicle. Attorney R. made his willingness to withdraw clear in the event an actual conflict creating divergent interests arose. Consistent with this representation, the court’s entry acknowledged that though Attorney R.’s obligations might have been subject to change, the court would not conjecture regarding what may or may not occur in the future. Because Calhoun has failed to identify a plausible tactic of sufficient substance that Attorney R. failed to pursue due to his alleged conflicting loyalties, an abuse of discretion is not demonstrated as to Portman. 16  2. Christian {¶ 39} At the start of trial, Prosecutor H. advised the court that in April 2025, Attorney R. had entered an appearance in another case for Christian, the victim of attempted murder, and that a waiver of conflict was required. Attorney R. indicated that his representation of Christian was in “a completely unrelated matter” and that he had discussed the issue with Calhoun. The court noted to Calhoun that “we’ve been through this before,” and it ascertained that Calhoun had discussed any potential issue as to Christian with Attorney R. and that Calhoun was confident in his representation. The following exchange occurred: THE COURT: And do you want to waive any potential conflict of interest that might exist in Mr. Rion’s representing you and a potential alleged victim in this matter, sir? DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: So you want to waive that conflict, sir? DEFENDANT: Yeah. The court then accepted the oral waiver, noting that Calhoun had been properly advised about any potential conflict by Attorney R. and that they both wished to proceed. {¶ 40} Again, Calhoun mischaracterizes the record in arguing, first, that the court “rejected” Calhoun’s initial negative response to the court’s question regarding waiver and, second, that the “oral record is ambiguous.” Prior to the court’s question, Attorney R. had advised that his representation of Christian had no connection to Calhoun’s trial, that he had discussed the issue with Calhoun, and that the court was aware that Calhoun was resolute about Attorney R. representing him. In other words, the court merely elucidated what Attorney R. and Calhoun already had represented to the court. 17  {¶ 41} Finally, although Calhoun argues that Christian’s medical records and testimony were crucial to Calhoun’s defense strategy, he does not explain why that was so, and Attorney R. was in the best position to determine the existence of a conflict. It was undisputed that Christian was shot at Fowler’s home. An abuse of discretion is not demonstrated as to Christian, and Calhoun’s first assignment of error is overruled. II. Other Acts Evidence {¶ 42} In his second assignment of error, Calhoun argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the November 2022 shooting of Portman by Calhoun at the Wayside Tavern. He directs our attention to the testimony of Detective Justin Massie of the Springfield Police Division, the first witness to testify for the State. Massie stated that he viewed November 21, 2022 surveillance video from the Wayside Tavern depicting Calhoun shooting Portman. According to Calhoun, the “jury was immediately and fatally prejudiced by the introduction of irrelevant opinion testimony.” He claims that the “facts presented here [did] not meet the definition of [m]otive” but suggested his “propensity or inclination to commit a shooting crime.” Calhoun argues that “because this evidence was the first evidence put before the jury, it colored the jury’s bias throughout the presentation of every single item of evidence presented to them,” and “no corrective instruction was offered to mitigate that prejudice.” {¶ 43} The State concedes that the connection between Calhoun’s 2022 shooting of Portman and the subsequent shooting at Fowler’s home is “a bit attenuated” but asserts that it was nevertheless admissible to show the chain of events that led to the final shooting. According to the State, it was not intended to show Calhoun’s propensity for violence. {¶ 44} The record reflects that on May 14, 2025, the State filed a notice pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) indicating that it intended to prove that the motive for Calhoun’s actions on 18 February 5, 2023, arose from a chain of events beginning with the November 2022 shooting of Portman by Calhoun. The motion stated that the events were “inextricably intertwined,” that the evidence of the November shooting was not offered as character evidence, and that the evidence was admissible under Evid.R. 404(B)(2). The State indicated that Attorney R. had been provided with video evidence of the November 2022 shooting as part of discovery and that the shooting was “discussed as a motive by several individuals in recordings provided by the State.” {¶ 45} The motion was addressed at the start of trial, and the State advised the court that the purpose of the evidence was to establish Calhoun’s motive. The court initially allowed the State to introduce the evidence for that purpose. After Attorney R. asserted that the evidence established only the motive for Portman to shoot at Calhoun, the State responded that the evidence “shows the history” and “chain of events.” According to the prosecutor, the evidence would also help the jury to understand how Calhoun put together “who was chasing him and why he eventually goes where he goes,” and “so [the evidence was for] motive, but it [was] also lack of mistake, lack accident.” The trial court noted that the evidence was offered “not just for motive but also . . . intent, preparation and plan,” and that “it [was] a cluster of these things that [led] up to the admissibility of this evidence,” and the State agreed. The court indicated that it would “allow the evidence in general.” {¶ 46} “‘A hallmark of the American criminal justice system is the principle that proof that the accused committed a crime other than the one for which he is on trial is not admissible when its sole purpose is to show the accused’s propensity or inclination to commit crime.’” State v. Hartman, 2020-Ohio-4440, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 (1975). This principle “is premised on our understanding of human nature: the typical juror is prone to ‘much more readily believe that a person is guilty of the crime charged 19 if it is proved to his satisfaction that the defendant has committed a similar crime.’” Id., quoting State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d 167, 174-175 (1969). {¶ 47} Evid.R. 404(B)(1) states that “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Evid.R. 404(B)(2) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” “Motive evidence establishes that the accused had a specific reason to commit a crime.” Hartman at ¶ 48. {¶ 48} To be admissible under Evid.R. 404(B)(2), the “key is that the evidence must prove something other than the defendant’s disposition to commit certain acts.” Id. at ¶ 22. In other words, “while evidence showing the defendant’s character or propensity to commit crimes or acts is forbidden, evidence of other acts is admissible when the evidence is probative of a separate, nonpropensity-based issue.” Id. {¶ 49} As noted by the Third District: “Evid.R. 404(B) only applies to limit the admission of so-called ‘other acts’ evidence that is ‘extrinsic’ to the crime charged. State v. Stallworth, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2013-L-122, 2014-Ohi