State v. Young

[Cite as State v. Young, 2026-Ohio-4519.] IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT STARK COUNTY, OHIO STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2026CA00062 Opinion And Judgment Entry Plaintiff-Appellee Appeal from the Canton Municipal Court, Case No.2026CRB00266 TYLER ALLEN EDWARD YOUNG Judgment: Affirmed Date of Judgment Entry: November 9, 2026 Defendant-Appellant BEFORE: William B. Hoffman, Kevin W. Popham, and David M. Gormley, Judges APPEARANCES: Jason Reese, Canton Law Director, Kristine Canton City Prosecutor, Christopher Buswell, Assistant Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Donovan Hill, for Defendant-Appellant OPINION Popham, J., {¶1} Appellant Tyler Young ("Young") appeals his convictions following a no- contest plea in the Canton Municipal Court, Stark County, Ohio. For the reasons below, we affirm. Facts and Procedural History {¶2} On January 17, 2026, Young was arrested and charged with Domestic Violence, Aggravated Menacing, and Endangering Children, all first-degree misdemeanors.  {¶3} The charges arose from allegations that Young lifted the mother of his three children and slammed her to the ground, and threatened to kill her, all while the children were present. {¶4} On February 5, 2026, pursuant to Crim.R. 12(E), the State filed a Notice of Intention to Use Evidence. The State sought to introduce evidence concerning two prior incidents involving Young and the same victim, specifically the following: 1. On April 1, 2022, Young allegedly struck the victim with a closed fist, grabbed her arm, causing a visible injury, and pushed her multiple times. Young was charged with Domestic Violence, a first-degree misdemeanor, and ultimately pleaded to Disorderly Conduct, a fourth-degree misdemeanor. 2. On July 22, 2022, Young allegedly held the victim against a wall by her throat, causing her to partially lose consciousness and leaving a visible injury. After releasing the victim, Young allegedly persuaded her not to contact law enforcement. {¶5} The State contended that this evidence was admissible to establish the victim's subjective belief that Young would cause her serious physical harm, which the State identified as an element of Aggravated Menacing. Young did not file a response, a motion in limine or a motion to suppress. {¶6} By Judgment Entry filed February 6, 2026, the trial court scheduled the matter for a jury trial beginning February 17, 2026. {¶7} With Young and his attorney present, the trial court considered the State’s Notice of Intent. Judgment Entry, Feb. 13, 20261. The court noted, 1 No transcript or App.R. 9(C) statement concerning this hearing has been submitted with the record.  The defendant argues that this testimony is irrelevant, and thus, inadmissible under Evid. R 402. More concerning to the Court, however, is whether evidence of other-acts, in this case, is so prejudicial that it would preclude the defendant from receiving a fair trial. Id. at 2. The court noted that the other acts testimony may be relevant to establish the victim’s state of mind, if that is relevant to the charged offense, provided, however, the testimony is limited regarding the time, place and description of the events. The court held, Therefore, the Court will allow testimony of other acts with limitations. This testimony must be specific to time, place and description of the events. Further, the Court will instruct the jury that this testimony cannot be considered to suggest or to prove that the defendant committed the alleged acts in the current case. The Court further limits this testimony by prohibiting testimony that the defendant was previously charged with Domestic Violence and ultimately convicted of the reduced charge of Disorderly Conduct. Id. (emphasis added). {¶8} On the morning of trial, February 17, 2026, Young filed a "Motion in Limine/Motion for Reconsideration," asking the trial court to prohibit the State from introducing any information concerning prior incidents or allegations of domestic violence or physical harm. Young reiterated his contention that the other acts evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible pursuant to Evid.R. 401. However, Young also argued that because the mental state of the mother is irrelevant to the charges of Domestic Violence, R.C. 2919.25(A) [Cause or attempt to cause physical harm], and Endangering Children, R.C. 2919.22(A) [creating a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection or support], if the evidence was admissible with respect to the Aggravated Menacing charge, allowing the evidence in a trial involving all three charges would “improperly cloud the issues” concerning the Domestic Violence and Endangering Children charges. {¶9} On February 17, 2026, Young executed a written Waiver of Rights/Plea Change. Young did not request that the trial court conduct a hearing on his motion to reconsider/motion in limine or ask the trial court to issue a ruling on the motion before proceeding with the change of plea hearing. Young thereafter entered a plea of no contest to Domestic Violence, Aggravated Menacing, and Endangering Children. The trial court then proceeded to sentencing. {¶10} The trial court sentenced Young to 180 days in jail, concurrently, with 148 days suspended on the condition that Young participate in mental-health services. Young received credit for 32 days served. The court also imposed a $10 fine plus court costs and placed Young on probation for two years. The court further ordered Young to have no contact with the victims. Assignment of Error {¶11} Young raises one assignment of error, {¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY PERMITTING APPELLEE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS.” {¶13} Young argues that the trial court abused its discretion under the three-part test articulated in State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-5695, by permitting the State to present evidence of prior bad acts for a limited purpose. {¶14} The State contends that its Notice of Intent to Use Evidence constituted a motion in limine. The State argues that Young’s no-contest plea did not preserve for appeal any challenge to a ruling on a motion in limine, including the trial court’s judgment entry addressing the admissibility of the other-acts evidence. {¶15} We disagree with the State’s characterization of the notice and conclude that Young failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Governing Law {¶16} Crim.R. 12 governs the timing and presentation of pretrial motions and objections. Crim.R. 12(E)(2) provides that a defendant, in order to raise objections prior to trial under division (C)(3) of the rule, may request notice of the prosecuting attorney's intention to use evidence in chief at trial that the defendant is entitled to discover under Crim.R. 16. Under Crim.R. 12(E)(1), when the State intends to use certain evidence at trial, it may, in its discretion, provide notice to the defendant “[t]o afford the defendant an opportunity to raise objections to such evidence prior to trial under division (C)(3) of this rule.” {¶17} Young did not request notice from the State pursuant to Crim.R. 12(E)(2). Accordingly, the State's Notice of Intent to Use Evidence was provided pursuant to Crim.R. 12(E)(1). The notice did not itself seek a ruling from the trial court. Rather, it notified Young of the evidence the State intended to introduce and afforded him an opportunity to object before trial. The notice itself did not seek a ruling from the trial court and therefore was not, standing alone, a motion in limine. {¶18} Crim.R. 12(C) provides that, before trial, “any party may raise by motion any defense, objection, evidentiary issue, or request that is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue.” Of particular significance here, Crim.R. 12(I) provides:  The plea of no contest does not preclude a defendant from asserting upon appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred in ruling on a pretrial motion, including a pretrial motion to suppress evidence. {¶19} Thus, a no-contest plea does not preclude appellate review of a prejudicial error in a trial court's ruling on a pretrial motion. {¶20} The trial court entered a judgment, before Young entered his no-contest plea, ruling that evidence the State identified in it’s Notice of Intent was admissible. Although the State characterizes the notice as a motion in limine, the substance of the proceedings demonstrates that the trial court ultimately made a definitive pretrial ruling concerning the admissibility of the evidence. Because the trial court issued a definitive ruling before trial permitting the other acts testimony with respect to the Aggravated Menacing charge, Young was not required to renew his objection or make an offer of proof to preserve that alleged error for appeal. State v. Echols, 2024-Ohio-5088, ¶ 28. Accordingly, Young's no-contest plea did not preclude appellate review of that ruling. Crim.R. 12(I). {¶21} The scope of that preserved issue, however, is limited by the scope of the trial court's ruling. The judgment entry addressed the admissibility of the other acts evidence but did not specifically address whether the evidence could be considered in connection with the domestic violence or child endangering charges. Thus, while Young preserved his challenge to the trial court's determination that the evidence was admissible with respect to the aggravated menacing charge, he did not obtain a pretrial ruling on the separate question whether the evidence could properly be used, or was unduly prejudicial, in connection with the other charges.  Other Acts Evidence {¶22} Evidence of other acts is generally inadmissible to prove a person's character in order to show that the person acted in conformity with that character. Evid.R. 404(B)(1). Such evidence may, however, be admissible for another legitimate purpose. Evid.R. 404(B)(2). {¶23} In State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-5695, the Supreme Court of Ohio established a three-part analysis for determining the admissibility of other-acts evidence. First, the evidence must be relevant and material to a matter at issue. Id. at ¶ 20. Second, the evidence must be offered for a permissible purpose under Evid.R. 404(B). Id. at ¶ 21. Third, the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Id. at ¶ 20; Evid.R. 403(A). {¶24} Here, the State sought to introduce testimony concerning Young's prior conduct toward the victim to establish an element of aggravated menacing. To prove aggravated menacing, the State was required to establish, among other things, that the victim believed Young would cause her serious physical harm. Evidence concerning Young's prior conduct toward the victim was relevant to explain the basis for and reasonableness of the victim's fear of serious physical harm. See State v. Carter, 2010-Ohio-1061, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.); State v. Marcum, 2011-Ohio-6140, ¶ 39 (7th Dist.). {¶25} Young argues that, if the evidence is admissible in connection with the aggravated menacing charge, the evidence should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial in connection with the domestic violence and child endangering charges. {¶26} To the extent Young challenges the trial court's determination that the evidence was admissible for purposes of the aggravated menacing charge, that challenge is preserved and we address it under Williams. The record supports the trial court's determination that the evidence was relevant to establish the victim's belief that Young would cause her serious physical harm and was offered for a legitimate, non-propensity purpose. The trial court’s ruling limited the evidence to avoid any unfair prejudice. {¶27} Young's argument concerning the domestic violence and child endangering charges presents a different issue. The trial court's pretrial ruling did not determine whether the other acts evidence was admissible, or could be considered, or was unduly prejudicial for purposes of those charges. Consequently, Crim.R. 12(I) does not preserve an objection to a ruling the trial court never made. {¶28} Moreover, if Young believed that the State's use of the evidence for aggravated menacing would prejudice his defense against the domestic violence and child endangering charges, the appropriate procedural mechanism was a motion for severance under Crim.R. 14. Ohio law favors joinder of offenses of the same or similar character. Crim.R. 8(A); State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163 (1990). Nevertheless, Crim.R. 14 permits severance when joinder prejudices a defendant, and the defendant bears the burden of furnishing the trial court with sufficient information to permit it to weigh the considerations favoring joinder against the defendant's right to a fair trial. State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 343 (1981). {¶29} Young did not move to sever the aggravated-menacing charge from the domestic violence and child endangering charges. Nor did he obtain a pretrial ruling concerning whether the other acts evidence could be considered in connection with those charges, or whether allowing the evidence in a joint trial with the domestic violence and child endangering charges would be unduly prejudicial with respect to those charges. Accordingly, to the extent his assignment of error challenges the use or consideration of the evidence with respect to the domestic violence and child endangering charges, that issue was not preserved for appellate review. {¶30} We therefore distinguish between the two issues presented by Young's argument. His challenge to the trial court's definitive pretrial ruling that the other acts evidence was admissible as to the aggravated menacing charge is preserved by Crim.R. 12(I). His separate challenge to the use or consideration of that evidence in connection with the domestic violence and child endangering charges was not presented to the trial court for a ruling and, therefore, is forfeited. {¶31} To the extent Young's assignment of error challenges the admissibility of the evidence for the aggravated-menacing charge, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence for that limited purpose. To the extent he challenges the use of the evidence in connection with the domestic violence and child endangering charges as unduly prejudicial, we decline to address that argument because it was not preserved for appellate review. {¶32} Young's first assignment of error is overruled. Hoffman, J., concurring {¶34} I concur in the majority’s disposition of Appellant’s sole assignment of error and its decision to affirm the judgment of the trial court. {¶35} Unlike the majority, I do not believe Appellant’s no contest plea preserves his right to challenge the trial court’s February 13, 2026 pronouncement regarding the State of Ohio’s Notice of Intent or the trial court’s sub silentio denial of Appellant’s trial-day Motion in Limine/Motion for Reconsideration. {¶36} The trial court’s pronouncement of its ruling on the issue was clearly interlocutory in nature. It could be revisited at trial. {¶37} Accordingly, I find Appellant has waived this issue for appellate review. See State v. Humphries, 2019-Ohio-2878 (5th Dist.); State v. Gibbons, 2018-Ohio-3307 (5th Dist.); State v. Dudley, 2021-Ohio-478, (5th Dist.); citing State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199, paragraph two of the syllabus (1986); and State v. Pyo, 2004-Ohio-4768 (5th Dist.).  {¶33} For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Canton Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs to be paid by the appellant, Tyler Young. By: Popham, P. J., and Gormley J., concur; Hoffman, J., concurs separately