State v. Laney
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket2026-P-0002
JudgeLucci
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Laney, 2026-Ohio-4541.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PORTAGE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2026-P-0002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
TRAVIS D. LANEY,
Trial Court No. 2024 CR 00973
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: November 16, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed
Connie J. Lewandowski, Portage County Prosecutor, and Timothy P. Bogner, Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Kimberly Kendall Corral and Alasan M. Huff, 3311 Perkins Avenue, Suite 205,
Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Defendant-Appellant).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Travis D. Laney, appeals from the judgment of conviction and
sentence of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, entered upon his plea of “no
contest” to one count of possession of cocaine, a felony of the fifth degree. At issue is
whether the trial court erred when it denied Mr. Laney’s motion to dismiss based upon the
State’s alleged failure to preserve evidence and, if not, whether the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
{¶2} Following the trial court’s denial of both motions, Mr. Laney entered his no
contest plea on September 10, 2025, and the trial court made a finding of guilt. On
December 8, 2025, the court sentenced Mr. Laney to 12 months of community control
under the supervision of the Portage County Adult Probation Department, subject to a
reserved prison term, and imposed costs. The sentencing entry was filed December 9,
2025, and Mr. Laney filed his notice of appeal on January 8, 2026. The appeal is therefore
timely. App.R. 4(A)(1). A plea of no contest does not preclude our review of the trial court’s
rulings on these pretrial motions. Crim.R. 12(I).
{¶3} On October 30, 2024, Mr. Laney was stopped for speeding by Officer
Michael Carnahan of the Kent City Police Department (“KPD”). During the stop, Mr. Laney
initially appeared to consent to a search of the vehicle but then revoked that consent.
Officer Carnahan asked Mr. Laney to exit the vehicle. Mr. Laney was observed reaching
toward his waistband, and Officer Carnahan saw a plastic bag containing a white
substance in his hand. At the officer’s command, Mr. Laney dropped the bag on the
driver’s side floorboard, and he was removed from the vehicle and detained. Officer
Carnahan then deployed his K-9 partner to conduct an open-air sniff, and the dog alerted
at the driver’s door. The officer searched the vehicle, retrieved the bag, and field-tested
its contents, which returned positive for cocaine. Mr. Laney was arrested.
{¶4} On November 7, 2024, Mr. Laney was indicted for possession of cocaine,
a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.11. On November 12, 2024, Mr.
Laney’s defense counsel filed various motions, the most significant of which was a motion
for an order to preserve evidence. The motion sought to preserve evidence, in relevant
part: “All recordings (including film, audiotape[,] and videotape) of the alleged incident . .
. .” While the motion indicated the requested preservation “includes, but is not limited to .
. .[,]” it did not seek specific digital records (e.g., GPS data, metadata associated with
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various cameras, or automatic vehicle locator (“AVL”) data). On November 13, 2024, the
trial court granted the motion, issuing an order directing the State and its subdivisions to
preserve enumerated categories of evidence, in relevant part, “All recordings (including
film, audiotape[,] and videotape) of the alleged incident, of Defendant or any possible co-
defendants at the time of the incident . . . .” None of the categories referred to global
positioning system(s) (“GPS”), computer-aided dispatch (“CAD”), or AVL data. The State
recognizes that there was no mention of GPS or AVL data in the motion; it, however,
recognizes that these items are “arguably” encompassed by the language requesting “all
recordings” in Mr. Laney’s motion to preserve.1
{¶5} Mr. Laney filed a motion to dismiss the charge based upon the State’s
alleged failure to preserve evidence, in violation of the trial court’s order, and a motion to
suppress evidence. At the hearings, held on July 7 and July 29, 2025, the trial court
received testimony from Officer Carnahan, Assistant Portage County Prosecutor Mitchell
Rozaieski, Captain Jennifer Ennemoser, the KPD’s Service Captain, Allison Butcher,
Police Support Services Manager for Kent State University Police Department
(“KSUPD”), and Mr. Laney. The following evidence and information was adduced at the
hearings.
{¶6} On October 30, 2024, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Officer Carnahan was on
patrol in the city of Kent. He noticed a black sedan driven by Mr. Laney and began
“pacing” the vehicle. The officer asserted that pacing is a process of gauging a vehicle’s
speed whereby an officer attempts to keep an equal distance between him or herself and
1. As will be discussed at greater length below, testimony indicated that nothing in the trial court’s order
would have prompted the KPD’s Service Captain to contact the record holder of the information to produce
the unique information now at issue.
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the subject vehicle to provide a speed reading. Officer Carnahan explained pacing is not
an exact science but provides a reasonably accurate reading.
{¶7} The officer stated he paced the vehicle for four or five hundred yards, from
a following distance of approximately 30 to 45 yards, and determined Mr. Laney was
traveling 42 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone. The officer confirmed that his speedometer had
been calibrated and certified. After the pace was complete, while stopped at the red light
at Middlebury, the officer completed a record search which indicated Mr. Laney was the
subject of a drug investigation in 2014. The officer’s subjective interest in that information
does not bear on the validity of a stop otherwise supported by an objective basis. Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
{¶8} The officer continued to follow the vehicle but did not immediately stop it
due to the narrowness of the street. Once the vehicle entered the parking lot of “The Pub”
in Kent, the officer activated his lights and initiated the stop. According to Officer
Carnahan, the speeding violation occurred approximately one minute or one-half mile
before the stop. Because, however, the dash cam and/or body cam only captures events
up to 30 seconds prior to the activation of a cruiser’s lights, no camera footage existed of
the “pacing” leading to the speeding violation.
{¶9} After the stop, Officer Carnahan stated he made contact with the passenger
side of the vehicle and engaged both the passenger and the driver, Mr. Laney. The officer
advised the individuals of the reason for the stop and asked if either had been “in trouble”
previously. The passenger stated he had “marijuana issues,” but Mr. Laney did not
answer. Officer Carnahan asked if there were any drugs in the vehicle, and Mr. Laney
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awkwardly laughed. The officer asked if he could search the vehicle. Mr. Laney initially
appeared to consent but, when he was asked to exit the vehicle, he withdrew his consent.
{¶10} During Officer Carnahan’s initial interactions with the vehicle’s occupants,
Lieutenant Jim Ennemoser arrived for backup on the stop. After Officer Carnahan
requested Mr. Laney to exit the vehicle, Lieutenant Ennemoser advised Mr. Laney to “stop
reaching.” Officer Carnahan testified he observed Mr. Laney reaching to the right side of
his waistband. Officer Carnahan then observed a plastic, transparent tie-off bag or bindle
with a white substance in Mr. Laney’s possession. Fearing that Mr. Laney was attempting
to conceal or destroy the bindle, the officer reached through the open window, secured
Mr. Laney’s left wrist, drew his taser, and ordered him to drop it. Mr. Laney dropped the
object on the driver’s side floorboard. Mr. Laney was then removed from the vehicle and
secured in handcuffs, and the passenger exited and consented to a search of his person,
which yielded nothing. Officer Carnahan, a K-9 handler, deployed his dog. The K-9
“alerted” to the driver’s door. The bindle was retrieved, a field test was performed on the
contents, and the test returned a positive result for cocaine. The evidence was later sent
to the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) laboratory. BCI confirmed the
evidence was positive for cocaine and methamphetamine. Mr. Laney was arrested.
{¶11} Defense counsel filed an open-ended motion to preserve evidence, as
described above. The trial court granted the motion. On December 18, 2024, defense
counsel sent an email to Portage County Assistant Prosecutor Mitchell Rozaieski
requesting, inter alia, whether KPD had GPS data showing an officer’s “speed and
location” for the incident in question. Mr. Rozaieski testified that, in his understanding, the
GPS data was contained in the “raw” Getac link, which allowed access to the dash cam
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and body cam footage. Mr. Rozaieski stated the GPS footage was sent to Mr. Laney’s
counsel. Mr. Rozaieski observed, however, that he was unaware, at the time of the
request and order to preserve, of the existence of the AVL data. Mr. Rozaieski stated that
he, as a prosecutor, had never utilized AVL data. At the hearing, he was not able to assert
the data would be useful to confirm or undermine Officer Carnahan’s estimation on the
accuracy of his pacing speed prior to the stop.
{¶12} Captain Jennifer Ennemoser, Service Captain of KPD, testified that when
an officer initiates his or her video in the cruiser or body cameras, there is a 30-second
playback and, as a result, the GPS data begins with that playback. The captain stated
that when defense counsel requested the GPS data, it was the first time she received
such a request. After some clarification and discussion, the captain recognized that Mr.
Laney’s counsel was seeking information beyond the general GPS data. Instead, counsel
was seeking information related to the Getac CAD, which included AVL data. According
to Captain Ennemoser, the CAD system is administered by KSUPD under contract with
KPD, and KSUPD in turn licenses the software from a private vendor. The system retains
the CAD and AVL data for only 90 days. By the time the discovery request was clarified,
the AVL data from the date of the incident had been overwritten.
{¶13} Allison Butcher, Police Support Services Manager for KSUPD, stated that
KPD’s AVL data is stored on KSUPD’s CAD servers on the KSUPD premises. Ms.
Butcher confirmed that the AVL data is automatically overwritten every 90 days, due to
storage needs. Ms. Butcher stated:
AVL in the cars, the system keeps track of the locations. My
understanding is it pings every five to ten seconds, depending
on the cell towers and how busy the cell towers are. And then
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it will create a package. You can go in and search up to eight
hours of time. The retention is ninety days. And it shows
approximate speed of the vehicles and locations of vehicles,
depending on which agency you’re looking for. You can
search by vehicle or you can search by just date and time.
{¶14} Ms. Butcher testified that, to her knowledge, neither KPD nor the Portage
County Prosecutor’s Office had ever sought AVL information from her. She further
testified that, had a request been made, KSUPD could have extracted the data into a
separate file and held it beyond the 90-day period.
{¶15} Mr. Laney testified that he was traveling between 25 and 30 m.p.h. as he
passed the officer’s stationary position, and that he was traveling 35 m.p.h.—the posted
limit—over the stretch on which the officer claimed to have paced him. He stated Officer
Carnahan was originally 400 to 450 feet behind his vehicle and eventually ended up at
the same point as him. Mr. Laney, accordingly, claimed the officer did not maintain an
equal distance and/or the same speed as him. Mr. Laney acknowledged, however, that
he had “no question” that Officer Carnahan’s cruiser was traveling 42 to 43 m.p.h.
{¶16} At the suppression hearing, defense counsel engaged in a dialogue with the
trial court regarding the reasonable scope of defense counsel’s request to preserve. Mr.
Laney’s trial counsel conceded that his request to preserve evidence primarily discussed
videos and recordings relating to the incident and did not specifically request the retention
of GPS, CAD, or AVL information/data. And, although the trial court recognized the
preservation order it had issued was inclusive but open-ended in its terms, the motion on
which that order was based was broad rather than specific. Also, given the unique nature
of the CAD information, including the AVL data, the trial court wondered whether it
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is even in the realm of possibility that [the prosecutor or police
department] would consider, oh we better not purge that, or
we’ll contact our - - When they got the letter to preserve, I don’t
know that they’re going to go well, we were diligent in keeping
the audio, the video of all of the officer’s doings, but are we
going to call the CAD company and say you’ve got to preserve
that. I don’t know that that’s realistically included within your
motion to preserve.
{¶17} Defense counsel recognized the court’s point and acknowledged the court’s
position was “definitely arguable.” Counsel noted that he was made aware of the AVL
data when he was doing research on CAD information. He acknowledged the State
provided him with the GPS data, but that data did not provide any insight into the issue of
Officer Carnahan’s pacing prior to the stop. The trial court reiterated its point regarding
the lack of specificity in defense counsel’s request. The court observed, “I don’t know that
[the request] should or does encompass the information generated by the AVL that is not
kept specifically by Kent PD.”
{¶18} Defense counsel conceded the point but noted that KPD still owns,
operates, and controls the system. As such, he maintained his client was entitled to all
GPS data on the vehicle to which KPD has access. Counsel noted that his request was
sent to the prosecutor’s office within the 90-day purge period and the office forwarded the
request to KPD. While defense counsel acknowledged he received GPS data, he stated
it included “stuff that doesn’t tell me anything . . . .” Counsel argued, “[s]o if there were
two bundles, if you will, of GPS information out there . . . I got one of them that tells me
nothing, and I didn’t get the other one.
{¶19} The trial court recognized defense counsel’s position that he did not receive
the CAD and AVL data. The trial court, however, remained concerned that the information
requested in the open-ended request for preservation was not specified and was not kept
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“in-house” by KPD. The court also observed that, when the motion to preserve was filed,
the AVL data was “probably there.”
{¶20} In its judgment entry, filed August 13, 2025, the trial court found that defense
counsel filed a motion to preserve evidence on November 13, 2025.2 Further, the trial
court found that defense counsel sent an email to the prosecutor’s office in December
2024 requesting GPS data for the cruiser driven by Officer Carnahan at the relevant time
of the stop. The court noted that this request was not included in the initial motion for
preservation. The trial court found that Captain Ennemoser testified that the order to
preserve received in November 2024 “would not have prompted her to provide or
preserve the GPS data” at issue. The court further found that the information at issue is
not kept as a record by KPD but is maintained by a third party, KSUPD. The trial court
recognized the limited time frame that the CAD information and AVL data are retained. It
also acknowledged Mr. Laney’s testimony that he was not driving in excess of the speed
limit prior to the stop.
{¶21} With respect to Mr. Laney’s motion to dismiss, the trial court set forth the
relevant law regarding an alleged due process violation for failure to preserve evidence.
After doing so, the trial court determined that there was no basis to conclude the AVL
data was destroyed intentionally; instead, the trial court concluded that the data “was not
obtained prior to destruction through some miscommunication between the State,
defense counsel, and KPD.” The trial court accordingly overruled Mr. Laney’s motion to
dismiss.
2. The trial court’s August 13, 2025 judgment states that the motion to preserve was filed on “November
13, 2025.” This date is inaccurate. First, the motion was filed on November 12 and, second, it was filed in
2024. We perceive these inaccuracies as clerical errors.
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{¶22} The trial court additionally concluded that Officer Carnahan possessed, at
least, reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Laney. As the motion to suppress was limited to
the officer’s basis for the stop, the trial court concluded pacing was a reasonable and
acceptable manner for determining a vehicle’s speed. The trial court therefore overruled
Mr. Laney’s motion to suppress evidence. This appeal follows.
{¶23} Mr. Laney assigns two errors for this court’s review. His first provides:
{¶24} “The trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion to dismiss based on
the State’s failure to preserve evidence that the trial court ordered it to preserve, in
violation of appellant’s right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.”
{¶25} Under his first assignment of error, Mr. Laney argues the trial court generally
ordered the State to preserve all “specific” evidence requested by the defense of the
incident. Mr. Laney argues the State destroyed the AVL data which, in his view, would
have provided the defense with the cruiser’s speed and location. Mr. Laney asserts that
this evidence would have demonstrated Officer Carnahan’s testimony regarding “pacing”
was in error because Mr. Laney was never traveling faster than 35 m.p.h. Accordingly, he
maintains the State’s alleged destruction of the AVL data violated his right to due process.
He further asks this court to adopt a burden-shifting framework and, in the alternative,
contends the State acted in bad faith.
{¶26} During the hearing, trial counsel admitted he did not believe he had to prove
bad faith. He stated, “I’m not alleging bad faith and I want the people here in the courtroom
to hear that . . . .” Instead, counsel argued that the evidence at issue was materially
exculpable. Still, we shall address each aspect of the due process issue; one, which
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embraces the “material-exculpable” nature of evidence, and the other, which considers
“potentially useful” evidence. The former does not require a demonstration of bad faith,
the latter does.
{¶27} “A trial court’s ruling on a pretrial motion to dismiss a criminal indictment is
subject to a mixed standard of review.” State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-3526, ¶ 14 (11th
Dist.), citing State v. Clemons, 2013-Ohio-3415, ¶ 6 (4th Dist.) (“Appellate review of a trial
court’s decision regarding a motion to dismiss involves a mixed question of law and fact.”).
This court reviews a trial court’s legal conclusions on a pretrial motion to dismiss criminal
charges de novo. State v. Frasure, 2008-Ohio-1504, ¶ 35 (11th Dist.). However, “‘[w]e
accord due deference to the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by competent,
credible evidence[.]’” Williams at ¶ 14, quoting Clemons at ¶ 6. Applied here, whether the
State acted in bad faith is a question of fact, and the trial court’s determination is entitled
to deference if supported by competent, credible evidence. Whether the evidence at issue
was “materially exculpatory,” by contrast, is a legal question we review de novo.
{¶28} The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects a criminal defendant from conviction when the State either fails to
preserve materially exculpatory evidence or, in bad faith, fails to preserve potentially
useful evidence. See, e.g., State v. Glenn, 2015-Ohio-4832, ¶ 32-34 (11th Dist.); Kent v.
Lusane, 2022-Ohio-4057, ¶ 31-33 (11th Dist.). Accordingly, “the suppression of
exculpatory evidence that is material to guilt or punishment violates due process without
respect to whether the state acted in bad faith.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Jalowiec,
2015-Ohio-5042, ¶ 48 (9th Dist.). When the State, however, fails to preserve evidence
that is merely “potentially useful,” a criminal defendant must demonstrate that the State
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acted in bad faith. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); see also State v.
Geeslin, 2007-Ohio-5239, ¶ 9-10. Although Mr. Laney invokes the Fifth Amendment as
well, that Amendment’s Due Process Clause constrains federal rather than state action,
and we analyze his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
{¶29} “Evidence is ‘materially exculpatory’ if it (1) possesses ‘an exculpatory value
that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed’ and (2) is ‘of such a nature that
the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably
available means.’” State v. McClain, 2016-Ohio-838, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.), quoting California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984). Alternatively, “‘[p]otentially useful evidence
indicates that the evidence may or may not have incriminated the defendant.’” Williams,
2023-Ohio-3526, ¶ 16 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Durnwald, 2005-Ohio-4867, ¶ 30 (6th
Dist.).
{¶30} To properly consider the import of the destruction of potentially useful
evidence, we underscore that “‘[t]he term ‘bad faith’ generally implies something more
than bad judgment or negligence.’” State v. Powell, 2012-Ohio-2577, ¶ 81, quoting State
v. Tate, 2008-Ohio-3759, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.). “‘“It imports a dishonest purpose, moral
obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or
ill will partaking of the nature of fraud. It also embraces actual intent to mislead or deceive
another.”’” Powell at ¶ 81, quoting Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 272, 276
(1983), quoting Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148 (1962), paragraph two
of the syllabus.
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{¶31} The burden rests with the defendant to establish that the evidence at issue
was materially exculpatory in his or her case. State v. Lothes, 2007-Ohio-4226, ¶ 17 (11th
Dist.), citing State v. Jackson, 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 33 (1991).
{¶32} We begin with the character of the evidence at issue, because the Supreme
Court of Ohio has addressed closely analogous circumstances. In State v. Geeslin, 2007-
Ohio-5239, a portion of a trooper’s cruiser video capturing the driving that supplied the
basis for a traffic stop was recorded over. Id. at ¶ 4. The Court held that the erased footage
was, at most, potentially useful rather than materially exculpatory, because it bore only
on the justification for the stop and not on the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the offense
charged. Id. at ¶ 12-13; see also id. at ¶ 5.
{¶33} The same is true here. The AVL data would have reflected, at most, the
location and approximate speed of Officer Carnahan’s cruiser in the minutes preceding
the stop. It could not have borne on any element of possession of cocaine—the offense
to which Mr. Laney pleaded no contest and of which he stands convicted. Under Geeslin,
that is dispositive of the materially-exculpatory inquiry: evidence going only to the validity
of the stop, rather than to the conviction itself, is potentially useful and not materially
exculpatory.
{¶34} That conclusion largely answers Mr. Laney’s remaining arguments, but we
address them in turn. Mr. Laney asks this court to depart from the general principle
requiring a defendant to bear the burden of establishing the evidence at issue is materially
exculpatory. Instead, he asserts that, because the State breached its duty of good faith
in responding to the defense’s request to preserve evidence, “the appropriate remedy is
to shift to the [S]tate the burden of proof as to the exculpatory value of the evidence.”
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Columbus v. Forest, 36 Ohio App.3d 169, 173 (10th Dist. 1987); see also State v. Benton,
136 Ohio App.3d 801, 805-806 (6th Dist. 2000) (applying Forest where the defendant had
specifically requested the item in discovery and “the [S]tate did not in good faith respond
to that request”).
{¶35} We need not decide whether to adopt the Forest framework, because its
predicate is absent on this record. Forest and the decisions following it condition the shift
on the State having had notice of the particular evidence sought and having failed, in
good faith, to respond to that request.
{¶36} Further, this court has held “a general demand for discovery is not a request
to preserve a specific item of evidence.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. DiNardo, 2015-
Ohio-1061, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.). Neither Mr. Laney’s motion to preserve nor the trial court’s
order identified GPS, CAD, or AVL data, by name or by category. On these facts, no
burden shift is triggered under Forest. We therefore turn to whether the State breached a
duty of good faith or acted in bad faith and conclude it did neither.
{¶37} We underscore that Mr. Laney’s motion to preserve was concededly broad
and did not specifically request GPS information or CAD information, including AVL data.
As highlighted above, the State, once the request was clarified, produced the GPS
information. Captain Ennemoser testified, however, that she did not understand until well
after the request was submitted that defense counsel was seeking CAD information which
included AVL data. Indeed, she testified that, to her knowledge, the instant matter was
the first time any form of GPS had been requested, let alone CAD files and AVL data.
Because the request and order to preserve were general, because the CAD files and AVL
data were stored on servers maintained by a contracting law-enforcement agency rather
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than by KPD, and because the captain had never, in any prior case, received a request
for such digital information, we conclude there was no lack of good faith and certainly no
bad faith on the part of the State or its actors.
{¶38} Moreover, Assistant Prosecutor Rozaieski testified that, at the time he
received defense counsel’s email (on December 18, 2024), he forwarded the email to the
prosecutor’s investigator who sent all the requests directly to KPD. The Getac link was
emailed from the investigator to defense counsel on May 29, 2025. The State held the
GPS data when the December 18, 2024 request arrived and produced it after a motion to
compel was filed by the defense on May 1, 2025. KPD then sent “everything they had in
regardS to [the requests defense counsel] had.” One such item was GPS data for Officer
Carnahan on the date in question. Although defense counsel submitted he also was
interested in the AVL data (which was not specified), Mr. Rozaieski testified he “did not
know about [AVL data] until just recently.” While there was a delay, the delay was
seemingly premised upon either a miscommunication or a misunderstanding of defense
counsel’s request. By the time the matter was “cleared up,” the data had been overwritten
approximately five months earlier.
{¶39} The generality of the request bears not on any allocation of fault between
counsel but on whether the State’s conduct was culpable. Had the motion or the order
identified CAD or AVL data, the State would have been on notice to contact the agency
housing that data; Captain Ennemoser testified that such a request would have prompted
her to do so. No such request was made, and the data was overwritten automatically by
a retention setting.
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{¶40} Considering these points, in light of Captain Ennemoser’s testimony, in
conjunction with Assistant Prosecutor Rozaieski’s testimony, we cannot impute a breach
of the State’s duty of good faith, let alone a legal finding of bad faith. Accordingly, we hold,
regardless of Mr. Laney’s request for this court to adopt a burden-shifting model for
failure-to-preserve claims, he has failed to set forth evidence or persuasive argument that
the State breached its duty of good faith to preserve the alleged exculpatory evidence.
{¶41} Next, Mr. Laney argues that the AVL evidence had a tendency to impeach
the credibility of Officer Carnahan’s version of the basis of the stop. He claims the
evidence would have shown that neither vehicle was traveling over 35 m.p.h. As a result,
he maintains that the failure to preserve the evidence was sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. We do not agree with Mr. Laney’s position
{¶42} Mr. Laney’s argument assumes the exculpatory character of the evidence.
Nothing in the record establishes that any exculpatory value of the AVL data was apparent
before it was destroyed. We acknowledge that Ms. Butcher testified that AVL data could
or might show the “approximate speed” of a vehicle as well as its location(s); she also
stated, however, the AVL systems keep track of a vehicle’s location by way of “pings
every five to ten seconds, depending on the cell towers and how busy the cell towers are.”
This testimony, while indicating that the evidence could be potentially useful, does not
establish it would be materially exculpatory.
{¶43} Mr. Laney also suggests the data would have shown whether Officer
Carnahan’s cruiser was stationary at the Longmere traffic light, a point on which the two
men’s accounts diverge. Even assuming location data sampled at five- to ten-second
intervals could resolve that question, it would impeach the officer’s recollection of a detail
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preceding the pace; it would not establish Mr. Laney’s speed over the stretch on which
he was paced, which is the only fact bearing on the validity of the stop.
{¶44} Mr. Laney did not put forth evidence that AVL data can or will provide a
specifically accurate “real-time” read of a vehicle’s speed. And a speed reading sampled
only every five to ten seconds is not a reliable measure of a vehicle’s speed across the
interval in question. Mr. Laney did not show, on this record, that any “ping” would have
fallen within the stretch over which he was paced.
{¶45} At most, Mr. Laney offers this court the argument that CAD information,
including AVL data, might provide some evidence of Officer Carnahan’s speed at the time
he was pacing. This argument, however, only establishes the evidence’s possible or
potential usefulness. And, as Geeslin instructs, evidence bearing solely on the justification
for a stop is potentially useful rather than materially exculpatory.
{¶46} Accordingly, Mr. Laney has not demonstrated the evidence was materially
exculpatory because its exculpatory character or value was not apparent before (or even
after) it was destroyed. The value of the evidence could impact the evidential weight, but
the significance of that weight is nevertheless speculative. Without more technical and/or
scientific detail regarding the informational data the AVL actually provides, we hold it
cannot be deemed materially exculpatory
{¶47} Mr. Laney also fails the second Trombetta requirement. See Trombetta, 467
U.S. at 489 (evidence must be “of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to
obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means”). He contends the
element is undisputed because the data existed only in law enforcement’s hands. But the
question is whether he could obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available
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means; in this case, his counsel did so via effective cross-examination. Mr. Laney
received the Getac GPS data and the 30 seconds of dash-cam and body-cam footage
preceding activation of the cruiser’s lights. Defense counsel cross-examined Officer
Carnahan at length on the distance and duration of the pace and on the absence of any
formal pacing training. And Mr. Laney testified himself as to his own speed, his position
relative to the cruiser, and whether the vehicles stopped at Longmere. The substance of
the impeachment Mr. Laney claims the data would have supplied was available to him—
and was in fact developed—through the GPS data, the video, and cross-examination.
This is especially true where the testimony of Ms. Butcher, the Police Support Service
Manager for KSUPD, indicated the data would have been, at best, approximate and thus,
inexact AVL information regarding the officer’s speed might provide “pings” every five to
ten seconds.
{¶48} Our decision in Williams, 2023-Ohio-3526 (11th Dist.), does not compel a
different result. There, a trooper had actual, contemporaneous knowledge of the specific
item sought—a vehicle identified by VIN and plate in a preservation letter—and the
evidence was lost through affirmative conduct that departed from the agency’s own
written-evidence policy. Id. at ¶ 27-30. Here, by contrast, the prosecutor did not know that
AVL data existed. Moreover, while the KPD captain knew of the system, she did not
understand the defense’s request to reach it until months after the retention period had
run. Accordingly, no policy was violated, and the data was overwritten by an automated
setting on a system administered by another agency. The duty to learn of favorable
evidence known to others acting on the government’s behalf does not necessarily extend
to an open-ended obligation to inventory every data stream a contracting agency or its
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vendor may maintain. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). Considering this
point, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—and the “fundamental
fairness” requirement of Ohio’s Due Course of Law Clause in Art. I, § 16 of the Ohio
Constitution have long been equated. See State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, ¶ 14-15. In
this regard, the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not impose
“on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material
that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.”
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.
{¶49} Finally, we note that the relief Mr. Laney sought below was dismissal of the
indictment—the most drastic sanction available. Even had he shown that potentially
useful evidence was negligently lost, dismissal would not follow as a matter of course.
The mismatch between the violation asserted and the remedy requested is itself a reason
for caution.
{¶50} Hence, the trial court did not err in overruling Mr. Laney’s motion to dismiss
for the State’s alleged failure to preserve materially exculpatory evidence.
{¶51} Mr. Laney’s first assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶52} Mr. Laney’s second assignment of error provides:
{¶53} “The trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress
evidence obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment Right under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.” (Sic.)
{¶54} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
and fact.” State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a hearing on a motion to suppress,
the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence by resolving
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factual questions and evaluating the credibility of witnesses. Id.; State v. Mills, 62 Ohio
St.3d 357, 366 (1992). As a result, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings
of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8. An
appellate court reviews the trial court’s application of the law to its factual findings de
novo. State v. Belton, 2016-Ohio-1581, ¶ 100. Accepting the facts as true, the reviewing
court then must independently determine, without deference to the trial court, whether the
trial court properly applied the substantive law to the facts of the case. Burnside at ¶ 8.
{¶55} It is well established that a traffic stop is constitutionally valid where an
officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit a crime. State v. Mays, 2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 7-8, citing
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). A stop supported by probable cause of a
traffic violation is likewise reasonable. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996);
Dayton v. Erickson, 1996-Ohio-431, syllabus. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014); see also State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-
2072, ¶ 19.
{¶56} Further, if a traffic stop is lawful, officers may order the driver to exit the
vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
111 (1977); State v. Evans, 1993-Ohio-186, ¶ 11; State v. Jackson, 2022-Ohio-4365, ¶
13. No additional justification for the order to exit is required. Jackson at ¶ 13.
{¶57} We also point out that, in State v. Fips, 2026-Ohio-1207, the Supreme Court
of Ohio recently held that “inquiring into a driver’s license status is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment even though the reasonable suspicion that initially justified the stop
has been dispelled.” Id. at ¶ 16. The Court further held, consistent with the lead opinion
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