State v. Mays

[Cite as State v. Mays, 2026-Ohio-3547.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 30741 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2025 CR 02277 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas NANCY LAJOYCE MAYS : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION ........... Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on September 11, 2026, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24. Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket. For the court, MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE EPLEY, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.  OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30741 JOHNNA M. SHIA, Attorney for Appellant MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee TUCKER, J. {¶ 1} Nancy Lajoyce Mays appeals from her conviction following a guilty plea to one count of felony theft. {¶ 2} Mays contends the trial court erred in failing to address her motion for intervention in lieu of conviction (“ILC”) before she pleaded guilty. She asserts that the trial court’s inaction on the motion invalidated her guilty plea under Crim.R. 11. Mays also claims her nine-month term of incarceration is contrary to law, because the trial court failed to consider the statutory purposes and principles of sentencing or the statutory seriousness and recidivism factors. {¶ 3} For the reasons set forth below, we find Mays’ arguments to be unpersuasive and affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Background {¶ 4} A grand jury indicted Mays on one count of theft as a fifth-degree felony for stealing merchandise from a T.J. Maxx store. She subsequently moved for ILC. The trial court orally overruled the motion during a scheduling conference after reviewing an ILC report and hearing from the parties. Mays later entered a guilty plea. The trial court accepted the plea, made a finding of guilt, and imposed a nine-month sentence. Mays timely appealed, advancing two assignments of error. 2  II. Analysis {¶ 5} The first assignment of error states: The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to address Mays’ ILC motion. {¶ 6} Mays contends the trial court was obligated to rule on her ILC motion before accepting her guilty plea. She asserts that it erroneously accepted the plea without addressing the motion, thereby rendering her plea not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under Crim.R. 11. {¶ 7} Mays’ argument lacks merit. After she filed her appellate brief, the State obtained leave to supplement the record with a transcript of a December 30, 2025 scheduling conference. During that proceeding, which took place one week before Mays’ guilty plea, the trial court orally overruled her ILC motion. In so doing, it noted that she had “12 prior felony theft related convictions.” It found that ILC would be unlikely to reduce her future criminal activity and would demean the seriousness of her current offense. {¶ 8} Although the trial court did not follow up with a written entry denying ILC, Mays does not raise that issue. Rather, she contends the trial court failed to address her motion at all—an argument that is belied by the scheduling conference transcript. In any event, we are unpersuaded that the trial court’s failure to file an entry journalizing its oral ILC ruling negated the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of her guilty plea. The first assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 9} The second assignment of error states: Mays’ prison sentence is contrary to law. {¶ 10} Mays contends her nine-month term of incarceration clearly and convincingly is contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). In support, she asserts that the trial court failed 3 to consider the statutory purposes and principles of felony sentencing or the statutory seriousness and recidivism factors. {¶ 11} The record controverts Mays’ claim. At sentencing, the trial court stated that it had considered “the purposes and principles of sentencing, [and] the . . . seriousness and recidivism factors of the Ohio Revised Code, including using the minimum sanctions to accomplish those purposes without unnecessarily burden[ing] governmental resources.” Its judgment entry also noted its consideration of these factors. While acknowledging Mays’ mental-health problems at sentencing, the trial court recognized her extensive criminal history. {¶ 12} On appeal, Mays cites her mental health history, her claimed need for treatment, and the lack of details in the record about her numerous prior offenses. She also characterizes her current offense as a “low level” property crime, arguing that there was “no harm done,” because T.J. Maxx is a large corporation. When imposing Mays’ sentence, however, the trial court was not required to give particular weight to any statutory factor. It had full discretion to impose any sentence within the authorized range without giving reasons for doing so. State v. Cox, 2026-Ohio-2851, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). The trial court’s statement that it had considered the applicable statutory factors was sufficient. State v. Seiker, 2026-Ohio- 1073, ¶ 11-13 (2d Dist.). The second assignment of error is overruled. III. Conclusion {¶ 13} The judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. ............. EPLEY, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. 4