State v. Young

[Cite as State v. Young, 2026-Ohio-3790.] STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN ) STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 25CA012238 Appellee v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE MALAKHI YOUNG COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 23CR108559 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: September 28, 2026 SUTTON, Judge. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant Malakhi Young appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, this Court affirms. I. Relevant Background Information {¶2} This appeal arises from a series of events in July of 2020 that ultimately led to the death of O.L. At the time of these events, Mr. Young was fifteen years of age. {¶3} First, C.D. came home from a business trip to find a broken window at his home. C.D. contacted the Lorain County Sheriff’s Office, and a deputy came to the residence. Once inside, C.D. discovered several of his firearms were missing from a bookcase in the bedroom. Days later, C.D. found a shard of glass from the broken window in a bush with dried blood on it. C.D. provided it to the Sheriff as evidence in the burglary and robbery of his home. The glass was  2 sent to the Bureau of Criminal Investigation for a DNA analysis, and the dried blood was consistent with Mr. Young’s DNA profile. {¶4} Later in July, D.O. was watching television when he heard a “scuffling noise,” and then heard his 78-year-old neighbor, O.L., calling for help from his front door. D.O. ran towards O.L. and saw a white Mitsubishi with front end damage backing out of O.L.’s driveway. D.O. then observed O.L. had a bloodied face and injuries. The Lorain Police Department responded to the scene and O.L. told the responded officer someone had entered his home, demanded money, and assaulted him. O.L. suffered extensive injuries to his face and head and was taken to the hospital. After being released from the hospital, O.L.’s health began to fail, and he was readmitted to the hospital. O.L. passed away approximately one month after the attack in his home. The medical examiner ruled O.L.’s death a homicide. {¶5} After an investigation, detectives linked Mr. Young, along with Jonathan Quillen, to the attack and robbery of O.L. C.D.’s stolen gun was found in Mr. Quillen’s white Mitsubishi, with O.L.’s blood on the weapon along with Mr. Young’s DNA. After a data extraction from Mr. Young’s iPhone and Google drive, the detectives recovered a 28-second video of the incident inside O.L.’s home. A Lorain police detective identified the voices of O.L. and Mr. Young on the video, and the voice of Mr. Young is heard yelling, where the money…where the money…I’m about to put one in you.” {¶6} Two complaints were filed 10 days apart in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, alleging Mr. Young to be a delinquent child for committing the following acts: burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), a felony of the second degree; grand theft when the property is a firearm or dangerous ordnance, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a felony of the third degree, with a 1-year firearm specification; aggravated burglary, in violation of R.C.  3 2911.11(A)(1), a felony of the first degree; aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), a felony of the first degree; felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree; aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B), an unclassified felony; and tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a felony of the third degree. {¶7} The State filed a motion to transfer Mr. Young for prosecution as an adult to the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, General Division. Mr. Young was subject to a discretionary transfer and a probable cause hearing was had in juvenile court. Mr. Young stipulated to his age at the time of the offenses as fifteen, and that he was currently seventeen years of age. Further, Mr. Young stipulated that probable cause existed that he committed each of the charged offenses. The trial court also inquired separately to ensure Mr. Young was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving a probable cause hearing and stipulating that probable cause existed that he committed the charged offenses. {¶8} After the stipulation, the trial court ordered Dr. Deborah Koricke to conduct an examination of Mr. Young prior to an amenability hearing. The case was then transferred to a different juvenile judge who ordered a second examination of Mr. Young by Dr. Jaime Adkins. The amenability hearing was held and each doctor testified they performed psychological examinations of Mr. Young and he was not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system. Additional testimony at the amenability hearing indicated Mr. Young had previously escaped from ODYS while under sanctions, Mr. Young’s Instagram had active posts wherein Mr. Young had a black handgun, O.L. was bludgeoned during the home invasion and died as a result of his injuries, and Mr. Young struck O.L. with a firearm during the robbery. {¶9} The juvenile court issued a ruling finding that, pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D) and R.C. 2152.12(E), Mr. Young was not amenable to juvenile sanctions within the juvenile system.  4 As such, the matter was transferred to the adult general division of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. The grand jury returned indictments which were nearly identical to those in the juvenile court, with the exception of an additional count of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B). Both matters were consolidated for trial. Prior to Mr. Young’s jury trial, the State moved to dismiss the count for aggravated murder. A jury trial commenced and Mr. Young was found guilty on all remaining counts. {¶10} Mr. Young now appeals raising three assignments of error for our review. II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I [MR. YOUNG] WAS PREJUDICED BY INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL DURING THE DISCRETIONARY BINDOVER HEARING[.] {¶11} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Young argues his trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to probable cause in the bindover procedure, which included stipulating to probable cause for aggravated murder. {¶12} To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A deficiency exists only if counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. See State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. The defendant bears the burden to overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance was adequate or that counsel’s actions were sound trial strategy. State v. Edwards, 2009-Ohio-3558, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.). To demonstrate prejudice, “the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” Bradley at paragraph three of syllabus.  5 {¶13} “The juvenile court has the exclusive original jurisdiction over ‘a person under eighteen years of age [who] allegedly commits an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult.’” State v. Smith, 2015-Ohio-579, ¶ 14, quoting R.C. 2151.23(I). However, “in response to a rise in rates and severity of juvenile crime and the belief that not all juveniles can be rehabilitated, in 1969, the General Assembly enacted a statutory scheme that provides for some juveniles to be removed from the juvenile courts’ authority.” State v. D.W., 2012-Ohio-4544, ¶ 9; see also R.C. 2152.10 and R.C. 2152.12. This process is commonly referred to as a bindover procedure. “When the state requests a discretionary transfer, the juvenile court must determine the age of the child, whether probable cause exists to believe that the juvenile committed the act charged, and whether the child is amenable to juvenile rehabilitation.” State v. Powell, 2021-Ohio-200, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.); see also R.C. 2152.12(B). {¶14} Moreover, before considering a transfer under R.C. 2152.12(B), the juvenile court must order an investigation of the child’s social history, education, family situation and “any other factor bearing on whether the child is amenable to juvenile rehabilitation, including a mental examination of the child by a public or private agency or a person qualified to make the examination.” R.C. 2152.12(C). In deciding whether to transfer the case to adult court, the juvenile court must consider factors listed in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E) to determine whether the child “is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.” R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). {¶15} At the probable cause hearing in this matter, Mr. Young came before the juvenile court on several counts including aggravated murder, an unclassified felony. Mr. Young was  6 represented by counsel and his mother was also present.1 The court began the hearing, indicating, “[Mr. Young], you are entitled to a hearing to determine if there is probable cause to charge you with [the] offenses in [the juvenile complaints], and that is what we are here for today. And the [c]ourt must find that, as well, that you are not amenable to the juvenile court before it can bind you over to the adult court for prosecution.” The court then asked if there were any stipulations, and both parties responded affirmatively. Specifically, Mr. Young’s counsel explained: I’ve had the opportunity to discuss this matter with [Mr. Young] on a number of occasions. I actually did forward him the probable cause agreement, the stipulations. I do have in my possession via e-mail a signed copy from [Mr. Young]. ... But I’ve had the opportunity to speak with him regarding what probable cause is, what probable cause means, the consequences of waiving probable cause; that he would still be entitled to an amenability hearing at a later date. At this point, Your Honor, on both cases, we would want to waive the probable cause hearing. We would stipulate to the probable cause. And as [the State] said, we would actually ask for a contested amenability hearing at a later date in person. The court then addressed Mr. Young’s mother to explain the process and “get [her] input” on the matter. In so doing, the court indicated the State filed motions to transfer the cases to adult court for prosecution, but before transferring the cases to adult court, the trial court had to have a probable cause hearing “to determine if there is cause to charge [Mr. Young] with those offenses.” The court then stated Mr. Young’s counsel “would waive that on behalf of [Mr. Young] today and not have the State prove that there’s probable cause to charge him with these offenses.” Further, the court explained if Mr. Young waives probable cause or the trial court finds probable cause, there must be a second hearing to determine if Mr. Young is “amenable, rehabilitatable in the 1 Due to the coronavirus pandemic, the probable cause hearing was held remotely via video teleconference, and all parties consented to the hearing.  7 juvenile system and that the safety of the community may require subjecting him to adult sanctions.” Prior to the amenability hearing, the court indicated Mr. Young would be examined and there would be an investigation in order for the court to determine if Mr. Young is “amenable in the juvenile system or not.” The court then asked Mr. Young’s mother if she understood the procedure and if she had anything to add to the previous discussion. Mr. Young’s mother said she understood the procedure and had nothing to add to the discussion. {¶16} The court then turned to Mr. Young, asking if he understood what was going on that day. Mr. Young responded affirmatively. The court further asked Mr. Young if he talked with his counsel concerning the probable cause waiver and Mr. Young indicated he did talk with his counsel about the waiver. Further, the court asked Mr. Young if he understood the State would have to “prove probable cause to charge you with these offenses, and you are waiving that today[,]” to which Mr. Young responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” The court asked Mr. Young, “so you are knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving your right to a preliminary hearing today,” and Mr. Young responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” The court read the stipulations for both juvenile cases into the record and asked Mr. Young if he reviewed and signed those stipulations. Mr. Young indicated he did review and sign the stipulations as to: (1) his date of birth, current age, and the age he was at the time of the offenses; (2) jurisdiction; and (3) probable cause to believe Mr. Young committed the offenses of burglary, grand theft of property, which is a firearm or dangerous ordinance, a one-year firearm specification, aggravated burglary, aggravate robbery, felonious assault, aggravated murder, and tampering with evidence. Based upon these stipulations, the court found probable cause to believe that Mr. Young committed the alleged offenses. See In re A.J.S., 2008-Ohio-5307, ¶ 62 and 64 (Probable cause is not guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; it is evidence that raises more than a suspicion of guilt.).  8 {¶17} Based upon the foregoing, we cannot say Mr. Young’s counsel’s performance, in stipulating to probable cause as to all offenses as Mr. Young desired, fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. The record here supports that Mr. Young’s counsel had conversations with Mr. Young regarding the meaning of probable cause and what the consequences would be in stipulating to probable cause. Further, the juvenile court’s colloquy with Mr. Young addressed these same issues and Mr. Young acknowledged he was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his right to a probable cause hearing. Mr. Young’s mother was present and did not question Mr. Young’s decision to stipulate as to probable cause when given the opportunity to do so. The juvenile court explained the hearing process to both Mr. Young and Mr. Young’s mother. As such, the record in this case does not support a finding that the performance of Mr. Young’s counsel was deficient. See State v. D.F., 2014-Ohio-1820, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.) (determining counsel was not deficient where D.F. desired to stipulate to probable cause and waive the amenability hearing after being questioned by the juvenile court.). {¶18} Accordingly, Mr. Young’s first assignment of error is overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II THE PROSECUTOR’S FAILURE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AT THE BINDOVER HEARING THAT AT LEAST TWO ASSAILANTS WERE WITHIN [O.L.’S] HOME AND EXCULPATORY MEDICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE CAUSATION OF DEATH WAS PREJUDICIAL MISCONDUCT[.] {¶19} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Young argues the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to correct the record and permitting the presentation of false evidence at the amenability hearing during the bindover process. Specifically, Mr. Young challenges the testimony of Detective Kurt Graupmann of the Lorain Police Department. In his brief, Mr. Young indicates Detective Graupmann testified “to his personal conclusory opinions,”  9 at the amenability hearing and the State failed to correct the record. Mr. Young’s argument hinges on Detective Graupmann’s testimony that Mr. Young bludgeoned O.L. to death and was the principal assailant in O.L.’s home. Mr. Young argues this testimony contradicted testimony at trial that O.L. picked Mr. Quillen out of a photo array line-up, prepared by another detective, as his assailant, leading to the State’s alternative theory that Mr. Young and Mr. Quillen acted together in committing these crimes. {¶20} Essentially, Mr. Young argues Detective Graupmann’s testimony effected the trial court’s consideration of one of the factors against transfer to adult court: R.C. 2152.12 (E)(3) “[t]he child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, at the time of the act charged, the child was under the negative influence or coercion of another person.” {¶21} “In deciding whether a prosecutor’s conduct rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct, a court determines if the prosecutor's actions were improper, and, if so, whether the defendant’s substantial rights were actually prejudiced.” State v. Haywood, 2017-Ohio-8299, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14 (1984). “[A] judgment may only be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct when the improper conduct deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” Haywood at ¶ 19, quoting State v. Knight, 2004-Ohio-1227, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.). “The defendant must show that, but for the prosecutor’s misconduct, the trier of fact would not have convicted him.” State v. Ecker, 2018-Ohio-940, ¶ 28 (9th Dist.). “The touchstone of the analysis ‘is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’” Id., quoting State v. Diar, 2008-Ohio-6266, ¶ 140. “Thus, ‘[t]he prosecutor’s conduct must be considered in the context of the entire trial.’” (Alteration in original.) Ecker at ¶ 28, quoting State v. Pleban, 2011-Ohio-3254, ¶ 39 (9th Dist.). {¶22} As previously indicated, at the amenability hearing, the State did not present Detective Graupmann’s testimony in isolation. Instead, Drs. Koricke and Adkins also testified  10 that after their psychological testing of Mr. Young, Mr. Young was not amenable to the care and rehabilitation of the juvenile system due in part to his extensive juvenile record and prior escape from ODYS. Additionally, the juvenile court heard testimony from Trooper Austin Skipper, who investigated Mr. Young’s escape from ODYS, and Probation Officer Mildred Gonzalez, who testified as to Mr. Young’s prior court involvement and escapes/attempted escapes from prior juvenile facilities. The State also presented several exhibits including both doctors’ psychological evaluations of Mr. Young. In response, Mr. Young presented testimony from his mother with no supporting exhibits. {¶23} In accordance with R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E), the juvenile court considered the following relevant factors that are in favor of transferring a matter to adult court, and against transferring a matter to adult court: (D) In considering whether to transfer a child under division (B) of this section based on an act charged that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall consider the following relevant factors, and any other relevant factors, in favor of a transfer under that division: (1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psychological harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of the alleged act. (2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim due to the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of the physical or psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim. (3) The child’s relationship with the victim facilitated the act charged. (4) The child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or as a part of a gang or other organized criminal activity. (5) The child had a firearm on or about the child’s person or under the child’s control at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm.  11 (6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adjudication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community control sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudication or conviction. (7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile system. (8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer. (9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system. (E) In considering whether to transfer a child under division (B) of this section based on an act charged that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall consider the following relevant factors, and any other relevant factors, against a transfer under that division: (1) The victim induced or facilitated the act charged. (2) The child acted under provocation in allegedly committing the act charged. (3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, at the time of the act charged, the child was under the negative influence or coercion of another person. (4) The child did not cause physical harm to any person or property, or have reasonable cause to believe that harm of that nature would occur, in allegedly committing the act charged. (5) The child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent child. (6) The child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer. (7) The child has a mental illness or intellectual disability. (8) There is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system and the level of security available in the juvenile system provides a reasonable assurance of public safety. {¶24} In weighing all of the above factors, both for and against transfer to adult court, the juvenile court stated: The [c]ourt has taken into consideration and weighed all the evidence, testimony, and exhibits presented by the parties. The [c]ourt further considered all the relevant factors pursuant to [R.C.] 2952.12 (D) [and] (E) as required by statute. It is the  12 [c]ourt’s finding that the evidence and factors overwhelmingly support the transfer of [Mr.] Young to the adult court and specifically finds that [Mr.] Young is not amenable to juvenile sanctions within the juvenile system.” (Emphasis added.) {¶25} Based upon the foregoing record, Mr. Young has not met his burden to show that but for the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct, the trier of fact would not have transferred him to adult court. {¶26} Accordingly, Mr. Young’s second assignment of error is overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III THE CORONER’S FINDING THAT [MR. YOUNG] CAUSED THE DEATH OF [O.L.] WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE[.] {¶27} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Young contends the coroner’s finding that Mr. Young caused O.L.’s death was against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶28} This Court has previously stated: [i]n determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist. 1986). “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the fact[-]finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). {¶29} An appellate court should exercise the power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional cases. Otten at 340. “[W]e are mindful that  13 the [trier of fact] is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Gannon, 2020-Ohio-3075, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.). “This Court will not overturn a conviction on a manifest weight challenge only because the [trier of fact] found the testimony of certain witnesses to be credible.” Id. {¶30} Here, Mr. Young is not arguing his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence, or that the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice, but that the “coroner’s finding” that Mr. Young proximately caused the death of O.L. is against the weight of the evidence. (Emphasis added.) The jury heard all of the testimony at trial, including the cross-examination of witnesses, and reviewed all of the evidence. The testimony at trial included that of Dr. Todd Barr, Deputy Medical Examiner at the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office, who performed O.L.’s autopsy. Dr. Barr ruled O.L.’s cause of death to be sequalae of blunt force trauma of the head and face, and that O.L.’s manner of death was homicide. Dr. Barr explained sequalae meant the blunt force trauma from the assault started the sequence of events that led to O.L.’s death. Further, Dr. Barr explained O.L. had a number of comorbidities, including heart and kidney disease, which made him a frail, 78-year-old individual. Dr. Barr testified, “[O.L.] was never able to fully recover to where he was prior to the assault, that steady decline over the ensuing four weeks is what [led] to his demise, and that’s completely relatable back to the assault.” The jury also heard information about O.L.’s medical history, including Mr. Young’s assertion that O.L. refused to take care of himself. {¶31} Based upon this record, we cannot say the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in convicting Mr. Young for the murder of O.L. {¶32} Accordingly, Mr. Young’s third assignment of error is overruled.  14 III. {¶33} For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Young’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant. BETTY SUTTON FOR THE COURT HENSAL, P. J. STEVENSON, J. CONCUR.  15 APPEARANCES: JOHN F. CORRIGAN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. ANTHONY CILLO, Prosecuting Attorney, and LINDSEY C. POPROCKI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.