State v. Hernandez
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledAugust 3, 2026
Docket1-25-51
JudgeMiller
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Hernandez, 2026-Ohio-2985.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 1-25-51
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
JUAN J. HERNANDEZ, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR2024 0302
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 3, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Max Hersch for Appellant
John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 1-25-51
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Juan J. Hernandez (“Hernandez”), appeals the judgment
of conviction and sentence entered against him in the Allen County Common Pleas Court
following a jury trial in which Hernandez was found guilty of aggravated burglary and
felonious assault, both carrying repeat violent offender specifications. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} This case originated on February 13, 2025, when an Allen County Grand Jury
indicted Hernandez on one count aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1),
(B), a felony of the first degree; and one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(1), (D)(1)(a), a felony of the second degree. Both counts included a repeat
violent offender specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.149(A). On February 21, 2025,
Hernandez pleaded not guilty to both counts in the indictment.
{¶3} On July 8, 2024, a jury trial commenced. Following introductory remarks and
the swearing-in of the venire, the trial court began its examination, which resulted in
several removals for cause. The prosecutor then initiated the State’s voir dire. The
prosecutor began with several illustrations exemplifying the concept of “reasonable
doubt,” followed by brief introductory questions inquiring into the prospective jurors’
interests, hobbies, and occupations. Finally, the prosecutor questioned the jurors regarding
various legal concepts, including direct versus circumstantial evidence, methods for
assessing witness credibility, differing human reactions to trauma, the distinction between
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important and trivial facts, the prospective jurors’ ability to return a guilty verdict despite
potential excuses or justifications for the defendant’s conduct, and whether anyone can be
the victim of a crime.
{¶4} Counsel for Hernandez then conducted his examination of the venire. In doing
so, counsel noted the absence of any “magic formula” or precise science to voir dire, stating
that his approach would instead rely upon a “gut feeling” derived from the prospective
jurors’ responses to the inquiries of the court and counsel. (July 8, 2025 Tr., Vol. I, at 87–
88). To that end, defense counsel engaged the prospective jurors in a series of general
inquiries. Counsel first requested that the prospective jurors introduce themselves and
provide brief background information. This inquiry prompted brief follow-up questions
regarding their respective families and hobbies, and permitted counsel to confirm that one
prospective juror’s prior acquaintance with defense counsel would not impair that juror’s
ability to remain impartial.
{¶5} Defense counsel next posed a series of what he characterized as “silly goofy
questions” designed to elicit impressions of the panel, asking the prospective jurors to
identify two items on their personal “bucket lists” of things they would like to accomplish,
under the constraints that money was no object and the items could not be philanthropic in
nature. (July 8, 2025 Tr., Vol. I, at 98-99). In response, many of the prospective jurors
indicated a desire to travel. Finally, operating under the stated assumption that the
prospective jurors would approach the trial with fairness and impartiality, counsel
requested each individual to identify an attribute that would render them a good juror. After
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thanking the venire for their indulgence of his questions, counsel concluded his
examination. Ultimately, the defense exercised two peremptory challenges.
{¶6} Following the trial, the jury found Hernandez guilty of both counts and the
accompanying specifications. For purposes of sentencing, the trial court merged the
offenses and sentenced Hernandez to an aggregate mandatory prison term of 16 to 21.5
years. Hernandez timely appealed.
{¶7} Hernandez raises a single assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
Counsel for Hernandez was ineffective for not conducting meaningful
voir dire.
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Hernandez argues his trial counsel failed to
conduct a meaningful voir dire, thereby violating his constitutional rights to a fair and
impartial jury and the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Hernandez contends
that trial counsel’s voir dire was deficient because counsel failed to elicit information
regarding potential juror bias or educate the prospective jurors on the law. He further
contends the prosecution’s voir dire was insufficient to address his specific concerns as a
criminal defendant.
Standard of Review
{¶9} In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
“‘(1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective
standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that
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but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different.’” State v.
Rogers, 2025-Ohio-4794, ¶ 25, quoting State v. Mundt, 2007-Ohio-4836, ¶ 62, citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694 (1984). “Both the deficient-
performance and prejudice prongs must be met for a successful ineffective-assistance
claim; neither is individually sufficient.” Id.
Analysis
{¶10} “The conduct of voir dire by defense counsel does not have to take a particular
form, nor do specific questions have to be asked.” State v. Evans, 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 247
(1992). Ohio courts have long recognized that “counsel is in the best position to determine
whether any potential juror should be questioned and to what extent.” State v. Murphy, 91
Ohio St.3d 516, 539 (2001). Indeed, a trial attorney's decision to limit or entirely forgo the
questioning of a prospective juror can be a sound tactical choice. Mundt at ¶ 65. For
instance, where the examination of a prospective juror by the trial court or the prosecutor
sufficiently demonstrates to defense counsel that the juror is favorably inclined toward the
defense, further inquiry merely risks alienating the juror, prompting the state to exercise a
peremptory challenge, or inadvertently establishing a basis for a challenge for cause. Id.
“Additionally, we give deference to decisions by trial counsel during voir dire because trial
counsel sees and hears jurors and is in the best position to determine whether voir dire
questions are needed.” State v. Phillips, 2016-Ohio-3105, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.).
{¶11} Regarding the performance prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel
standard, Hernandez highlights the constitutional significance of voir dire and points to the
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brief nature of his trial counsel’s examination of the venire. However, trial counsel is
afforded broad discretion regarding tactics and strategy during jury selection. See id. and
Murphy at 539. The trial court noted this latitude prior to jury selection, observing that “if
[defense counsel] didn’t want to ask any questions, he wouldn’t have to.” (July 8, 2025
Tr., Vol. I, at 45). Given the highly discretionary nature of trial counsel's conduct during
voir dire, we do not find counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable representation.
{¶12} As to the prejudice prong, Hernandez argues the Supreme Court of the United
States has established that a showing of prejudice is not required when trial counsel is either
totally absent or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the
proceeding. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, fn. 25 (1984). However, the
record reveals trial counsel was present during the entirety of the trial, including voir dire,
and was at no point prevented from providing effective representation. Counsel asked
probing questions of the prospective jurors and ultimately exercised two peremptory
challenges, demonstrating an active exercise of professional judgment. Trial counsel’s
participation during voir dire does not constitute deficient performance, nor does it
establish prejudice, merely because Hernandez would have personally preferred a different
approach to jury selection. Therefore, we find Cronic is inapplicable to the facts of this
case and a showing of prejudice is necessary to succeed on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Hernandez's failure to make such a showing defeats the second prong of
our analysis.
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{¶13} Hernandez’s assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶14} Having found no error prejudicial to the defendant-appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby rendered. The
cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R. 27; and
serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the proceedings
and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
Mark C. Miller, Judge
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
DATED:
/jlm
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