State v. Ivery

[Cite as State v. Ivery, 2026-Ohio-2542.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115737 v. : GEORGE IVERY, JR., : Defendant-Appellant. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 2, 2026 Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-697017-A Appearances: Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Ann Zaky, Andrew Szczepanik, and Daniel T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant. DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.: On September 23, 2025, following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant-appellant George Ivery, Jr., guilty of one count of making terroristic threat, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2909.23(A)(1)(a), and two counts of inducing panic, misdemeanors of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2917.31(A)(2) and 2917.31(A)(3). The trial court sentenced appellant to two years of community-control sanctions under the supervision of the adult probation department’s community-based correctional facility unit. Appellant timely appealed, challenging the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and its guilty verdict on the single count of making terroristic threat. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm. I. Procedural Background On November 20, 2024, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned a three-count indictment charging appellant with making terroristic threat, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2909.23(A)(1)(a), and two counts of inducing panic in violation of R.C. 2917.31(A)(2) and 2917.31(A)(3). The charges stemmed from appellant’s posts to his Instagram account (specifically his Instagram stories), the public’s reactions thereto, and appellant’s continuing Instagram dialog, as it were, with the public at large. As detailed below, appellant posted multiple videos of himself wearing a black mask or balaclava while displaying, brandishing, and even shooting a 9 mm semiautomatic handgun outdoors, with several videos taken on downtown sidewalks, transit stops, and both in and around Cleveland’s Tower City complex. Following discovery and pretrial conferences, the case came on for trial beginning July 9, 2025. Prior to the commencement of trial, appellant waived his right to trial by jury on the record. The signed waiver was docketed that morning. The case proceeded to trial before the bench the same day. After opening statements, the trial court took testimony from eight witnesses and admitted 12 exhibits into evidence. II. Summary of Trial Testimony and Exhibits A. The State’s Case-in-Chief 1. Kelsey Johnson The State’s first witness was Lakewood patrol officer Kelsey Johnson. Officer Johnson described the process of receiving calls from dispatchers. She testified that on November 9, 2024, shortly after 2:00 p.m., a dispatcher transferred a 911 caller to her. The caller, an anonymous woman, “called in stating that she runs a Cleveland Remembrance page, and that one of her followers had messaged her saying that she saw a male posting on a live Instagram story saying that he was pointing a gun at cars driving by, and she believed that it might have been in Lakewood.” (Tr. 28.) The female gave Officer Johnson the Instagram name of the individual in question. She was able to locate the account. According to Officer Johnson’s testimony, “it was to the public, so it wasn’t private[,] so [she] was able to view the videos.” (Tr. 29.) Asked to clarify what she meant by “public,” Officer Johnson testified that “[a]nybody can view it. It’s not private, so you can click on it, and anybody can see it that has Instagram.” (Tr. 29.) She stated that the videos she observed were Instagram stories, which she characterized as “like a live feed.” (Tr. 31.)  Officer Johnson stated that in viewing the Instagram page, she observed a male with an extended magazine “sticking out of his hoodie pocket.” (Tr. 30.) In another post, he was on a bridge “pointing the gun with the extended magazine at cars driving by.” (Tr. 30.) In an effort to preserve the recordings, Officer Johnson recorded the videos using her work phone and saved them as evidence. (Tr. 31.) She testified that she identified the account holder as appellant after contacting Cleveland police, who had also received calls. She also stated that in viewing the Instagram stories, she was able to see the face of the person posting them. Officer Johnson, in open court, identified appellant as that individual. On redirect, Officer Johnson clarified that she knew the name to search for on Instagram because the female caller provided his Instagram handle. She “was able to search it in a search, and then it came up.” (Tr. 39.) She confirmed she was able to access the account just as any member of the public could. (Tr. 39-40.) 2. Joshua Greear The State’s next witness was Lakewood Detective Joshua Greear. After providing a short narrative of his employment and experience, Detective Greear described the city’s 911 dispatch system. He indicated that calls were automatically recorded and were stored on the information technology department servers. (Tr. 45-46.) They could be downloaded later for investigatory purposes, in response to public records requests, or to share with prosecutors or other police agencies. He testified they are stored on the system in the ordinary course of business.  Detective Greear testified that to his knowledge only one call came into Lakewood dispatch on November 9, 2024. The State identified the recording as State’s exhibit No. 1. Appellant promptly objected on hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds. The State responded that the “911 calls are generally admissible” because they “have been found to be non-testimonial[]” and the person calling “is giving information to what they believe is an ongoing emergency.” (Tr. 50.) The trial court overruled the objection, and the State played the 911 call in its entirety. Detective Greear testified that it was a fair and accurate copy of the actual 911 call. (Tr. 51.) 3. Ray Lopez The State’s third witness, Raymond Lopez, identified himself as a bartender employed by Jack Casino, connected to Tower City in downtown Cleveland. Lopez also testified that he lived in an apartment in Terminal Tower, allowing him to walk to work. Lopez had the day off on November 9, 2024, but he was in the Terminal Tower. He went down to a convenience store in the complex but “ran into a friend . . . who is a police officer, and he was frantic and he pulled me over to the side” because “he knew [Lopez] lived there.” (Tr. 54.) Lopez testified: He showed me this live stream video with this gentleman that was terrorizing Cleveland, and he told me to be careful and that I should go up to my apartment, because he’s currently there, so that’s exactly what I did. (Tr. 54-55.)  Lopez testified that the video showed an individual pointing and shooting guns at cars on the highway, as well as “on the escalator in Tower City, terrorizing families with his gun; with the extended clip.” (Tr. 55.) Lopez went to his apartment but realized he had forgotten the items from the convenience store. He went back downstairs, but then “noticed the individual walking in the hallway[.]” (Tr. 55.) According to Lopez, the individual was in the Terminal Tower lobby, “right where the Public Square entrance is.” (Tr. 56.) He was able to identify the individual “because he [was] wearing the same exact outfit” as “in the video.” (Tr. 56.) Lopez contacted the police in person and also called 911 after seeing the individual a second time. The State played the 911 call, identified as State’s exhibit No. 7, without objection. Lopez testified that the incident left him extremely upset. He lost sleep, dreamt of the incident, and lost his appetite. He called off work after determining that the individual in the video had not yet been caught. (Tr. 56.) On cross-examination, Lopez testified that he definitely remembered footage of the individual “shooting at some random space[,]” i.e., “live fire[,]” but he conceded that he could not recall whether the individual had actually shot at cars “or if he was just pointing” a firearm. (Tr. 62.) He also conceded that when he saw the individual in person he did not personally observe a firearm and did not observe anyone reacting to a firearm. (Tr. 68.) On redirect, Lopez testified that he perceived the conduct as “a threat.” (Tr. 71.) Specifically, “[h]im running around with a gun, streaming himself on the internet and being downtown.” (Tr. 71.) He clarified that he had observed three videos. (Tr. 71.) 4. Joel Ortiz Joel Ortiz testified that he was employed by Rock Security, “a privately owned security company owned by Dan Gilbert.” (Tr. 74.) Ortiz stated that his duties included monitoring surveillance cameras. (Tr. 75.) The cameras, he stated, are located throughout the Tower City complex, and provide real-time, continuous, 24/7 surveillance monitored from a small office within Tower City. (Tr. 76.) On November 9, 2024, Ortiz’s office received a call from Cleveland dispatch reporting a male inside Tower City “possibly with a weapon, so [they] were tasked to investigate, to look through the footage to see if anything was seen on our cameras.” (Tr. 78.) Ortiz continued: We were able to locate the individual, and we were given the name of George Ivery, along with his social media page. We were told he may have had a weapon on him while he was in our building, so we began to review the video footage at that time. It was after the individual had left our building that we actually discovered that he was actually in our building. (Tr. 78.) According to Ortiz, Cleveland police had described the videos and given his office the associated Instagram handle. “[A]t that time,” Ortiz testified, “his Instagram account was open, so [they] were able to see any video that he had posted at that time on that day.” (Tr. 78-79.) Based on a general time frame provided by Cleveland police, they were able to locate footage of the individual on the street level of Tower City. (Tr. 80.)  The security office then continued to “monitor the system live to see if he would return, but [they] did not see him until the next day.” (Tr. 80.) Ortiz testified that they took these steps because “any time there’s a risk for safety for our pedestrians, our patrons, our employees, you know, we take that very seriously and we have to make sure our building is safe and secure at all times.” (Tr. 80.) Beyond monitoring the surveillance cameras in real time, they also notified their third-party security department, Allied Universal Security, dispatched them to the building, and “[made] them aware that this is the report that we received” and “to be on basically high alert[.]” (Tr. 80-81.) The following day, at the beginning of his shift, Ortiz checked the Instagram page for any further videos. He noted a bike that the individual appeared to be using to travel between locations. Later that afternoon, he spotted the individual on surveillance camera, in real time, “exiting Tower City through our north entrance, because [he] noticed the bike that was from the videos as well.” (Tr. 82.) Ortiz also “saw the extended magazine sticking out of his jacket at that point.” (Tr. 82.) Having spotted the individual, another security officer “made multiple calls to different law enforcement personnel,” and the security office continued to track him to the extent possible using exterior cameras. (Tr. 83.) Ortiz identified State’s exhibit No. 9 as a fair and accurate copy of the surveillance footage captured by the security system and provided to police. (Tr. 87.)  On cross-examination, appellant asked Ortiz to observe the individuals in Tower City who passed by appellant during the several minutes he remained in the building during mid-afternoon on November 9, 2024. Ortiz conceded that it did not appear that anyone ran from appellant or otherwise seemed fearful. (Tr. 89-90.) He further conceded that the security office did not shut down Tower City, issue a shelter-in-place order, or order a building evacuation. (Tr. 90- 91.) On redirect, Ortiz testified that they did not shut down the building because the individual had not been “actually observed live in our building.” (Tr. 94.) He explained: By the time we received the call from dispatch, the individual . . . had already left our property. We had not received any other information that he was back on our property and we did not observe him on our property as well during the 9th. (Tr. 94.) 5. Donald Zubal The State’s next witness was Cleveland police officer Donald Zubal. Officer Zubal testified that he had served as a patrol officer in the downtown area for several years. (Tr. 96.) Asked to describe the third district’s downtown services unit, Officer Zubal testified that the department created the downtown services unit to focus on quality of life issues in the downtown area with the businesses and the citizens that live down there, and because of the crime and the concentration of the businesses and the citizens that live down there, they wanted a specific unit that could handle it mostly with veteran officers. (Tr. 98.)  On November 9, 2024, Officer Zubal was working a shift from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. (Tr. 99.) That day, he and his partner responded to a call to Tower City “for a male threatening with a gun and brandishing a gun.” (Tr. 100.) He was informed “that there [were] multiple calls coming in for this incident.” (Tr. 100.) Tower City security sent photos of the individual. Officer Zubal “notified the other officers that were on scene touring, and [they] communicated to try to locate the suspect on scene while also conferring with Tower City security to get a better location and description of the suspect.” (Tr. 101.) Officer Zubal and his partner responded directly to Tower City, pulling up in front of it at approximately 3:00 p.m. (Tr. 101.) They did not locate the individual at that time, but additional calls came in and were reported to him both by police radio and calls from Tower City. (Tr. 102.) As a result, Zubal and his partner “were there multiple times.” (Tr. 102.) They “contacted Tower City security, personnel from the Third District, [their] bosses, conferred with [members] of the NICE [Neighborhood Impact and Community Engagement] unit and disseminated all the information [they] could.” (Tr. 102.) Officer Zubal reported that while speaking with “multiple people” in Tower City the next day, they appeared “anxious and surprised.” (Tr. 103.) On November 10, 2024, Officer Zubal further assisted in locating appellant, working not only with Tower City security but also the NICE unit and some officers from the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority. (Tr. 103-104.)  On cross-examination, Officer Zubal admitted that he did not prepare any written reports in connection with the incident. He also conceded that police did not evacuate the downtown area, set up roadblocks, shut down public transit, or call in a SWAT team. 6. Daniel Moore Daniel Moore testified that he was employed by Cleveland’s Division of Police Bureau of Communications, i.e., the 911 call center for the city of Cleveland. He had been employed there for close to 14 years, and his duties included retrieving public records in response to requests, including retrieving 911 call recordings “for the prosecutor, police, [or] public record requests.” (Tr. 109.) He testified that he was familiar with the way calls came into the 911 call center and the way they were recorded and stored, and he described the 911 call process, which happens in real time. Moore testified that “about seven or eight calls, total[,]” came in regarding the incident in question. (Tr. 113.) Those calls were retrieved and sent to the prosecutor’s office in the usual manner. At this point the State indicated it would play some of the calls and ask Moore if he recognized them. Appellant objected on hearsay grounds. The State repeated its argument that the 911 recordings had been authenticated as business records and that 911 calls “are generally admissible in court.” (Tr. 115.) The State continued: These calls, like I said earlier when they’re coming in, people are, in fact, watching this as it’s happening. These Instagram posts are  happening in real — they’re not calling days later to report what they saw in Instagram. They’re watching their lives. They’re watching these stories and they are calling. So it is, to them, it’s just as if they’re witnessing it in person. They’re calling in because to them, again, that is an ongoing process. (Tr. 115.) The trial court overruled the objection. The State played several calls, and Moore authenticated State’s exhibit No. 2, exhibit No. 4, and exhibit No. 5. Appellant again objected to State’s exhibit Nos. 4 and 5, noting that they appeared to consist of an individual “calling because someone told her niece about what her granddaughter saw on Instagram.” (Tr. 120.) The trial court overruled the objection, but stated: The objection is overruled but certainly the Court will give the appropriate weight to State’s Exhibit No. 4. . . . Exhibit No. 4 was basically the way the Court heard it, the caller was basically relaying information third hand to the Cleveland Police dispatch with no actual personal knowledge[.] (Tr. 121-122.) Moore went on to authenticate State’s exhibit No. 6 and exhibit No. 8. He testified that all of the 911 calls, which bore electronic date and time stamps, were fair and accurate copies of the calls he assisted in retrieving for the case. (Tr. 124.) 7. Thomas Barnes The State’s next witness, Thomas Barnes, testified that he was employed by the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department as a deputy sheriff assigned to the Cleveland Gun Intelligence Center. In that capacity, he “test fire[s] crime guns from Cuyahoga County.” (Tr. 131.) In short, when a gun comes in, he inspects it, makes sure it is operable, and test fires it. After that, two spent shell casings are sent to the United States Department of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms to “put in their system for comparison for other crimes.” (Tr. 131-132.) Deputy Barnes identified State’s exhibit No. 10 as his unit’s report related to this case. He explained that such a report would be prepared regardless of whether an inspected and tested firearm was operable. (Tr. 134.) Deputy Barnes testified that he test fired the firearm, identified as a Derya Arms model DY9 9 mm, bearing serial number TG970-24L26546, on November 15, 2024. (Tr. 135.) He testified that it was “functioning normally.” (Tr. 135.) Deputy Barnes also identified State’s exhibit No. 25 as the operable firearm submitted and tested. He testified that the make, model, and serial number matched the test-fire report. (Tr. 137-138.) On cross-examination, Deputy Barnes was interrogated regarding chain of custody. He conceded that he had not retrieved the firearm from an evidence locker himself and that there was no line item in the chain of custody list for whoever delivered it to his office. (Tr. 139.) 8. David Hardy The State’s final witness was Detective David Hardy of the Cleveland Police Department. After discussing his background, he testified that he was assigned to the “regular detective bureau,” which essentially investigates any type of felony apart from a sex offense or homicide, as well as some misdemeanors. (Tr. 146.)  Detective Hardy testified that whether he works a case by himself or as part of a team depends on the case itself. “For this case,” he testified, “it was a team of us.” (Tr. 147.) The decision to work alone or as a team might be driven, for example, by whether an alleged offender had been arrested or was still at large. (Tr. 148.) Detective Hardy received appellant’s case on November 10, 2024. He testified that in reviewing call notes to determine what had warranted a police presence, “there were multiple calls for a male with a gun threatening on Instagram.” (Tr. 149.) He determined that appellant’s Instagram account was public, allowing him to pull up the account, obtain a photo of appellant himself, and compare it to his Ohio driver’s license photo, which he obtained electronically. (Tr. 149.) Next, Detective Hardy testified that he went through appellant’s Instagram account and ultimately worked to obtain an arrest warrant. He identified by name three specific Third District detectives who assisted him on November 10, 2024, and further testified that “there were other detectives and other officers looking into the case.” (Tr. 151.) Testimony then took a step back (temporally) to November 9, 2024. Asked to describe what actions Cleveland police had taken, Detective Hardy testified: Since we received the threats, and seen the videos and the firearm that Mr. Ivery had we were concerned that someone was going to be harmed, so I know on the 9th, November 9th, the Second District and multiple zone cars tried to locate Mr. Ivery on their side. The Third District had multiple officers in our Downtown Services Unit trying to  search the area for him on our side. And I think we had a couple specialized units as well searching both areas to see if we could locate him. (Tr. 151.) With respect to the Instagram posts, Detective Hardy testified that he sent a preservation request to Meta in anticipation of a search warrant. He received and reviewed the Instagram information after Meta responded to the warrant. (Tr. 152.) Detective Hardy testified that appellant was arrested on November 10, 2024, in the area of Prospect Avenue and East 6th or 8th Street. Police “had multiple zone cars again looking for him.” (Tr. 153.) Officer Zubal had spotted him getting off public transit and heading downtown. Detective Hardy and a Detective Barnett drove to the area and arrested appellant: We were able to get out and identify ourselves and we arrested him. He had a blue coat on, a ski mask, a firearm in his waistband with an extended magazine, and we advised him he’s under arrest. And again, that was our encounter on the 10th. (Tr. 153.) Detective Hardy testified that the firearm seen on appellant’s Instagram was the same found on him when he was arrested based upon its distinct colors, glow-in-the-dark sights, and the extended magazine. (Tr. 154.) It was likewise the same firearm identified as State’s exhibit No. 25. Testimony then shifted to State’s exhibit No. 11, a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation containing video and still images on the left side, purportedly from appellant’s Instagram account, and certain data from Meta (the company that owns Instagram) on the right. Appellant objected that the Meta data had not been authenticated by a Meta records custodian.1 The trial court overruled the objection. It first noted that there was already testimony that appellant’s Instagram account had been public at the time of the incident and that Detective Hardy testified he had viewed it himself shortly after the incident. The trial court next asked the State to clarify that Detective Hardy planned to testify that the Instagram content being presented in court was solely what he had himself viewed in appellant’s Instagram feed. (Tr. 160.) Appellant renewed his objection, noting again that while the left side of each slide contained Instagram content, the right side consisted of Meta information that Detective Hardy would not have had access to and which had not been authenticated. (Tr. 161-162.) The trial court acknowledged the distinction, indicating that the Meta data on the right-hand side of each slide would not affect its analysis: I don’t disagree, [counsel]. I mean, I will say, though, what I’m looking at from Meta, it tells me nothing. It’s a timestamp, a story I.D., it says linked media file, and there appears to be some sort of code of some sort. It doesn’t provide any information that I think quite honestly proves or disproves any element of any charge in this case. 1 The parties repeatedly referred to the information on the right-hand side of each PowerPoint slide as “Meta data,” meaning data received from the company Meta Platforms, Inc., which owns Instagram. This should not be confused with the more commonly used term “metadata,” which Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines as “data that provides information about other data.” Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/metadata (accessed June 26, 2026) [https://perma.cc/78KL- PZVZ]. In this case, by sheer coincidence, the terms could be used interchangeably for the information on the right-hand side of each PowerPoint slide. As discussed more fully below, however, the trial court declined to consider any of the Meta data appearing on the PowerPoint slides. (Tr. 162.) After further argument, the State began to walk Detective Hardy through the PowerPoint presentation. When it asked him to specify the date, time, and location of the very first video, appellant objected, stating that the information was “coming from the Meta data.” (Tr. 169.) The trial court sustained the objection. (Tr. 169.) Detective Hardy stated that the second slide depicted appellant in downtown Cleveland. (Tr. 170.) Asked to recount what appellant said in the video, Detective Hardy responded: “On my mom I’m going to shoot this bitch up.” (Tr. 171.) Slide 3 was a screenshot pertaining to a police call for service, likewise posted to appellant’s Instagram with a notation stating, “They were riding past me yesterday. I was fucking them up.” (Tr. 171.) Slide 4 contained video footage of the confiscated gun being pointed “on a highway overpass.” (Tr. 172.) Detective Hardy stated that the area was “Cleveland State pointing down to like the 90 Interstate.” (Tr. 172.) He confirmed that he reviewed this post on appellant’s Instagram. (Tr. 172.) In the video, appellant sweeps the firearm from left to right over traffic that is likewise moving left to right, appearing to follow occupied cars with his handgun. Detective Hardy identified slide 5 as a post he reviewed in which appellant was wearing a facemask and black gloves. The caption read: “Lakewood do not play.” In the video, appellant was “[b]asically saying after he fired his weapon in Lakewood there was multiple cars in the area and they took it serious as they should.” (Tr. 173.) Slide 6 featured a screenshot of an Instagram message from someone who asked, in response to the video depicting appellant pointing the gun at cars, if appellant was shooting at random cars. It also featured appellant’s response, in the form of a caption. The caption read, “No.” (Tr. 173.) Detective Hardy confirmed he had previously reviewed slide 6. (Tr. 173.) Slide 7 consisted of a video at either a Rapid stop or bus station. In the video, appellant notes that people are sharing his posts: “Somebody shared the fuck out of me, bro.” He also remarks, “Get your ass burnt, messing with mine.” (Tr. 174.) He brandishes a firearm in the video. Again Detective Hardy confirmed he had personally reviewed the video. (Tr. 174.) Testimony next turned to slide 8, in which appellant stated he had been pointing his gun but was not doing anything stupid. (Tr. 176.) Slide 9 was a screenshot rather than a video, depicting the reaction of an individual who observed the story showing appellant pointing his firearm at passing cars. The person responding had stated: “Why are you doing that?? We are people with families and kids & all that’s sad af.” Appellant then inserted a caption that reads, “IM NOT DOING ANYTHINGGGG WTF.” Detective Hardy confirmed that both the video in slide 8 and the screenshot in slide 9 had been posted to appellant’s Instagram account. (Tr. 174 and 176.)  Slide 10 is a screenshot depicting accounts who had viewed appellant’s Instagram story. In an associated caption, appellant was “basically saying even the Cleveland Remembrance Page is reviewing his story.” (Tr. 177.) The caption reads: “Y’all sent the Cleveland remembrance page me yall tweaking.” Detective Hardy described the Cleveland Remembrance Page: It’s a social media page that, you know, keeps people up-to-date for shootings, police activity all around, basically all around Cleveland and surrounding suburbs. It’s on Instagram. It’s got thousands of followers. A lot of people get their news from Cleveland Remembrance Page. (Tr. 177.) This was again a slide that was posted on appellant’s Instagram story that Detective Hardy had viewed. (Tr. 177.) Slide 11 was yet another screenshot, this one of message requests sent to appellant. Detective Hardy reviewed the screenshot on appellant’s Instagram. (Tr. 178.) The screenshot depicts four message requests. Three have the text truncated, but they begin with (in order): “It’s sad your willing to . . .”; “What exactly are you . . .”; and “Why are you doing th . . . .” The screenshot contains a caption rhetorically asking what appellant did wrong since so many others “post they guns all day.” Slide 12 consists of a still photo of the interior of Tower City from the second floor, with Christmas decorations and an escalator in view. The post is captioned: “I’m finna show y’all what I did wrong bet y’all trying me.” Detective Hardy confirmed he viewed the post on appellant’s Instagram story and gave his interpretation of the caption: “He’s saying that you’re saying he did something wrong, he’s going to basically show you he’s going to do something wrong.” (Tr. 179.) Slide 13, another screenshot, is captioned “I HIT A BAND WTFFFF.” Detective Hardy explained that this meant the number of people who had viewed his videos, and that “band” stood for 1,000. (Tr. 179.) Again, Detective Hardy confirmed that this was on appellant’s Instagram story. (Tr. 179.) Next, slide 14, identified by Detective Hardy as a post from appellant’s Instagram story, depicted a reaction to his videos. One woman wrote: “We scared of you baby. That’s why we here. Where do you be at so I know to stay away.” Appellant responded by saying “I’m scaring all the pretty ladies ommg.” Slide 15, identified as a post Detective Hardy reviewed on appellant’s Instagram story, indicates that his video of himself following cars with his handgun had reached 1,483 views. Slide 16 consisted of a video depicting appellant actually firing his handgun with a caption that reads, “He was creeping up my bad.” Detective Hardy had reviewed the video on appellant’s Instagram account. (Tr. 181.) Slide 17, a video that Detective Hardy likewise viewed on appellant’s Instagram story, depicted appellant wearing a facemask and ski goggles. Slide 18 consists of a video in which appellant appears to imply that it will be difficult to find him. Detective Hardy testified that he viewed it on appellant’s Instagram story. (Tr. 182.) Slide 19, a screenshot viewed by Detective Hardy on appellant’s Instagram story, provided an update on the number of views reached by the video in which he sweeps his firearm left-to-right across a highway, pointing it at passing cars. It indicates the video had been viewed 3,057 times. Detective Hardy could not discern exactly what appellant was saying in the video contained in slide 20, other than that appellant mentioned he had a gun for protection. Again Detective Hardy confirmed it was a post from appellant’s Instagram story. (Tr. 184.) The State skipped slide 21. Slide 22 featured a video from appellant’s Instagram story stating he could not believe he was “receiving all this bullshit. Basically saying he’s getting all these responses for doing what he’s doing.” (Tr. 185.) In slide 23, appellant appears on video wearing a facemask and asks, “Why you getting the Remembrance Page on me?” Detective Hardy stated that based on a street sign, he appeared to be in Cleveland’s Ohio City neighborhood. (Tr. 186.) Detective Hardy identified this as a post he viewed on appellant’s Instagram story. Slide 24, another screenshot viewed by Detective Hardy on appellant’s Instagram story, provided an update on the number of views reached by the video in which he sweeps his firearm left-to-right across a highway. It indicates the video had been viewed 4,740 times. The same screenshot likewise shows that multiple other videos comprising the story had been viewed more than 4,000 times. Detective Hardy testified that he viewed this screenshot on appellant’s Instagram story. (Tr. 186-187.) Detective Hardy identified slide 25 as an Instagram story he viewed on appellant’s account. Appellant posted a screenshot of a text message from “Dad.” The text calls appellant “motherfucking crazy,” warns appellant that police will kill him because he is “armed and dangerous,” and urges appellant to “get [his] life together.” Slides 26 and 27 contained Instagram posts depicting appellant in downtown Cleveland with the extended magazine and firearm visible. In slide 27, the video depicts him pointing the firearm towards Cleveland’s skyline. Detective Hardy testified that all 27 slides depicted posts or stories that he had viewed from appellant’s Instagram and were fair and accurate copies of the items received from Meta. (Tr. 189-190.) He further testified that he was involved in appellant’s arrest and identified appellant in open court. (Tr. 189.) On cross-examination, Detective Hardy admitted that items posted to a story — as opposed to a live video — could have been created at another time. (Tr. 199.) He further conceded that the only video depicting appellant actually shooting the firearm was in an area surrounded by trees, in a location that Detective Hardy could not pinpoint. (Tr. 199-200.) He admitted that none of the posts depicted a gunshot fired in an urban setting, and that at various points in the videos appellant remarked that he was being misinterpreted and that he was not going to do anything. (Tr. 202-205.) Detective Hardy also conceded that neither Tower City nor downtown Cleveland were shut down or evacuated and that surveillance footage of appellant in Tower City did not reflect any patrons running or otherwise behaving abnormally. (Tr. 205-208.) On redirect, Detective Hardy testified that based upon his experience, he took appellant’s Instagram posts seriously, including appellant saying he was “going to shoot this bitch up on my mama” while in possession of a firearm. (Tr. 212.) He explained that he interpreted “on my mama” as “I promise on my mother[,]” i.e., not a baseless threat. (Tr. 212.) In one public video he shot the firearm. (Tr. 213.) While it was an area with trees in the background, it could not be determined whether it was in downtown Cleveland or not. (Tr. 213-214.) In addition, Detective Hardy testified that in several slides individuals reacting to appellant’s posts indicated they were scared or concerned. (Tr. 213.) While acknowledging he was not an Instagram expert, Detective Hardy testified that he was familiar with the platform’s operation, particularly the fact that content posted to a “story” remains visible for 24 hours after posting. (Tr. 215.) In other words, Detective Hardy could view posts from November 9, 2024, on November 10, 2024. (Tr. 215.) He further confirmed that the gun was operable based on the fact that appellant was seen firing it on video, that it was loaded, and that it was test-fired after appellant’s arrest. (Tr. 216.) Finally, Detective Hardy testified that as a result of appellant’s activity Cleveland police “took a lot of cars out of service to search for” appellant, something that would not be common if an incident was considered nonthreatening (Tr. 217- 218.) Asked if he was aware whether anyone changed their behavior as a result of appellant’s activity, he first noted the testimony of witness Ray Lopez, who “said he was scared” and “went the other way and . . . called police.” (Tr. 218.) He further pointed to the 911 calls expressing concern over appellant walking around with a firearm and making threats. (Tr. 218.) Detective Hardy testified that the slides likewise included examples of individuals expressing concern. B. Admission of Exhibits, Appellant’s Crim.R. 29 Motions, Verdict, and Sentencing The State rested pending the admission of exhibits. Appellant objected to State’s exhibit No. 11 (the PowerPoint slideshow) and further noted that appellant continued to object to the 911 recordings. Appellant also objected to admission of the firearm testing report and the firearm itself, principally on chain- of-custody grounds. The trial court admitted all of the State’s proffered exhibits over appellant’s objection. Appellant then moved for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29 of Count 1, making terroristic threat, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2909.23(A)(1)(a). Appellant conceded that for Crim.R. 29 purposes the State had satisfied the evidentiary threshold for misdemeanor inducing panic. (Tr. 234.) Indeed, appellant’s principal argument was that the crime of making terroristic threat was “not just a big inducing panic,” but also required coercion or intimidation. (Tr. 232-233.) In response, the State asked the trial court to focus on the “intimidate” component of the offense of making terroristic threat. The State argued that appellant acknowledged the fearful reactions of the public and that he mocked or taunted the public by saying he “was not going