State v. Price
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 13, 2026
DocketC-260152
JudgeKinsley
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Price, 2026-Ohio-4509.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-260152
TRIAL NO. B-2504309
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
ERIQUAN PRICE, : JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 11/13/2026.
Pursuant to App.R. 30, the clerk is directed to send all parties, or their
counsel if represented, a copy of the court’s judgment and note such action
on the docket.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Price, 2026-Ohio-4509.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-260152
TRIAL NO. B-2504309
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
OPINION
ERIQUAN PRICE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 13, 2026
Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Norbert Wessels,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Timothy J. McKenna, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} A jury convicted defendant-appellant Eriquan Price of two counts of
felonious assault and of having weapons while under disability. Price appeals, arguing
that the manifest weight of the evidence showed that he acted in self-defense, that his
convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence, and that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to continue the trial when the State was late in disclosing a
ballistics report. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we disagree and affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Background
{¶2} Price was charged with felonious assault in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(1) and (2), both second-degree felonies, and having weapons while under
disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a third-degree felony, after an August 11,
2025 confrontation with A.W. A.W. had recently dated Price’s then-girlfriend, T.S.,
and the two men confronted one another at T.S.’s apartment complex. Both men
suffered gunshot wounds.
{¶3} Five days before trial, the State disclosed a ballistics report to Price’s
attorney that connected a gun found in T.S.’s car to a cartridge found at the scene. This
was past the deadline established in Crim.R. 16(K), which requires the State to disclose
expert reports at least 21 days before trial, so the State sought a continuance. Price’s
attorney objected. According to defense counsel, Price did not intend to contest that
the gun from T.S.’s car was the same gun used to shoot A.W. but instead planned to
argue that he acted in self-defense. Thus, in Price’s view, a continuance was
unnecessary. Based on counsel’s representations, the trial court overruled the State’s
motion, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial.
{¶4} The State first called D.W., a resident of T.S.’s apartment complex. D.W.
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testified that on August 11, 2025, she was at home with her daughter when they heard
a gunshot. D.W. immediately went to the main floor of the complex, where she saw
Price and another man on the ground “with a gun in their hand.” D.W. did not know
who brought the gun to the scene. Price was “sitting, slouched,” holding a gun with
“the other man’s hand on top of his hand.” Price asked D.W. to call an ambulance and
told the other man that “he already shot hisself.” The other man then ran out of the
door, “the girlfriend” came upstairs, and Price asked her to take him to the hospital.
Price, who was visibly limping, then left with his girlfriend.
{¶5} A.W. testified that he had dated T.S. for several years, but they broke up
in March 2025 and had recently attempted to rekindle their romance. A.W. went to
T.S.’s apartment, uninvited, on August 11 to discuss their relationship, when he saw
another man’s contact on her phone. Upset that T.S. might be dating someone else,
A.W. called the man and briefly spoke with him on FaceTime. T.S. then stepped
outside to make a call, and A.W. tried to leave. But when he got to the main floor of
the building, A.W. encountered Price, who “just came right at [him].” Price hit A.W.,
and in response A.W. “kind of grabbed him up.” Price then “reached at his waist, then
he fired a shot.”
{¶6} Not wanting to give Price another opportunity to shoot the gun, A.W.
wrestled Price down and pinned his hand to the ground. While Price was pinned, A.W.
heard Price tell T.S. that he had shot himself. According to A.W., T.S. began hitting
him and telling him to let Price go. A.W. then saw T.S. grab the gun and walk away.
When she did, Price told T.S. to shoot him, and she gave Price the gun. Price then
aimed the gun at him, so he ran away.
{¶7} A.W. eventually went to the hospital where he spoke to police. A.W.
denied owning a gun, bringing one to the apartment that day, or attempting to throw
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Price over the stairwell during the altercation. He emphasized that he was just trying
to pin Price down to prevent him from shooting the gun again.
{¶8} Officer Dews, a Cincinnati Police Department (“CPD”) investigator,
testified that he collected evidence at the crime scene, including a spent shell casing
and an intact bullet. Dews also spoke to both A.W. and Price at different hospitals.
Price told Dews that his leg was injured but said nothing about A.W. Believing that
the firearm in question was in T.S.’s vehicle, Dews obtained a warrant, searched the
car, and found a gun in the glovebox.
{¶9} Bridget Chambers, a firearms examiner at the Hamilton County
Coroner’s Office and Crime Laboratory, testified that she analyzed a cartridge case that
was found at the scene. Based on her analysis, she believed that the cartridge was fired
from the gun police retrieved from T.S.’s car.
{¶10} Officer Giver, a CPD detective, testified that he spoke to Price at the
hospital, who reported that he was shot in his leg while watching a fight. Through
Giver, the State introduced into evidence recorded jail calls between Price and T.S. In
pertinent part, the recordings contained the following exchange:
Price: If they get in that car, you gonna have to tell them that gun
was yours. You hear me?
T.S.: Yeah.
Price: Then, if it come down to it, just tell them it was mine. Tell
them the truth . . . Make sure you tell them that I didn’t shoot
him.
...
T.S.: I just went and got my car.
Price: Good, good. Is my stuff still in there?
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
T.S.: No, there’s nothing in here.
Price: Man, fuck. They got it.
T.S.: Yeah
Price: Did you check?
T.S.: Yeah
Price: The glove compartment?
T.S.: Yes, it’s gone.
Price: Well, we goin’ from there then. We’ll be goin’ from fuckin’
there.
{¶11} T.S. testified that she and A.W. had previously dated. They broke up in
February 2025, but A.W. recently began calling and texting again. T.S. told Price she
had been abused by another man to explain damage in her apartment. When A.W.
started appearing unannounced, she told Price that she was afraid of him.
{¶12} According to T.S., Price stayed at her apartment for several days leading
up to the incident. She and A.W. exchanged calls and texts the day of the shooting
about her relationship with Price. After T.S. told A.W. to stop calling, A.W. showed up
to her apartment uninvited, “busted open” the bathroom door, and took her phone.
When he saw messages between her and Price, he called Price on her phone.
{¶13} T.S. tried to leave, but A.W. initially blocked her way. When she finally
got outside, A.W. pushed past her so he could get up the stairs to Price. T.S. watched
as A.W. immediately ran up to Price, hit him, and then tried to throw him over the
banister. T.S. tried to pull A.W. back, at which point she heard a gunshot. She did not
initially see the gun, but after it fired, she said that Price was on the ground with A.W.
over him, and they both had their hands on the gun. T.S. grabbed the gun, put it under
her shirt, and ran out of the building. She wanted to lock the gun in her car, but A.W.
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chased her. She eventually went back to the apartment where Price was still on the
ground. T.S. helped Price into her car and put the gun in the glove compartment. T.S.
acknowledged that she later talked to Price by phone while he was in jail.
{¶14} Price testified that around April or May of 2025, T.S. confided in him
that she had recently been in an abusive relationship, but she did not tell him who the
abuser was. Price spent the week leading up to the shooting at T.S.’s apartment and
left that day around 3:00 p.m. After he left, he received a call from an unknown man
on T.S.’s phone, whom he assumed was her ex-boyfriend. When the man said, “I’m
over here,” Price believed T.S. was in danger and went back to protect her.
{¶15} When he returned to the apartment, Price asked T.S. to come outside,
but instead, A.W. came up the stairs and swung at him. In response, Price hit A.W.
who then tried to push him over the banister. A.W. then reached for his waistband to
pull out a gun, and Price tried to grab the gun to stop him. The gun fell, and as the two
men wrestled for it, the gun discharged a bullet into Price’s leg. Price recalled saying,
“I done near shot myself.”
{¶16} Price then told T.S. to take the gun so neither of them would get hurt.
In response, T.S. punched A.W. to remove him from Price, after which Price handed
T.S. the gun, and T.S. ran to her car. A.W. chased her, and Price told T.S., “If he touch
you, shoot him.” T.S. then brought the gun back towards Price but did not actually
give it to him. Instead, she helped Price into her car, placing the gun in her glove
compartment before racing to the hospital.
{¶17} Price acknowledged telling the police that he was shot while watching a
fight but testified that he was “high” from the pain medication and traumatized from
the day’s events. Regarding his jail calls, Price emphasized that he wanted T.S. to tell
the truth. Price insisted that he did not bring the gun to T.S.’s apartment.
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{¶18} Following the testimony, the jury found Price guilty of all three charges.
On March 31, 2026, the trial court merged the two felonious assault offenses and
sentenced Price to a term of four-to-six years in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation
and Correction for felonious assault, three years for the firearm specification, and
three years for having weapons while under disability. It remitted fines and costs.
This appeal followed.
Analysis
{¶19} Price raises three assignments of error on appeal. First, he argues that
his counsel was ineffective for not continuing the trial. He next contends that the
manifest weight of the evidence showed that he acted in self-defense. Finally, he
argues that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence.
A. Ineffective Assistance
{¶20} First, Price contends that his trial attorney represented him ineffectively
by agreeing to try his case rather than continuing it when the State disclosed
Chambers’s ballistics report less than 21 days before trial in violation of Crim.R. 16(K).
He also argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to engage a
crime-scene expert to aid in his defense. We disagree.
{¶21} The defendant bears the burden to show ineffective assistance of
counsel. State v. Hackney, 2016-Ohio-4609, ¶ 36 (1st Dist.). To succeed on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must show that (1) trial counsel’s
performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance deprived the appellant
of a fair trial. State v. Akins, 2024-Ohio-1491, ¶ 45 (1st Dist.), citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). As to the first prong, “[t]he defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might
be considered sound trial strategy.” State v. Grubbs, 2025-Ohio-2756, ¶ 67 (1st Dist.),
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
citing Strickland at 689. As to the second, the appellant must prove that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different. State v. Bradley, 42
Ohio St.3d 136, 143 (1989).
1. Expert Report
{¶22} Price first takes issue with his trial counsel’s decision to accept the
State’s submission of an expert ballistics report five days before trial rather than
acquiescing in the State’s request for a continuance. We cannot say this constituted
deficient performance, as neither the nature of the gun nor its connection to the
incident were contested issues at trial. In fact, Price himself testified that T.S. put the
gun in her glovebox after she picked it up from the scene. Thus, the decision of Price’s
attorney to move forward with trial was strategically reasonable, given the
inconsequential impact of the late-disclosed ballistics report. See Grubbs at ¶ 67.
{¶23} Moreover, we fail to see how agreeing to the State’s request for a
continuance would have changed the outcome of Price’s trial. Both Price and T.S.
testified that T.S. put the gun in her glovebox. Thus, even if defense counsel had
somehow undermined the ballistics report by continuing the trial or excluding it under
Crim.R. 16(K), the testimony of two witnesses still established that the gun from T.S.’s
car was the same gun used in the incident. Viewed in that light, any potential
deficiency in counsel’s failure to object was not prejudicial. See Bradley at 143; see
also State v. Opp, 2014-Ohio-1138, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.) (holding that the defendant was not
prejudiced by expert testimony that provided the same basic facts that defendant
admitted to on the record and that defense witnesses did not contradict). Counsel’s
failure to object to the untimely expert report simply did not amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
2. Defense Expert
{¶24} Price next argues that counsel’s failure to hire a crime scene
reconstructionist amounted to ineffective assistance. He asserts that such an expert
could have “explained the contradictory testimony and helped the jury understand
what happened.” But no reconstructionist’s report appears in the record, so Price’s
argument is pure speculation. We simply do not know what an expert in crime scene
reconstruction would have said or whether that testimony would have changed the
outcome below. Without such a record before us, Price cannot carry his burden of
demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Jordan, 2022-Ohio-
2566, ¶ 70 (1st Dist.), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
{¶25} Accordingly, we overrule Price’s first assignment of error.
B. Manifest Weight
{¶26} In his second assignment of error, Price argues that his convictions were
against the manifest weight of the evidence on the issue of self-defense.
{¶27} The elements of a self-defense claim in a case involving nondeadly force
are (1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the altercation, (2) that he had
reasonable grounds to believe that he was in imminent danger of bodily harm, and (3)
that the only way to protect himself from the danger was by using force and that he
did not use more force than was reasonably necessary to defend himself against the
imminent danger of bodily harm. State v. Ridley, 2022-Ohio-2561, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.).
Ohio follows a burden-shifting scheme for self-defense. The initial burden rests with
the defendant to produce evidence that tends to support the elements of self-defense.
State v. Harris, 2025-Ohio-5438, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.), citing R.C. 2901.05(B)(1).
{¶28} If the defendant satisfies his initial burden, then the burden shifts to the
State to disprove at least one of the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
doubt. Id. One of the ways the State may do so is by showing that the defendant was
“at fault in causing the circumstances that led to the altercation.” State v. Nichols,
2025-Ohio-1515, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.); State v. Hendrickson, 2009-Ohio-4416, ¶ 27 (4th
Dist.) (“[T]he ‘not-at-fault’ requirement generally means that the defendant must not
have been the initial aggressor in the incident.”).
{¶29} We review the question of whether the State successfully rebutted a
defendant’s self-defense claim under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of
review. State v. Harris, 2025-Ohio-5438, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Messenger,
2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26. To assess whether a conviction is supported by the manifest
weight of the evidence, we must independently “review the entire record, weigh the
evidence, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the trier of
fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Powell,
2020-Ohio-4283, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 388
(1997). In doing so, we afford substantial deference to the credibility determinations
of the trier of fact because the trier directly observes the witnesses during trial
proceedings. State v. Reillo, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 28. Moreover, “[i]f
the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound
to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most
favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.” Id., quoting In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-
4703, ¶ 14. Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is warranted “only in
the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id.
at ¶ 27, quoting Thompkins at ¶ 31.
{¶30} Here, the State does not contest that Price put forth sufficient evidence
to meet his initial self-defense burden. Thus, the only question is whether the State
satisfied its burden to disprove at least one of the elements of self-defense beyond a
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
reasonable doubt. See Messenger at ¶ 25.
1. Felonious Assault
{¶31} With regard to Price’s conviction for felonious assault, the State
presented evidence at trial that established that Price was the first aggressor. Most
notably, A.W. testified that when he attempted to leave T.S.’s apartment, Price came
towards him, hit him, pulled a gun from his waistband, and fired a shot. Price argues
that T.S.’s testimony contradicts A.W.’s, as does his own, because both T.S. and Price
identified A.W. as the first aggressor. But the jury was entitled to discount these
accounts and to instead believe A.W., which it clearly did. While the testimony of
Price’s defense witnesses could support a finding that A.W. was the initial aggressor,
we must interpret the evidence in a way that is consistent with the jury’s finding of
guilt. See Reillo at ¶ 14. Thus, the jury did not lose its way in rejecting Price’s claim of
self-defense, and his conviction for felonious assault was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
2. Weapons under Disability
{¶32} Price next argues that his conviction for having a weapon while under a
disability was against the manifest weight of the evidence because he was acting in
self-defense when he had the firearm. Ohio law allows a person under a legal disability
to use a firearm in self-defense in “very limited circumstances.” State v. Courtney,
2026-Ohio-676, ¶ 26-27 (1st Dist.). “In Ohio, the self-defense exception to having a
weapon while under a disability does not apply in circumstances where the defendant
had possession of the weapon prior to the incident giving rise to the charges or in
anticipation of a confrontation.” (Cleaned up.) Id. at ¶ 27, quoting State v. Kyle, 2020-
Ohio-3281, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.).
{¶33} Price argues that no physical evidence tied him to the gun before the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
incident. However, “a lack of physical evidence, standing alone, does not render
appellant’s conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Carter,
2023-Ohio-18, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Peeples, 2014-Ohio-4064, ¶ 21 (10th
Dist.). “[T]he elements of a crime may be proven by circumstantial evidence.” State
v. Maiocco, 2026-Ohio-3211, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.). Here, A.W. testified that Price reached
for his waist and fired a shot. A.W. further testified that he does not own a gun and
did not bring one to T.S.’s apartment. Additionally, during his jail calls, Price said to
T.S., “Then, if it come down to it, just tell them that [the gun] was mine. Tell them the
truth.” He also asked if his “stuff” was still in the glove compartment after the police
searched the car, and T.S. told him “it” was gone. Finally, Dews testified that the only
thing he removed from T.S.’s car was a gun. Although no witnesses saw Price with the
gun before the incident, this was more than enough evidence from which a jury could
infer that he possessed it prior to the confrontation. See Courtney at ¶ 27. The jury
was “in the sole position to believe or disbelieve all or any of the testimony presented
at trial,” and we defer to its determination. Reillo, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2701,
at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-2424, ¶ 23 (6th Dist.). As a result, Price’s
weapons under disability conviction was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶34} We overrule Price’s second assignment of error.
C. Sufficiency
{¶35} In his final assignment of error, Price argues that the State presented
insufficient evidence to prove the requisite mental state for each conviction. As to his
felonious assault conviction, Price argues that the State failed to prove he acted
knowingly, because no physical evidence established who the shooter was and because
the gun could have discharged accidentally. As to the weapons under disability charge,
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Price again argues that the State failed to prove that he acted knowingly, because there
was conflicting testimony about who brought the gun to the altercation.
{¶36} To assess whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, we
ask “whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Powell, 2020-Ohio-4283, at ¶ 16 (1st Dist.), citing
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “Where
reasonable minds can reach different conclusions upon conflicting evidence,
determination as to what occurred is a question for the trier of fact. It is not the
function of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder.”
State v. Gurung, 2024-Ohio-3202, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.).
{¶37} “Culpable mental states are frequently demonstrated through
circumstantial evidence.” (Cleaned up.) State v. Pride, 2026-Ohio-3328, ¶ 19 (1st
Dist.), citing State v. Thomas, 2025-Ohio-1767, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.). “A defendant’s state
of mind may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.” Id., citing State v.
Murphy, 2018-Ohio-3506, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.).
1. Felonious Assault
{¶38} To convict Price of felonious assault, the State was required to prove
that he knowingly caused physical harm or serious physical harm to another person.
See R.C. 2903.11. The evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to
demonstrate that Price acted knowingly. For example, A.W. testified that after Price
hit him, Price reached for his waist and fired a shot. The act of reaching for the gun
and purposefully firing it indicates that Price acted with knowledge of his conduct.
Moreover, Price himself admitted to saying that he shot himself, a statement D.W. also
overheard. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, this statement implies
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
knowledge on Price’s part that he was the shooter. D.W. also testified that she saw
Price’s hand on the gun.
{¶39} Price points to conflicting testimony regarding who fired the shot as
support for his sufficiency challenge. But when determining sufficiency of the
evidence, appellate courts “neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the
credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Todd, 2023-Ohio-2139, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.), citing
State v. Thomas, 2013-Ohio-5386, ¶ 45 (1st Dist.). Thus, the testimony of A.W. and
D.W., coupled with Price’s own statement, is sufficient to support his conviction, even
if Price and T.S. testified differently.
2. Weapons under Disability
{¶40} The State was also required to prove that Price acted knowingly to
convict him of having weapons while under a disability. See R.C. 2923.13. It presented
sufficient evidence to do so. Price essentially admitted in his recorded jail
conversations with T.S. that the gun was his. A.W. also testified that Price pulled the
gun from his waistband. While Price and T.S. might have testified differently at trial,
we do not consider witness credibility or weigh conflicting testimony in considering a
sufficiency challenge on appeal. Todd at ¶ 6.
{¶41} There was sufficient evidence to support Price’s convictions, and we
overrule his third assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶42} Because Price’s counsel was not ineffective, and because his convictions
were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the
evidence, we overrule his assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
CROUSE and MOORE, JJ., concur.
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